Friedrich Engels 
The Asiatic campaign 


New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4585, 29. Dezember 1855 


The Asiatic campaign. 


As soon as Omer Pasha, by establishing his headquarters at Sukum- 
Kaleh, had clearly indicated what plan of campaign he was going to 
follow, we said that his movement upon Tiflis, the Russian main base of 

5 operations, was the first movement in this war which had a distinct stra- 
tegical character, by leaving all minor points out of consideration, and 
directing itself straight at the fountain-head of all Russian power south 
of the Caucasus. That is its merit; but in order to relieve Kars, its decisive 
effects must develop themselves within the period that Kars would be 

10 able to hold out; and that, again, must depend entirely upon the state of 
provisions at Kars, of which we had but little knowledge. 

Thus it was that we expressed ourselves upon this subject, at the time 
the British press, overjoyed at being able to recount a maneuver based 
upon a correct strategical idea, were busy informing the public that no 

15 better or safer plan could have been found to relieve Kars than this 
movement; that to march from Batoum upon Kars would have been to 
give the Russians the certainty of a safe retreat; but that Omer Pasha, by 
marching straight on Tiflis, had made sure of capturing alive General 
Muravieff, all his army, and every other Russian who might still be south 

20 of the Caucasus. For, indeed, would not Muravieff abandon the siege of 
Kars and return by forced marches to Tiflis as soon as he should hear of 
this daring maneuver? And who, of course, was to have the credit of this 
ingenious and bold march, but Col. Simmonds and the remainder of the 
British officers at Omer Pasha's headquarters, and consequently above 

25 all, John Bull, whom they represented. 

However, in spite of the strategy of the British newspapers, Muravieff 
did raise the blockade of Kars, for siege there was none. On the contrary, 
he made every preparation to pass the Winter before the town, never 


781 


Friedrich Engels 


minding the operations of Omer Pasha in Mingrelia and the terrible 
English Napoleons of his staff. And that he was perfectly justified in 
doing so, we showed a few days since by our approximative statement of 
the forces at the disposal of Prince Bebutoff, the commander in Georgia 
and Mingrelia. A General having at his disposal two Russian divisions of 5 
the line, at least one of the reserve, and from twenty to thirty battalions 
of militia, has no reason of Omer Pasha being able to endanger Tiflis 
with an army numbering at the outset but 30,000 to 40,000 Turks; and 
Gen. Muravieff might well be tranquil in his camp before Kars. From 
that moment, then, the fate of Kars was decided, unless the weather 10 
should drive off the blockading army; or relief should come from Erze- 
roum. Now, as to the first, the underground huts constructed by the 
Russians were proof that they intended to risk the chances of the weath- 
er; and as to the second eventuality, Selim Pasha at Erzeroum never 
could concentrate more than some 6,000 regular and 5,000 irregular 15 
troops, with which body he would never have had the courage to under- 
take even a reconnoissance. The Russians, too intent to insulate Kars 
from all chances of supply, did not venture to establish themselves west 
of the Soghanly Dagh, (a range of hills separating the Valley of the Kars 
Cha'i from that of the Araxes,) except by the detachment advancing from 20 
the Valley of the Murad Cha'i to Deli Baba. The British officers at Er- 
zeroum, seeing that this detachment was posted some thirty miles in 
advance of the Russian position at the Soghanly Dagh, and badly con- 
nected with it, proposed to attack it; and as this detachment could not 
muster more than 1,000 men, with perhaps 2,500 more in reserve, the 25 
matter was feasible enough. But Selim Pasha would not do anything of 
the kind. No move was made, and the convoys of provisions collected at 
Erzeroum, and destined ostensibly for Kars, were not even sent off. 
Thus, it was but a question of provisions. As soon as the supply should 
fail at Kars the town would have to surrender; and this is said to have 30 
taken place. The garrison had for a long time been on short rations—first 
one half, afterward one third of the normal daily quantity of food; at last 
everything was exhausted. Under these circumstances the capitulation of 
the town appears at least very probable. Gen. Kmety (Ismail Pasha) with 
a few officers is reported to have made his way through the Russian 35 
lines—how, is not yet explained—and brought the news to Erzeroum 
that the commander had sent a flag of truce to Muravieff to treat for a 
capitulation. Authentic news on the subject, however, we have not yet 
received. 

The defense of the place deserves great credit. Not only did the 40 
garrison, though charged with the defense of extended and faultily- 


782 


The Asiatic campaign 


constructed lines, cheerfully stand by its arms, day and night, and when 
the assault came, repelled it with glory; it also endured the pangs of 
hunger with an obstinacy worthy the greatest praise. On the other hand, 
Gen. Muravieff deserves equal credit for his tenacity of purpose. After 
5 the attack of Sept. 29, ending so disastrously for the Russians, their 
retreat from Kars was expected on all hands. But, instead of retreating, 
Muravieff reestablished the blockade far more severely than before, sent 
away his unnecessary baggage, and made himself and his army at home 
all around the town. Three enemies menaced him, the strength of none of 

10 which he could easily calculate with any degree of accuracy. Selim Pasha 
at Erzeroum, Omer Pasha in Mingrelia, and the Winter of the Araunian 
Hills. But he appears to have kept steadily before his eyes the real state of 
the case. The danger from Selim Pasha's, as well as from Omer Pasha's 
armies was distant and uncertain, while the fall of Kars was near and 

15 certain, if the blockade could only be kept up. He was, therefore, perfect- 
ly right to disregard his military enemies. As to the effects of Winter, his 
army, three times as strong as the garrison of Kars, was sure, under all 
circumstances, of a safe retreat to Gumri (Alexandropol), its main depot, 
and one of the strongest fortresses in Russia. Gumri is but forty miles 

20 from Kars, and whatever harm the climate might do the Russians, it 
could never prevent them from regaining this fortress where they would 
find everything they required besides, perfect security from all attacks. 
Thus Muravieff s resolution to see the end of the blockade of Kars was 
perfectly justified. 

25 The loss of Kars is not of any immediate strategical importance to the 
Turks. The season is too far advanced for further active operations on the 
Armenian highlands. The possession of Kars secures to the Russians, it is 
true, a strip of land forty miles broad by a hundred long; but this strip 
has been virtually in their possession for more than a year. To them it is 

30 most important that their immediate base of operations is thereby ad- 
vanced forty miles and their next line of attack pushed from the Kars 
Chai to the Araxes. What they will make of this advantage depends upon 
the circumstances under which next Spring's campaign is opened. And 
there is no possibility of foretelling them. The fall of Kars suggests the 

35 question whether Omer Pasha was justified in undertaking his eccentric 
operation in Mingrelia—eccentric with regard to the menaced points of 
Turkey in Asia, when Kars was so hard pressed. 

Omer Pasha concentrated his army at Sukum-Kaleh from the middle 
of September to the middle of October. It was not till about the 15th or 

40 20th of October that he was in a position to advance. If he had made 
Batoum his maritime base of operations, he could not have advanced a 


783 


Friedrich Engels 


day sooner. Now, he had to decide upon his course during the last half of 
September, when Kars was hard pressed, and a regular siege expected, 
and before Muravieff made his assault. What was he to do?—to take the 
only regular army Turkey still possessed, to march it by either Ardahan 
or Olti upon Kars, a march into the interior of some 180 or 200 miles 5 
with no other object but to relieve a place which might fall long before he 
could reach it? And supposing Kars had fallen, what was he to do with 
his troops then?—to retire to Erzeroum and spend his days in squabbles 
for precedence with Selim Pasha, who is Mushir or Field-Marshal of 
equal rank with himself? Certainly not. Far better to leave Kars to its fate 10 
and advance on a line which in the long run must certainly menace 
Russian power in Transcaucasia more than any other. Tiflis, after all, is 
the heart of that Power, and the shortest road to Tiflis is that from 
Redout-Kaleh by Kutais and Gori. 

So far so good. But now comes the execution, and here we recognise at 15 
every step our old friend Fabius Cunctator, Omer Pasha. Slow and sure 
is his motto, although he has scarcely any respectable hostile forces in his 
immediate neighborhood. He is an Austrian, and he recollects the old 
German popular song: "Jog on quietly, my boys, jog on slowly so that 
the Austrian militia can keep pace with you." In accordance with this 20 
principle, we find that his semi-official chronicler, Mr. L. Oliphant, now 
of The Times, informs us in the very first sentence of his last letter, dated 
Sugdidi, Nov. 11: "The day after a battle is generally a day of rest." 
Generally! What would old Napoleon or even Blucher have said to this 
new strategical rule? To judge from this new principle, there never were 25 
such blunders made as Napoleon's pursuit of the Prussians in 1806, from 
Jena to Stettin, or the one in which Blucher repaid him, from Waterloo to 
Paris. But we manage things better in the Caucasus. Pursuit is nonsense. 
Two days we rest, and during the following three we advance fully fifteen 
miles to Sugdidi. At that rate, with good luck, we may be in Kutais 30 
sometime in January, which is near forty miles further on. 


184