London, 13 October 1891 

Dear August, 

All I have time for today is to send you a reply about the Russians 
and in fact this is the only item of importance; the other business is 
over and done with.3!7 

As to the likelihood of war breaking out early next year, there are 
in Russia three important currents. First you have the diplomats. Of 
the latter I have said all along that they look for victories without the 
expense or risk of war, but for that very reason see to it that everything 
is placed on a warlike footing in order that Russia’s enormously fa- 
vourable defensive position may be exploited to the full. This hap- 
pens every time. They can then put forward outrageous demands and 
stick to them up to the last minute and then, without a shot being 
fired, extract the maximum profit from the enemy — who has more to 
lose— by playing upon his fear of war. Alongside the diplomats, how- 
ever, you have the soldiers who, despite their numerous mishaps on 
the field of battle, are exceedingly cock-a-hoop and full of bluster — 
more so than anywhere else. They want to let fly. And, thirdly, you 

* Lilian Rosher 

have the new bourgeoisie to whom, as to the American bourgeoisie of 
the 40s, the expansion of the market appears as MANIFEST DESTINY, as 
Russia’s historic mission, namely the liberation of the Slavs and 
Greeks and the domination of the eastern continent. All three must 
be taken into account; under Alexander III the diplomats have hith- 
erto been consistently victorious. Now there is famine to be reckoned 
with and in the east and south-east this is very severe. East of the line 
Odessa-Nizhni Novgorod and Vyatka there is acute famine every- 
where; to the west of this line the harvest showed a gradual improve- 
ment and in the west itself the wheat harvest was passable in places 
though the rye harvest was consistently poor. In Russia potatoes are 
not a staple food. The extremely acute form assumed by the famine in 
the Volga basin shows how wretched Russia’s communications still 
are. For that reason it seems plain to me that you would expose your- 
self unnecessarily should you seek to place credence in the assurances 
of those presenting the German military estimates when they tell you 
that war may certainly be expected next spring. It is just as much the 
job of Russia’s diplomats to prepare for war with an assiduity that is 
all the greater for their reluctance to embark on it, as it is the duty of 
the General Staff to talk you people in the Reichstag into believing 
that war will definitely break out in April ’92. You are perfectly right 
to pay careful attention to these statements and I shall be very grate- 
ful for any authentic information in this connection; however the 
chaps also have their ulterior motives. 

This point is not as academic as it seems. For it will assume the ut- 
most importance the moment the government estimates are present- 
ed to the Reichstag. If we are positive that there’ll be a bust up early 
next year, we can hardly be opposed to these estimates in principle. 
And that would be a pretty disastrous state of affairs so far as we are 
concerned. For the arse-crawling parties would all be overjoyed that 
they should have been proved right and that we should now have to 
spurn our policy of the past twenty years. And so impromptu 
a change of course would also cause enormous friction within the 
party. And internationally as well. 

On the other hand there may nevertheless be a war in the spring. 
What then should our attitude to the estimates be? 

In my view there can only be one attitude: 1. There’s no longer 
time in which to change our weapons. If peace prevails until new can- 
non and a rifle of even smaller calibre are introduced, peace will in 
any case presumably continue to prevail. So these objections don’t 

hold water. 2. The same applies, if to an even greater extent, to new 
cadres for the standing army—I mean to the demand for new reg- 
iments. In view of the gigantic armies of today, the few new for- 
mations which may now be demanded are of no account and, if they 
are to serve as fraining cadres enabling more men to be recruited and 
trained, they can only do so during an extended period of peace and 
thus would be useless so far as a war next spring is concerned.— On 
the other hand we can, however, 3. vote estimates where the inten- 
tion is to bring today’s army closer to the concept of a whole people 
under arms, to strengthen the defensive side alone, to train and arm 
bodies of men of any age between 17 and 60 who have not yet been 
conscripted and to incorporate them into permanent cadres without 
a proliferation of pettifogging regulations. While the threat of war 
persists we cannot demand that the existing organisation of the army 
be revolutionised, but if we seek to prepare the vast mass of untrained 
but able-bodied men as best as we can and organise them in cadres — 
for actual battle, not for show or pettifoggery— that will bring us 
closer to our concept of a people’s militia which alone is acceptable 
to us. 

Should the threat of war increase, we can then tell the government 
that we should be prepared, if enabled to do so by decent treatment, 
to support them against a foreign enemy, provided they prosecuted 
the war ruthlessly and with all available means, including revolution- 
ary ones. Should Germany be attacked from the east and west, all 
means of defence would be justified. It is a question not only of the 
nation’s existence but also, in our own case, of asserting the position 
and the future prospects for which we have fought. The more revolu- 
tionary the prosecution of the war, the more it will be waged in accor- 
dance with our ideas. And it might happen that, in contrast to the cow- 
ardice of the bourgeoisie and Junkers, who want to save their prop- 
erty, we should turn out to be the only truly vigorous war party. 
Of course it might also happen that we should have to take the helm 
and do a 1794 in order to chuck out the Russians and _ their 
allies. 

I must close so as to get this letter registered (cannot be done after 
5 o’clock). From past experience I felt pretty sure that the first 
field army would be surreptitiously receiving substantial rein- 
forcements but we are glad to have authentic confirmation of this 

point. So far as the Austrians are concerned, the men are absolutely 
Just-rate, the junior officers possess pluck but vary greatly in the mat- 
ter of battle-training, while the senior ranks are utterly unpredict- 
able. A man can rise to the top there on the strength of his services as 
pimp to Francis Joseph. 

I shall get something done for the French on the question of the 
war,?'? but it will be damned difficult not to do more harm than 
good; the chaps are so touchy. 

Constans is doing all he can to promote Lafargue’s candidature *'? 
by resorting to some typical Prussian chicanery; that is no good in 
France. 

But how will things work out with the present war policy and with 
Liebknecht at the Foreign Office? His foreign policy — Parnell, Gari- 
baldi festival in Nice, etc.—is beneath contempt.?! What with his 
adoration of the ‘Republic’, there’s the prospect of a nice old rumpus 
before long. 

If you are so certain that war will break out in the spring, it seems 
to me that you ought at least to discuss the matter behind the scenes 
when you hold your party congress.?°! 

Regards from Louise and 

Your 

F. E.