[London] Tuesday [25 March 1856]* 

Dear Engels, 

In one of my next letters I shall reply to your last. Today simply 
an inquiry, to which I should like, if possible, an answer by return. 
I did not send any article to the Tribune today because I hadn’t 
finished reading the Brut Boox on Kars*—I1 only got hold of it 
late yesterday evening. I have to send off my article” on Friday, at 
the same time as the one I am expecting from you. Well, ad rem‘: 

A large part of the Biue Boox is of a purely military nature; you 
will be able to see later whether anything can be done with it. But 
there’s one point on which I want your critical opinion, since it is 
also material to the political-diplomatic aspect of the matter and I 
have got to discuss it in this Friday’s article. At the end of June the 
Turks proposed to send reinforcements to Redoute-Kaleh in order 
to operate from there in the direction of Kutais,° etc. The British 
government, on the other hand, wanted to send a relief force to 
Erzerum via Trebizond and, it seems, to abandon Kars as a place 
of little importance, regarding Erzerum as the centre of resistance. 
At all events this dispute meant that the moment propitious for 
action was irretrievably lost. So that you may be rutty informed on 
the question I append here the crucial extracts. 

Stratford de Redcliffe to Clarendon. 28th June, 1855. 

**The Turkish ministers, who had talked of sending 10,000 men from 
Batoum f to Erzeroum, now, in their embarrassment, incline to another plan. They 
propose to form an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, and to concentrate there 
the corps of General Vivian—completed by a draft of 10,000 men from the 
Bulgarian army—that of General Beatson, and the detachment from Batoum, 
reduced to 7,000 men. The total of these combined forces would be about 30,000 
of all arms. Stationary they might operate as a diversion in favour of the army at 
Kars or Erzeroum; advancing by Kutais or Georgia they might either attack the 
Russians in the rear or force them to retreat.’* : 

2 Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Dera and Capitulation 
of Kars (below Marx quotes in English from this collection). - © K. Marx, “The Fall 
of Kars’. - © to the point - 4 Kulevi - © Kutaisi - Batumi 

Id to id., 30th June, 1855. 

*‘The meeting which I had previously announced, took place this morning at 
the Grand Vizier’s4 house on the Bosphorus. In addition to his Highness, the 
Seraskierb and Fuad Effendi were present. I was accompanied by Brigadier- 
General Mansfield.... It appears, that the Russians advancing from Gumri¢ with an 
amount of force varying from 20-30,000, had presented themselves before Kars; 
that a partial engagement of Cavalry had taken place, followed two days later by an 
attack, which had been repulsed, on the part of the enemy, and that the town was 
threatened with a siege.... It was clear, to all present, that whether the Russians 
besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its 
relief with all practicable despatch, and that of 3 possible modes of acting for that 
purpose, the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into 
Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative. To 
establish an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, would, at this unhealthy season, be 
equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction. The real question was, whether 
a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in 
time at Kutais to make an excursion into Georgia and threaten the communications 
of the Russian army.... The Turkish ministers proposed that the expeditionary 
force should be composed of 12,000 men from Batoum and the neighbouring 
stations; of the troops made over to General Vivian, and estimated at 10,000 of all 
arms; of General Beatson’s Irregular Cavalry, of 10,000 men to be detracted from 
the army in Bulgaria as the complement of the Turkish contingent; of 5,000 more 
derived from the same source; of an Egyptian regiment of horse now here, and of 
another regiment expected from Tunis. To these the Seraskier proposed to add 
2,000 Albanians by way of riflemen. These several forces ... would present a total 
of 44,000 men, not perhaps to be reckoned with prudence at more than 36,000 
effectives.’ * 

Id. to id., Ist July, 1855 

* ‘the proposed diversion at Redoute-Kaleh originated with the Porte.’ * 

Clarendon to Stratford de Redcliffe. July 13th, 1855. 

**.Her Majesty’s4 government are of opinion, that the wiser course would be 
to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an 
expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to 
Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from 
Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than that from Redoute-Kaleh to Tiflis,¢ and the 
march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum 
the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies 
instead of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the 
Russians, [...] it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected, than by 
divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive, the further 
it took place within the Turkish frontier. Trebizond is a place where supplies of all 
kinds might be landed etc.’ * : 

Id. to id., 14th July, 1855 (telegraphic). 

* ‘The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatch of the 
30th June and Ist inst., is disapproved. [...] Trebizond ought to be the base of 

a Ali Mehemet Pasha - > Rushdi Pasha, Turkish War Minister - ¢ now Leninakan - 
d Victoria - © Tbilisi 

operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the 
latter place against the Russians, it might fall back on Trebizond, where it would easily 
be reinforced.’ * 

Id. to id., 16th July, 1855. 

* ‘If, indeed, Omer Pasha ... should determine to take any part of his own 
army, with Tunisians and Albanians to Redoute-Kaleh, Her Majesty’s government 
would have nothing to say to that proceeding, but as regards the contingent under 
General Vivian and General Beatson’s Horse, Her Majesty's government abide by 
their opinion that they should be directed through Trebizond or Erzeroum.’* 

Lord Panmure to General Vivian, 14th July, 1855. 

** Y place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety 
lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as 
that contemplated by the Porte.... A coup de main by means of suddenly throwing 
an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack an enemy’s stronghold, is one 
thing, but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy’s country, and on his own 
territory to make war upon him, is quite another.’ * 

I must confess that Clarendon’s strategy strikes me as curious in 
the extreme, as does also the fine distinction drawn by Lord 
Panmure Carnot favouring the Sevastopol ‘coup de main’ against the 
Turkish plan for a strategic move in Georgia. 

If possible, then, an answer to these points by return. 

Salut. 

Your 
K. M. 
F. Engeis und K. Marx, Bd. 2, Stuttgart, ‘ . 4 . 
1913 Published in English for the first 
time