Berlin, March. Until quite recently the south of our Fatherland 
was thought to be the only part of it capable of strong political 
convictions; Baden, Wirttemberg and Rhenish Bavaria seemed to 
be the only three altars on which could be kindled the fire of the 
only patriotism worthy of the name, independent patriotism. The 
north seemed to have sunk back into inert indifference, a limp, if 
not servile, torpor, in which it sought recovery from the truly 
grand and unusual exertion of the wars of liberation, in which the 
south took no part. With that deed the north seemed to feel it had 
done enough and now deserved some rest, so that the south soon 
began to look down on it, chide its lack of interest and be scornful 
of its patience. The events in Hanover’? were also amply 
exploited by the south to vindicate its superiority over the north. 
While the latter seemed to be quieter, less active, the former was 
triumphant, preening itself on its developing parliamentary life, its 
speeches in the chambers, its opposition, which had to give 
support to. the north while the south knew its own existence 
assured even without it.— This has all changed. The movement of 
the south has gone to sleep, the cogs on its wheels which used to 
engage so firmly and keep them revolving have gradually become 
ground down and no longer interlock properly; one voice after 
another falls silent and the younger generation has no desire to 
follow the path of its predecessors. The north, on the other hand, 
although external circumstances were not nearly so favourable for 
it as for the south, although the platform, when not entirely 
lacking, could never rise to the significance of that of South 
Germany, has nevertheless for some years possessed a store of 

solid political conviction, of firmness of character combined with 
lively energy, of talent and journalistic activity such as the south was 
never able to accumulate in the period of its finest flowering. 
Moreover, North-German liberalism is incontestably more 
thoroughly developed and versatile and possesses a firmer histori- 
cal and national basis than the liberalism of the south could ever 
achieve. The standpoint of the former far transcends that of the 
latter. Why so? The history of the two phenomena provides the 
clearest answer. 

When in the year 1830 political consciousness began to awaken 
all over Europe and the interest of the state began to come to the 
fore, the events and stimulations of that year, colliding with the 
reawakening dreams of Germanisation, gave rise to the new 
phenomenon of South-German liberalism. Born of immediate 
practice, it remained true to it and made it the basis of its theory. 
The practice out of which its theory was constructed was, however, 
as we know, very varied: French, German, English, Spanish, etc. 
Hence it came about that the theory, the real content of this 
movement, also ended up as something very general, vague and 
blurred, which was neither German nor French, neither national 
nor definitely cosmopolitan, but simply abstract and incomplete. 
There was a common purpose, the legalisation of liberty, but 
generally two diametrically opposed means of achieving it; thus, 
constitutional guarantees were desired for Germany and, in order 
to achieve this, one day greater independence of the princes from 
the Federal Diet !%° would be proposed and the next, greater 
depertlence but a popular chamber alongside the Federal Diet: 
two equally impractical means in the prevailing circumstances. One 
day the great purpose was to be achieved through greater unity of 
Germany, and the next through greater independence of the small 
princes in relation to Prussia and Austria. Hence, always united on 
the purpose but never on the means, the by far more powerful 
party was soon overtaken by the government and realised its 
imprudence too late. Moreover, its strength was dependent on a 
momentary excitement, on the effect of a purely external event, 
the July revolution, and when this abated, it also had to go to 
sleep. 

During this period things were much quieter in North Germany 
and outwardly less active. Only one man poured forth all the 
ardour of his vitality in living flames, and he was worth more than 
all the South Germans put together. I am speaking of Bérne. In 
him, who with all the energy of his character rose above their 
half-heartedness, this one-sidedness carried on the fight to its 

North- and South-German Liberalism 267 

conclusion and so overcame itself. In him theory wrested itself 
free from practice and revealed itself as the latter’s most beautiful 
flower. Hence he adopted the standpoint of North-German 
liberalism firmly, becoming its precursor and prophet. 

This movement, whose domination of Germany can no longer 
be disputed, has gained a fuller content and more enduring 
existence through its basis. From the start it linked its being not to 
an individual event but to the whole of world history, and 
especially German history; the source from which it flowed was 
not in Paris, but in the heart of Germany; it was the newer 
German philosophy. Hence the North-German liberal is distin- 
guished by a high degree of consistency, a definiteness in his 
demands, and a consonance of means and purpose, for which the 
South-German liberal has hitherto always striven in vain. Hence 
his conviction appears as a necessary product of national aspira- 
tions and itself national, because it wants to see Germany equally 
worthily placed in internal and external matters and cannot fall 
into the ludicrous dilemma of whether to be liberal first and then 
German, or German first and then liberal. Hence it knows itself to 
be equally safe from the one-sidedness of both parties and is free 
of the quibbles and sophistries into which they were driven by 
their own inner contradictions. Hence it can launch a resolute, 
vigorous and successful battle against each and every form of 
reaction, such as South-German liberalism never could, and hence 
its eventual victory is certain. 

Nevertheless, South-German liberalism is not to be regarded as 
a lost outpost or an unsuccessful experiment; through it we have 
achieved results which are not to be disregarded. Above all, it was 
South-German liberalism that founded a German opposition, 
thereby making political convictions possible in Germany and 
awakening parliamentary life; that did not allow the seed which 
lay within the German constitution to fall asleep and rot, and that 
extracted from the July revolution the profit to be won from it for 
Germany. It proceeded from practice to theory and failed; so let 
us begin the other way round and try to penetrate from theory 
into practice—I will wager anything that in the end we shail get 
farther this way.