Friedrich Engels 
The war in Asia. November 20, 1855 


The war in Asia. 


The arrival of the steamer St. Louis at this port yesterday morning, pre- 
ceding by a few hours the mail of the America which reached us last 
night at midnight, puts us in possession of documents that render it 

possible to form a judgment upon Omer Pasha's recent brilliant exploit 
at the River Ingour, where he forced a passage in face of the enemy. Our 
readers have already been informed of the fact that after landing part of 
his troops at Batoum, the Turkish general had singled out the valley of 
the river Rioni for his line of operations. This determination was mani- 
fested by the transfer of his base of operations from Batoum to Sukum- 
Kaleh. The Rioni flows into the Black Sea about half way between these 
two towns; and as there is no harbor on the intervening coast, Omer 
Pasha was obliged to choose between the two, if he intended to march up 
the Rioni. There are no very practicable roads between Batoum and the 
plain of that river, while from Sukum-Kaleh not only the Russian mili- 
tary road along the coast to Redout-Kaleh, and thence up the river, the 
Tiflis high road was available, but also a cross-road which leaves the 
coast at Shemsherrai, near the fort and town of Ilori, and joins the Tiflis 
road near Khopi, about nine miles above Redout-Kaleh. It appears that 
these reasons decided Omer Pasha's choice, and made him prefer Su- 
kum-Kaleh. 
Ilori is the frontier town between Abkasia and Mingrelia—the former 
a narrow strip of mountain land formed by the steep slopes of the Cau- 
casus toward the sea—the latter partly a similar mountain country in the 
southern slope of the Caucasus, but partly, too, a rich alluvial plain 
formed by the deposits of the Caucasian rivers between the mountains 
and the sea. Of these rivers there are but two of any importance—the 
Ingour, whose valley forms Mingrelia, and the Rioni, whose valley is 

called Imeretia. Imeretia, the larger and southernmost of the two prov- 
inces, is bordered by the Caucasus to the north, and by the highlands 
connecting that range with the Armenian group to the east. Across these 
highlands runs the road into Georgia, straight to Tiflis. 

Thus, the first object for Omer Pasha to accomplish was the conquest 
of the valleys of the Ingour and Rioni—in other words, of the provinces 
of Mingrelia and Imeretia. This accomplished, his land communication 
with Batoum and Asiatic Turkey would be restored so as to leave him the 
choice of retreat, in case of necessity, either toward Batoum or Sukum- 
Kaleh. At the same time, considerable mountains, passable at certain 
points only, would protect him against any sudden attack; in fact, he 
might consider himself as occupying the salient angle of a vast bastion, 
one face of which, formed by the Caucasus, is completely impregnable; 
while the other, formed by the Armenian and Georgian mountains, is 
assailable at two or three points only. In the present state of affairs, if 
once established in this bastion, he might consider himself safe against 
any eventuality. At the same time, this position was sure to rouse to 
active hostilities against Russia the tribes of the northern slope of the 
Caucasus, in Ossetia and the Kabardas, while it was a constant and 
direct menace against Tiflis and Akalzik. And if the time during which 
Kars could hold out against the Russian blockade was correctly calcu- 
lated, this maneuver of Omer Pasha's would indeed be the very first 
correct and great strategical move made during all this war. Tiflis being 
the center of Russian resistance, the chief Russian base of operations 
south of the Caucasus, a march on Tiflis is the simplest and most decisive 
move not only to relieve Kars, but to force the Russians to abandon the 
greater part of Transcaucasia for the protection of this single town. Tiflis 
once attacked by a sufficient force and taken, the whole of Transcaucasia 
would be lost to Russia, the remnant of the army there would be without 
retreat except by the Caspian Sea, and the military and political limit to 
Russian power would at once recoil, from Akalzik and Erivan to Rostoff 
and Stavropol, from the Araxes to the Kuban and Terek. Russia would 
be reduced, on this side, to her frontier of 1782, and the fruits of seventy 
years' labor would be lost. 

Now, it is not be expected that such can be the result of Omer Pasha's 
operations, at least for this season. A march on Tiflis would require at 
least 40,000 men, as it would be met by the concentration of all the 
Russian forces in Transcaucasia; and while the Turkish army of Erze- 
roum and Kars would have enough to do to follow up the Russians on its 
own side, the occupation of Imeretia and Mingrelia would require 20,000 
men more. Omer Pasha would then require about 60,000 men in all, 

independent of the army of Erzeroum; and such an army he is very far 
from having at present. But what Omer Pasha may accomplish before 
Winter is the conquest of Mingrelia and Imeretia, of that mountain bas- 
tion which will secure him comfortable and safe quarters till Spring, and 

the occupation of which must at all events oblige the Russians about 
Kars and Gumri to fall back toward Tiflis before Winter has made the 
Armenian table-land impracticable. 

As far as our news go, Omer Pasha had collected about 25,000 men at 

Sukum-Kaleh, with the greater portion of which he marched down the 

coast to Ilori, and then took the cross road toward Khopi. This road 
crosses several mountain streams, the passage of most of which might be 
disputed, but none of which is of such importance as the Ingour. It was 
behind this river, consequently, that the Russians had taken up a defen- 
sive position. Their number is stated in various dispatches to have 

amounted to 6,000, 10,000, or 16,000; the total of 10,000, however, 
agrees best with what information we received previously, and appears 
the most likely of all. The Russians, cut off from the coast and occupying 
a province scarcely defensible against attacks coming from the sea, might 
concentrate in it some 15,000 men, for the greater part Transcaucasian 

Christian militia, but scarcely more; and of these no more than 10,000 
could have been spared for the defense of Ingour. Thus, not only were 
the Russians evidently outnumbered by the Turks, (whatever exaggerated 
dispatches may say to the contrary,) but the quality of the Russian troops 
was not much to boast of. Of the troops of the line employed south of the 

Caucasus, all but one brigade of the 13th division of infantry and one 
brigade of the 21st division were engaged at Kars, unless indeed the 19th 
and 20th divisions had been brought across from their positions on the 
northern slope of the Caucasus, which is not likely. What other troops 
the Russians have south of that range consist of Georgian militia bat- 

talions, troops of no great value, and it was evidently a body composed 
principally of such which opposed the Turks on the Ingour. 

Of the tactical merits of the battle we have as yet no means of judging. 
Neither the natural strength of the position, nor the extent and impor- 
tance of the intrenchments covering the Russian front are known. We 

cannot tell whether the position could be easily turned, nor whether it 
actually was turned. All we know is that the river Ingour was low enough 
to enable Omer Pasha to ford it in four places by as many columns; that 
these columns attacked the Russian position and carried it after a five 
hours' combat. The encounter has this interesting feature, that it is the 

first battle in this war in which the Turks have attacked intrenched lines, 
and, to their credit, they carried them. On the other hand, it cannot be 

denied that the position, being just at the head of the delta of the Ingour, 
not more than ten miles from the sea and twenty from Redout-Kaleh, 
would indeed appear liable enough to be turned on its left; and that the 
Russians, in case a serious flanking maneuver had been attempted, would 
have been perfectly justified in using the right of the weaker party and 
retreating. Any how, the details of this action will be received with un- 
common interest as they will show us how the Turkish army acted under 
circumstances completely new to its previous military traditions and hab- 
its; and as far as Omer Pasha is concerned, the operations entered upon 
will have an equally great interest, inasmuch as they will, for the first 
time, give us an opportunity of judging of him as a commander in the 
field. 

That the battle of the Ingour will decide the conquest of Mingrelia and 
Imeretia would be more than can be expected. A number of smaller 
mountain-torrents run down, parallel to the Ingour, from the Caucasian 
ridge; one or two are not unimportant, and every one offers a position 
for rear-guard demonstrations so as to retard pursuit, and to allow the 
beaten army a chance of re-forming. At Kutais, at least, the Rioni itself 
offers a serious barrier; and if Omer Pasha could bring 20,000 men to the 
Ingour, he can hardly appear with more than 14,000 here, unless fresh 
reénforcements are landed. Thus at Kutais, the forces of both parties 
with their present strength, would be about balanced; and the ability of 
bringing up reénforcements would decide the possession of Upper Ime- 
retia. The battle of the Ingour took place on the 6th, (some dispatches 
say 5th,) of November; by the end of that month the season for active 
operations in that country would cease; we shall, therefore, soon learn 
what fruits the action has born to the Turks. 

There is another point of high importance, which has been noticed by 
some correspondents of the British press. The inhabitants of Mingrelia 
and Imeretia are Christians in great part—those of Georgia almost ex- 
clusively so. They had to carry on a continuous war against both Cir- 
cassians and Turks up to the time the Russians took possession of the 
country; and the object of this war was to prevent their Mohammedan 
neighbors from carrying off the young men and women of the country to 
be sold into slavery at Constantinople. Nay, in the beginning of this 
campaign, as soon as the Russians had abandoned the coast and many 
posts in the interior in order to concentrate their troops, the Circassians, 
and even the Turks at Redout-Kaleh, recommenced their slave-catching 
excursions, and thereby all at once exasperated the Christian populati- 
ons. To secure, therefore, at least the indifference of the Georgians, a 
division of French or English troops should be added to Omer Pasha's 

army; for, whatever his own views of the case may be, his officers and 
soldiers will be sure to relapse into a traffic so congenial to their habits 
and so lucrative to themselves. This is an occurrence the Allies should 
try, by all means, to prevent; and until European forces are sent to Ge- 
orgia to protect the Christians of that country, every step in advance of 
Turkish troops alone will but serve to rivet their allegiance to Russia 
faster and faster.