Friedrich Engels 
Garibaldi's Movements 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 6031, 23. August 1860 

Garibaldi's Movements. 

From Our Own Correspondent. 
London, August 8, 1860. 

The crisis in Southern Italy is at hand. If we are to trust the French and 
Sardinian papers, 1,500 Garibaldians have landed on the coast of Calabria 
and Garibaldi is hourly expected. But even if this news be premature, there 
can be no doubt that Garibaldi will have transferred the seat of war to the 
Italian mainland before the middle of August. 

To understand the movements of the Neapolitans, it must be kept in mind 
that there are two opposing undercurrents at work in their army: the 
moderate Liberal party, officially in power, and represented by the Ministry, 
and the Absolutist camarilla, to which most of the chiefs of the army are 
attached. The orders of the Ministry are counteracted by the secret orders 
of the Court and by the intrigues of the generals. Hence conf licting move- 
ments and conflicting reports. To-day we hear that all royal troops are to 
leave Sicily, to-morrow we find them preparing a fresh base of operations 
at Melazzo. This state of things is inherent to all half-and-half revolutions; 
the year 1848 furnishes examples of it all over Europe. 

While the ministry offered to evacuate the island, Bosco, who seems to 
be the only resolute man among the parcel of old women bearing Neapolitan 
generals’ epaulettes, quietly attempted to turn the north-eastern corner of 
the island into a stronghold from which the reconquest of the island might 
be attempted, and for this purpose marched to Melazzo with a picked 
force of the best men to be had in Messina. Here he fell in with Medici's 
brigade of Garibaldians. He did not, however, venture any serious attack on 
them until Garibaldi himself had been sent for and brought some reenf orce- 

Garibaldi's Movements 

ments. Here the insurgent chief, in his turn, attacked the royals, and, after 
an obstinate fight of above twelve hours' duration, defeated them com- 
pletely. The forces engaged on either side were about equal, but the position 
held by the Neapolitans was very strong. However, neither positions nor men 
could withstand the dash of the insurgents, who drove the Neapolitans right 
through the town into the citadel. Here nothing remained to them but to 
capitulate, and Garibaldi allowed them to embark, but without arms. After 
this victory, he marched at once to Messina, where the Neapolitan general 
consented to give up the outer forts of the town on condition of not being 
molested in the citadel. This citadel being unable to hold more than a few 
thousand men, will never be a serious obstacle of any offensive operations 
of Garibaldi, and he therefore did quite right in sparing the town of a bom- 
bardment, which would inevitably have followed any attack. As it is this 
series of capitulations at Palermo, Melazzo, and Messina, must do more to 
destroy the confidence of the royal troops in themselves and in their chiefs, 
than twice as many victories. It has become a matter of course that the 
Neapolitans always capitulate before Garibaldi. 

From this moment it became possible for the Sicilian Dictator to think of 

landing on the continent. His steam navy does not as yet appear to be suffi- 
ciently large to warrant him in attempting a landing further north, somewhere 
within six or eight marches from Naples, say in the Bay of Policastro. He, 
therefore, seems to have decided on crossing the Straits where they are 
narrowest, that is, on the extreme north-eastern point of the island, north 
of Messina. On this point he is said to have concentrated about 1,000 vessels, 
very likely most of them fishing and coasting felucas, such as are common 
on those coasts, and if the landing of the 1,500 men under Sacchi be con- 
firmed, they will form his advanced guard. The point is not the most favorable 
for a march on Naples, as it is the part of the mainland furthest away from 
the Capital; but if his steam navy cannottransport something like 10,000 men 
at once, he cannot select any other, and then he has at least this advantage, 
that the Calabrians will at once join him. If, however, he can cram some ten 
thousand men on board his steamers, and can rely on the neutrality of the 
Royal navy (which appears resolved not to fight against Italians), then he 
may still land a few men in Calabria as a feint, and himself go with the main 
body to the Bay of Policastro, or even to that of Salerno. 

The force at present at the disposal of Garibaldi consists of five brigades 
of regular infantry, of four battalions each, together with ten battalions of 
Cacciatori dell' Etna; of two battalions of Cacciatori delle Alpi, the élite of 
his army, of one foreign (now Italian) battalion under Col. Dunne, an English- 

40 man ; of one battalion of engineers ; one regiment and a squadron of cavalry ; 

and four battalions of field artillery; in all 34 battalions, four squadrons, and 

Friedrich Engels 

32 guns, equal to some 25,000 men in all, of whom, rather more than onehalf 
are North Italians, the rest Italians. The whole, nearly, of this force might 
be used for the invasion of Naples, as the new formations now being organ- 
ized will soon suffice to observe the citadel of Messina, and protect Palermo 
and the other towns from insult. Still, this force looks very small when 
compared with what the Neapolitan Government disposes of on paper. 

The Neapolitan army consists of three regiments of the guard, fifteen ditto 
of the line, four foreign regiments, each of two battalions, or together 
44 battalions ; of 13 battalions of chasseurs ; of nine regiments of cavalry, and 
two of artillery—in all 57 battalions, and 45 squadrons, onthe peace-footing. 
Inclusive of the 9,000 gens d'armes, who also are organized ona perfectly 
mihtary footing, this army, on the peace-footing, counts 90,000 men. But, 
during the last two years, it has been raised to the full war complement; third 
battalions of regiments have been organized, the depot squadrons have been 
put to active service, the garrison troops have been completed; and this army 
now consists, on paper, of above 150,000 men. 

But what an army is this! Externally fine to look at for a martinet, there 
is no life, no spirit, no patriotism, no fidelity in it. It has no national mihtary 
traditions. When Neapolitans fought as such, they were always defeated. 
Only in the wake of Napoleon were they ever associated with victory. It is 
not a National army. It is a purely Royal army. It was raised and organized 
for the express and exclusive purpose of keeping down the people. And even 
for that it appears unfit; there are plenty of anti-royalist elements in it, and 
they now break forth everywhere. The sergeants and corporals, especially, 
are Liberals almost to aman. Whole regiments shout "Viva Garibaldi!"No 
army ever underwent such disgrace as this one did from Calatafimi to 
Palermo; and if the foreign troops and some Neapolitans fought well at 
Melazzo, it is not to be forgotten that these picked men form but a small 
minority of the army. 

Thus it is almost certain that, if Garibaldi lands with a force sufficient to 
obtain a few successes on the continent, no concentration of Neapolitan 
masses will be able to oppose him with any chance of success; and we may 
next expect to hear that he is continuing his triumphal career, with 15,000 men 
against tenfold odds, from the Scylla to Naples.