Friedrich Engels 

The military situation in France 

The Pall Mail Gazette. 
Nr. 1806, 26. November 1870 

The military situation in France. 

Yesterday we called attention to the fact that since the surrender at Sedan 
the prospects of France had much improved, and that even the fall of 
Metz, and the setting free thereby of some 150,000 German soldiers, does 
not now look the crushing disaster it appeared to be at first. If we recur 5 
to the same subject to-day, it is in order to prove still more, by a few 
military details, the correctness of this view. 

The positions of the German armies on the 24" of November, as far as 
they can be made out, were as follows: — 

Investing Paris: The Third Army (2°, 5", 6", and 2: Bavarian corps, 10 
the 21, the Wurtemberg, and Landwehr Guard divisions) and the 
Fourth Army (4%, 12", and Guards corps); in all seventeen divisions. 

Army of Observation, protecting this investment: To the north, the 
First Army (1st and 8" corps); to the west and south-west, Duke of 
Mecklenburg's army (17 and 22 divisions, and 1" Bavarian corps); to 15 
the south, the Second Army (3, 9", and 10" corps, and a division of 
landwehr, a detachment of which was so severely handled at Chätillon by 
Ricciotti Garibaldi); in all fifteen divisions. 

On special duty, in the south-east of France, the 14" corps (Werder's, 
consisting of two divisions and a half), and 15" corps; in Metz and about 20 
Thionville, the 7" corps; on the line of communication, at least a division 
and a half of landwehr; in all eight divisions at least. 

Of these forty divisions of infantry, the first seventeen are at present 
fully engaged before Paris; the last eight show by their immobility that 
they have as much work cut out for them as they can manage. There 25 
remain disposable for the field the fifteen divisions composing the three 
armies of observation, and representing with cavalry and artillery a total 
force of some 200,000 combatants at most. 

The military situation in France 

Now, before the 9» of November, there appeared to be no serious 
obstacle to prevent this mass of men from overrunning the greater part of 
central and even southern France. But since then things have changed 
considerably. And it is not so much the fact of Von der Tann having been 
beaten and compelled to retreat, or that of D'Aurelle having shown his 
ability to handle his troops well, which has inspired us with a greater 
respect for the Army of the Loire than we confess we had up to that day; 
it is chiefly the energetic measures which Moltke took to meet its expect- 
ed march on Paris which have made that army appear in quite a different 
light. Not only did he find it necessary to hold in readiness against it, 
even at the risk of raising de facto the investment of Paris, the greater 
portion of the blockading forces on the south side of the town, but he 
also changed at once the direction of march of the two armies arriving 
from Metz, so as to draw them closer to Paris, and to have the whole of 
the German forces concentrated around that city; and we now hear that, 
moreover, steps were taken to surround the siege park with defensive 
works. Whatever other people may think, Moltke evidently does not 
consider the Army of the Loire an armed rabble, but a real, serious, 
redoubtable army. 

The previous uncertainty as to the character of that army resulted to a 
great extent from the reports of the English correspondents at Tours. 
There appears to be not one military man among them capable of distin- 
guishing the characteristics by which an army differs from a mob of 
armed men. The reports varied from day to day regarding discipline, 
proficiency in drill, numbers, armament, equipment, artillery, transport 
—in short, regarding everything essential to form an opinion. We all 
know the immense difficulties under which the new army had to be 
formed; the want of officers, of arms, of horses, of all kinds of matériel, 
and especially the want of time. The reports which came to hand, prin- 
cipally dwelt upon these difficulties; and thus, the Army of the Loire was 
generally underrated by people whose sympathies do not run away with 
their judgment. 

Now the same correspondents are unanimous in its praise. It is said to 
be better officered and better disciplined than the armies which suc- 
cumbed at Sedan and in Metz. This is no doubt the case to a certain 
extent. There is evidently a far better spirit pervading it than ever was to 
be found in the Bonapartist armies; a determination to do the best for the 
country, to co-operate, to obey orders on that account. Then this army 
has learned again one very important thing which Louis Napoleon's 
army had quite forgotten—light infantry duty, the art of protecting 
flanks and rear from surprise, of feeling for the enemy, surprising his 

Friedrich Engels 

detachments, procuring information and prisoners. The Times' corre- 
spondent with the Duke of Mecklenburg gives proofs of that. It is now 
the Prussians who cannot learn the whereabouts of their enemy, and have 
to grope in the dark; formerly it was quite the reverse. An army which 
has learned that has learned a great deal. Still, we must not forget that 5 
the Army of the Loire as well as its sister Armies of the West and North 
has still to prove its mettle in a general engagement and against some- 
thing like equal numbers. But, upon the whole, it promises well, and 
there are circumstances which make it probable that even a great defeat 
will not affect it as seriously as such an event does most young armies. 10 
The fact is that the brutalities and cruelties of the Prussians, instead of 
stamping out popular resistance, have redoubled its energies; so much so 
that the Prussians seem to have found out their mistake, and these burn- 
ings of villages and massacres of peasants are now scarcely ever heard of. 
But this treatment has had its effect, and every day the guerrilla warfare 15 
takes larger dimensions. When we read in the Times the reports about 
Mecklenburg's advance towards Le Mans, with no enemy in sight, no 
regular force offering resistance in the field, but cavalry and francs-ti- 
reurs hovering about the flanks, no news as to the whereabouts of the 
French troops, and the Prussian troops kept close together in pretty large 20 
bodies, we cannot help being reminded of the marches of Napoleon's 
marshals in Spain, or of Bazaine's troops in Mexico. And, that spirit of 
popular resistance once roused, even armies of 200,000 men do not go 
very far towards the occupation of a hostile country. They soon arrive at 
the point beyond which their detachments become weaker than what the 25 
defence can oppose to them; and it depends entirely upon the energy of 
popular resistance how soon that line shall be reached. Thus even a 
defeated army soon finds a safe place from the pursuit of an enemy if 
only the people of the country arise; and this may turn out to be the case 
now in France. And if the population in the districts occupied by the 30 
enemy should rise, or merely his lines of communication be repeatedly 
broken, the limit beyond which the invasion becomes powerless will be 
still more contracted. We should not wonder, for instance, if Meck- 
lenburg's advance, unless powerfully supported by Prince Frederick 
Charles, turned out to have been pushed too far even now. 35 
For the present everything of course hinges upon Paris. If Paris hold 
out another month-and the reports on the state of provisions inside do 
not at all exclude that chance—France may possibly have an army in the 
field large enough, with the aid of popular resistance, to raise the invest- 
ment by a successful attack upon the Prussian communications. The ma- 40 
chinery for organizing armies appears to be working pretty well in Fran- 

The military situation in France 

ce by this time. There are more men than are wanted; thanks to the 
resources of modern industry and the rapidity of modern communicati- 
ons, arms are forthcoming in unexpectedly large quantities; 400,000 rifles 
have arrived from America alone; artillery is manufactured in France 
5 with a rapidity hitherto quite unknown. Even officers are found, or 
trained, somehow. Altogether, the efforts which France has made since 
Sedan to reorganize her national defence are unexampled in history, and 
require but one element for almost certain success—time. If Paris holds 
out but one month more, that will go much towards it. And if Paris 
10 should not be provisioned for that length of time, Trochu may attempt to 
break through the investing lines with such of his troops as may be fit for 
the work; and it would be bold to say, now, that he cannot possibly 
succeed in it. If he should succeed, Paris would still absorb a garrison of 
at least three Prussian army corps to keep it quiet, so that Trochu might 
15 have set free more Frenchmen than the surrender of Paris would set free 
Germans. And, whatever the fortress of Paris can do if defended by 
Frenchmen, it is evident that it could never be successfully held by a 
German force against French besiegers. There would be as many men 
required to keep the people down within as to man the ramparts to keep 
20 offthe attack from without. Thus the fall of Paris may, but does not of 
necessity, imply the fall of France. 

It is a bad time just now for speculating on the probability of this or 
that event in the war. We have an approximative knowledge of one fact 
only—the strength of the Prussian armies. Of another, the strength, nu- 

25 merical and intrinsic, of the French forces, we know but little. And, 
moreover, there are now moral factors at work which are beyond all 
calculation, and of which we can only say that they are all of them 
favourable to France and unfavourable to Germany. But this much ap- 
pears certain, that the contending forces are more equally balanced just 

30 now than they ever have been since Sedan, and that a comparatively 
weak reinforcement of trained troops to the French might restore the 
balance altogether.