Friedrich Engels 
The Moorish War 
January 18, 1860 

The Moorish War. 

The campaign in Morocco has at last fairly begun, and with this beginning 
disappear all the romantic hues in which the Spanish press and Spanish 
popular enthusiasm had dressed out O'Donnell, who sinks down into a 
passable average general; instead of the chivalry of Castile and Leon, we 
have the Princesa Hussars, and instead of Toledo blades, rifled cannon and 
cylindro-conoidal shot do the work. 

About the 20th of December the Spaniards began to construct a road, 
practicable for artillery and carriages, which was to lead across the hilly 
ground south of the camp before Ceuta. The Moors never attempted to 
destroy the road; they attacked, sometimes, Gen. Prim, whose division 
covered the working parties, sometimes the camp; but always without suc- 
cess. None of these engagements rose beyond the dimensions of skirmishes 
of the advanced guard; and in the most serious of them, on December 27, 
the Spanish loss did not exceed 6 killed and 30 wounded. Before the close 
of the year the road, itself not more than two miles long, was completed; 
but a fresh onset of storms and rain prevented the army from moving. In 
the mean time, as if it was meant to give the Moorish camp notice of the 
impending movements of the army, a Spanish squadron of one sailing vessel 
of the line, 3 screw frigates, 3 paddle steamers, in all 246 guns, ran up to the 
mouth of the Tetuan River, and bombarded, on the 29th December, the forts 
atits mouth. They were silenced, and the earthworks destroyed in about three 
hours; it is not to be forgotten that they were the same forts which the French 
had bombarded about a month before with a far inferior force. 

The weather having become fair on the 29th, the Spanish army at last began 

to move on the Ist of January. The First Corps of two divisions, under 
Echague, which had been the first to land in Africa, remained in the lines 
in front of Ceuta. Although it had suffered much by disease in the first weeks, 

it was now pretty well acclimatized, and, with reénf orcements received since, 
numbered 10,000 men, considerably more than either the Second or the Third 
Corps. These two corps, commanded, the Second by Zabala, and the Third 
by Ros de Olano, together with Prim's reserve division, in all 21,000 to 
22,000 men, marched out on the first day of the new-year. Every man carried 

six days’ rations, while a million of rations, or one month's provisions for 
the army were shipped on board transports to accompany the army. With 
Prim for an advance guard, supported by Zabala, and Ros de Olano bringing 
up the rear, the high ground south of Ceuta was passed. The new road led 
down toward the Mediterranean within two miles from the camp. There a 

semi-circular plain extended for some distance, the chord being formed by 
the sea, and the periphery by broken ground rising gradually into rugged 
mountains. No sooner had Prim's division fairly debouched from the camp 
than the skirrnishing began. The Spanish Light Infantry easily drove back 
the Moors into the plain, and thence into the hills and brushwood, which 
flanked their line of march. Here it was that by some misunderstanding two 
weak squadrons of Princesa Hussars were led to charge, and did so with such 
a spirit that they passed right through the Moorish line into their camp; but 
getting everywhere into broken ground, and finding nowhere either cavalry 
or infantry in practicable ground at which they could charge they had to turn 

back whith a loss of seven or nearly all of their officers, beside privates. So 
far, the fight had been carried on principally by the infantry in skkmishing 
order, and a battery or two of mountain artillery, supported here and there 
by the effect—more moral than physical—of the fire of a few gunboats and 
steamers. It appears that O'Donnell intended to halt in the plain, without 
occupying permanently, as yet, the ridge forming the boundary of this plain 
to the south. In order, however, to secure his position for the night, he 
ordered Prim to dislodge the Moorish skirmishers from the northern slope 
of the ridge and then to fall back about dusk. Prim, however, who is the 
greatest fighting man in the Spanish army, engaged in a serious encounter, 

which ended in his taking possession of the whole top of the ridge, though 
not without severe loss. His advanced guard encamped on the ridge and 
threw up field-works on its front. The Spanish loss amounted, that day, to 
73 killed and 481 wounded. The position gained that day was the one known 
by the name of Castillejos, from two white buildings, the one on the inner 
slope near the plain, and the other on the ridge conquered, in the afternoon, 
by Prim. The official designation of this camp, however, appears to be 
Campamento de la Condesa. On the same day, the Moors had attempted a 
slight diversion against the camp before Ceuta, by attacking both the extreme 
right redoubt and the interval between the two extreme left redoubts. They 

were, however, easily repulsed by Echague's infantry and artillery fire. 

The active army remained three days in the Camp de laCondesa. The field 
artillery and a rocket battery, as well as the remainder of the cavalry (the 
whole cavalry brigade consists of eight squadrons of hussars, four of cuiras- 
siers without cuirasses, and four of lancers, in all 1,200 men), arrived in the 
camp. The siege train alone (among which was a battery of rifled 12-pound- 
ers) was still behind. On the 3d, O'Donnell reconnoitered toward Monte 
Negro, the nextrange of mountains to the South. The weather continued fine, 
hot at noon; with very heavy dews at night. Cholera was still rife among one 
or two divisions, and some corps had suffered severely from sickness. The 
two battalions of engineers, for instance, who had been very severely 
worked, were reduced from 135 men to 90 men per company. 

So far, we have detailed accounts; for what follows, we are reduced to 
meager and not quite consistent telegrams. On the 5th, the army advanced. 
On the 6th, it was encamped "to the north of the Negro valley, having 

traversed the passes without opposition." Whether this means that the Monte 
Negro ridge had been passed, and the army was encamping on its southern 
slope, is very uncertain. On the 9th the army was, we are told, one league 
from Tetuan, and an attack of the Moors had been repulsed. On the 13th, 
the whole of the positions of Cabo Negro were carried, a complete victory 
was obtained, and the army was before Tetuan; so soon as the artillery could 
be brought up, the town would be attacked. On the 14th, the division of 
Gen. Rios, ten battalions strong, which had been concentrated at Malaga, 
landed at the mouth of the Tetuan River, and occupied the forts destroyed 
by the fleet a fortnight before. On the 16th, we are informed that the army 
was on the point of passing the river and attacking Tetuan. 

To explain this, we may state that there are four distinct ridges of hills to 
be passed between Ceuta and Tetuan. The first immediately south of the 
camp and leading to the plain of Castillejos; the second closing that plain 
to the south. These two were taken by the Spaniards on the Ist. Still further 

south, and running perpendicular to the Mediterranean shore, is the ridge 
of Montenegro, and parallel to this range, only further south still, comes 
another and higher ridge ending on the coast, in the Cape called Cabo Negro, 
south of which flows the Tetuan River. The Moors, after hanging on the 
flanks of the invading army during the Ist, changed their tactics, removed 
further south, and attempted to bar the road to Tetuan in front. It was 
expected that the decisive fight for the possession of this road was to come 
off in the passes of the last or Cabo Negro ridge, and such seems to have 
been the case on the 13th. 

The tactical arrangements of these combats do not appear very creditable 
to either party. From the Moors we cannot expect anything but irregular 
fighting, carried on with the bravery and cunning of semi-savages. But, even 

in this they appear deficient. They do not seem to show that fanaticism which 
the Kabyles of the Algerian coast-ridges, and even of the Riff, have opposed 
to the French; the long, unsuccessful skirmishing in front of the redoubts 
near Ceuta seem to have broken the first ardor and energy of most of the 
tribes. Again, in their strategical arrangements, they do not come up to the 
example of the Algerians. After the first day, they abandon their proper plan, 
which was to harass the flank and rear of the advancing column, and to 
interrupt or menace its communication with Ceuta; instead of this, they work 
hard to gain a march upon the Spaniards, and to bar their road to Tetuan in 
front, thus provoking what they ought to avoid—a pitched battle. Perhaps 
they may yet learn that with such men, and in such acountry as they have, 
petty warfare is the proper way to wear out an enemy who, whatever his 
superiority in discipline and armament, is hampered in all his movements by 
immense impedimenta, unknown to them, and which it is no easy matter to 
move in a roadless and inhospitable country. 

The Spaniards have gone on as they commenced. After lying idle two 
months at Ceuta, they have marched twenty-one miles in sixteen days, 
advancing at the rate of five miles in four days! With all due allowance for 
difficulties of roads, this is still a degree of slowness unheard of in modern 
warfare. The habit of handling large bodies of troops, of preparing extensive 
operations, of marching an army which, after all, scarcely equals in strength 
one of the French army corps in the last Italian campaign, seems to have 
become quite lost with Spanish Generals. Otherwise how could such delays 
arise? On the 2d of January O'Donnell had all his artillery at Castillejos, with 
the exception of the siege train, but still he waited two days longer, and only 
advanced on the 5th. The march of the column itself appears to be pretty 
well arranged, but with such short marches this could scarcely be otherwise. 
When under fire the Spaniards appear to fight with that contempt of their 
enemy which superior discipline and a series of successful combats cannot 
fail to give; but it remains to be seen whether this certainty of victory will 
hold good when the climate and the fatigues of a campaign, which is sure 
to end in harassing, petty warfare, will have reduced both the morale and 
the physique of the army. As to the leadership, we can, so far, say very little, 
the details of all but the first engagement in the field being still deficient. This 
first fight, however, exhibits two conspicuous blunders—the charge of the 
cavalry, and the advance of Gen. Prim beyond bis orders; and if these things 
should turn out to be regular features of the Spanish army, so much the worse 
for them. 

The defense of Tetuan will very likely be a short but an obstinate one. The 
works are no doubt bad, but the Moors are capital soldiers behind ramparts, 
as has been proved in Constantine and many other Algerian towns. The next 

mail may bring us the news that it has been stormed. If so, we may expect 
a lull in the campaign, for the Spaniards will require time to improve the road 
between Tetuan and Ceuta, to form Tetuan into a second base of operations, 
and to await reénforcements. Thence the next move will be upon Larache 

or Tangier.