Manchester, 2 June 1869 
My dear Paul, 

You can, of course, dispose of my name as you like. Still, there are 
some objections. In the first instance, what you want, is work 
which, for the present, I am unable to perform, while Engels still 
suffers from an inflammation of the eyes which for some time is 
sure to debar him from writing. Of course, if a very urgent 
question arose, we should address ourselves to the Renaissance,’ 
but this could be done without my name figuring amongst the 
rédacteurs. A merely nominal co-editorship would prove of no 
possible avail. However, my most serious objection is of an 
exclusively private nature, and I leave it to your discretion to 
decide the case. The intended paper will probably involve you and 
your friends in judicial conflicts with the government, and your 
father,* becoming sooner or later aware of my name figuring among 

a Francois Lafargue 

the rédacteurs of that paper, would be likely to draw the conclusion 
that I had pushed you to premature political action, and 
prevented you from taking the steps necessary (and which I am 
continuously urging you to take*) to pass your medical examina- 
tions and establish you professionally. He would justly consider 
such presumed influence on my part as running counter to our 
express mutual engagement. 

As to the misgivings of Le Petit,” they are altogether unfounded. 
To make ready for an invasion of France, Prussia would, under the 
most favourable circumstances, want instead of 8 days at least one 
month. But the circumstances are now anything but favourable to 
her. There exists, in point of fact, no German unity. It could only 
be founded by a German Revolution, sweeping away the Prussian 
dynasty, which was, is, and must always be, the man-servant of the 
Muscovite. It is only by the overthrow of ‘Prussia’ that Germany 
can become really centralised. 

Prussia has not merged into Germany. It has, on the contrary, 
conquered a part of Germany, and treats it—the directly annexed 
provinces as well as those pressed into the Northern German 
Confederation —as a conquered land. Hence the greatest disaffec- 
tion prevails in her new acquisitions. In case of an offensive (not 
defensive) war against France, Prussia would be forced to employ a 
large part of its army for the purpose of keeping down these 
provinces, the more dangerous since her means of communication 
with France, such as railways, telegraphs etc. run through them, 
and the Prussian lines of retreat from the Rhine pass through 
them. As to the military contingents raised from Hanover, 
Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony, Kurhessen, Nassau etc., they could not 
be relied upon, and would prove a source of weakness instead of 
strength. 

Apart from these provinces, either directly annexed or pressed 
into the Northern German Confederation, there is Southern 
Germany (Baden, Wirttemberg, Bavaria, Hessen-Darmstadt) num- 
bering 9 millions. Here the popular masses are Anti-Prussian to 
the core. In case of a war against France, Prussia would, therefore, 
have to detach another part of her army in order to make sure of 
that part of Southern Germany which, on a_long-stretched 
line, borders upon France. 

And last, not least, Prussia would be bound to concentrate a 
strong army of observation against Austria. Do not forget that the 
Hapsburg Dynasty is sorely smarting under the recent humilia- 

a See this volume, pp. 224-25.- > Louis Auguste Blanqui 

tions and losses *** inflicted upon it by the Prussian upstart.* Admit 
even the quite absurd hypothesis, that the Hapsburg Dynasty was 
ready to condone for the past, it would still be unable to support 
Prussia. The Austrian Emperor? has no longer any control over 
international affairs. The Hungarian diet has now to decide, and it 
would decide for France against Prussia. So would the Vienna 
diet. Thus, however friendly the apparent attitude of the Vienna 
Cabinet might be, Prussia could and would not rely upon it, but 
find herself always obliged to detach a strong army of observation 
against the army which Austria would be sure to concentrate in 
Bohemia. 

Hence you see de prime abord, that of the seemingly formidable 
military power of Prussia a very large part would not be available 
against France, but, on the contrary, would have to be frittered 
away in different directions. 

Prussia would have no ally except Russia who is not able to 
dispose of her army on a sudden emergency. Before her contingents 
had been mobilised and had entered Prussia the whole campaign 
would have been decided. 

The very idea that Prussia, under such circumstances, would 
venture single-handed, as she must do, upon an invasion of France, 
and revolutionary France too, is incorrect. 

I have till now considered only the strictly military and 
diplomatic aspect of the question but there is not the least doubt 
that in case of a Revolution in France, Prussia would have to act 
now as in 1848. Instead of throwing her forces abroad, she would 
be forced to absorb them in expeditions a l’intérieur. 

If, in 1848, the movement in Germany paralysed the Prussian 
Government, what would the case be now, when the popular 
masses in Prussia and the other parts of Germany, are much more 
developed, and, simultaneously, the Prussian government as well 
as the other German governments have ceased to be absolute and 
been weakened by the trammels of a mock constitutionalism? 

As to the German working classes, they are, in my opinion, 
better organised than the French ones. Their ideas are more 
international than in any other country. Their atheism is more 
pronounced than in any other country. Their predilection for 
France, is general. 

Prussia can do nothing in case of a French Revolution. (One 
working men’s representative in the North German Diet’ recently 
threatened them with the approach of a French Revolution.*”*) Only 

a Bismarck - > Francis Joseph I - © at first sight - 4 Johann Baptist von Schweitzer