London, 29 September 1891 

Dear August, 

We all of us very much liked your Russian article in the Vor- 
warts °°?; it should prove very effective. A point on which you and 
I are agreed is that there is an imminent threat of war, and _ this 
specifically from Russia; also that, if it materialises, everything possi- 
ble should be done, especially by us and in our own interests, to crush 
Russia. Where we differ is in contending, you that the Russians want 
war, and I that all they want is to threaten without any definite in- 
tention of attacking, while at the same time being fully aware that 
things might nevertheless eventually get to that stage. 

I have for years studied the methods and habits of Russian diplo- 
mats past and present and know that war, inasmuch as it is invari- 
ably unsolicited by the aforesaid diplomats, invariably spells a diplo- 
matic defeat. For in the first place, victories obtained by diplomatic 
intimidation are cheaper and safer and, in the second, every new war 
merely goes to prove how relatively weak the Russian army is when it 
comes to conquest. So enormously do the military in Russia overrate 
their preparedness for war that, even after discounting 30% of their 
claims, the diplomats still pitch the army’s efficiency too high. Of all 

the factors they must take into account, their own army is the most 
incalculable. Only in cases where others have to fight their battles for 
them (1813-14) do Russian diplomats willingly go to war. 

If Gladstone comes to the helm over here, the Russian diplomats 
will be in a position more favourable than they could hope to achieve 
for decades to come. France an active ally, England a benevolent 
neutral—- that’s plenty to be going on with. That the Russians will 
make war-like gestures, I am in no doubt. But if they go to war it will 
not be intentionally. 

There is no doubt whatever that the loan is a potential war loan. 
But that is merely a sign that the gentlemen are preparing themselves 
for any eventuality. As I see it, all the other signs you adduce — the 
ban on the export of rye, landing exercises in the Black Sea, etc.,— 
only go to prove the same thing. I would hazard a guess that, when it 
comes to the point, Europe, and the Triple Alliance in particular,?°* 
will be more afraid of a war than unassailable Russia will have need 
of one; whereupon Russia will be one up in the East while the French 
chauvinists will be the dupes. 

You suggest that Russia is bound to attack because of difficulties at 
home. I do not think so— not, at any rate, in the sense in which you 
presumably understand it. In Russia three classes suffer-—the land- 
owning aristocracy, the peasantry, the emergent proletariat. The lat- 
ter is still, and the first is already, too weak for revolution, while all 
the peasantry could achieve would be local insurrections which 
would be fruitless unless given the necessary cohesion and moral sup- 
port by a successful insurrection in urban centres. The new bourgeoi- 
sie, on the other hand, is flourishing as nowhere else; it is gradually 
moving towards the point at which it will inevitably clash with bu- 
reaucracy, but this may not be reached for years. The Russian bour- 
geoisie originated from farmers connected with vodka production 
and from army contractors plundering the state and is what it is be- 
cause of the state —protective tariffs, subsidies, robbing of the state, 
licence and state protection for the most oppressive exploitation of la- 
bour. So things would have to get pretty bad before these people, 
whose turpitude far exceeds that of our own. bourgeoisie, would 
undermine the rule of the Tsar. 

If consideration for ths particular bourgeoisie is conducive to war, 
it is only because it has translated pan-Slavism into materialist terms 
or, rather, has discovered the latter’s material basis— the expansion 
of the home market by means of annexation. Hence the Slavophil fa- 

naticism, hence the unbridled Germanophobia— up till 20 years 
ago, after all, Russia’s trade and industry was almost exclusively in 
German hands— and hence the anti-Semitism. This really vile and 
ignorant bourgeoisie, unable to see beyond the end of its own nose, 
does indeed want war and is clamouring for it in the press. But nowa- 
days no Tsar need go to war for fear of revolution at home. This may 
have been the case in the 70s when the decaying aristocracy in the 
zemstvos* was becoming aware and resentful of the situation to which 
it had everywhere been reduced. Today that same aristocracy is very 
much on its uppers, is being bought out of its landed property by the 
bourgeoisie and is altogether in the latter’s financial clutches, while 
the bourgeoisie is Tsarism’s new bulwark, particularly in the big cities 
which alone might present a threat. And nowadays a palace revolu- 
tion or successful assassination attempt could only bring the bour- 
geoisie to power, no matter who had instigated the coup. Yet this self- 
same bourgeoisie would be even more likely than the Tsar to precipi- 
tate a war. 

But that’s beside the point. We both of us recognise the danger of 
war and, despite the famine in Russia, which you decidedly under- 
rate, the reins may slip from the hands of the rulers, an eventuality for 
which we too must be prepared. I shall see what can be done in 
France; while it may be necessary to draw our people’s attention to 
certain points, this should be done by the French themselves. Our peo- 
ple have got to realise that a war against Germany in alliance with 
Russia would first and foremost be a war against the strongest and 
most efficient socialist party in Europe, and that we should have no 
option but to fight with all our might against any assailant who went 
to Russia’s aid. For either we should succumb, and that would put 
paid to the socialist movement in Europe for the next 20 years, or we 
should ourselves come to the helm and then the words of the Marseil- 
larse, 

‘Quoi, ces cohortes étrangeres feraient la loi dans nos _foyers?’” 

would apply to the French. 

In neither case would the present regime in Germany survive 
a war; its defence would require too strenuous an effort and means 
that were too revolutionary. 

* provincial assemblies-? What, shall these foreign cohorts lay down the law in our 
own homes? 

You are right; if war comes we must call for the general arming of 
the population. But in co-ordination with the organisation already in 
existence and/or prepared for war. That would mean the embodi- 
ment of hitherto untrained men in the Ersatzreserve?°* and Landsturm 3°5 
and, above all, the immediate introduction of a rough-and-ready training 
programme in addition to the arming of the population and its embodi- 
ment into permanent cadres. 

The address to the French would have to assume a somewhat differ- 
ent form.% The Russian diplomats are not so stupid as to provoke 
war before the whole of Europe. On the contrary, things will be so ar- 
ranged as to make either France or one of the Triple Alliance coun- 
tries appear to be the offending party. The Russians always have do- 
zens of such casus belli up their sleeves; what the exact answer to this 
should be depends on the pretext adduced for war. Whatever the 
case, we shall have to declare that since 1871 we have always been 
ready to come to a peaceable understanding with France, that as soon 
as our party comes to power it will not be able to exercise that power 
unless Alsace-Lorraine is free to decide its own future but that, should 
war be forced upon us, notably a war in alliance with Russia, we 
should regard it as an attack upon our existence and should have to 
defend ourselves with all available means and make use of all avail- 
able positions —i.e. including Metz and Strasbourg. 

As for the actual conduct of the war, there are two aspects which 
are of prime importance: Russia is weak in attack but enormously 
strong in defence, a thrust into the heartland is impossible. France is 
strong in attack but, after one or two defeats, is rendered impotent 
and incapable of attacking. Since I have no great opinion of Au- 
strians as generals or of Italians as soldiers, our army will have to lead 
and sustain the main thrust. Containment of the Russians, defeat of 
the French, such must be the opening gambits in a war. Once the 
French offensive has been scotched, but hardly any sooner, a start can 
be made on the conquest of Poland up to the Dvina and the Dnieper. 
This must be effected by revolutionary means and, if necessary, by 
conceding to Poland, as ultimately constituted, part of Prussian Po- 
land and the whole of Galicia. If all goes well, a volte-face may be ex- 
pected in France. This should be our cue for insisting that Metz and 
Lorraine at any rate be accorded the French as a peace-offering. 

But things probably won’t go as smoothly as all that. The French 
won't simply let themselves be defeated. Their army is very good and 
better armed than ours nor, considering the kind of performance our 

generals put up, does it look to me as though very much is to be ex- 
pected from that quarter. The French have shown this summer that 
they have learnt how to mobilise. Likewise that they have enough 
officers for the first field army, which is stronger than ours. 
Not until more troops move into the line will our numerical superior- 
ity in officers make itself felt. Moreover, the direct route between Ber- 
lin and Paris is heavily defended on both sides by fortifications. In 
short, and taking the most favourable view, it will probably turn out 
to be a campaign of changing fortunes in which both sides will conti- 
nually bring in new reinforcements until one side is exhausted — or 
England actively intervenes, being able in the circumstances then ob- 
taining to starve out the side, whether France or Germany, which it de- 
cides to oppose, and to compel it to sue for peace simply by cutting off 
its supply of corn. What happens meanwhile on the Russian border 
will depend largely on how the Austrians conduct the war, and is 
therefore unpredictable. 

This much is, I believe, certain —if we are beaten, chauvinism and 
retaliatory warfare will flourish unchecked in Europe for years to 
come. If we are victorious, our party will take the helm. The victory 
of Germany, therefore, will be the victory of the revolution and, if 
war comes, we must not only desire that victory but promote it with 
all available means. 

Ede’s article °°’ was intended as a reply to Vollmar?’° and, as 
such, would have been altogether appropriate. Instead, our good Ede 
dilly-dallied for so long that it appeared as a reply to the Kronstadt fra- 
ternisation ? for which, of course, it was totally unsuitable, since the 
emphasis should have been laid on wholly different aspects. What 
certainly ought to have been said was that if France, as opposed to 
Germany, is the formal representative of revolution, Germany, by rea- 
son of its workers’ party, is the material leader of revolution and that 
this would necessarily emerge in a war in which we —and with us the 
revolution— would either be suppressed or else come to the helm. 

Apropos, I hear that you intend to put forward K. Kautsky’s dec- 
laration of principles as your programme at the party congress. I too 
regard it in its present version (Neue Zeit, No. 51) as a great improve- 
ment on our draft. My only recommendation was that he should 
make a few alterations in the passage on p. 788.* He has obviously giv- 
en the thing a great deal of thought and to good purpose. I have not 

* See previous letter. 

yet been able to read Ede’s article concerning individual de- 
mands.*°*° About Leibfried-Cuno anon, in my next. 
Regards from Louise and 

Your 
F.E. 

1 October 

I had meant to send off the above today, when your letter of the 
29th turned up. I trust you read in the original the article by me 
which appeared in the Soczaliste, for the rendering in the Vorwdrts is 
atrocious and in places sheer nonsense.* Where the devil does Lieb- 
knecht unearth such appalling translators? —It is clear that the time 
is at hand when we shall be in the majority in Germany, or at any 
rate the only party strong enough to take the helm — provided peace 
continues. And for that very reason I would be reluctant to see this pro- 
cess of development interrupted by a crisis which might, it is true, 
curtail it by 2 or 3 years but which might equally well prolong it by 
10 or even 20. 

As regards my remarks concerning the undue consideration shown 
by you for your opponents’ opinions, you alone are to blame; in your 
letter” you say of Ede’s note °°°: ‘For our opponents attack the work simply 
for being couched in tendentiously anti-Lassallean terms.’ This regularly 
reiterated argument about your opponents cannot but end by invit- 
ing the interpretation that those opponents can play ducks and 
drakes with us. Come to that, Marx and I used to say as long ago as 
1848: ‘What blunder of ours can have earned us our opponents’ praise?’ 
i.e. just as you do. 

Whatever happens, you must keep Geiser away from the Vorwarts. 
After all, at St Gallen the man was the object of a formal vote of no 
confidence 25% so surely Ae cannot be allowed to take part in the edit- 
ing! Blos, too, is an alarmist and, what’s more, a bore.— As regards 
the sixth leading article Liebknecht is to write, there’s no need to: 
worry your heads about it?!°; Pll wager that in 3 weeks’ time he’ll 

* F. Engels, ‘Le congrés de Bruxelles. La situation de lEurope’, Le Socialtste, No. 51, 
12 September 189] and ‘Uber den Brisseler Kongreß und die Lage in Europa. (Aus ei- 
nem Brief an Paul Lafargue)’, Vorwdrts, No. 216, 16 September 1891 (see this volume, 
pp. 234-36 and also present edition, Vol. 27.)-> of 12 September 1891 

have lost all enthusiasm for leading articles and will say, as he did in 
Leipzig in 1866, that anyone who supposes this to be the right time 
for writing leading articles cannot have a proper understanding of the 
times. 

The Vienna Arbeiterinnenblatt* will doubtless be a thorn in the flesh 
of your women’s paper ladies. The latter are all still very much ‘be- 
schacked’? and would like to have something specifically women’s 
movementish and not confined to one feminine aspect of the labour 
movement. However, the latter standpoint is put forward with 
tremendous vigour in the Vienna journal and, if the women at home 
are as promising as you say, all this separate women’s rights busi- 
ness— bourgeois trifling, no more,-- will soon be pushed into the 
background. If the present spokeswomen are elbowed out by mem- 
bers of their own sex, no matter; but the Vienna paper must be given 
the credit for being the first of all women’s papers to adopt and advo- 
cate this standpoint. 

In failing to accept Aveling’s anti-Gilles statement you have again 
proved that inside every German there lurks a bureaucrat who pops 
out the moment he holds some petty official post. Aveling considered 
it incompatible with his honour for Gilles’ claim that he had likewise 
given him, Aveling, a licking, to go unchallenged in the German 
press. Aveling got Louise to attest the facts and they both of them put 
their names to the document. In any other country the reaction 
would have been: “This is a matter in which those concerned must 
themselves know what they ought to do; I, the editor, though I may 
disapprove of their conduct, am bound to recognise their right to 
plead their own cause as they think fit.’ With you, however, the edito- 
rial department sets itself up as censor, lays claim to complete infalli- 
bility, and forbids them to conduct their own case. The editorial de- 
partment has a right to believe that ¢# has finished and done with Gil- 
les and need not for its part allude to him again, but if Aveling and 
Louise come forward in their own names, it ought not to use this view 
as a pretext for muzzling a friend. Incidentally, I do not in the least 
share your reservations — indeed it was I who drafted Louise’s state- 
ment. 

Gilles at once proceeded to publish the enclosed leaflet. You will be 
getting Aveling’s reply in a day or two. The business with Bradlaugh 

* Arbeiterinnen-Zeilung (sce also this volume, p. 252).-” derived from the name of Ger- 
trud Guillaume - Schack -° See this volume, pp. 237-38, 251, 252. 

was a stupendous blunder of Aveling’s, but he was the innocent 
party. At the time Aveling was, so far as money matters and political 
negotiations were concerned, a thoroughly naive, inexperienced and 
incredibly foolish young poet. Bradlaugh was aware of this and ex- 
ploited him most outrageously; they started a Natural Science School 
and laboratory, the business side of which was managed by Brad- 
laugh while Aveling had to bear not only the brunt of the work but, 
towards the end, also the financial responsibility. When Aveling be- 
came a socialist and married Tussy, Bradlaugh falsely accused him of 
having engaged in dubious money transactions— Aveling was mon- 
strously hoodwinked but altogether innocent — just unbelievably stu- 
pid. And when Bradlaugh published his circular letter, Aveling was 
stupid enough to keep silent and even by degrees repay Bradlaugh, 
by whom, for good measure, he had been cheated, something in the 
region of £200. It is now an old story, Bradlaugh is dead and, since 
he took care not to formulate any definite charges, there is nothing for 
it but for Aveling to make the circumstances known whenever the op- 
portunity arises. As will happen the moment Mr Hyndman, who was 
originally responsible for raking up this tittle-tattle again, accepts Av- 
eling’s challenge to confront him in public.— The story of the Chi- 
cago telegram is also pure moonshine and again emanates from 
Hyndman. Our aim is to catch out the Jatter, for Gilles is simply. his 
mouthpiece. 

Many regards from Louise and myself to your wife* and yourself. 

Your 
F.E.