Greek philosophy seems to have met with something with which 
a good tragedy is not supposed to meet, namely, a dull ending.* 
The objective history of philosophy in Greece seems to come to an 
end with Aristotle, Greek philosophy’s Alexander of Macedon, 
and even the manly-strong Stoics did not succeed‘ in what the 
Spartans did accomplish in their temples, the chaining of Athena 
to Heracles so that she could not flee. 

Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics are regarded as an. almost 
improper addition bearing no relation to its powerful premises.° 
Epicurean philosophy is taken as a syncretic combination of 
Democritean physics and Cyrenaic morality; Stoicism as a com- 
pound of Heraclitean speculation on nature and the Cynical- 
ethical view of the world, together with some Aristotelean logic; 
and finally Scepticism as the necessary evil confronting these 
dogmatisms. These philosophies are thus unconsciously linked to 
the Alexandrian philosophy by being made into a one-sided and 
tendentious eclecticism. The Alexandrian philosophy is finally 
regarded entirely as exaltation and derangement—a confusion in 
which at most the universality of the intention can be recognised. 

* After “ending”, Marx erased “an incoherent finale” .— Ed. 
> Corrected by Marx from “after” — Ed. 
©“ The sentence “The objective history .. succeed” was originally: “With 

Aristotle, Greek philosophy’s Alexander of Macedon, the owl of Minerva seems to 
lower its wings, and even the manly-strong Stoics seem not to have suc- 
ceeded....” — Ed. 
Corrected by Marx from “Minerva” .— Ed. 
© Prémissen (premises) corrected by Marx from Antezedentien (predeces- 
sors).— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 35 

To be sure, it is a commonplace’ that birth, flowering and 
decline constitute the iron circle in which everything human is 
enclosed, through which it must pass. Thus it would not have been 
surprising if Greek philosophy, after having reached its zenith in 
Aristotle, should then have withered. But the death of the hero re- 
sembles the setting of the sun, not the bursting of an inflated frog. 

And then: birth, flowering and decline are very general, very 
vague notions under which, to be sure, everything can be 
arranged, but through which nothing can be understood. Decay 
itself is prefigured in the living; its shape should therefore be just 
as much grasped in its specific characteristic as the shape of life. 

Finally, when we glance at history, are Epicureanism, Stoicism 
and Scepticism particular phenomena? Are they not the pro- 
totypes of the Roman mind, the shape in which Greece wandered 
to Rome? Is not their essence so full of character, so intense and 
eternal that the modern world itself has to admit them to full 
‘Spiritual citizenship? 

I lay stress on this only in order to call to mind the historical 
importance of these systems. Here, however, we are not at all con- 
cerned with their significance for culture in general, but with their 
connection with the older Greek philosophy. 

Should not this relationship urge us at least to an inquiry, to see 
Greek philosophy ending up with two different groups of eclectic 
systems, one of them the cycle of Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic 
philosophy, the other being classified under the collective name of 
Alexandrian speculation? Furthermore, is it not remarkable that 
after the Platonic and Aristotelean philosophies, which are univer- 
sal in range, there appear new systems which do not lean on these 
rich intellectual forms, but look farther back and have recourse to 
the simplest schools —to the philosophers of nature in regard to 
physics, to the Socratic school in regard to ethics? Moreover, what 
is the reason why the systems that follow after Aristotle find their 
foundations as it were ready made in the past, why Democritus is 
linked to the Cyrenaics and Heraclitus to the Cynics? Is it an 
accident that with the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics all moments 
of self-consciousness are represented completely, but every mo- 
ment as a particular existence? Is it an accident that these systems 
in their totality? form the complete structure of self-consciousness? 
And finally, the character with which Greek philosophy mythically - 

* Corrected by Marx from “not to be denied” .— Ed. 

b Marx erased after “totality” the word gleichsam, “so to say”, or “as it 
were” -— Ed. 

begins in the seven wise men, and which is, so to say as its central 
point, embodied in Socrates as its demiurge—I mean the charac- 
ter of the wise man, of the sophos ( sog0¢ )—is it an accident that it 
is asserted in those systems as the reality of true science? 

It seems to me that though the earlier systems are more sig- 
nificant and interesting for the content, the post-Aristotelean 
ones, and primarily the cycle of the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic 
schools, are more significant and interesting for the subjective 
form, the character of Greek philosophy. But it is precisely the 
subjective form, the spiritual carrier of the philosophical systems, 
which has until now been almost entirely ignored in favour of 
their metaphysical characteristics. 

I shall save for a more extensive discussion the presentation of 
the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic philosophies as a whole and in 
their total relationship to earlier and later Greek speculation. 

Let it suffice here to develop this relationship as it were by an 
example, and only in one aspect, namely, their relationship to 
earlier speculation. 

As such an example I select the relationship between the 
Epicurean and the Democritean philosophy of nature. I do not 
believe that it is the most convenient point of contact. Indeed, on 
the one hand it is an old and entrenched prejudice to identify 
Democritean and Epicurean physics, so that Epicurus’ modifica- 
tions are seen as only arbitrary vagaries. On the other hand I am 
forced to go into what seem to be microscopic examinations as 
far as details are concerned. But precisely because this prejudice 
is as old as the history of philosophy, because the differences are 
so concealed that they can be discovered as it were only with a’ 
microscope, it will be all the more important if, despite the 
interdependence of Democritean and Epicurean physics, an essen- 
tial difference extending to the smallest details can be demon- 
strated. What can be demonstrated in the small can even more 
easily be shown where the relations are considered in larger 
dimensions, while conversely very general considerations leave 
doubt whether the result will hold when applied to details. 

II. OPINIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRITEAN 
AND EPICUREAN PHYSICS 

The way in which my general outlook is related to earlier points 
of view will become quite obvious if a brief review is made of the 
opinions held by the ancient authors concerning the relationship 
between Democritean and Epicurean physics. 

Doctoral Dissertation 37 

Posidonius the Stoic, Nicolaus and Sotion reproach Epicurus for 
having presented the Democritean doctrine of atoms and Aristip- 
pus’ teaching on pleasure as his own.” Cotta the Academician asks 
in Cicero: “What is there in Epicurus’ physics which does not 
belong to Democritus? True, he modifies some details, but most of 
it he repeats after him.” ” Cicero himself says similarly: 

“In physics, where he is the most pretentious, Epicurus is a perfect stranger. 
Most of it belongs to Democritus; where he deviates from him, where he 
endeavours to improve, he spoils and worsens it.” 

Although many authors reproach Epicurus for aspersions 
against Democritus, Leonteus, according to Plutarch, affirms on 
the contrary that Epicurus honoured Democritus because the 
latter had adhered to the true doctrine before him, because he 
had discovered the principles of nature earlier. In the essay De 
placitis philosophorum Epicurus is called one who philosophises after 
the manner of Democritus.” Plutarch in his Colotes goes further. 
Successively comparing Epicurus with Democritus, Empedocles, 
Parmenides, Plato, Socrates, Stilpo, the Cyrenaics and the Acade- 
micians, he seeks to prove that “Epicurus appropriated from the 
whole of Greek philosophy the false and did not understand the 
true”. Likewise the treatise De eo, quod secundum Epicurum non 
beate vivi possit teems with inimical insinuations of a similar kind. 

In the Fathers of the Church we find this unfavourable opinion, 
held by the more ancient authors, maintained. In the note I quote 
only one passage from Clement of Alexandria,” a Father of the 
Church who deserves to be prominently mentioned with regard to 
Epicurus, since he reinterprets the warning of the apostle Paul 
against philosophy in general into a warning against Epicurean 
philosophy. as one which did not even once spin fantasies 
concerning providence and the like.* But how common was the 
tendency to accuse Epicurus of plagiarism is shown most strikingly 
by Sextus Empiricus, who wishes to turn some quite inappropriate 
passages from Homer and Epicharmus into principal sources of 
Epicurean philosophy.” 

It is well known that the more recent writers by and large make 
Epicurus, insofar as he was a philosopher of nature, a mere 
plagiarist of Democritus. The following statement of Leibniz may 
here represent their opinion in general: 

“Nous ne savons presque de ce grand homme” (Démocrite) “que ce qu’Epicure 
en a emprunté, qui n’était pas capable d’en prendre toujours le meilleur.” * 

* “Of this great man” (Democritus) “we scarcely know anything but what 
Epicurus borrowed from him, and Epicurus was not capable of always taking the 
best.” — Ed. 

Thus while Cicero says that Epicurus worsened the Democritean 
doctrine, at the same time crediting him at least with the will to 
improve it and with having an eye for its defects, while Plutarch 
ascribes to him inconsistency’ and a predisposition toward the 
inferior, hence also casts suspicion on his intentions, Leibniz 
denies him even the ability to make excerpts from Democritus 
skilfully. 

But all agree that Epicurus borrowed his physics from De- 
mocritus. 

III. DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING THE IDENTITY 
OF THE DEMOCRITEAN AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 

Apart from historical testimony, there is much other evidence 
for the identity of Democritean and Epicurean physics. The 
principles — atoms and the void —are indisputably the same. Only 
in isolated cases does there seem to be arbitrary, hence unessential, 
difference. 

However, a curious and insoluble riddle remains. Two 
philosophers teach exactly the same science, in exactly the same 
way, but — how inconsistent! —they stand diametrically opposed in 
all that concerns truth, certainty, application of this science, and all 
that refers to the relationship between thought and reality in 
general. I say that they stand diametrically opposed, and I shall 
now try to prove it. 

A. The opinion of Democritus concerning the truth and certainty of 
human knowledge seems hard to ascertain. Contradictory passages 
are to be found, or rather it is not the passages, but Democritus’ 
views that contradict each other. For Trendelenburg’s assertion in 
his commentary to Aristotelean psychology, that only later authors, 
but not Aristotle, knew of such contradictions, is factually incor- 
rect. Indeed, in Aristotle’s Psychology* it is stated: “Democritus 
posits soul and mind [Verstand] as one and the same, since the 
phenomenon is the true thing.” But in his Metaphysics he writes: 
“Democritus asserts that nothing is true or it is concealed from 
us.”” Are not these passages of Aristotle contradictory? If the 
phenomenon is the true thing, how can the true thing be con- 
cealed? The concealment begins only when phenomenon and 
truth separate.’ But Diogenes Laertius reports that Democritus was 

* Corrected by Marx from “Physiology”.— Ed. 
"This sentence and the one before were inserted by Marx.— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 39 

counted among the Sceptics. His saying is quoted: “In reality 
we know nothing, for truth lies at the deep bottom of the well.” » 
Similar statements are found in Sextus Empiricus.» 

This sceptical, uncertain and internally self-contradictory view 
held by Democritus is only further developed in the way in which 
the relationship between the atom and the world which is apparent to the 
senses 1s determined. 

Sensuous appearance, on the one hand, does not belong to the 
atoms themselves. It is not objective appearance, but subjective sem- 
blance [Schein]. “The true principles are the atoms and the void, 
everything elseis opinion, semblance.” “Cold exists only according to 
opinion, heat exists only according to opinion, but in reality there 
are only the atoms and the void.” Unity therefore does not truly 
result from the many atoms, but rather “through the combination 
of atoms each thing appears to become a unity”.” The principles 
can therefore be perceived only through reason, since they 
are inaccessible to the sensuous eye if only because of their small- 
ness. For this reason they are even called ideas.) The sensuous 
appearance is, on the other hand, the only true object, and the 
aisthesis (atoBnotc) is the phronesis (ppdvactc)*; this true thing 
however is the changing, the unstable, the phenomenon. But to 
say that the phenomenon is the true thing is contradictory.” Thus 
now the one, now the other side is made the subjective and 
the objective. The contradiction therefore seems to be held 
apart, being divided between two worlds. Consequently, Democri- 
tus makes sensuous reality into subjective semblance; but the 
antinomy, banned from the world of objects, now exists in his 
own self-consciousness, where the concept of the atom and sen- 
suous perception face each other as enemies. 

Thus Democritus does not escape the antinomy. This is not yet 
the place to explain it. It is enough that we cannot deny its 
existence. 

Now let us listen to Epicurus. 

The wise man, he says, takes a dogmatic, not a sceptical position.’ 
Yes, exactly this makes him superior to all the others, that he 
knows with conviction.') “All senses are heralds of the true.” '” 
“Nor is there anything which can refute sensations, neither like can 
refute like, because of their equal validity, nor can unlike refute 
unlike, because they do not pass judgment on the same thing, nor 
the concept, because the concept depends on the sensuous 

? Aisthesis sensuous perception, phronesis— reason, that which is rational.— Ed. 

perceptions,” \* as it says in the Canon. But while Democritus turns 
the sensuous world into subjective semblance, Epicurus turns it into 
objective appearance. And here he differs quite consciously, since he 
claims that he shares the same principles but that he does not reduce 
the sensuous qualities to things of mere opinion. 

Since therefore sensation was in fact Epicurus’ standard, since 
objective appearance corresponds to it: then we can only regard as 
a correct conclusion that at which Cicero shrugs his shoulder: 

“The sun seems large to Democritus, because he is a man of science well versed 

in geometry; to Epicurus it seems to be about two feet large, for he pronounces it 
to be as large as it seems.” 

B. This difference in the theoretical judgments of Democritus and 
Epicurus concerning the certainty of science and the truth of its 
objects manifests itself in the disparate scientific energy and practice of 
these men. 

Democritus, for whom the principle does not enter into the 
appearance, remains without reality and existence, is faced on the 
other hand with the world of sensation as the real world, full of 
content. True, this world is subjective semblance, but just because 
of this it is torn away from the principle, left in its own 
independent reality. At the same time it is the unique real object 
and as such has value and significance. Democritus is therefore 
driven into empirical observation. Dissatisfied with philosophy, he 
throws himself into the arms of positive knowledge. We have already 
seen that Cicero calls him a vir eruditus.? He is versed in physics, 
ethics, mathematics, in the encyclopedic disciplines, in every art.’ 
The catalogue alone of his books given by Diogenes Laertius bears 
witness to his erudition.'” But since it is the characteristic trait of 
erudition to expand in breadth and to collect and to search on the 
outside, we see Democritus wandering through half the world in order 
to acquire experiences, knowledge and observations. 

“I have among.my contemporaries,” he prides himself, “wandered through the 
largest part of the earth, investigating the remotest things. I have seen most 
climates and lands, and I have heard most learned men, and in linear composition 
with demonstration no one surpassed me, not even the so-called Arsipedonapts of 
the Egyptians.” 1 

Demetrius in the Homonymois (dpwyojsots)” and Antisthenes in the 

Diadochats (8.ad0yai¢)* report that he travelled to Egypt to the priests 
in order to learn geometry, and to the Chaldeans in Persia, and 

* Man of science.— Ed. 
> Men of the Same Name.— Ed. 
“ Successions of Philosophers.— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 41 

that he reached the Red Sea. Some maintain that he also met the 
gymnosophists*° in India and set foot in Ethiopia.’ On the one 
hand it is the lust for knowledge that leaves him no rest; but it is at 
the same time dissatisfaction with true, 1. e., philosophical, knowledge 
that drives him far abroad. The knowledge which he considers 
true is without content, the knowledge that gives him content is 
without truth. It could be a fable, but a true fable, that anecdote 
of the ancients, since it gives a picture of the contradictory 
elements in his being. Democritus is supposed to have blinded 
himself so that the sensuous light of the eye would not darken the 
sharpness of intellect.2° This is the same man who, according to 
Cicero, wandered through half the world.* But he did not find 
what he was looking for. 

An opposite figure appears to us in Epicurus. 

Epicurus is satisfied and blissful in philosophy. 

“You must,” he says, “serve philosophy so that true freedom will be your lot. 
He who has subordinated and surrendered himself to it does not need to wait, he 
is emancipated at once. For to serve philosophy is freedom itself.” 2h) Consequently 
he teaches: “Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old 
grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the 
health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not 
yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not 
yet come to him, or has passed away.” 

While Democritus, dissatisfied with philosophy, throws himself 
into the arms of empirical knowledge, Epicurus has nothing but 
contempt for the positive sciences, since in his opinion they contribute 
nothing to true perfection.” He is called an enemy of science, a 
scorner of grammar. He is even accused of ignorance. “But,” 
says an Epicurean in Cicero, “it was not Epicurus who was without 
erudition, but those are ignorant who believe that what is 
shameful for a boy not to know ought still to be recited by the old 
man.”) 

But while Democritus seeks to learn from Egyptian priests, Persian 
Chaldeans and Indian gymnosophists, Epicurus prides himself on not 
having had a teacher, on being self-taught.” There are some 
people, he says according to Seneca, who struggle for truth 
without any assistance. Among these people he has himself traced 
out his path. And it is they, the self-taught, whom he praises most. 
The others, according to him, are second-rate minds.*” While 
Democritus is driven into all parts of the world, Epicurus leaves 
his garden in Athens scarcely two or three times and travels to 

* “Half the world” corrected from “the whole of infinity”.— Ed. 

Ionia, not to engage in studies, but to visit friends. Finally, while 
Democritus,* despairing of acquiring knowledge, blinds himself, 
Epicurus, feeling the hour of death approaching, takes a warm 
bath, calls for pure wine and recommends to his friends that they 
be faithful to philosophy. ” 

C. The differences that we have just set forth should not be 
attributed to the accidental individuality of the two philosophers; 
they embody two opposite tendencies. We see as a difference of 
practical energy that which is expressed in the passages above as a 
difference of theoretical consciousness. 

We consider finally the form of reflection which expresses the 
relation of thought to being, their mutual relationship. In the general 
relationship which the philosopher sees between the world and 
thought, he merely makes objective for himself the relation of his 
own particular consciousness to the real world. 

Now Democritus uses necessity as a form of reflection of 
reality.*° Aristotle says of him that he traces everything back to 
necessity. *”) Diogenes Laertius reports that the vortex of atoms, 
the origin of all, is the Democritean necessity. *” More satisfactory 
explanations are given by the author of De placitis philosophorum: 

Necessity is, according to Democritus, fate and law, providence and the creator 
of the world. But the substance of this necessity is the antitype and the movement 
and impulse of matter. 

A similar passage is to be found in the Physical Selections of 
Stobaeus** and in the sixth book of the Praeparatio evangelica of 
Eusebius.*» In the Ethical Selections of Stobaeus the following 
aphorism of Democritus is preserved*”—it is almost exactly 
repeated in the 14th book of Eusebius*”: human beings like to 
create for themselves the illusion of chance—a manifestation of 
their own perplexity, since chance [Zufall] is incompatible with sound 
thinking. Simplicius similarly attributes to Democritus a passage in 
which Aristotle speaks of the ancient doctrine that does away with 
chance. * 

Contrast this with Epicurus: 

“ Necessity, introduced» by some as the absolute ruler, does not exist, but some 
things are accidental, others depend on our arbitrary will. Necessity cannot be per- 
suaded, but chance is unstable. It would be better to follow the myth about the gods 

* Before “Democritus” Marx erased “the widely travelled”.— Ed. 

> “Introduced” (emngeftihrt) corrected by Marx from “played up” (auf- 
geftihrt).— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 43 

than to bea slave to the heimarmene (elwappevy)? of the physicists. For the former 
leaves hope for mercy if we do honour to the gods, while the latter is inexorable 
necessity. But it is chance, which must be accepted, not God, as the multitude 
believe.” “~" “It is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in necessity is not a 
necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open. Let us 
therefore thank God that no man can be kept in life. It is permitted to subdue 
necessity itself.” * 

The Epicurean Velleius in Cicero says something similar about 
Stoic philosophy: 
“What are we to think of a philosophy in which, as to ignorant old women, 

everything seems to occur through fate? ... by Epicurus we have been redeemed, 
set free.” 

Thus Epicurus even denies disjunctive judgment so as not to have 
to acknowledge any concept of necessity. * 

True, it is claimed that Democritus also used the concept of 
chance, but of the two passages on this matter which can be found 
in Simplicius *” the one renders the other suspect, because it shows 
clearly that it was not Democritus who used the category of 
chance, but Simplicius who ascribed it to him as a consequence. 
For he says: Democritus assigns, generally speaking, no cause for 
the creation of the world, he seems therefore to make chance the 
cause. Here, however, we are concerned not with the determination 
of the content, but with the form used consciously by Democritus. The 
situation is similar in regard to the report by Eusebius that 
Democritus made chance the ruler of the universal and divine and 
claimed that here it is through chance that everything happens, 
whereas he excluded chance from human life and empirical 
nature and called its supporters foolish. 

In part, we see in these statements only a desire of the Christian 
bishop Dionysius for conclusion-forcing. In part, where the univer- 
sal and divine begin, the Democritean concept of necessity ceases 
to differ from chance. 

Hence, this much is historically certain: Democritus makes use of 
necessity, Epicurus of chance. And each of them rejects the opposite 
view with polemical irritation. 

The principal consequence of this difference appears in the way 
individual physical phenomena are explained. 

Necessity appears in finite nature as relative necessity, as determin- 
ism. Relative necessity can only be deduced from real possibility, 
i.e., it is a network of conditions, reasons, causes, etc., by means 
of which this necessity reveals itself. Real possibility is the explica- 

2 What has been decreed, destiny.— Ed. 
b After “is” Marx erased gleichsam, ‘“‘as it were” .— Ed. 

tion of relative necessity. And we find it used by Democritus. 
We cite some passages from Simplicius. 

If somebody is thirsty and drinks and feels better, Democritus 
will not assign chance as the cause, but thirst. For, even though he 
seems to use chance in regard to the creation of the world, yet he 
maintains that chance is not the cause of any particular event, but 
on the contrary leads back to other causes. Thus, for example, 
digging is the cause of a treasure being found, or growing the 
cause of the olive tree.*» 

The enthusiasm and the seriousness with which Democritus 
introduces this manner of explanation into the observation of 
nature, the importance he attaches to the striving to ascertain 
causes, are naively* expressed in his avowal: 

“I would rather discover a new aetiology than acquire the Persian crown.” 

Once again Epicurus stands directly opposed to Democritus. 
Chance, for him, is a reality which has only the value of possibility. 
Abstract possibility, however, is the direct antipode of real possibility. 
The latter is restricted within sharp boundaries, as is the intellect; 
the former is unbounded, as is the imagination. Real possibility 
seeks to explain the necessity and reality of its object; abstract 
possibility is not interested in the object which is explained, but in 
the subject which does the explaining. The object need only be 
possible, conceivable. That which is abstractly possible, which can 
be conceived, constitutes no obstacle to the thinking subject, no 
limit, no stumbling-block. Whether this possibility is also real is 
irrelevant, since here the interest does not extend to the object as 
object. 

Epicurus therefore proceeds with a boundless nonchalance in 
the explanation of separate physical phenomena. 

More light will be thrown upon this fact by the letter to 
Pythocles, later to be considered. Suffice it here to draw attention 
to Epicurus’ attitude to the opinions of earlier physicists. Where 
the author of De placitis philosophorum and Stobaeus quote the 
different views of the philosophers concerning the substance of 
the stars, the size and shape of the sun and similar matters, it is 
always said of Epicurus: He rejects none of these opinions, all 
could be right, he adheres to the possible.*” Yes, Epicurus polemi- 
cises even against the rationally determining, and for precisely this 
reason one-sided, method of explanation by real possibility. 

Thus Seneca says in his Quaestiones naturales: Epicurus maintains 

* After “naively” Marx erased “also”.— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 45 

that all these causes are possible, and then attempts in addition 
still other explanations. He blames those who claim that any par- 
ticular one of them occurs, because it is rash to judge apodic- 
tically about that which can only be deduced from conjectures.*” 

One can see that there is no interest in investigating the real 
causes of objects. All that matters is the tranquillity of the 
explaining subject. Since everything possible is admitted as possi- 
ble, which corresponds to the character of abstract possibility, the 
chance of being is clearly transferred only into the chance of thought. 
The only rule which Epicurus prescribes, namely, that “the 
explanation should not contradict sensation”, is self-evident; for to 
be abstractly possible consists precisely in being free from con- 
tradiction, which therefore must be avoided.*” And Epicurus con- 
fesses finally that his method of explaining aims only at the ata- 
raxy'' of self-consciousness, not at knowledge of nature in and for itself. 

It requires no further clarification to show how in this matter, 
too, Epicurus differs from Democritus. 

We thus see that the two men are opposed to each other at 
every single step. The one is a sceptic, the other a dogmatist; 
the one considers the sensuous world as subjective semblance, 
the other as objective appearance. He who considers the sensuous 
world as subjective semblance applies himself to empirical natural 
science and to positive knowledge, and represents the unrest of 
observation, experimenting, learning everywhere, ranging over the 
wide, wide world. The other, who considers the phenomenal 
world to be real, scorns empiricism; embodied in him are the serenity 
of thought satisfied in itself, the self-sufficiency that draws 
its knowledge ex principio interno? But the contradiction goes still 
farther. The sceptic and empiricist, who holds sensuous nature 
to be subjective semblance, considers it from the point of view 
of necessity and endeavours to explain and to understand the 
real existence of things. The philosopher and dogmatist, on the other 
hand, who considers appearance to be real, sees everywhere only 
chance, and his method of explanation tends rather to negate all 
objective reality of nature. There seems to be a certain absurdity 
in these contradictions. 

It hardly seems still possible to presume that these men, who 
contradict each other on all points, will adhere to one and the 
same doctrine. And yet they seem to be chained to each other. 

The task of the next section is to comprehend their relation- 
ship in general.” 

* From an inner principle.— Ed. 

Part Two 

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRITEAN 
AND EPICUREAN PHYSICS IN DETAIL 

Chapter One 

THE DECLINATION OF THE ATOM 
FROM THE STRAIGHT LINE 

Epicurus assumes a threefold motion of the atoms in the void.” 
- One motion is the fall in a straight line, the second originates in the 
deviation of the atom from the straight line, and the third is 
established through the repulsion of the many atoms. Both Democri- 
tus and Epicurus accept the first and the third motion. The 
declination of the atom from the straight line differentiates the one 
from the other.” 

This motion of declination* has often been made the subject of 
a joke. Cicero more than any other is inexhaustible when he 
touches on this theme. Thus we read in him, among other things: 

“Epicurus maintains that the atoms are thrust downwards in a straight line by 
their weight; this motion is said to be the natural motion of bodies. But then it 
occurred to him that if all atoms were thrust downwards, no atom could ever meet 
another one. Epicurus therefore resorted to a lie. He said that the atom makes a 
very tiny swerve, which is, of course, entirely impossible. From this arose 
complexities, combinations and adhesions of the atoms with one another, and out 
of this came the world, all parts of it and its contents. Besides all this being a 
puerile invention, he does not even achieve what he desires.” 

We find another version in the first book of Cicero’s treatise On 
the Nature of the Gods: 

“Since Epicurus saw that, if the atoms travelled downwards by their own weight, 
nothing would be within our control, for their motion would be determined and 
necessary, he invented a means for escaping this necessity, a means which had 
escaped the notice of Democritus. He says that the atom, although thrust 
downwards by its weight and gravity, makes a very slight swerve. To assert this is 
more disgraceful than to be incapable of defending what he wants.” 

* Corrected by Marx from “last motion”.— Ed. 

Doctoral Dissertation 47 

Pierre Bayle expresses a similar opinion: 

“Avant lui” (c.-a-d. Epicure) “on n’avait admis dans les atomes que le mouve- 
ment de pesanteur, et celui de réflexion. [...] Epicure supposa que méme au milieu 
du vide, les atomes déclinaient un peu de la ligne droite, et de la venait la liberté, 
disait-il... Remarquons en passant que ce ne fut [pas] le seul motif qui le porta a 
inventer ce mouvement de déclinaison, il le fit servir aussi 4 expliquer la rencontre 
des atomes; car il vit bien qu’en supposant qu’ils se mouvaient [tous] avec une égale 
vitesse par des lignes droites qui tendaient toutes de haut en bas, il ne ferait jamais 
comprendre qu’ils eussent pu se rencontrer, et qu’ainsi la production du monde 
aurait été impossible. I] fallut donc [...] qu’ils s’écartaient de la ligne droite.” * 

For the present I leave the validity of these reflections an open 
question. This much everyone will notice in passing, that the most 
recent critic of Epicurus, Schaubach, has misunderstood Cicero 
when he says: 

“The atoms are all thrust downwards by gravity, hence parallel, owing to physical 
causes, but through mutual repulsion they acquire another motion, according to 
Cicero (De natura deorum, I, xxv [, 69]) an oblique motion due to accidental causes, 
and indeed from all eternity.” 

In the first place, Cicero in the quoted passage does not make 
the repulsion the reason for the oblique direction, but rather the 
oblique direction the reason for the repulsion. In the second place, 
he does not speak of accidental causes, but rather criticises the fact 
that no causes at all are mentioned, as it would be in and for itself 
contradictory to assume repulsion and at the same time accidental 
causes as the reason for the oblique direction. At best one could 
then still speak of accidental causes of the repulsion, but not of 
accidental causes of the oblique direction. ; 

For the rest, one peculiarity in Cicero’s and Bayle’s reflections is 
too obvious not to be stressed immediately. They foist upon 
Epicurus motives of which the one nullifies the other. Epicurus is 
supposed to have assumed a declination of the atoms in order to 
explain the repulsion on one occasion, and on another freedom. 
But if the atoms do not meet without declination, then declination 
as an explanation of freedom is superfluous; for the opposite of 

* “Before him” (i.e., Epicurus) “only the motion of weight and that of 
reflection were conceded to the atom.... Epicurus supposed that even in the midst 
of the void the atoms declined slightly from the straight line, and from this, he 
said, arose freedom.... It must be noted, in passing, that this was not the only 
motive that led him to invent this motion of declination. He also used it to explain 
the meeting of atoms; for he saw clearly that supposing they [all] move with equal 
speed downwards along straight lines, he would never be able to explain that they 
could meet, and that thus the creation of the world would have been impossible. It 
was necessary, then, that they should deviate from the straight line.” — Ed. 

freedom begins, as we see in Lucretius,” only with the deterministic 
and forced meeting of atoms. But if the atoms meet without 
declination, then this is superfluous for explaining repulsion. 
I maintain that this contradiction arises when the causes for the 
declination of the atom from the straight line are understood so 
superficially and disconnectedly as they are by Cicero and Bayle. 
We shall find in Lucretius, the only one in general of all the 
ancients who has understood Epicurean physics, a more profound 
exposition. 

We now shall consider the declination itself. 

Just as the point is negated [aufgehoben] in the line, so is every 
falling body negated in the straight line it describes. Its specific 
quality does not matter here at all. A falling apple describes a 
perpendicular line just as a piece of iron does. Every body, insofar 
as we are concerned with the motion of falling, is therefore 
nothing but a moving point, and indeed a point without indepen- 
dence, which in a certain mode of being—the straight line which 
it describes—surrenders its individuality [Finzelheit]. Aristotle 
therefore is correct when he objects against the Pythagoreans: 
“You say that the motion of the line is the surface, that of the 
point the line; then the motions of the monads will also be 
lines.” » The consequence of this for the monads as well as for the 
atoms would therefore be—since they are in constant mo- 
tion” —that neither monads nor atoms exist, but rather disappear 
in the straight line; for the solidity of the atom does not even 
enter into the picture, insofar as it is only considered as something 
falling in a straight line. To begin with, if the void is imagined as 
spatial void, then the atom is the immediate negation of abstract space, 
hence a spatial point. The solidity, the intensity, which maintains 
itself in itself against the incohesion of space, can only be added by 
virtue of a principle which negates space in its entire domain, a 
principle such as time is in real nature. Moreover, if this itself is 
not admitted, the atom, insofar as its motion is a straight line, is 
determined only by space and is prescribed a relative being and a 
purely material existence. But we have seen that one moment in 
the concept of the atom is that of being pure form, negation of all 
relativity, of all relation to another mode of being. We have noted 
at the same time that’ Epicurus objectifies for himself both 
moments which, although they contradict one another, are 
nevertheless inherent in the concept of the atom. 

How then can Epicurus give reality to the pure form-determi- 
nation of the atom, the concept of pure individuality, negating 
any mode of being determined by another being? 

Doctoral Dissertation 49 

Since he is moving in the domain of immediate being, all 
determinations are immediate. Opposite determinations are there- 
fore opposed to one another as immediate realities. 

But the relative existence which confronts the atom, the mode of 
being which it has to negate, is thé straight line. The immediate 
negation of this motion is another motion, which, therefore, spatially 
conceived, is the declination from the straight line. 

The atoms are purely self-sufficient bodies or rather bodies 
conceived in absolute self-sufficiency, like the heavenly bodies. 
Hence, again like the heavenly bodies, they move not in straight, 
but in oblique lines. The motion of falling is the motion of non- 
self-sufficiency. 

If Epicurus therefore represents the materiality of the atom in 
terms of its motion along a straight line, he has given reality to its 
form-determination in the declination from the straight line, and 
these opposed determinations are represented as directly opposed 
motions. 

Lucretius therefore is correct when he maintains that the 
declination breaks the fati foedera, and, since he applies this 
immediately to consciousness,'! it can be said of the atom that the 
declination is that something in its breast that can fight back and 
resist. 

But when Cicero reproaches Epicurus that 

“he does not even attain the goal for which he made all this up — for if all atoms 
declined, none of them would ever combine, or some would deviate, others would 
be driven straight ahead by their motion. So it would be necessary as it were to give 
the atoms definite weslgaments beforehand: which had to move straight ahead and 
which obliquely”, 

this objection has the justification that the two moments inherent 
in the concept of the atom are represented as directly different 
motions, and therefore must be allotted to different individuals: 
an inconsistency, but a consistent one, since the domain of the 
atom is immediacy. 

Epicurus feels this inherent contradiction quite well. He there- 
fore endeavours to represent the declination as being as impercepti- 
ble as possible to the senses; it takes place 

Nec regione loci certa, nec tempore certo,°!9) 

it occurs in the smallest possible space. 

* The bonds of fate.— Ed. 
> In time, in place unfixt (Lucretius, De rerum natura, II, 294).— Ed. 

Moreover Cicero,’ and, according to Plutarch, several ancient 

authors, ' reproach Epicurus for saying that the declination of the 
atom occurs without cause. Nothing more disgraceful, says Cicero, 
can happen to a physicist.'” But, in the first place, a physical 
cause such as Cicero wants would throw the declination of the 

atom back into the domain of determinism, out of which it was 
precisely to be lifted. And then, the atom is by no means complete be- 

fore it has been submitted to the determination of declination. To in- 
quire after the cause of this determination means therefore to 
inquire after the cause that makes the atom a principle —a clear- 
ly meaningless inquiry to anyone for whom the atom is the 
cause of everything, hence without cause itself. 

Finally, Bayle,’ supported by the authority of Augustine,'? who 
states that Democritus ascribed to the atom a spiritual princi- 
ple—an authority, by the way, who in contrast to Aristotle and 
the other ancients is without any importance —reproaches Epicu- 
rus for having thought out the concept of declination instead of 
this spiritual principle. But, on the contrary, merely a word would 
have been gained with this “soul of the atom”, whereas the de- 
clination represents the real soul of the atom, the concept of 
abstract individuality. 

Before we consider the consequence of the declination of the 
atom from the straight line, we must draw attention to another, 
most important element, which up to now has been entirely 
overlooked. 

The declination of the atom from the straight line is, namely, not a 
particular determination which eae accidentally in Epicurean physics. 
On the contrary, the law which tt expresses goes through the whole 
Epicurean philosophy, in such a way, however, that, as goes without 
saying, the determination of its appearance depends on the domain in 
which it is applied. 

As a matter of fact, abstract individuality can make its concept, 
its form-determination, the pure being-for-itself, the independence 
from immediate being, the negation of all relativity, effective only 
by abstracting from the being that confronts it; for in order truly to 
overcome it, abstract individuality had to idealise it, a thing only 
generality can accomplish. 

Thus, while the atom frees itself from its relative existence, the 
straight line, by abstracting from it, by swerving away from it; so 
the entire Epicurean philosophy swerves away from the restrictive 
mode of being wherever the concept of abstract individuality, 
self-sufficiency and negation of all relation to other things must be 
represented in its existence. 

Doctoral Dissertation 51 

The purpose of action is to be found therefore in abstracting, 
swerving away from pain and confusion, in ataraxy.”” Hence the 
good is the flight from evil,*” pleasure the swerving away from 
suffering.» Finally, where abstract individuality appears in its 
highest freedom and independence, in its totality, there it follows 
that the being which is swerved away from, is all being; for this 
reason, the gods swerve away from the world, do not bother with it and 
live outside it.” 

These gods of Epicurus have often been ridiculed, these gods 
who, like human beings, dwell in the intermundia* of the real 
world, have no body but a quasi-body, no blood but quasi-blood,”” 
and, content to abide in blissful peace, lend no ear to any 
supplication, are unconcerned with us and the world, are hon- 
oured because of their beauty, their majesty and their superior 
nature, and not for any gain. 

And yet these gods are no fiction of Epicurus. They did exist. 
They are the plastic gods of Greek art.”* Cicero, the Roman, rightly 
scoffs at them,*” but Plutarch, the Greek, has forgotten the whole 
Greek outlook when he claims that although this doctrine of the 
gods does away with fear and superstition, it produces no joy or 
favour in the gods, but instead bestows on us that relation to them 
that we have to the Hyrcanian™ fish, from which we expect 
neither harm nor advantage.*” Theoretical calm is one of the 
chief characteristics of the Greek gods. As Aristotle says: 

“What is best has no need of action, for it is its own end.” 2”) 

We now consider the consequence that follows directly from the 
declination of the atom. In it is expressed the atom’s negation of 
all motion and relation by which it is determined as a particular 
mode of being by another being. This is represented in such a way 
that the atom abstracts from the opposing being and withdraws 
itself from it. But what is contained herein, namely, its negation of 
all relation to something else, must be realised, positively established. 
This can only be done if the being to which it relates itself is none other 
than itself, hence equally an atom, and, since it itself is directly 
determined, many atoms. The repulsion of the many atoms is therefore 
the necessary realisation of the lex atomi,” as Lucretius calls the 
declination. But since here every determination is established as a 
particular being, repulsion is added as a third motion to the 
former ones. Lucretius is therefore correct when he says that, if 

* The spaces between the worlds (literally: inter-worlds).— Ed. 
> Law of the atom.— Ed. 

the atoms were not to decline, neither their repulsion nor their 
meeting would have taken place, and the world would never have 
been created.” For atoms are their own sole object and can only be 
related to themselves, hence speaking in spatial terms, they can only 
meet, because every relative existence of these atoms by which they 
would be related to other beings is negated. And this relative 
existence is, as we have seen, their original motion, that of falling 
in a straight line. Hence they meet only by virtue of their 
declination from the straight line. It has nothing to do with merely 
material fragmentation.” 

And in truth: the immediately existing individuality is only 
realised conceptually, inasmuch as it relates to something else 
which actually is itself —even when the other thing confronts it in 
the form of immediate existence. Thus man ceases to be a product 
of nature only when the other being to which he relates himself is 
not a different existence but is itself an individual human being, 
even if it is not yet the mind [Geist]. But for man as man to 
become his own real object, he must have crushed within himself 
his relative being, the power of desire and of mere nature. 
Repulsion is the first form of self-consciousness, it corresponds there- 
fore to that self-consciousness which conceives itself as im- 
mediate-being, as abstractly individual. 

The concept of the atom is therefore realised in repulsion, 
inasmuch as it is abstract form, but no less also the opposite, 
inasmuch as it is abstract matter; for that to which it relates it- 
self consists, to be true, of atoms, but other atoms. But when I re- 
late myself to myself as to something which is directly another, then my 
relationship is a material one. This is the most extreme degree 
of externality that can be conceived. In the repulsion of the atoms, 
therefore, their materiality, which was posited in the fall in 
a straight line, and the form-determination, which was established 
in the declination, are united synthetically. 

Democritus, in contrast to Epicurus, transforms into an enforced 
motion, into an act of blind necessity, that which to Epicurus is the 
realisation of the concept of the atom. We have already seen above 
that he considers the vortex (éfvy) resulting from the repulsion 
and collision of the atoms to be the substance of necessity. He 
therefore sees in the repulsion only the material side, the frag- 
mentation, the change, and not the ideal side, according to 
which all relation to something else is negated and motion is estab- 
lished as self-determination. This can be clearly seen from the 
fact that he conceives one and the same body divided through 
empty space into many parts quite sensuously, like gold broken 

Doctoral Dissertation 53 

up into pieces.*°) Thus he scarcely conceived of the One as the 

concept of the atom. 
Aristotle correctly argues against him: 

“Hence Leucippus and Democritus, who assert that the primary bodies always 
moved in the void and in the infinite, should say what kind of motion this is, and 
what is the motion natural to them. For if each of the elements is forcibly moved 
by the other, then it is still necessary that each should have also a natural motion, 
outside which is the enforced one. And this first motion must not be enforced but 
natural. Otherwise the procedure goes on to infinity.” oh) 

The Epicurean declination of the atom thus changed the whole 
inner structure of the domain of the atoms, since through it the 
form-determination is validated and the contradiction inherent in 
the concept of the atom is realised. Epicurus was therefore the 
first to grasp the essence of the repulsion—even if only in 
sensuous form, whereas Democritus only knew of its material 
existence. 

Hence we find also more concrete forms of the repulsion 
applied by Epicurus. In the political domain there is the cove- 
nant, * in the social domain friendship,* which is praised as the 
highest good. 

Chapter Two 
THE QUALITIES OF THE ATOM 

It contradicts the concept of the atom that the atom should have 
properties, because, as Epicurus says, every property is variable 
but the atoms do not change.’ Nevertheless it is a necessary 
consequence to attribute properties to atoms. Indeed, the many 
atoms of repulsion separated by sensuous space must necessarily 
be immediately different from one another and from their pure essence, 
ie., they must possess qualities.