[Ryde,] 10 September [1857,] Thursday 

Dear Marx, 

Herewith ‘Bennigsen’ and ‘Barclay’.* I am taking a closer look at 
the Napoleonic generals, who will follow tomorrow or the day 
after. ‘Army’ ready shortly. 

Your 
F. E. 

All that I know about Bennigsen is that in 1807, at the 
beginning of the campaign under Kamenski, he commanded the 
First Army (there were 2 of them, the 2nd under Buxhdévden); on 
26 December 1806, he was attacked by Lannes near Pultusk and, 
having the superiority in numbers, he held out (because Napoleon 
attacked the other army with the main force) and then, assuming 
himself to be the victor, wanted to attack in strength. He was soon 
given the supreme command and attacked Napoleon’s winter 
quarters at the end of January 1807; was soon pressed hard and 
by mere chance evaded the trap which Napoleon had set for him; 
he fought at Eylau on 7 and 8 February.””’ On the 7th Napoleon 
captured Eylau (Barclay de Tolly, who directed the defence, 
distinguishing himself), and on the 8th the main engagement took 
place, Bennigsen being obliged to give battle in order to evade hot 
pursuit by Napoleon, and being saved from total defeat only by 
the toughness of his troops, the arrival of the Prussians under 
Lestock and the slowness with which Napoleon’s individual corps 
appeared on the battlefield. In the spring Bennigsen entrenched 
himself at Heilsberg, because he was the weaker; he did not 
attack Napoleon while part of the French army was absent, 
engaged in the siege of Danzig’; but when Danzig had fallen and 
the French army was united, he attacked (!), let himself be held up 
by Napoleon’s vanguard, which had only '/; the strength he had, 
and then be manoeuvred back into his entrenched camp by 
Napoleon. This Napoleon attacked without success on 10 [June] 

a The material that follows was used by Marx and Engels in their articles ‘Bennigsen’ 
and ‘Barclay de Tolly’. 

with only 2 corps and several battalions of the Guard, but on the 
very next day he forced Bennigsen out of his camp and caused 
him to beat a hasty retreat; however, Bennigsen suddenly went 
over to the offensive without waiting for a corps of 28,000 men, 
which was already in Tilsit, occupied Friedland and established 
himself there, with his back to the river and therefore with only one 
line of retreat, the Friedland bridge (always wrong to give battle 
before a defile). Instead of advancing rapidly before Napoleon 
could concentrate his corps, he let himself be held up for 5-6 
hours by Lannes and Mortier (‘coupe-gorge dans lequel Bennigsen 
s'était engage’, says Jomini of this position) until at about 5 
o’clock? Napoleon was ready and gave the order for the attack. 
The Russians were thrown back to the river, Friedland was 
captured, the bridge having been destroyed by the Russians 
themselves while their whole right wing was still on the other side 
and escaped only over fords and with the loss of its artillery. 
20,000 men lost. Bennigsen 

‘avait fait fautes sur fautes dans cette journée ... il y eut dans sa conduite un 
mélange d‘imprudence téméraire et d’irrésolution’.© 

In 1812 he followed Russian headquarters around inveighing 
against Barclay in order to get his place, intriguing against him 
until Alexander relieved Bennigsen of his post. In 1813 he was 
ordered to lead the reserve army out of Russia into Bohemia, and 
when it arrived it was disbanded and Bennigsen disappeared. 

Barclay de Tolly commanded a brigade at Eylau, etc. (see 
above); in 1812 commanded the First West Army and was War 
Minister; after Alexander’s departure until Kutuzov’s arrival was 
General-in-Chief, directed the retreat of the Russian army skilfully 
and had the great merit of resisting the clamourous demands of 
the Russians and of the whole headquarters to give battle. When 
he had to fight, as at Smolensk, he took up such a position that hé 
could not be involved in a decisive battle,'*? and when this could 
no longer be avoided—shortly before Moscow—he selected a 
position by Gzhatsk which was almost impregnable from the front 
and could be bypassed only by a very big detour. The army had 
already occupied this position when Kutuzov arrived, and natural- 
ly he would not agree to it because it was not he who had chosen 
it, and so the Russians had to fight in the unfavourable position at 

a ‘A robbers’ den into which Bennigsen has ventured’ (A. H. Jomini, Vie politique et 
militaire de Napoléon, t. 2, p. 414). - > 14 June 1807 - ¢ ‘committed mistake after 
mistake on that day ... his conduct was a mixture of rash imprudence and irresolution’ 
(A. H. Jomini, op. cit., t. 2, p. 421).