The war in Asia. 


While the campaign in the Crimea may be regarded as ended, and new 
developments of importance are not to be expected, in Asia the struggle 
still remains in uncertainty, which may not be entirely cleared up, at least 
for us on this side of the ocean, for some time to come. As a means of 
shedding light upon the subject, and of enabling our readers the better to 
appreciate the facts when they become known, we will now lay before 
them the most accurate information within our command as to the re- 
lative strength of the parties at the immediate seat of war. 

The Russian army of the Caucasus, including Georgia and Erivan, is 
composed in time of peace of three divisions of infantry, or six brigades, 
containing twelve regiments—which in turn include forty-eight active 
service battalions, with one Grenadier reserve brigade, consisting of three 
battalions of Grenadiers and three of carabineers and one battalion of 
rifles—in all, fifty-five battalions. Every one of these regiments has also 
two reserve battalions, making with eight battalions of combined reser- 
ves, thirty-six battalions. Then there are forty-seven battalions of the 
Caucasian line, and a militia force occupying in common with the regular 
line troops the lines of forts north and south of the Caucasus and along 
the coasts of the Black and Caspian seas. The total infantry is thus seen 
to be 138 battalions. Of cavalry there is one regiment of dragoons, three 
Mussulman and two Kurdish regiments, and a variable number of Cos- 
sacks. Of artillery, there is one division of fourteen batteries, light, heavy, 
and mountain guns. Of all these troops, the three divisions of infantry 
(numbered in the official army lists as the 14th, 20th and 21st,) with their 
reserves, the dragoons and artillery, are mostly made up of Russians and 
Poles, while the line battalions and the Mussulmans and Kurdish horse 
are recruited from the natives. The depots of the infantry divisions were 

at Rostoff, on the Don, and therefore at a great distance from most of 
the stations. In consequence of this and of the climate the regiments were 
generally very weak, and the line and reserves can scarcely have averaged 
500 men to the battalion, while those of the militia were scarcely any 
stronger. The whole force of this Caucasian army may be estimated at 
from 70,000 to 80,000 men. When the war broke out the 13th and 18th 
divisions of infantry, beside three regiments of dragoons, were sent to the 
Caucasus, increasing the total strength to 90,000 or 100,000 men. This 
force, however, had not only to guard the southern slope of the Cauca- 
sus, to hold Georgia and Mingrelia, and to meet the Turks in Ar- 
menia—it had, also, in conjunction with the Don and Black Sea Cos- 
sacks, to hold the line of the Kuban and Terek, as well as the advanced 
forts of the northern slope. To set them free, the Orenburg corps (23d 
division, counting eleven battalions) was sent to the Kuban and Terek, 
which line it now holds along with the Cossacks before mentioned. Thus 
the greater part, if not all, of these 170 battalions of infantry, four regi- 
ments dragoons and five regiments of native irregulars, beside Cossacks, 
have been moved to the south of the Caucasus. 
What their present strength is we have but few data to estimate. The 
regular line and reserve infantry cannot have been properly reénforced by 
recruits, and must number considerably less than five hundred men to the 
battalion. The militia on the contrary may have been increased by re- 
cruits from the country itself, many of whom may also have found their 
way into the regular army. Thus the militia force must now be stronger in 
proportion to the line than some time ago, and it will be sufficiently exact 
if we put down the numerical strength of each, at a rough estimate, as 


follows: 

5 divisions of infantry, 1 brigade of grenadiers, 1 rifle 
battalion and 36 reserve battalions, rather under 


400 men per battalion . . .... . . . . . 45,000 
47 militia battalions, rather above 600. : : ‘ : : 30,000 
Artillery and regular Cavalry . ©. ©. . . . . .. 8,000 
Irregular cavalry . . . . . 3,000 

Total 20000... 86,000 


These troops are distributed in the garrisons of Mingrelia, Akaltzik, Ge- 
orgia and Erivan, and form beside, General Muravieff s active army. 
That General has before Kars and in the garrisons of Akaltzik and 
Gumri, the thirteenth, eighteenth and twenty-first divisions of infantry, 
three regiments of dragoons, three of Mussulmans, and some Cossacks. 

The Kurds deserted after the defeat of 29th September. According to our 
estimate this army should be from twenty to twenty-five thousand men 
strong, including all the troops of the military district of Akhaltzikh, 
commanded until lately by General Kovalevski, killed before Kars. 

The command of Erivan seems to comprise the grenadier brigade and 
the battalion of rifles, beside some militia. They fought last year at Bay- 
azid, and now occupy the upper valley of the Murad Chai, and south- 
eastern Euphrates. The command of Mingrelia until lately comprised 
nothing but horse and foot militia, beside Cossacks under Gen. Bagra- 
tion Mukhranski, but it has been reénforced of late by the 19th division 
of infantry, who were engaged, along with the militia, at the Ingour 
against Omer Pasha. The remainder of the troops, especially the 19th and 
20th divisions of infantry, one regiment of dragoons, and the bulk of the 
reserve and militia, were stationed in Georgia, under Gen. Bebutoff, as a 
general reserve, ready to move wherever they might be required. At the 
news of Omer Pasha's landing at Sukum-Kaleh, Bebutoff moved to the 
front with the 19th division, and ordered the 20th division to follow as 
far as Kutais. No doubt he has taken proper steps to concentrate the 
disposable reserves and militia at convenient places. Now, supposing that 
the army under Muravieff and the Erivan corps amount to 25,000 men 
together—that the garrisons on the Turkish and Persian frontier amount 
to 15,000—that there must remain 15,000 men in Georgia to watch the 
hill tribes and to guard Tiflis—there would still remain a disposable force 
of 31,000 men under Prince Bebutoff, to meet the Turkish invasion, most 
of them old and tried troops of the line. This corps is fully equal, if not 
superior, to that which Omer Pasha can bring against it. In the beginning 
of November the Turkish commander had some 30,000 men, of which 
army two-thirds only are disposable at Ingour, the rest being required to 
guard depots and communications on the coast. In the way of reénfor- 
cements from Varna and Shumla, 10,000 men are all he could expect. Of 
this addition a considerable portion will be required to hold his line of 
communication as he advances inland, so that it is not to be expected 
that he will be able to outnumber Bebutoff at any given point. His im- 
mediate aim is evidently the conquest of Mingrelia, but with his present 
force he is likely to do this only in case of his being aided by a general 
rising of the mountaineers, or some other equally improbable event.