The way in which my general outlook is related to earlier points 
of view will become quite obvious if a brief review is made of the 
opinions held by the ancient authors concerning the relationship 
between Democritean and Epicurean physics. 

Posidonius the Stoic, Nicolaus and Sotion reproach Epicurus for 
having presented the Democritean doctrine of atoms and Aristip- 
pus’ teaching on pleasure as his own.” Cotta the Academician asks 
in Cicero: “What is there in Epicurus’ physics which does not 
belong to Democritus? True, he modifies some details, but most of 
it he repeats after him.” ” Cicero himself says similarly: 

“In physics, where he is the most pretentious, Epicurus is a perfect stranger. 
Most of it belongs to Democritus; where he deviates from him, where he 
endeavours to improve, he spoils and worsens it.” 

Although many authors reproach Epicurus for aspersions 
against Democritus, Leonteus, according to Plutarch, affirms on 
the contrary that Epicurus honoured Democritus because the 
latter had adhered to the true doctrine before him, because he 
had discovered the principles of nature earlier. In the essay De 
placitis philosophorum Epicurus is called one who philosophises after 
the manner of Democritus.” Plutarch in his Colotes goes further. 
Successively comparing Epicurus with Democritus, Empedocles, 
Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Stilpo, the Cyrenaics and the Acade- 
micians, he seeks to prove that “Epicurus appropriated from the 
whole of Greek philosophy the false and did not understand the 
true”. Likewise the treatise De eo, quod secundum Epicurum non 
beate vivi possit teems with inimical insinuations of a similar kind. 

In the Fathers of the Church we find this unfavourable opinion, 
held by the more ancient authors, maintained. In the note I quote 
only one passage from Clement of Alexandria,” a Father of the 
Church who deserves to be prominently mentioned with regard to 
Epicurus, since he reinterprets the warning of the apostle Paul 
against philosophy in general into a warning against Epicurean 
philosophy. as one which did not even once spin fantasies 
concerning providence and the like.* But how common was the 
tendency to accuse Epicurus of plagiarism is shown most strikingly 
by Sextus Empiricus, who wishes to turn some quite inappropriate 
passages from Homer and Epicharmus into principal sources of 
Epicurean philosophy.” 

It is well known that the more recent writers by and large make 
Epicurus, insofar as he was a philosopher of nature, a mere 
plagiarist of Democritus. The following statement of Leibniz may 
here represent their opinion in general: 

“Nous ne savons presque de ce grand homme” (Démocrite) “que ce qu’Epicure 
en a emprunté, qui n’était pas capable d’en prendre toujours le meilleur.” * 

Thus while Cicero says that Epicurus worsened the Democritean 
doctrine, at the same time crediting him at least with the will to 
improve it and with having an eye for its defects, while Plutarch 
ascribes to him inconsistency’ and a predisposition toward the 
inferior, hence also casts suspicion on his intentions, Leibniz 
denies him even the ability to make excerpts from Democritus 
skilfully. 

But all agree that Epicurus borrowed his physics from De- 
mocritus. 

III. DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE IDENTITY 
OF THE DEMOCRITEAN AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 

Apart from historical testimony, there is much other evidence 
for the identity of Democritean and Epicurean physics. The 
principles — atoms and the void —are indisputably the same. Only 
in isolated cases does there seem to be arbitrary, hence unessential, 
difference. 

However, a curious and insoluble riddle remains. Two 
philosophers teach exactly the same science, in exactly the same 
way, but — how inconsistent! —they stand diametrically opposed in 
all that concerns truth, certainty, application of this science, and all 
that refers to the relationship between thought and reality in 
general. I say that they stand diametrically opposed, and I shall 
now try to prove it. 

A. The opinion of Democritus concerning the truth and certainty of 
human knowledge seems hard to ascertain. Contradictory passages 
are to be found, or rather it is not the passages, but Democritus’ 
views that contradict each other. For Trendelenburg’s assertion in 
his commentary to Aristotelean psychology, that only later authors, 
but not Aristotle, knew of such contradictions, is factually incor- 
rect. Indeed, in Aristotle’s Psychology* it is stated: “Democritus 
posits soul and mind [Verstand] as one and the same, since the 
phenomenon is the true thing.” But in his Metaphysics he writes: 
“Democritus asserts that nothing is true or it is concealed from 
us.”” Are not these passages of Aristotle contradictory? If the 
phenomenon is the true thing, how can the true thing be con- 
cealed? The concealment begins only when phenomenon and 
truth separate.’ But Diogenes Laertius reports that Democritus was 

counted among the Sceptics. His saying is quoted: “In reality 
we know nothing, for truth lies at the deep bottom of the well.” » 
Similar statements are found in Sextus Empiricus.» 

This sceptical, uncertain and internally self-contradictory view 
held by Democritus is only further developed in the way in which 
the relationship between the atom and the world which is apparent to the 
senses 1s determined. 

Sensuous appearance, on the one hand, does not belong to the 
atoms themselves. It is not objective appearance, but subjective sem- 
blance [Schein]. “The true principles are the atoms and the void, 
everything elseis opinion, semblance.” “Cold exists only according to 
opinion, heat exists only according to opinion, but in reality there 
are only the atoms and the void.” Unity therefore does not truly 
result from the many atoms, but rather “through the combination 
of atoms each thing appears to become a unity”.” The principles 
can therefore be perceived only through reason, since they 
are inaccessible to the sensuous eye if only because of their small- 
ness. For this reason they are even called ideas.) The sensuous 
appearance is, on the other hand, the only true object, and the 
aisthesis (atoBnotc) is the phronesis (ppdvactc)*; this true thing 
however is the changing, the unstable, the phenomenon. But to 
say that the phenomenon is the true thing is contradictory.” Thus 
now the one, now the other side is made the subjective and 
the objective. The contradiction therefore seems to be held 
apart, being divided between two worlds. Consequently, Democri- 
tus makes sensuous reality into subjective semblance; but the 
antinomy, banned from the world of objects, now exists in his 
own self-consciousness, where the concept of the atom and sen- 
suous perception face each other as enemies. 

Thus Democritus does not escape the antinomy. This is not yet 
the place to explain it. It is enough that we cannot deny its 
existence. 

Now let us listen to Epicurus. 

The wise man, he says, takes a dogmatic, not a sceptical position.’ 
Yes, exactly this makes him superior to all the others, that he 
knows with conviction.') “All senses are heralds of the true.” '” 
“Nor is there anything which can refute sensations, neither like can 
refute like, because of their equal validity, nor can unlike refute 
unlike, because they do not pass judgment on the same thing, nor 
the concept, because the concept depends on the sensuous 

perceptions,” \* as it says in the Canon. But while Democritus turns 
the sensuous world into subjective semblance, Epicurus turns it into 
objective appearance. And here he differs quite consciously, since he 
claims that he shares the same principles but that he does not reduce 
the sensuous qualities to things of mere opinion. 

Since therefore sensation was in fact Epicurus’ standard, since 
objective appearance corresponds to it: then we can only regard as 
a correct conclusion that at which Cicero shrugs his shoulder: 

“The sun seems large to Democritus, because he is a man of science well versed 

in geometry; to Epicurus it seems to be about two feet large, for he pronounces it 
to be as large as it seems.” 

B. This difference in the theoretical judgments of Democritus and 
Epicurus concerning the certainty of science and the truth of its 
objects manifests itself in the disparate scientific energy and practice of 
these men. 

Democritus, for whom the principle does not enter into the 
appearance, remains without reality and existence, is faced on the 
other hand with the world of sensation as the real world, full of 
content. True, this world is subjective semblance, but just because 
of this it is torn away from the principle, left in its own 
independent reality. At the same time it is the unique real object 
and as such has value and significance. Democritus is therefore 
driven into empirical observation. Dissatisfied with philosophy, he 
throws himself into the arms of positive knowledge. We have already 
seen that Cicero calls him a vir eruditus.? He is versed in physics, 
ethics, mathematics, in the encyclopedic disciplines, in every art.’ 
The catalogue alone of his books given by Diogenes Laertius bears 
witness to his erudition.'” But since it is the characteristic trait of 
erudition to expand in breadth and to collect and to search on the 
outside, we see Democritus wandering through half the world in order 
to acquire experiences, knowledge and observations. 

“I have among.my contemporaries,” he prides himself, “wandered through the 
largest part of the earth, investigating the remotest things. I have seen most 
climates and lands, and I have heard most learned men, and in linear composition 
with demonstration no one surpassed me, not even the so-called Arsipedonapts of 
the Egyptians.” 1 

Demetrius in the Homonymois (dpwyojsots)” and Antisthenes in the 

Diadochats (8.ad0yai¢)* report that he travelled to Egypt to the priests 
in order to learn geometry, and to the Chaldeans in Persia, and 

that he reached the Red Sea. Some maintain that he also met the 
gymnosophists*° in India and set foot in Ethiopia.’ On the one 
hand it is the lust for knowledge that leaves him no rest; but it is at 
the same time dissatisfaction with true, 1. e., philosophical, knowledge 
that drives him far abroad. The knowledge which he considers 
true is without content, the knowledge that gives him content is 
without truth. It could be a fable, but a true fable, that anecdote 
of the ancients, since it gives a picture of the contradictory 
elements in his being. Democritus is supposed to have blinded 
himself so that the sensuous light of the eye would not darken the 
sharpness of intellect.2° This is the same man who, according to 
Cicero, wandered through half the world.* But he did not find 
what he was looking for. 

An opposite figure appears to us in Epicurus. 

Epicurus is satisfied and blissful in philosophy. 

“You must,” he says, “serve philosophy so that true freedom will be your lot. 
He who has subordinated and surrendered himself to it does not need to wait, he 
is emancipated at once. For to serve philosophy is freedom itself.” 2h) Consequently 
he teaches: “Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old 
grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the 
health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not 
yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not 
yet come to him, or has passed away.” 

While Democritus, dissatisfied with philosophy, throws himself 
into the arms of empirical knowledge, Epicurus has nothing but 
contempt for the positive sciences, since in his opinion they contribute 
nothing to true perfection.” He is called an enemy of science, a 
scorner of grammar. He is even accused of ignorance. “But,” 
says an Epicurean in Cicero, “it was not Epicurus who was without 
erudition, but those are ignorant who believe that what is 
shameful for a boy not to know ought still to be recited by the old 
man.”) 

But while Democritus seeks to learn from Egyptian priests, Persian 
Chaldeans and Indian gymnosophists, Epicurus prides himself on not 
having had a teacher, on being self-taught.” There are some 
people, he says according to Seneca, who struggle for truth 
without any assistance. Among these people he has himself traced 
out his path. And it is they, the self-taught, whom he praises most. 
The others, according to him, are second-rate minds.*” While 
Democritus is driven into all parts of the world, Epicurus leaves 
his garden in Athens scarcely two or three times and travels to 

Ionia, not to engage in studies, but to visit friends. Finally, while 
Democritus,* despairing of acquiring knowledge, blinds himself, 
Epicurus, feeling the hour of death approaching, takes a warm 
bath, calls for pure wine and recommends to his friends that they 
be faithful to philosophy. ” 

C. The differences that we have just set forth should not be 
attributed to the accidental individuality of the two philosophers; 
they embody two opposite tendencies. We see as a difference of 
practical energy that which is expressed in the passages above as a 
difference of theoretical consciousness. 

We consider finally the form of reflection which expresses the 
relation of thought to being, their mutual relationship. In the general 
relationship which the philosopher sees between the world and 
thought, he merely makes objective for himself the relation of his 
own particular consciousness to the real world. 

Now Democritus uses necessity as a form of reflection of 
reality.*° Aristotle says of him that he traces everything back to 
necessity. *”) Diogenes Laertius reports that the vortex of atoms, 
the origin of all, is the Democritean necessity. *” More satisfactory 
explanations are given by the author of De placitis philosophorum: 

Necessity is, according to Democritus, fate and law, providence and the creator 
of the world. But the substance of this necessity is the antitype and the movement 
and impulse of matter. 

A similar passage is to be found in the Physical Selections of 
Stobaeus** and in the sixth book of the Praeparatio evangelica of 
Eusebius.*» In the Ethical Selections of Stobaeus the following 
aphorism of Democritus is preserved*”—it is almost exactly 
repeated in the 14th book of Eusebius*”: human beings like to 
create for themselves the illusion of chance—a manifestation of 
their own perplexity, since chance [Zufall] is incompatible with sound 
thinking. Simplicius similarly attributes to Democritus a passage in 
which Aristotle speaks of the ancient doctrine that does away with 
chance. * 

Contrast this with Epicurus: 

“ Necessity, introduced» by some as the absolute ruler, does not exist, but some 
things are accidental, others depend on our arbitrary will. Necessity cannot be per- 
suaded, but chance is unstable. It would be better to follow the myth about the gods 

than to bea slave to the heimarmene (elwappevy)? of the physicists. For the former 
leaves hope for mercy if we do honour to the gods, while the latter is inexorable 
necessity. But it is chance, which must be accepted, not God, as the multitude 
believe.” “~" “It is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in necessity is not a 
necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open. Let us 
therefore thank God that no man can be kept in life. It is permitted to subdue 
necessity itself.” * 

The Epicurean Velleius in Cicero says something similar about 
Stoic philosophy: 
“What are we to think of a philosophy in which, as to ignorant old women, 

everything seems to occur through fate? ... by Epicurus we have been redeemed, 
set free.” 

Thus Epicurus even denies disjunctive judgment so as not to have 
to acknowledge any concept of necessity. * 

True, it is claimed that Democritus also used the concept of 
chance, but of the two passages on this matter which can be found 
in Simplicius *” the one renders the other suspect, because it shows 
clearly that it was not Democritus who used the category of 
chance, but Simplicius who ascribed it to him as a consequence. 
For he says: Democritus assigns, generally speaking, no cause for 
the creation of the world, he seems therefore to make chance the 
cause. Here, however, we are concerned not with the determination 
of the content, but with the form used consciously by Democritus. The 
situation is similar in regard to the report by Eusebius that 
Democritus made chance the ruler of the universal and divine and 
claimed that here it is through chance that everything happens, 
whereas he excluded chance from human life and empirical 
nature and called its supporters foolish. 

In part, we see in these statements only a desire of the Christian 
bishop Dionysius for conclusion-forcing. In part, where the univer- 
sal and divine begin, the Democritean concept of necessity ceases 
to differ from chance. 

Hence, this much is historically certain: Democritus makes use of 
necessity, Epicurus of chance. And each of them rejects the opposite 
view with polemical irritation. 

The principal consequence of this difference appears in the way 
individual physical phenomena are explained. 

Necessity appears in finite nature as relative necessity, as determin- 
ism. Relative necessity can only be deduced from real possibility, 
i.e., it is a network of conditions, reasons, causes, etc., by means 
of which this necessity reveals itself. Real possibility is the explica- 

tion of relative necessity. And we find it used by Democritus. 
We cite some passages from Simplicius. 

If somebody is thirsty and drinks and feels better, Democritus 
will not assign chance as the cause, but thirst. For, even though he 
seems to use chance in regard to the creation of the world, yet he 
maintains that chance is not the cause of any particular event, but 
on the contrary leads back to other causes. Thus, for example, 
digging is the cause of a treasure being found, or growing the 
cause of the olive tree.*» 

The enthusiasm and the seriousness with which Democritus 
introduces this manner of explanation into the observation of 
nature, the importance he attaches to the striving to ascertain 
causes, are naively* expressed in his avowal: 

“I would rather discover a new aetiology than acquire the Persian crown.” 

Once again Epicurus stands directly opposed to Democritus. 
Chance, for him, is a reality which has only the value of possibility. 
Abstract possibility, however, is the direct antipode of real possibility. 
The latter is restricted within sharp boundaries, as is the intellect; 
the former is unbounded, as is the imagination. Real possibility 
seeks to explain the necessity and reality of its object; abstract 
possibility is not interested in the object which is explained, but in 
the subject which does the explaining. The object need only be 
possible, conceivable. That which is abstractly possible, which can 
be conceived, constitutes no obstacle to the thinking subject, no 
limit, no stumbling-block. Whether this possibility is also real is 
irrelevant, since here the interest does not extend to the object as 
object. 

Epicurus therefore proceeds with a boundless nonchalance in 
the explanation of separate physical phenomena. 

More light will be thrown upon this fact by the letter to 
Pythocles, later to be considered. Suffice it here to draw attention 
to Epicurus’ attitude to the opinions of earlier physicists. Where 
the author of De placitis philosophorum and Stobaeus quote the 
different views of the philosophers concerning the substance of 
the stars, the size and shape of the sun and similar matters, it is 
always said of Epicurus: He rejects none of these opinions, all 
could be right, he adheres to the possible.*” Yes, Epicurus polemi- 
cises even against the rationally determining, and for precisely this 
reason one-sided, method of explanation by real possibility. 

Thus Seneca says in his Quaestiones naturales: Epicurus maintains 

that all these causes are possible, and then attempts in addition 
still other explanations. He blames those who claim that any par- 
ticular one of them occurs, because it is rash to judge apodic- 
tically about that which can only be deduced from conjectures.*” 

One can see that there is no interest in investigating the real 
causes of objects. All that matters is the tranquillity of the 
explaining subject. Since everything possible is admitted as possi- 
ble, which corresponds to the character of abstract possibility, the 
chance of being is clearly transferred only into the chance of thought. 
The only rule which Epicurus prescribes, namely, that “the 
explanation should not contradict sensation”, is self-evident; for to 
be abstractly possible consists precisely in being free from con- 
tradiction, which therefore must be avoided.*” And Epicurus con- 
fesses finally that his method of explaining aims only at the ata- 
raxy'' of self-consciousness, not at knowledge of nature in and for itself. 

It requires no further clarification to show how in this matter, 
too, Epicurus differs from Democritus. 

We thus see that the two men are opposed to each other at 
every single step. The one is a sceptic, the other a dogmatist; 
the one considers the sensuous world as subjective semblance, 
the other as objective appearance. He who considers the sensuous 
world as subjective semblance applies himself to empirical natural 
science and to positive knowledge, and represents the unrest of 
observation, experimenting, learning everywhere, ranging over the 
wide, wide world. The other, who considers the phenomenal 
world to be real, scorns empiricism; embodied in him are the serenity 
of thought satisfied in itself, the self-sufficiency that draws 
its knowledge ex principio interno? But the contradiction goes still 
farther. The sceptic and empiricist, who holds sensuous nature 
to be subjective semblance, considers it from the point of view 
of necessity and endeavours to explain and to understand the 
real existence of things. The philosopher and dogmatist, on the other 
hand, who considers appearance to be real, sees everywhere only 
chance, and his method of explanation tends rather to negate all 
objective reality of nature. There seems to be a certain absurdity 
in these contradictions. 

It hardly seems still possible to presume that these men, who 
contradict each other on all points, will adhere to one and the 
same doctrine. And yet they seem to be chained to each other. 

The task of the next section is to comprehend their relation- 
ship in general.” 

Part Two 

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRITEAN 
AND EPICUREAN PHYSICS IN DETAIL 

Chapter One