Friedrich Engels 
The state of the war. December 6, 1855 


The state of the war. 


The diplomatic saloons and the stock exchanges of Europe are again, as 
in the beginning of last Winter, occupied with rumors of peace. Sweden 
has joined the Western Alliance, Austria has prepared an ultimatum sat- 
isfactory to the Allies, Prussia is earnestly bestirring herself in the peace- 
making business, Louis Bonaparte is quite willing to conclude a treaty on 
reasonable terms, the old Four Points of Vienna are dug out of their 
graves again, and the funds everywhere take on an upward tendency. 

Everybody seems agreed with everybody, and it would all be very well 

had not the principal party—Russia—been left entirely out of the ques- 
tion. Now, whatever may be the internal condition of Russia, and sup- 
posing even that all the tales of the European Press about the prostra- 
tion, the exhausted resources, the distress and discontest among all 
classes of the population of Russia be correct, we must certainly admit 

that she shows no sign of an inclination to give in. The orders of the day 
of the Emperor during his recent tour are now published, and from the 
facts they indicate, as well as those given in the journal of his voyage and 
other sources of information, we must conclude that Russia is preparing, 
not for peace, but for a new campaign on the very grandest scale. 

And indeed it cannot be denied that the military position held by the 
Russians is by far more favorable than they had a right to expect after 
their repeated disasters. In Asia, they maintain the blockade of Kars in 
spite of their recent severe defeat, and all the Turkish troops in Asia 
Minor are not sufficient to drive them back. Nay, they even carry out, 

unresisted, offensive movements in the valley of the Murad Chai (S.E. 
Euphratis), menacing the upper valleys of the Kars Chai, the Aras (Ar- 
axes), and the Frat (N.W. Euphratis). Omer Pasha has indeed invaded 
Mingrelia, but the success of his further movements is now seen to be, at 


the least, very doubtful, even though Muravieff should remain where he 
is. In the Caucasus, there has not been, up to the present time, any 
serious insurrection of the mountain tribes, much less a general one, and 
it would seem they are even more tranquil than before the war broke out. 
In the Crimea, there can now be scarcely any doubt that they intend 
holding their ground, that is, the whole of the Peninsula with the excep- 
tion of a few square miles; and if they intend, by this time, to hold it 
during the Winter, they must have found a means to arrange the greatest 
difficulty—the supply of provisions. For that their position, in a merely 
tactical and strategical sense, is fully tenable there can be no doubt; the 
allied Generals have left them the time to fortify the accessible points and 
to march up their reénforcements. We do not at present propose to in- 
quire how much of all this is due to the skill of the Russians and how 
much to the neglect, timidity and errors of the allied Generals; but the 
fact is that the Russians, after the loss of the Sea of Azoff, the interrup- 
tion of their communication by the spit of Arabat, the defeat of the 
Chernaya, and the storming of South Sevastopol, still believe themselves 
in a position to hold the Crimea during the Winter. And not only 
that—there are very strong indications of an attack being prepared on 
Kertch and Yenikale as soon as the frost shall have driven the allied 
vessels from the Sea of Azoff and the Straits. Thus, the actual ground 
lost by the Russians during two campaigns amounts to this: the Dobrod- 
ja, the Circassian coast, South Sevastopol, Eupatoria and Kertch; while 
the concentrated efforts of the Allies have been unable thus far to drive 
them out of Asiatic Turkey, or to wrench the Crimea from their grasp. 
True, all these are negative results, and what sacrifices Russia has had 
to suffer in order to secure even these! Out of 29% divisions of infantry at 
the disposal of Russia 19⁄2 have been actively engaged—some for three, 
most for two campaigns, and but a small portion for one campaign only. 
All of these 19% divisions have suffered severely, so much so that in 
many the third and fourth battalions have been or are being merged in 
the first and second; and this in spite of constant arrivals of fresh recruits. 
Of the remaining ten divisions, not one can for the moment be spared. 
Myriads of men have been lost during the long forced marches, especially 
in Winter. The reserve brigades are either incorporated with the line or 
disposed of as separate bodies. Even the regimental depots have had to 
march levies four times as heavy as in time of peace—repeated now for 
three consecutive years—and yet have not been able to keep up the ranks 
of the army. The militia, recruited by another levy requiring at once as 
many men as the regular army in eight years of peace, is now being 
incorporated with the line. A fresh levy, going on at this moment, calls 


out four times the number wanted in ordinary circumstances. All this is 
true enough. It is even true that, with the exception of the ten untouched 
divisions and about the same number of reserve brigades, the regular 
Russian army, as it existed before the war, belongs to bygone things. The 
same regiments are there, and with cadres pretty well filled after the 
incorporation on the militia, but they are no longer the same soldiers. 
The vast majority are raw, badly drilled recruits, and the Russian is a 
slow hand at learning the soldier's trade. We repeat it, all this is perfectly 
true; but with such tremendous efforts, there cannot be the slightest 
doubt that the number of armed men now in the pay of Russia must 
exceed whatever she may have kept up at any previous period. The very 
fear of the allied Generals—absurd as it is—of being attacked on the 
Chernaya, proves it; the results of all the reconnoissances from Eupatoria 
or Kertch prove that at a short distance from these places the Russians 
were always in a position to draw up superior forces. Whatever exagger- 
ation there may be in the orders of the day of the Emperor Alexander, 
(and these cannot be so very great, as such appeals are intended to act as 
much upon the army itself as upon Europe,) it still remains true that the 
Crimean army is strong enough to resist any attack upon its main posi- 
tions; that it is fully prepared to winter in the Crimea; that during Oc- 
tober and November an uninterrupted tide of reénforcements has flowed 
toward Perekop, partly to strengthen the Crimean army, and partly to 
form, as it were, an army of reserve, intrusted at the same time with the 
defense of Nikolaiéff and Cherson; that, unlike last Autumn, the neces- 
sary concentrations of troops have taken place before the bad season set 
in; that therefore, the disastrous marches across the snow-clad steppe 
need not be repeated; and that, finally, the Russians can open the next 
campaign with a marked superiority, unless they suffer extraordinary 
misfortunes, (such as the British last Winter,) or unless the Allies display 
the greatest activity in bringing up fresh troops before Spring.