Karl Marx 
The Russo-French Alliance 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 6025, 16. August 1860 

The Russo-French Alliance. 

From an Occasional Correspondent. 
London, August 3, 1860. 

The observations made in my last letter upon the secret connection between 

the Syrian massacres and the Russo-French alliance, have received unex- 5 
pected confirmation from the other side of the Channel, in the shape of a 
pamphlet published at Mr. Dentu's on Tuesday last, entitled "La Syrie et 
l'Alliance Russe,"and ascribed to the penmanship of M.Edmond About. 

M. Dentu, as you are aware, is the French Government publisher, who has 
issued all the semi official pamphlets which from time to time initiated 10 
Europe into the "studies" just indulged at the Tuileries. The above mentioned 
pamphlet derives a peculiar interest from the circumstance that its publica- 
tion followed closely on the love-letter addressed by the Man of December 

to Persigny, which was destined to mesmerize John Bull, and of which Lord 
John Russell, at the very moment he refused to lay it before the House, 15 
forwarded a copy to The London Times. The subjoined extracts contain the 
substance of La Syne et L’AlHance Russe: 

"As at the time of the Crusades, Christian Europe is moved by the horrible 
crimes of which Syria has just been the scene. Seven hundred thousand 
Christians are delivered up to the merciless fanaticism of two millions of 20 
Mussulmans, and the Turkish Government, by its inexplicable inaction, 
appears to avow itself their accomplice. Assuredly, France would have 
forgotten all her traditions had she not immediately claimed the honor of 
protecting the lives and properties of those who, in former days, were the 
soldiers of Peter the Hermit and Philip Augustus... It is, therefore, high time 25 
to think of a remedy for a situation which could not last any longer without 

The Russo-French Alliance 

leading to a great calamity—the total exterrnination of the Christian subjects 
of the Porte. The expedition which the Turkish Government talks so much 
about is totally insufficient to restore order. The Powers which have co-reli- 
gionists in Syria and which are justly alarmed for their safety, must be 
prepared bodily to interfere. If they tarried, it would no longer be time to 
protect victims; their only duty would be to avenge martyrs. 

Two nations are especially interested in defending the Cross on those 
distant shores—France and Russia. What would be the probable consequence 
of the union of their arms, and the result on the ulterior organization of 
Europe? This is what we are about to investigate. 

At certain periods of history we find that under the impulse of certain laws 
of attraction and agglomeration peoples form political combinations un- 
known to the past. We are ‘assisting’ at one of these critical moments in the 
life of mankind. The Syrian question is but one of the knots of a very com- 
plicated situation. The whole of Europe is in a state of expectation and 
anxiety, waiting for a vast solution which may settle the basis of a lasting 
peace both in Europe and in the East. Now that object can only be attained 
in so far as the organization of our continent shall be in conformity with the 
wishes and requirements of the present questions of nationalities struggling 
beneath the yoke. Hostile religious tendencies, incompatibility of tempers, 
languages radically opposed to each other, keep up in certain European 
States an undercurrent of agitation, which prevents the restoration of con- 
fidence and hinders the progress of civilization. Peace, that ultimate term 
of the ambition of all Governments, can only be permanently secured when 
the permanent causes of disturbance we have just indicated shall have dis- 
appeared. We therefore wish to arrive at a double result: 

1. Wherever sucha thing is possible, to favor the formation of a homogene- 
ous and national State, the mission of which would be to absorb and con- 
centrate, in a mighty unity, populations having ideas or tendencies in com- 
mon. 

2. To try and carry out that principle without having recourse to arms. 

At first sight, France and Russia appear to have realized the ideal of 
monarchies. Though 400 leagues divide them, these two Powers have arrived 
by the most different roads atthat unity which alone is able to create durable 
empires, not ephemeral circumscription, the limits of which may be changed 

any day by the fortune of war... The Czars, meditating for the last 
135 years over the will of Peter the Great, have not ceased to cast covetous 
glances on European Turkey. . . . Must France continue to protest against 

the pretensions of the Czars to the decaying empire ofthe Sultan? We think 
not. If Russia lent us her cooperation for the reannexation of the Rhine 
frontier, it appears to us that a kingdom would not be too high a price for 

Karl Marx 

her alliance. Thanks to such a combination, France might resume her real 
limits, as traced by the geographer Strabo, 18 centuries ago. (Then follows 
a quotation from Strabo, enumerating the advantages of Gaul as the seat of 
a powerful empire). It can easily be understood that France should desire 
to reconstruct that divine work (I presume the frontiers of Gaul), thwarted 
for so many centuries by the fraud of man, and thisis so muchin the nature 
of things, that at a period when we were not thinking of territorial aggrandize- 
ment, Germany was nevertheless subject to periodical fits of uneasiness, and 
flung at us, as a pledge of defiance, Becker's patriotic song = We know 
that we are not alone in having plans of aggrandizement. Now, if Russia 
Tegards Constantinople in the same way as we look at the Rhine, can one 
not turn these analogous pretensions to some account, and force upon 
Europe the acceptance of a combination which would allot Turkey to Russia, 
to France that Rhine frontier, which Napoleon I. considered in 1814 as a sine 
qua non condition of his existence as a sovereign? 

There are only two milhons of Turks in Europe, whereas there are thirteen 
millions of Greeks, whose spiritual head is the Czar The Greek in- 
surrection, which lasted nine years, was but the prelude of the movement 
which the massacres in Syria may actupon as a signal to break out. The Greek 
Christians are only waiting for an order from their Chief at St. Petersburg, 
or their Patriarch at Constantinople, to rise against the infidels; and there 
are but few far-sighted politicians who do not anticipate a solution of the 
Eastern question in a sense favorable to Russia, and that at no distant time. 
It is not, therefore, surprising, that at the call of their co-religionists, and 
encouraged by the predictions of Stalezanew, the Russians should be pre- 
pared to cross the Pruth at the first moment. 

If we cast an eye on our frontiers, the considerations which justify our 
tendencies appear to be quite as important as those which actuate Russia. 
Letus set aside all historical recollections, and all geographical motives, take 
one by one the provinces inclosed by the Rhine, and examine the reasons 
that militate in favor of their annexation. 

First we meet with Belgium. In good faith it is difficult to question the 
striking analogy which has induced some historians to call the Belgians the 
French of the North. In fact, throughout that country the educated classes 
use no language but French, and the Flemish dialect is only understood by 
the lower classes of the population in some few localities. Moreover, Belgium 
is throughout attached to Catholicism, and it is to France, her sister, by origin, 
idiom and religion, that she is indebted for her independence. We will not 
recall the fact that Belgium, conquered by our armies in 1795, formed nine 
French departments until 1814. Nevertheless, it would appear that our yoke 
was not so very heavy; as in 1831, Belgium having been unable to obtain from 

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the Great Powers the permission of being annexed to France, offered, by 
a vote of the two Chambers, the Belgian Crown to the Duke de Nemours, 
the son of the King of the French. The refusal of the latter induced them 
subsequently to offer it to the Duke of Saxe Coburg, now Leopold I.; but 
the precedent we refer to appears to us highly important, and it leads to the 
presumption that if Belgium were consulted she would not be less generous 
than Savoy, and would prove once more the attraction of the prestige which 
the greatness of France causes her to feel. The opposition of a few mem- 
bers of the upper classes would be very soon stifled by popular acclama- 
lions. 

Before falling into the sea, the Rhine divides itself into three branches, 
two of which run in rather northerly directions—the Yssel, which flows into 
the Zuyderzee, and the Wahl, a confluent of the Meuse. If France had once 
more to trace her limits, might she not take the line of the Rhine, properly 

so called, instead of that of the Wahl or the Yssel, so as to slice off as little 
as possible of Southern Holland? That is what she would assuredly do. 
Moreover, it is not on the side of Holland that it is indispensable to rectify 
our frontier by taking the line of the Rhine as a basis. Belgium, with her 
present frontiers, would be enough to satisfy the want of extension which 
of late has been so loudly claimed by public opinion. The line of the Scheldt 
was, moreover, the frontier conceded to France by the treaty of Liineville 
in 1801." 

Next follows a short passage demonstrating, by similar arguments, the 
necessity of annexing the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, "which formed under 

the empire the Département des Forêts.” The pamphleteer then proceeds 
to show the necessity for the annexation of Rhenish Prussia: 

"Belgium and Luxemburg once in our power, our task is not over. ... To 
complete our frontiers we must not take less than two-thirds of Rhenish 
Prussia, the whole of Rhenish Bavaria, and about one-third of the Grand 
Duchy of Hesse. All these territories formed, under the Empire, the de- 
partments of Roer of the Rhine, and Moselle of the Sarre, of Mont Tonnerre, 
and the Grand Duchy of Berg. In 1815, they were distributed among several 
possessors, to render their recovery by us more difficult. A remarkable fact 
is, that these provinces, annexed to the French Monarchy, were but a few 
years in direct intercourse with us, and, nevertheless, our temporary stay 
among them has left the most enduring marks. What sympathy is lavished 
on the French traveler in those parts, we willingly appeal to those who have 
traveled there. For the last 45 years nota single French soldier has garrisoned 
those towns on the banks of the Rhine, and yet it is marvelous to see the 
touching reception our uniform meets with there. Catholics like us—like us 
they are Frenchmen. Was knot atAix-la-Chapelle that our Emperor, Charle- 

Kar Marx 

magne, held his Court?... Contiguous to France, the Rhenish Provinces must 
become the political, as they are the natural dependencies of France." 

The writer then returns to Russia, and after showing that the Crimean War 
forms no barrier to the alliance between France and Russia, as they had not 
then come to an understanding, gives the following piece of information 
concerning one of the claims of France to the gratitude of Russia: 

"It must be kept in mind that France did not lend herself to the plans of 
England in the Baltic. We do not know whether an attack on Cronstadt would 
have succeeded in any case; it was not attempted, thanks, we have reason 
to believe, to the opposition of France." 

After an excursion to the Italian campaign, the writer does not doubt that 
in the end Prussia will join the Franco-Russian alliance: 

"But to attach the Cabinet of Berlin to our pohcy, it must be withdrawn 
from the influence of England. How can this be brought about? By so 
contriving that Prussia shall cease to be our neighbor on the Rhine, and by 
promising to support her legitimate pretensions to preponderance in Ger- 
many. The exchange of these Rhenish provinces causes Bavaria and Prussia 
to take their compensations from Austria. The English alliance can only 
secure to Prussia the status quo—the French alliance throws open to her a 
boundless horizon. 

The alliance between France, Russia, and Prussia loyally concluded, as 
we have reason to hope it will be, the consequences that flow from it are 
most natural. ... We have demonstrated above what 1,800 years ago Strabo 
had laid down as beyond question—that the Rhine was the natural frontier 
of Northern France. Now Prussiais the greatest sufferer from this extension 
of territory. For the last 45 years she has kept the Rhine as the dragon used 
to keep watch over the garden of the Hesperides. Let this cause of hostility 
between France and Prussia disappear; let the left bank of the Rhine become 
French once more; in exchange for her good offices, Prussia would find a 
compensation in Austria—that Power would be punished for her bad faith 
and clumsiness. Let all be organized for a durable peace. 

Let the populations be consulted, so that no violent annexation should take 
place. With Russia at Constantinople, France on the Rhine, Austria dimin- 
ished, and Prussia preponderating in Germany, where can any cause for 
disturbance or revolution be found in Europe? Would England dare to 
contend single-handed against Russia, Prussia, and France? We cannot admit 
such a thing, If, however, it did happen, if Great Britain should venture to 
commit such an imprudence, she might receive a severe lesson. Gibraltar, 
Malta, the Ionian Islands are a security for her keeping quiet; those are the 

weak points of her armor. But though she will be reduced to a sterile agitation 40 

in her island, and be compelled to be a passive spectator of what takes place 

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on the continent, she will barely be permitted to offer her opinion, thanks 
to the five or six thousand men she will send to Syria. 

The moment has arrived when our policy must be clearly defined. It is in 
Syria that France must pacifically conquer the frontier of the Rhine, by 
cementing the alliance of Russia. But we must take care not to give Russia 
an unlimited extension. The provinces north of the Bosphorus must suffice 
for her ambition. Asia Minor must remain neutral ground. Were it, indeed, 
possible to look at a practical subject in a poetical and practical light, we 
would say our choice is made; a man has just come forward who seems the 
incarnation of the idea we should wish to see represented in Syria—Abd- 
el-Kader. He is sufficiently orthodox as a Moslem to conciliate the Mussul- 
man population; he is sufficiently civilized to distribute justice equally to 
all; he is attached to France by ties of gratitude; he would protect the 
Christians, and reduce to obedience the turbulent tribes ever ready to disturb 
the repose of Asia Minor. To make of Abd-el-Kader the Syrian Emir would 
be a noble reward for our prisoner's services."