Manchester, 10 March 1865 

Dear Weydemeyer, 

At last I have got down to answering your letter of 20 January. 
I had sent it to Marx who—partly because he was indisposed— 
kept it a very long while, tn racr did not return it until a week ago 
today,? so that my letter could no longer catch the steamer; I was 
too occupied with business on that day. 

My best thanks for your detailed answers to my questions.’ With 
the negligent reporting on militaria‘ in the papers here, I had lost 
the thread of all the ‘combined’ operations; I found the Red River 
expedition ' quite puzzling and I was not much wiser about 
Sherman’s move eastward from Vicksburg,” as there was no 
mention here of the Southern corps advancing from New Orleans. 
These combined operations with a point of meeting up not merely 
in the enemy’s territory but even behind his very lines show 
precisely how crude are the ideas of strategy of a nation that has 
no experience of war whatever. And yet if the noble Wrangel and 
Prince Frederick Charles had not been 2 to 1 in the Danish war 
they would have got up to much the same tricks. The battle at 
Missunde'” and the 2 inexplicable ‘demonstrations’ (to give a 
nameless thing some kind of name, nevertheless) against Düppel ”” 
before the assault were, if anything, even more childish. 

As to Grant’s conduct at Richmond,” I am trying to explain it in 
another way. I am completely of the same opinion as you that 
strategically the only correct thing was to attack Richmond from 
the west. However, it seems to me—insofar as one can form a 
judgement from such a distance and from such vague reports— 
that Grant preferred the eastern side for 2 reasons: 

1. because he could provision himself more easily there. Whilst 
on the western side he commanded only the roads to Fredericks- 
burg and to Tennessee (both crossing areas that had been exha- 
usted), on the eastern side he had the Fredericksburg line, and 
the York and James Rivers as well. Since the difficulty of supplying 
large armies with provisions has played an important part 

4 See this volume, p. 107. - > ibid., pp. 39-40. - © military matters 

throughout the war, I would not like to condemn Grant out of 
hand until I am clear on that score. You reproach him with having 
turned his back to the sea But if one controls the sea and has 
secure points of embarkation (Monroe and Norfolk), then that is 
an advantage. Compare Wellington’s campaigns in Spain and the 
Crimean campaign, where the Allies, who had been victorious on 
the Alma, positively ran away from the enemy in order to ensure 
their rear the protective cover of the sea south of Sevastopol.’ 
That the possession of the Shenandoah valley was the best way to 
secure Washington is clear. But? The question arises 

2. did Grant (and Lincoln) want to have Washington completely 
secure? On the contrary, it seems to me that with the loose 
constitution of the Federation and the great indifference to the 
war in some parts of the North, Lincoln never seriously wanted to 
drive the Confederates out of Richmond, that, on the contrary, he 
just wanted to pin them down in a position where they 
represented something of a threat to Washington, Pennsylvania 
and even New York. I believe that without that he would have got 
neither the recruits nor the money to finish the war. I certainly 
believe that Grant would have very much liked to have taken 
Richmond in the last 3-4 months, but he has not sufficient forces 
to do so. I see them estimated at from 70-90,000 men and Lee at 
50-70,000. If this ratio is approximately correct, then, with his 
attack acknowledged to be strategically wrong, he has done 
everything possible to frustrate any offensive defence by Lee, and 
to encircle Richmond on at least 3 sides out of 4. For, after 
distinguishing himself amongst all the other generals of North and 
South in the last 2 years just by his brilliant use of counter-attacks, 
I cannot believe that Lee would now abandon this tactic unless 
forced to. It was, however, a stupendous gain for the North if it 
succeeded in pinning down the South’s best army at Richmond, in 
one corner of the southern territory, because of a childish point 
d’honneur,* until the whole hinterland was cut off and militarily 
disrupted for the South, firstly by conquest of the Mississippi 
valley and then again by Sherman’s campaign, until finally, and 
this seems to be the case now, all the Union’s available troops are 
marching on Richmond and one decisive blow can put an end to 
the whole business. 

The latest news we have is from New York, dated 25 February, 
i.e. it includes the taking of Charleston and Wilmington, and 
Sherman’s advance from Columbia to Winnsborough. This Sher- 

@ prestige 

man appears to be the only fellow in the North who knows how to 
use his men’s legs to win battles. But he must, incidentally, have 
splendid lads under him. I can’t wait to see what will happen. If 
Lee assesses his desperate situation aright, he has no choice but 
to pack up and go south. But where to? The only way open to him 
is to Lynchburg and Tennessee; but that would be exceedingly 
hazardous to march into such a narrow mountain valley with just 
one railway, and Knoxville and Chattanooga fortified ahead of 
him. Besides, that would probably mean sacrificing Beauregard, 
Hardee and all other Confederate troops positioned in North 
Carolina, and exposing his flank to Sherman. Or he could advance 
from Petersburg, turn Grant’s left flank and march directly south 
against Sherman? Daring, but better; the only way to draw to 
himself the remnants of the fleeing armies, delay Grant by 
destroying the railways and bridges, and fall on Sherman with 
superior strength. If the latter offers battle to this combined force, 
he will certainly be beaten; if he falls back toward the coast, he will 
open up the road toward Augusta for Lee who will there be able 
to make his first respite. But Sherman and Grant would then 
surely join forces and Lee would then again be faced by a superior 
force, this time as good as in open country; for I do not believe 
the Confederates can again concentrate so many heavy guns in 
any one place inland as to organise another Richmond there. And 
even if they were to do so, they would only be jumping out of the 
frying-pan into the fire. Or else—invasion of the North? Jefferson 
Davis would no doubt be capable of this, but that would also spell 
the end within a fortnight. 

Now, however, Lee can only send some of his forces southwards 
as well to join with Beauregard and company and stop Sherman, 
and this seems to me the most probable course. In this case, 
Sherman will probably give them a proper ‘drubbing’, as they say 
in South Germany, and then Lee will really be stuck. But even if 
Sherman were to be defeated, Lee would only have gained one 
month’s respite, and the troops advancing from every part of the 
coast—not to mention Grant’s successes in the meantime against 
the weakened Richmond army—would soon make his position as 
bad as it had been before. One way or another, the game is up, 
and I look forward to the arrival of each srramer with expectancy; 
there is a positive deluge of exciting news just now. The strategic 
speculations of the numerous southern sympathisers here are most 
comical to listen to, they are all epitomised by the remark made by 
the Polish general Sznayde in the Palatinate who said after every 
rout, ‘We are doing exactly what Kossuth did.’ 

Incidentally, I am most grateful to you for your explanations 
about military organisation in America, it was only as a result of 
them that I obtained a clear picture of many aspects of the war 
there. I have been familiar with the canons Napoléon for many a 
long year, the English had already replaced them (light, smooth-bore 
12-pounders with a charge weighing '/, of the ball) when Louis 
Bonaparte re-invented them. You may have any number of 
Prussian howitzers, as they have all been withdrawn now and 
replaced by rifled 6-pounders and 4-pounders (which fire 
13-pound and 9-pound heavy shells). I am not surprised that the 
ELEVATION Of your howitzers is only 5°, it was no higher with the old 
long howitzers the French had (until 1856), and, if I am not 
mistaken, the English ones were only a little more. In general, the 
high-angle fire from howitzers has been used for a long time only by 
the Germans; its great unreliability in range-finding in particular 
had brought it into disrepute. 

Now to other matters. 

A Frankfurt lawyer ‘von Schweitzer’ had indeed established 
himself in Berlin with a little paper called Der Social-Demokrat and 
asked us to write for it. As Liebknecht, who is in Berlin, was to 
join the editorial board, we accepted.* But then, firstly, the little 
paper embarked on an insufferable cult of Lassalle, whilst we 
meanwhile received positive proof (the old Hatzfeldt woman told 
Liebknecht about it and urged him to work for the same ends) 
that Lassalle was much more deeply implicated with Bismarck than 
we had ever realised. There was an actual alliance between the two 
which had gone so far that Lassalle was to go to Schleswig- 
Holstein and there to advocate the annexation of the duchies by 
Prussia, while Bismarck had rather less definitely consented to the 
introduction of a sort of universal suffrage and more definitely to 
the right of combination and concessions regarding social policy, 
state support for workers’ associations, etc.** The foolish Lassalle 
had no guarantee whatever from Bismarck, au contraire? he would 
have been put in prison sans fagon‘ as soon as he became 
troublesome. The gentlemen on the Social-Demokrat knew this, but, 
for all that, they continued to intensify their cult of Lassalle. In 
addition to that, the fellows allowed themselves to be intimidated 
by threats from Wagener (of the Kreuz-Zeitung) into paying court 
to Bismarck, flirting with him, etc., etc. That was the last straw. 
We published the enclosed statement* and made our exit, with 

a See this volume, pp. 22, 23-24.-> on the contrary - ¢ without ceremony - 
4 K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘To the Editor of the Social-Demokrat’. 

Liebknecht doing likewise. The Social-Demokrat then declared that 
we did not belong to the Social-Democratic Party,’ which 
excommunication naturally did not bother us. The whole Lassal- 
lean General Association of German Workers? has taken such a 
wrong road that nothing can be done with it; however, it will not 
last long. 

I was asked to write about the military question, which I did, 
but, in the meantime, relations between us became more strained, 
and the article turned into a pamphlet,’ which I have now had 
published separately; I am now sending you a copy of it by the 
same steamer. To judge by the newspapers I receive, the thing 
appears to be creating quite a furore, especially on the Rhine, and 
it will, at any rate, make it very difficult for the workers to ally 
themselves with reaction just now. 

The Internationa, Association in London is going from strength 
to strength. In Paris especially, in London no less so. It is also 
going well in Switzerland and Italy. Only the German Lassalleans 
are refusing to bite, and in present circumstances least of all. 
However, we are again receiving letters and offers from all sides 
in Germany, a decisive change has taken place, and the rest will 
turn out right. 

The only reply I can make to your wife’s” question is that I have 
not yet entered into a state of holy matrimony. 

Photographs enclosed, of Lupus and myself, I have come out a 
little too dark; but it is the only one I have left. 

Schimmelpfennig has taken Charleston— Hurrah! 

Write soon. 

Your 
F. Engels