[Manchester,| 17 March 1858

Dear Moor,

When you get this letter and today’s Guardian, sent off at the
same time, give your wife the Paris report to read. It gives one
quite a turn to hear a Bonapartist and official relate how 100,000
ouvriers’ in the Faubourg St. Antoine responded to Orsini’s
execution 2”! with the cry ‘Vive la République’’ So deportations and
arrests a tort et ad travers‘ have borne as little fruit as the cités
ouvriéres’ and the national atéliers en gros and it is gratifying, on
the eve of the grand ball, to see such a roll-call take place and hear

politique et militaire de Napoléon...- > we shall see - ¢ workers - 4 Long live the
Republic. - © wholly at random - ! workers’ settlements - § workshops on a large
scale

100,000 men reply, ‘Present!’ ’'m only sorry Orsini couldn't
hear that cry.

A local philistine who was lately in Paris has returned with the
news that since Orsini’s attempt on Monsieur Boustrapa’s*° life
two more had been made. The first was also mentioned in the
English press; the fellow was arrested in the Bois de Boulogne at
the moment he took aim with his pistol; the second was news to
me; it appears that the fellow shot at or tried to stab him in the
Tuileries gardens and was summarily shot by soldiers of the
Guard in the gallery of June 1848 fame beneath the terrasse du
bord de Veau2*!

It seems that all threadbare patriotic notables want to make fools
of themselves: mad old Landor must needs go and write to The
Times today.” All that remains now is for Venedey to protest
against Orsini.

But Boustrapa has indeed come to a pretty pass, and it is a pity
that the Constitutionnel should no longer be in a position to declare
that l'horizon politique s’obscurcit. What could be funnier than to
find in the Moniteur, no less, a story about the officers at Chalon
who, before risking rank and skin for the empereur, hurried to the
sous-préfet to ask whether or not a republic had really been
proclaimed in Paris?* But one can also see how, even in the army,
the only genuine Bonapartists are the men at the top because
these are compromised and lured on by the prospect of truly
splendid bounties. For, after all, what has Boustrapa to offer the
bulk of subalterns? The blackguard doubtless knows as well as we
do that, aside from his Guard, there are few troops he can rely on.
Unfortunately the Guard is strong and knows that, under any
other government, it would either be relegated to the line or
disbanded. It consists, as far as infantry is concerned, of 4
regiments of grenadiers, 2 of riflemen, 1 of gendarmes, 1 of
Zouaves, 1 battalion of light infantry (17 infantry battalions all
told); further, 2 regiments of cuirassiers, 2 of dragoons, 1 of
mounted grenadiers, 1 of hussars, 1 of chasseurs—21 squadrons
and a strong force of artillery. In all 18,000-20,000 men with
40-50 cannon, a nucleus solid enough to stiffen a somewhat
wavering line. In addition everything has been so organised as to
provide for a speedy concentration of troops from the Provinces —
(you only have to look at a railway. map of France) so that a
movement, if anticipated, would undoubtedly find itself confronted
by 60,000-80,000 men. Victory over such vast numbers is to be

la soirée...., Le Moniteur universel, No. 68, 9 March 1858.

achieved in 2 ways only: either by secret societies within the army
itself—-and these are said to be numerous—or by a determined
anti-Bonapartist stand on the part of the bourgeoisie, as in
February.” I don’t believe that victory is possible in the absence of
one, let alone both, of these conditions. There is no doubt that the
lower echelons of the army are undermined by reds and the
higher by Orleanists'** and Legitimists,°* nor that the loi des
suspects*™ in conjunction with other repressive measures is making
life impossible for the bourgeoisie. Boustrapa’s mounting difficulties are daily forcing him into ever more desperate straits; he dare
not risk war with Prussia, he has shut himself out of Italy; no one
any longer believes in Boustrapian socialism; Algeria has no more
campaigns to offer. All diversions being excluded, reste la répression
croissante,” i.e. the virtual driving of the bourgeoisie into
revolution. For the Orleanists and Legitimists the restoration of
the constitutional republic under their joint rule must already be
LOOMING IN THE DISTANCE as the most probable pis aller“ should
circumstances not hold out an immediate prospect of victory for
either party. Le cas de soulévement donné’—and it’s bound to come
in the course of this year—there is every chance that they will
follow the pattern of February 1848, sauf a lancer plus tard les
troupes sur les faubourgs.. And we know what will happen then. As
soon as their fear of Bonaparte has made the troops unsteady
enough to render the success of the insurrection inevitable, their
fear of the prolétaires will make them induce the troops to put
down the insurrection—trop tard/!—the flood will surge over
them regardless, the troops will stand gaping—and then we shall
see how much ground the water has gained since the last
springtide of 1848. .

Fortunately commerce in France is in such a state that it cannot
improve until the chronic crisis has culminated in_ political
revolution. I don’t believe that the state of trade in France can
possibly improve so long as Boustrapa remains at the helm. While
the crisis lasts all the talk about ‘confidence’ being undermined by
Orsini, Espinasse, etc., is mere idle euphemism; but under a
régime of this nature it will become sober truth should the
conditions responsible for the crisis cease to obtain. By the way, I
have quite come round to your opinion that in France the Crédit
mobilier ” was no haphazard swindle but an altogether necessary
institution, and that Morny’s pilferings which it spawned were no

2 i.e. during the February Revolution of 1848 - © there remains growing repression ¢ expedient - 4 Given an insurrection - € save that later they may send troops against
the suburbs - f too late .

Jess inevitable, for it was only the prospect of getting rich quick
which made the Crédit mobilier viable in France. Under these
circumstances it’s a tossup which falls first—Boustrapa or the
Crédit mobilier—The prolongation of bills must inevitably give
rise to enormous losses. The use of such means to overcome a
crisis can be of avail only if the reprise des affaires is a real one in
industry too, but the mere fact of an EAsy Money-MARKET Cannot help
anyone who has no credit—and I believe that in France credit is
no longer accorded save by prolonging what has already been
given.

Things in Prussia look pretty rotten to me. The tinpot little
Chamber has greatly inflamed the parochial Prussian Ramone of
the philistines there and even the arch-philistine, I fear, looks
forward with assurance to the advent, along with the English
marriage,” ° of an English constitution, albeit democratised. If only
the corporal” were to make a fool of himself, and that right soon!
In Prussia, I fear, it won’t be too easy to get rid of the Royal
FAMILY—unless, that is, the proletariat has made really enormous
strides. The bourgeois and philistines have, at any rate, got even
worse since 1848. In German Austria, too, nothing much seems to
be happening. Plainly your good, honest German has not yet
emerged from the hibernation that followed the strenuous
exertions of 1848. Slav insurrections and the loss of Hungary and
Italy will, by the way, serve their turn in Austria, and on top of
that, in the big towns and industrial districts, the crisis will have
repercussions which, just now and at this distance, are impossible
to gauge. Apres tout, it’s going to be a hard struggle.

But what if Boustrapa were to subdue the first big attempt at an
uprising? I regard this as practically impossible, precisely because
the measures he has adopted are such that things would not
become serious save on a really major occasion. But supposing
Boustrapa were to succeed, he’d be doubly in the soup. Pélissier
would be empereur. The troops of the line, who would in any case
show signs of weakness and irresolution, would be declared non
grata and the Guard alone remain in favour—-indeed more so
than ever before. A sure means of fostering conspiracy in the
army. Next, Boustrapa would have to go directly for the Orleanists
and Legitimists, nor would Thiers get away with a couple of days
in the Mazas burnishing his Brown Bess.°% A sure means of
utterly ruining commerce. If Boustrapa were ever to triumph, his
downfall would be all the more assured.

4 resumption of business - > the Prince of Prussia - < After all

I only hope the fellow won't be assassinated. In which case I
believe things would turn out in the way Morny once described to
him: ‘Nous commencerions par jeter tous les Jér6me par la
fenétre et puis nous tacherions de nous arranger tant bien que
mal avec les Orléans.’* Before the faubourgs had had time to
collect their wits, Morny would have effected his palace revolution
and, although the revolution from below would only be postponed
for a short while, its basis would no longer be the same.

To return to our own private affairs, I’ve been able to find
virtually nothing about Billow in Jomini and Cathcart” and must
see if I can unearth some other source. I shall try and get
‘Bomarsund’ done tonight. These two articles are preying on my
mind.

As soon as the Indian mail brings details about Campbell’s
Lucknow expedition (in maybe a week or a fortnight’s time), send
me all the material you can lay hands on, so that I can make an
immediate start. I shall be able to buy The Times up here, but not
the other London papers, i. e. in single numbers.

Warm regards to your wife and children. I'd like to send you
some more money but shall have to wait and see what further
payments I shall have to make this month; as soon as I get
some idea of this I shall do what I can, you may be sure of
that.

Your
F. E.

Lupus has the solemn document from New York.”” Isn’t Kamm
that Kinkelian ‘proletarian’ who used to run a brothel? F. Jacobi is
everyone’s jokes in Switzerland.