Karl Marx 
British Commerce 
September 8, 1860 

British Commerce. 

From an Occasional Correspondent. 
London, Sept. 8, 1860. 

The Tribune was the first paper which called attention to the serious decline 
of the British export trade to the East Indies, a decline most conspicuous 
in the great staple articles, viz.: cotton goods and cotton yarns. The reaction 
hence arising has begun to be felt in Lancashire and Yorkshire, at the very 
moment when the home market is contracting in consequence of a harvest 
which is full five weeks later than that of last year, and, despite the improving 
prospects since Thursday, the 30th of August, will, at all events, fall below 
an average yield. The British Chambers of Commerce have, consequently, 
taken the alarm, and assailed the central government with protests against 
the New Indian Customs Act, by which the duty upon the staple imports from 
Great Britain was increased from 5 to 10 per cent; that is to say, at arate 
of 100 per cent. The English press, which, till then, had cautiously abstained 
from touching this point, has thus at last been compelled to break through 
its reserve. The London Economist treats us to the "Trade of India," and 
"The Cause of its Depression." Apart from the circumstance of The Econo- 
mist being considered the first English authority in matters of this kind, its 
articles on India derive peculiar interest from their connexion with the 
writing-desk of Mr. Wilson, the present Indian Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
The first part of the article, an attempt at disengaging the late Indian customs 
legislation from all responsibility for the present contraction of the Indian 
market, is best answered by the necessity to which the Governor-General 
at Calcutta has been put, of convening, at Calcutta, a committee, to consist 
of representatives of the Revenue Boards of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, 
and their respective Chambers of Commerce, and to be charged with the task 
of revising and readjusting the tariff lately introduced. That tariff, as I stated 
when first introducing this subject to your readers, did not create the Indian 
commercial crisis, whose outbreak it, however, accelerated by its sudden 
introduction at a time when the Indian commerce was already bloated to a 
size beyond its natural capacity. The glut of British commodities in the Indian 
market and of Indian commodities in the English market is avowed by The 
Economist. "We believe," he says, "it will be admitted on all hands that the 
enormous profits made in the Indian trade during a portion of last year, led 
to a sudden and large increase of supplies to the market, more than was 
required for any consumption, as far as this country was concerned, and to 
a very extensive speculative trade by the native capitalists for the supply 
of the markets in the interior from the seaports. For example, the exports 
of cotton piece goods to British India amounted in 1859 to the value of 
£12,043,000 against £9,299,000 in 1858 and £5,714,000 in 1857; and of yarns 
the exports were in 1859 £2,546,000 against£1,969,000in 1858,and£1, 147,000 
in 1857. For a long time goods were taken off as rapidly as they arrived, and 
as long as prices continued to rise, there was no lack of speculative Mahajans 
to make purchases and to consign to the markets of the interior; and there 
is no doubt, from the best information we can obtain, that large stocks of 
goods accumulated at all the markets in the North- West. Upon this point the 
testimony of Mirzapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Umritsur and 
Lahore is uniform." 
The Economist then proceeds to detail some circumstances which con- 
tributed to consolidate in a certain sense the glut in the Indian markets. The 
main cause—the continuance of large supplies from England—it does not even 
allude to. In the first instance, then, the Autumn crops of 1859 throughout 
northern India, consequent upon the drouth generally prevailing, f ell much 
below an average, and were affected both as to quality and quantity. Hence 
a high range of the prices of provisions through the Winter and Spring, which, 
later on in the season, was still more enhanced by famine prospects. Further- 
more, with scarcity and high prices, there was raging the disease. "Through- 
out the whole of the North-West, the cholera prevailed to so alarming an 
extent among the densely-peopled cities, that the ordinary business of life 
was in many cases suspended, and the population fled as from an invading 
enemy." But, worst of all, "Upper India was threatened, for a month or six 
weeks before the departure of the last mail, with a misfortune most appalling. 
The rains, upon which alone the Autumn crops depend, usually fall by the 
middle or at latest the end of June. This year, up to the middle of July, not 
a drop of rain had fallen. From the north-west frontier down to Lower 
Bengal, from the Kyber Pass to Benares, including the great Doabs of the 
Sutiej, the Jumna, and the Ganges, all was one arid, hard, and immovable 
surface of parched earth. It was only in the few exceptional places which 
were moistened by the rivers passing through them, or by the tributaries of 
the great irrigation works, the Jumna and Ganges canals, that any cultivation 

was possible. The prospect of a famine equal to that of 1837 and 1838 created 

on all hands the greatest apprehension. Prices rose still more. Cattle were 
dying in numbers or being drawn to the hills in place of tilling the soil, and 
the people are described as being on the borders of starvation." The worst 
apprehensions, however, have been set to rest, according to the telegraphic 
accounts received and published at Calcutta during the eight days previous 
to the departure of the last mail, which left on the 27th of July. Rains had 
at last fallen copiously, and in proper time to avert a famine, if not to secure 
a good crop. 

The details given by The Economist go far to prove that for the next future 
there exists not the least prospect of arevival in the Indian trade, which had 
already fallen off about £2,000,000 for the first half year of 1860 as compared 
with the first half year of 1859. The Australian markets exhibit also all the 
symptoms of contraction consequent upon over-trade. The trade with 
France, which was all at once to assume immense proportions by virtue of 
the Commercial Treaty, has on the contrary declined by more than 
£1,000,000, as will be seen by the following statement: 

Six months ended June 30, 1859. 1860. 

Imports from France £ 9,615,065 £ 8,523,983 
Exports to France. 2,358,912 2324,665 
Total, £11,973,977 £10,848,648 

The heavy decline in the British import trade from France maybe accounted 
for by the high prices of provisions in France during this year, while in 1859 
corn and meal had formed a principal item in the French exports to England. 
Great stress is laid on the increased rate at which the United States, inreturn 
for the present large exports of provisions to the United Kingdom, are 

presumed to become consumers of English manufactures. Butthough there 
will always be some proportion between the exports and the imports of a 
country, the above conclusion seems somewhat rash, if we are to judge from 
the movements of the Anglo-American trade in the first half years of 1859 

and 1860. There we shall find: 
1859. 1860. 
British Exports to the United States. £1 1,625,920 £ 9,366,647 
British Imports from United States. 17,301,790 25,618,472 

so that during the same epoch, in which the British imports from the United 
States increased by more than £8,000,000, the British exports to the United 
States decreased by more than £2,000,000. The only branches of international 
British trade which have enlarged are the Anglo-Turkish trade, the Anglo- 
Chinese trade, and the Anglo-German trade. Now Turkey is just being 
convulsed by Russian and French interference. China is convulsed by the 
English themselves, and Germany, while suffering in many parts from a 
deficient harvest, stands on the eve of grave political convulsions at home, 
and serious collisions abroad. As to the Anglo-Chinese trade, I still remark 
that some part of its increase is certainly due to the war demand; that part 
of the increased exports to China were only so many goods abstracted from 
the Indian market, and thrown, by way of experiment, on the Chinese market, 
and, lastly, that the import from China continues to be of much more im- 
portance than the export to China, as will be seen from the following fig- 
ures: 

Six months ending June 30, 

1859. 1860. 
Imports from China, including Hong Kong £5,070,691 £5,526,054 
Exports to China, exclusive of Hong Kong 1,001,709 1,622,525 
Exports to Hong Kong. 976,703 1236262 
Total! £7,049,103 £8,384,841 

Meanwhile, unexpected failures in most branches of business continue to 
feed a general feeling of distrust. The subjoined summary of the till now 
ascertained liabilities and assets of the late failures in the leather trade will 
show that the assets, on an average, but amount to 5s. 6d. in the pound, 
leaving to the holders of the bills of the fallen firms a loss of £1,471,589. 

Liabilities. 
Finns. 

9 £1,530,991 

15 499,806 

34 £2,030,797 

Assets. 
Amounts. In the £. Deficiency. 
9 £342,652 4s. 6d. £1,188,339 
Winding up or compromised . .. 15 216,556 8s. 8d. 283,250 
Total. |... aa 34 £559,208 5s. 6d. £1,471,589