Friedrich Engels 
The Crimean campaign. November 30, 1855 


The Crimean campaign. 


According to all our advices by the last steamer the relative positions of 
the Allied and Russian armies in the Crimea remain unchanged. Nothing 
had occurred on the Chernaya, where indeed the Allies, in spite of their 
boasted superiority, appear to be more afraid ofa hostile attack than the 
Russians. Desultory firing still went on across the Bay of Sevastopol with 
no other result than to prevent the Allies from taking up quarters in the 
half ruined town and to enforce greater caution upon their working par- 
ties in the city. At Kertch some skirmishing had taken place, but without 
the slightest importance. At Eupatoria, the Turkish cavalry, under Ali 
Pasha, accompanied by four Anglo-French squadrons, and supported by 
strong reserves on its flank and rear, had carried out a successful surprise 
against the village of Chotai, fifteen miles further north, and captured 
about three thousand animals, principally sheep, collected there by the 
Russians. No other warlike events had taken place; on the contrary, the 
return of the division of French guards to France, whither it is to be 
followed by another division, with the gradual transfer of all the cavalry, 
both French and English, from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus looks as if 
all idea of any offensive advance toward Mackenzie, and the Upper Bel- 
bek had been abandoned for this season. The guards have been replaced, 
it is true, by the freshly-arrived division under Chasseloup-Laubat, but 
had Marshal Pélissier intended an attack, the presence of an extra divi- 
sion, while the Guards were still there, would have offered him a chance 
which he certainly would not have lost. In the same manner the British 
fresh arrivals—a German and a Swiss brigade, with the large drafts from 
the depots of regiments whose service battalions are in the Crimea, and 
several regiments from the Mediterranean stations—are being concen- 
trated at Malta, Scutari and Smyrna. Thus the campaign may be said to 
be over so far as the allied commanders at Sevastopol are concerned: but 
these gentlemen do not appear to be convinced that it is over for the 
Russians also. Up to the latest dates the fear of a Russian night attack, a 
repetition of Inkerman and Traktir was so lively at headquarters that an 
intended expedition to Kaffa had been put off. Gen. Spencer's brigade, 
returned from Kinburn and destined to form part of this expedition, was 
retained on account of this expected Russian attack; but with a wisdom 
peculiar, as it seems, to British commanders, it was kept on board ship at 
Kamiesh, so that in case the attack should happen, it might be as useless 
as if it had been sent to Kaffa. 

This latter expedition would certainly have been accompanied by im- 
portant results, if undertaken with sufficient force. Kaffa is no more 
defensible on the seaside than Kertch was, if indeed it is not less so. There 
is no more doubt that the allied fleet can take Kaffa than that the allied 

troops can hold it when once established there. Kaffa once taken, the 
troops at Kertch, now reénforced by 15,000 men of the Anglo-Turkish 
contingent, would be in a position to advance with safety; for all the 
troops which Gen. Wrangel, who commands the Russians there, may 
have in the peninsula of Kertch, (between that town, Kaffa and Arabat), 

would have to withdraw or be cut off. Now, while the allied fleets can sail 
in a single night from Kamiesh and Balaklava to Kaffa, the Russians 
have seventy miles to march from their nearest point, Sympheropol—say 
fully three days’ marcii—through a difficult country, and at least another 
day must pass before the troops intended for the relief of Kaffa could 

receive the necessary orders. Thus the Allies would have four clear days' 
start, if the secret were kept, and if nothing but the course of the steam- 
ers, when once under weigh, betrayed their intention. In such a case, it 
is scarcely to be doubted that Gen. Wrangel must suffer a defeat before 
his supports could come up, and that this defeat would decide the fate of 

the little fort of Arabat also. But with Kaffa, Arabat and Kertch, the 
whole of the peninsula of Kertch would belong to the Allies, and a new 
base of operations would be gained, as important in many respects as 
that at Eupatoria. Before the campaign on the Chernaya and the Upper 
Belbek was over, there was this to be said against such an expedition, 

that it would have taken a valuable force away for a minor object, from 
the place where it was most wanted; but the defensive on the Chernaya 
being once resolved upon, this reason entirely disappears. 

The Russians have now in the Crimea fourteen divisions of regular 
infantry (two of the grenadiers, three of the second, three of the third, 

two ofthe fourth, two of the fifth, two of the sixth army-corps), forming 
a grand total, at the very outside, of 125,000 infantry. To these we must 
add some 20,000 militia, by this time probably incorporated with the line, 

a body of cavalry certainly not above 15,000 men, and say 15,000 artil- 
lery and sappers—in all say 165,000 to 175,000 men. The Allies now have 

in the Crimea, in all, about 150,000 infantry, 14,000 artillery, and a force 
of cavalry diminishing every day by the transfer of this arm to the Bos- 
phorus, but which, during the Winter, may average 9,000, including Ba- 
shi-Bazouks—in all say 170,000 men. Thus, the forces on both sides ap- 
pear pretty equal in numbers, but the Russians have the central position, 
and may therefore at any time concentrate the main body of their troops 
toward any given point, while the Allies occupy three unconnected points 
on the periphery of a large circle. In this particular case, however, these 
theoretical advantages amount to less than nothing. The central position, 

in field operations carried on by two armies of about equal strength, is 
certainly the more favorable, because it secures the shortest distances 
from point to point, and thereby the greatest rapidity of movement. It 
secures the advantage of attacking one portion of the enemy with supe- 
rior force, and thereby two thirds of the chances of victory. But where 
strong fortified points, as Eupatoria, and positions of great natural 
strength, as the Chernaya, offer the means to even a greatly inferior force 
of holding out a considerable time against a powerful attack, these ad- 
vantages are temporarily nullified. And, especially when a strong fleet of 
steamers, as in this case, enables the Allies, on the periphery of the circle, 

to move their troops quicker by sea than the Russians can by land, then 
the tables are turned. The Allies, though apparently on the periphery, in 
reality hold the center; while the Russians, though apparently placed 
centrally, are suffering all the disadvantages of the opposite situation. At 
present, the allied Generals, having given up all idea of offensive move- 
ments, cannot much avail themselves of these advantages. But this con- 
sideration shows how much they neglected their duty when, after the 
taking of the south side—the Russians being then from 25,000 to 35,000 
men weaker than they are now—they put out cautious feelers, first in one 
direction and then another instead of dealing one quick and heavy blow 
from Eupatoria on the rear of the demoralized and weakened enemy.