{[London,] 23 September 1851 
28 Dean Street, Soho 
Dear Engels, 

This business of the Paris document is quite stupid. The 
German papers, the Kolnische and the Augsburg; as might be 
expected of such undiscerning curs, attribute it to us. On the 
other hand, the wretched Willich & Co. are putting it about that 
we had had the rubbish denounced by acquaintances of ours in 
Paris. Qu’en dis-tu?? 

C. Schramm is also in jug. Habeat sibi.. Next time—when I’ve 
gleaned some further news—I’ll write and tell you more about the 
dirty business here. Today I shall regale you with the following 
résumé of Citizen Techow’s manifesto which occupies several 
columns in the New- Yorker Staatszeitungs and is entitled: ‘Umrisse 
des kommenden Kriegs. London, 7. August. (Ill-written, doctrinaire, 
sundry echoes of our Revue, seemingly intelligently developed, but 
insipid in content, undynamic in form, nothing striking.) I shall 
spare you Techow’s initial narrative of the revolution of 1849. 
These, for a start, are the general lessons he draws from it: 

1. Force can be resisted only by force. 

2. A revolution can only be victorious if it becomes general, i. e. 
if it is kindled in the larger centres of the movement (Bavaria- 
Palatinate, Baden) and if, furthermore, it is not the expression of 
one single oppositional faction. (Example: the June insurrection of 
1848.1°*) 

3. National struggles cannot be decisive because they are divisive. 

4. Fighting on the barricades has no significance other than to 
signal a population’s resistance and to put the power of 
governments, i.e. the troops’ frame of mind, to the test by 
confronting them with that resistance. Whatever the outcome of 
this test, the first and most important step in revolution always 
remains organisation for war, the raising of disciplined armies. For 
this alone makes an offensive possible and it is only in the 
offensive that victory lies. 

t 484 

a Kélnische Zeitung and Allgemeine Zeitung - » What do you make of that? - © Serve 
him right. See this volume, p. 459. - 4 of 6 September - © Neue Rheinische Zeitung. 
Politisch-Gkonomische Revue 

5. National constituent assemblies are not capable of organising 
for war. They invariably waste time on questions of internal politics, the 
time for whose solution does not come till after victory has been won. 

6. In order to be able to organise for war, a revolution must 
gain time and space. Hence it must attack politically, i. e. bring 
into its domain as many stretches of country as possible, since 
militarily it is at first always restricted to the defensive. 

7. In the republican, no less than in the royalist, camp 
organisation for war can only be based on compulsion. No pitched 
battle has ever been won by political enthusiasm or fantastically 
bedizened volunteers against disciplined and well-led soldiers. 
Military enthusiasm only sets in after a series of successes.— 
Initially there can be no better basis for such successes than the 
iron rigour of discipline. In armies, even more so than in the 
internal organisation of a country, democratic principles can only 
apply after the victory of the revolution. 

8. By its nature the coming war will be a war of extermination— 
of peoples or princes. From this follows the recognition of the 
political and military solidarity of all peoples, i. e. of intervention. 

9. Spatially the area of the coming revolution falls within the 
boundaries of that of the defeated ones: France, Germany, Italy, 
Hungary, Poland. 

From all this it follows that the question of the coming 
revolution is equally as important as that of a European war. 
Object of the war: a Cossack or republican Europe.* Theatre of 
the war—as before: Northern Italy and Germany. 

Mr ‘Techow now enumerates: 1}. the armed forces of the 
counter-revolution: 2. the armed forces of revolution. 

I. Armed Forces of the Counter-Revolution 

1. Russia Suppose that it could bring its armed forces up to 
300,000. That would be a great deal. How quickly and at what 
strength could it then appear on the Rhine or in Italy? At the best, 
in 2 months. Deduct at least '/; for sickness and for manning the 
lines of communication. That leaves 200,000 men who, 2 months 
after the action has begun, will make their appearance at the 
crucial points in the theatre of war. 

2. Austria. Estimates the strength of its army at 600,000 men. In 
1848 and ’49 employed 150,000 men in Italy. Radetzky is 
demanding that number even now, in time of peace. In Hungary 

a In Mémorial de Satnte-Héléne by Las Cases Napoleon is reported to have said: 
‘Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque’ (In fifty years Europe 
will be republican or Cossack). 

215, Marx to Engels. 23 September 1851 465 

he now requires, in peacetime, 90,000 men. During the last war, 
200,000 were not enough. '/; of this army consists of Hungarians 
and Italians, who will defect. At best, if the uprising does not take 
place simultaneously in Hungary and Italy, she will be able to 
reach the Rhine in 6 weeks with 50,000 men, having been delayed 
by sundry battles at the barricades. 

3. Prussia. Numbers 500,000 men, incl. of the replacement 
battalions and the Landwehr of the First Levy, which do not 
accompany the army into the field. For operations in the field, 
300,000 men, '/s line, '/ Landwehr. Mobilisation: 2 to 3 weeks. The 
officers’ corps in the Prussian army aristocratic, the non- 
commissioned officers bureaucratic, the masses ‘democratic’ through 
and through. The revolution has further opportunities in the 
mobilisation of the Landwehr. Disorganisation of the Prussian army 
by the revolution which will be mastered by the King* only under the 
protection of the Russian army and in order to lead the remnants of 
his army, in company with the Russians, against the rebels. Rhine 
Province, Westphalia, Saxony lost to him, thus the most important 
fortified lines and at least '/, of his army. He will need '/; against the 
uprisings in Berlin, Breslau,” the province of Posen and West 
Prussia. This leaves at most 100,000 who will be unable to appear on 
the battlefield any earlier than the Russians themselves. 

4. The German Federal Army. The regiments of Baden, 
Schleswig-Holstein, the Electorate of Hesse, and the Palatinate 
belong to the revolution. Only the remnants of the German 
Federal Army, following the fleeing princes, will reinforce the 
armies of reaction. Of no military significance. 

5. Italy. Italy’s only military force, the Sardinian army, belongs 
to the revolution. 

To sum up, then: 

Theatre of war in Germany 

150,000 Russians 
100,000 Prussians 
50,000 Austrians 300,000 men 

Theatre of war in Italy 

150,000° Austrians 
50,000 Russians 200,000 men 

Total: 500,000 men 

a Frederick William IV - > Polish name: Wroctaw - © In the original: 110,000 

II. Armed Forces of the Revolution 

1. France. 500,000 men at the disposal of the revolution from the 
very start. Of these, 200,000 on the Rhine, 100,000 in Italy (North) 
ensure that the revolution in Italy and Germany has time and space 
to organise itself. 

2. Prussia. a Gaol ie. half the defecting armies 
3. Austria. 100,000 organised. 
4. Small German armies: 100,000. 
This adds up as follows: 
Active French Army ..........000+ 300,000 men 
German revolutionary army .... 150,000 
Italy and Hungary ...............4- 200,000 ” 

650,000 ‘ 

Thus the revolution will lead 650,000 men against absolutism’s 
500,000. 

He concludes: 

“Whatever differences of nationality or principle may, after all, split the great 
party of the revolution—we have all of us learnt that the time to combat these 
different views amongst ourselves will only come after victory has been won’, etc., 
etc. 

What do you make of these calculations? Techow presupposes 
that there will be disorganisation on the part of the regular armies 
and organisation on the part of the revolutionary armed forces. 
That forms the basis of his calculation. However, you'll be better 
able than I to judge these statistics. 

But the essay’s actual political tendency, which emerges even 
more clearly in the exposition, is as follows: No revolution ever 
breaks out, i. e. there is no party struggle, no civil war, no class 
dissension, until after the ending of the war and the collapse of 
Russia. But in order to organise these armies for this war, force is 
needed. And where is the force to come from? From General 
Cavaignac, or some similar military dictator in France, who has his 
generals in Germany and Northern Italy. Voila la solution? which 
is not very far removed from Willich’s ideas. World war, i. e. as 
understood by your revolutionary Prussian lieutenant, domination, 

a There is the solution 

at least temporarily, of civilians by the military. But how any 
general, even were the old Napoleon himself to rise up out of his 
grave, is to get, not only the means, but also so much influence 
without preliminary and simultaneous internal struggles, without 
those damned ‘internal politics’, is not vouchsafed by the oracle. At 
least this future world-warrior’s ‘pious wish’, which finds its due 
political expression precisely in the classless politicians and 
democrats as such, has been clearly and frankly stated. 

Farewell. 
Your 

K. M. 

I have just received your letter which I acknowledge herewith. 

NB. You know, of course, that Stechahn or Steckhahn* has 
been arrested in Hanover and, before he joined our association, 
was corresponding with the Schapper committee, etc. Well, 2 
letters which he wrote to the secretary of this committee— Dietz, 
the cockroach—and which the latter received, are at present in 
the police inspector’s office in Hanover. We then entrusted Ulmer 
with the task of questioning Messrs Dietz & Co. on the subject at 
next Friday’s public sitting of the ‘refugee or émigré society’. This 
we countermanded again. Stechan has done a bunk and is, 
therefore, either on his way to London or already here. And who’s 
to say that Stechan won’t go to our enemies rather than to us? 

The Straubingers** are capables de tout.” Further proof: Mr Paul 
Stumpf who, during his short visit to London, did not come to see 
either myself or Lupus but consorted exclusively with the 
blackguards. 

I found your trade news exceedingly interesting. 

As for C, Schramm, he was carrying in his pocket-book a brief 
note from me establishing his bona fides. Those lines could have 
been as fatal Uriah’s letter.© They were originally given to him to 
make him think he was trusted and to disarm him, since the fellow 
could do us considerable damage. But at the same time a letter 
went off to Reinhardt warning him to be on his guard should he 

a should read Stechan - > capable of anything - © The bible relates that David sent a 
letter by Uriah condemning the bearer to death (2 Samuel 11:14, 15). 

(Schramm) present himself with the note, which was couched in 
general terms. The worst of it is that my name is at the bottom. It 

could earn Schramm 6 months. 
Addio!