Friedrich Engels 

The German position in France 

The Pall Mail Gazette. 
Nr. 1830, 24. Dezember 1870 

The German position in France. 

The wear and tear of this war is beginning to tell upon Germany. The 
first army of invasion, comprising the whole of the line troops of both 
North and South, was of the strength of about 640,000 men. Two 
5 months of campaigning had reduced that army so much that the first 
batch of men from the depot battalions and squadrons—about one- 
third of the original strength—had to be ordered forward. They arrived 
towards the end of September and beginning of October, and though 
they must have amounted to some 200,000 men, yet the field battalions 
10 were far from being again raised to their original strength of 1,000 men 
each. Those before Paris counted from 700 to 800 men, while those 
before Metz were weaker still. Sickness and fighting soon made further 
inroads, and when Prince Frederick Charles reached the Loire, his three 
corps were reduced to less than half their normal strength, averaging 
15 450 men per battalion. The fighting of this month and the severe and 
changeable weather must have told severely upon the troops both before 
Paris and in the armies covering the investment; so that the battalions 
must now certainly average below 400 men. Early in January the re- 
cruits of the levy of 1870 will be ready to be sent into the field, after 
20 three months’ drill. These would number about 110,000, and give rather 
less than 300 men per battalion. We now hear that part of these have 
already passed Nancy, and that new bodies are arriving daily; thus the 
battalions may soon be again raised to about 650 men. If, indeed, as is 
probable from several indications, the disposable remainder of the 
25 younger undrilled men of the depot-reserve (Ersatz Reserve) have been 
drilled along with the recruits of the regular levy, this reinforcement 
would be increased by some 100 men per battalion more, making in all 
750 men per battalion. This would be about three-fourths of the original 

Friedrich Engels 

strength, giving an army of 480,000 effectives, out of one million of men 
sent out from Germany to the front. Thus, rather more than one-half of 
the men who left Germany with the line regiments or joined them since, 
have been killed or invalided in less than four months. If this should 
appear incredible to any one, let him compare the wear and tear of 5 
former campaigns, that of 1813 and 1814 for instance, and consider that 
the continued long and rapid marches of the Prussians during this war 
must have told terribly upon their troops. 

So far we have dealt with the line only. Besides them, nearly the whole 
ofthe landwehr has been marched off into France. The landwehr battal- 10 
ions had originally 800 men for the Guards and 500 men for the other 
battalions; but they were gradually raised to the strength of 1,000 men all 
round. This would make a grand total of 240,000 men, including cavalry 
and artillery. By far the greater part of these have been in France for 
some time, keeping up the communications, blockading fortresses, &c. 15 
And even for this they are not numerous enough; for there are at present 
in process of organization four more landwehr divisions (probably by 
forming a third battalion to every landwehr regiment), comprising at 
least fifty battalions, or 50,000 men more. All these are now to be sent 
into France; those that were still in Germany, guarding the French pris- 20 
oners, are to be relieved in that duty by newly formed "garrison battal- 
ions." What these may be composed of we cannot positively tell before 
we receive the full text of the order creating them, the contents of which, 
so far, are known by a telegraphic summary only. But if, as we know to 
be the fact, the above four new landwehr divisions cannot be raised 25 
without calling out men of forty and even above, then what remains for 
the garrison battalions of drilled soldiers but men from forty to fifty 
years of age? There is no doubt the reserve of drilled men in Germany is 
by this measure fully exhausted, and, beyond that, a whole year's levy of 
recruits. 30 

The landwehr force in France has had far less marching, bivouacking, 
and fighting than the line. It has mostly had decent quarters, fair feeding, 
and moderate duty; so that the whole of its losses may be put down at 
about 40,000 men, dead or invalided. This would leave, including the new 
battalions now forming, 250,000 men; but it is very uncertain how soon, 35 
even ifever, the whole of these can be set free for service abroad. For the 
next two months we should say 200,000 would be a high estimate of the 
effective landwehr force in France. 

Line and landwehr together, we shall thus have in the second half of 
January a force of some 650,000 to 680,000 Germans under arms in 40 
France, of which from 150,000 to 200,000 are now on the road or pre- 

The German position in France 

paring for it. But this force will be ofa far different character from that 
which has hitherto been employed there. Fully one-half of the line battal- 
ions will consist of young men of twenty or twenty-one years—untried 
men of an age at which the hardships of a winter campaign tell most 
5 fearfully upon the constitution. These men will soon fill the hospitals, 
while the battalions will again melt down in strength. On the other hand, 
the landwehr will consist more and more of men above thirty-two, mar- 
ried men and fathers of families almost without exception, and of an age 
at which open-air camping in cold or wet weather is almost sure to pro- 
10 duce rheumatism rapidly and by wholesale. And there can be no doubt 
that the greater portion of this landwehr will have to do a deal more 
marching and fighting than hitherto, in consequence of the extension of 
the territory which is to be given into its keeping. The line is getting 
considerably younger, the landwehr considerably older than hitherto; the 
15 recruits sent to the line have barely had time to learn their drill and 
discipline, the new reinforcements for the landwehr have had plenty of 
time to forget both. Thus the Germany army is receiving elements which 
bring its character much nearer than heretofore to the new French levies 
opposed to it; with this advantage, however, on the side of the Germans, 
20 that these elements are being incorporated into the strong and solid ca- 
dres of the old army. 

After these, what resources in men remain to Prussia? The recruits 
attaining their twentieth year in 1871, and the older men of the Ersatz 
Reserve, the latter all undrilled, almost all of them married, and at an age 

25 when people have little inclination or ability to begin soldiering. To call 
these out, men who have been induced by long precedent to consider 
their relation to the army an all but nominal one, would be very unpopu- 
lar. Still more unpopular would it be if those able-bodied men were called 
out who for one reason or another have escaped the liability to service 

30 altogether. In a purely defensive war all these would march unhesitating- 
ly; but in a war of conquest, and at a time when the success of that policy 
of conquest is becoming doubtful, they cannot be expected to do so. A 
war of conquest, with anything like varying fortunes, cannot be carried 
out, in the long run, by an army consisting chiefly of married men; one or 

35 two great reverses must demoralize such troops on such an errand. The 
more the Prussian army, by the lengthening out of the war, becomes in 
reality a "nation in arms," the more incapable does it become for con- 
quest. Let the German Philistine shout ever so boisterously about Alsace 
and Lorraine, it still remains certain that Germany cannot for the sake of 

40 their conquest undergo the same privations, the same social disorganiza- 
tion, the same suspension of national production, that France willingly 

Friedrich Engels 

suffers in her own self-defence. That same German Philistine, once put in 
uniform and marched off, may come to his cool senses again on some 
French battlefield or in some frozen bivouac. And thus it may be, in the 
end, for the best if both nations are, in reality, placed face to face with 
each other in full armour.