London, 17 October 1854 
28 Dean Street, Soho 

Dear Engels, 

Your enumeration of the Russian armed forces made today is 
FORMIDABLE.” BUT THERE REMAINS THIS ONE QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED, whether, 
even by exerting themselves to the utmost, they were capable of 
sending more than 200,000 men outside their own country. I am 
aware of no such instance. 

From the standpoint of the old policy—-and what else do 
England and France advocate, even though the English Ministry is 
not in earnest and Napoleon III a caricature—, a distinction must 
be drawn between the interests of England and those of France. 
With the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and the 
Baltic and the Russians driven out of the Crimea, the Caucasus 
and the provinces they had filched from Persia and Turkey, 
England would have ensured her supremacy at sea and her 
hegemony over the most cultivated part of Asia for another 50 
years. It would then be just like her old self to let the continentals 
exhaust themselves in a seven years’ and other wars—whose main 
theatre would be Germany and, to some extent, Italy—and, at the 
end of the: struggle, see neither Russia nor Austria nor France 
supreme on the Continent. For France, on the other hand, the 
real struggle would only begin with the destruction of Russia’s 
sea-power and her influence in South Asia. She would be under 
all the greater compulsion to break Russia’s power on land in 
order to extend her own power on the Continent, and thus be 
able to cast a corresponding weight onto the scales against 
England. Is there any guarantee that, once England has destroyed 
the Russians in the Baltic and the Black Sea and rendered them 
innocuous to herself, revolutions won’t break out on the Continent 
and be used by England as a pretext for another official alliance 
with Russia against the Continent? 

However, the real joke is that none of the Englishmen now in 
power—neither Chathams nor Pitts Jun., anp nor even Welling- 

a F. Engels, ‘The Military Power of Russia’. 

tons—seriously pursue even the destruction of Russian sea-power 
and Russian influence in Turkey-Persia-Caucasus. If their Har and 
HALF MEASURES Compel them to do so, they may consider going so far; 
but their half-measures and villainy will probably land them in 
trouble, which will provoke movements here at home. 

_ The following passages, quoted from the Archives des Affaires 
Étrangères in Paris—relating to the Seven Years’ War™!—show 
how English Ministers colluded with the enemy actually during the 
campaign and in matters relating to it. On 24 June 1762 the 
French Pompadour marshal Soubise,” when encamped at 
Wilhelmstal, had allowed himself to be surprised by the English, 
Prussian, Hanoverian, etc., allies and driven back across the Fulda. 
For parliamentary and dynastic reasons, Lord Bute, George III’s 
Prime Minister, desired peace, but, in view of the nation’s bellicose 
mood and its bias in favour of Frederick II, could not propose 
peace so long as the French persisted in letting themselves be 
beaten and in retreating instead of advancing. Choiseul, as you 
know, was then Minister of Foreign Affairs in France. In authentic 
publications from the French archives, which I quote verbatim, we 
find: 

‘Aprés l'affaire du 24 Juin les ministres anglais écrivirent 4 M. de Choiseul: Vous 
vous laissez battre et nous ne pouvons plus faire la paix, nous n’oserions pas la proposer au 
parlement. M. de Choiseul, désolé de voir rompue la négociation, engage le roi a écrire 
a M. de Soubise: “Mon cousin, je vous écris la présente, qu’aussitot que vous l’aurez 
regue vous passiez la rivi¢re du Fulde et que vous attaquiez les ennemis, sans compter 
sur les dispositions qui vous conviendront et quelque soit le succés, vous n’en serez pas 
responsable. Sur ce je prie Dieu etc.” M. de Choiseul écrivit: “La lettre du roi, M. le 
Maréchal, est trop formelle pour que j’aie rien 4 y ajouter. Mais je puis vous dire que 
quand l'armée du rot serait détruite jusqu’au dernier homme et qu’il fat obligé d’enlever une 
nouvelle, Sa Majesté n’en serait effrayée.”» 

@ An ailusion to Marshal Soubise’s liaison with Jeanne Antoinette Pompado- 
ur. - > ‘After the affair of 24 June, the English Ministers wrote to M. de Choiseul: 
You are permitting yourselves to be beaten and we can no longer make peace; we would not 
dare propose it to Parliament. M. de Choiseul, distressed at seeing negotiations broken 
off, urged the King to write to M. de Soubise: “Dear Cousin, I am writing to you so 
that, immediately on receipt of this letter, you should cross the River Fulda and 
attack the enemy without heed for such dispositions as you might think fit and, 
whatever the result, you will not be held responsible. As to which, I pray God, etc.” 
M. de Choiseul wrote: “The King’s letter, M. le Maréchal, is too explicit for me to 
have to add anything. But I can tell you that, sheuld the King’s Army be destroyed 
down to the last man and His Majesty be obliged to raise a new one, he would not be 

ws 

dismayed at it”. 

Here, then, we have the English Ministry demanding outright 
that an allied army, subsidised by them and consisting partly of 
Englishmen, should be buffeted by the French. They had earlier 
meddled in French military operations in the opposite direction 
because George wanted his Hanover to be spared. For in the same 
extraits* we read: 

‘En 1762 Mrs. d’Estrées et de Soubise ont commandé I’armée du haut Rhin de 
150 000 hommes, établie en Hesse, a Goettinguen, Mulhouse et Eisenach; Mr. de 
Condé a commandé celle du bas Rhin de 30 000 hommes. La cour ne leur demandait 
que de conserver Cassel] de Goettinguen jusqu’a la fin du novembre, d’évacuer ces 
deux places 4 cette époque pour se retirer sur Ohm en mettant Ziegenhayn en avant 
de leur premiére ligne. Ce plan de guerre avec puissance égale, avec 180 000 contre 
80 000 serait extraordinaire, s'il n’avait pas été fondé sur la promesse, que le ministére 
anglais nous faisait de conclure la paix avant le mois de juillet, si nous ne ferions point 
d’incursions dans le Hanoure.’» 

This latter piece of meddling by London might, at most, be 
regarded as normal, had the warring powers been on the point of 
entering into peace negotiations; the first case, on the other hand, 
would have cost Lord Bute his head and George, such was the 
mood at the time (think only or Wilkes' AND Juntus Letters”), his 
throne but, comme toujours’ it was almost a century before the 
matter came to light. We encounter another such example just 
before the outbreak of the anti-Jacobin war when the ‘liberal’ Fox 
sent a secret emissary “© to Catherine II telling her not to be misled 
by Pitt’s threats, but to gobble up Poland at her leisure for, should 
Pitt try to go to war against Russia, he would be brought down.™™* 
True, Fox was then in the ‘opposition’ and not the Ministry, and I 
adduce this example simply as evidence that the ‘outs’ are no less 
honourable than the ‘ts’. 

Hence I believe that, in assessing the allies’ conduct of the 
war—as indeed you infer from time to time in your articles—the 

@ extracts - > In 1762 Messieurs d’Estrées and de Soubise were in command of the 
Army of the Upper Rhine numbering 150,000 men, stationed in Hesse, at 
Gottingen, Milhausen and Eisenach; M. de Condé commanded that of the Lower 
Rhine, numbering 30,000 men. All that the Court asked of them was to hold Cassel 
and Géttingen until the end of November, to evacuate those two places at that time 
and withdraw to the Ohm, having Ziegenhayn before their front line. Even 
assuming equal strengths, let alone 180,000 against 80,000, this plan of campaign 
would have been extraordinary had it not been based on a promise made to us by 
the English Ministry to conclude peace before the month of July, provided that we made nao 
incursions into Hanover. - © Philip Francis - 4 as always - ¢ Robert Adair 

exchanges between Downing Street (especially as long as Palmer- 
ston is there) and Petersburg must always BE consmeRED. I AM SURE 
that, as soon as the armies find themselves in a critical position, 
the generals will sh... on the Cabinet and do their best, since 
Messrs the generals are seldom or never Jet into secrets and even 
risk their necks—witness the example of Admiral Byng,”*” whose 
instructions from the Admiralty of the day were no less deplorable 
than those of e.g. Dundas now. 

I shall try to get hold of Bauer’s latest production* and send it 
to you. 

I don’t know whether Napier” and other historians of the 
Franco-Spanish war have presented in its true light a fact for 
which there is ample proof in Spanish works, namely that, right up 
to the end of the war, apart from a brief spell when Napoleon 
himself was in command in Spain,” a fully organised republican 
conspiracy existed in the French army, aimed at overthrowing 
Napoleon and restoring the republic. Apropos. Authentic sources 
suggest that the great ‘Mina y Espoz’© was an egregious rogue, 
inferior to Joh. Becker, No military TALENT AT ALL, but cunning, 
worldly-wise and avant tout voleur. A careful study of Spanish 
revolutionary history reveals that it has taken the fellows some 40 
years to subvert the material basis of the priesthood and the 
aristocracy, but that during this time they have also succeeded in 
completely revolutionising the old social order. Incidentally, the 
provisional governments, etc., there show about as much sense as 
in France, etc. Considering the hot-bloodedness of the whole race 
and their indifference to bloodshed, it is typical that, up to the 
time of the civil war of 1834-40,°*’ it was precisely the revolution- 
ary party which claimed to have a monopoly of philanthropic 
gentleness, and for this it was punished acain and acain. 

Tomorrow Pieper will probably become a Resident Master 30 miles 
from London. Having lost his post as correspondent to the Union, 
he is forced to accept this appointment. In view of my wife’s 
‘condition’ she will be able to do little as a secretary. 

This is deplorable. 

I have had another dunning letter from the ‘friendly’ Freund, 
but no reply as yet from Lassalle. 

When your old man leaves again, or if he decides not to come, I 

@ Presumably De la dictature occidentale (see previous letter). - > W. F. P. Napier, 
History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the 
Year 1814. -° Espoz y Mina - 4 above all a thief 

247, Marx to Engels. 25 October 1854 491 

should, circumstances permitting, like to come to Manchester for a 
time. : 

Still no answer from Lassalle—nine weeks now. Nothing from 
Cluss. 

Schnauffer has died. 

Your 
K. M.