From the Crimea. 


After all, the Russians are going to defend the Crimea. Prince Gorcha- 
koff s order of the day, in which he announces this intention, has reached 
us by the mail of the Canada. The Emperor had indeed left it to his 
judgment whether the present position should be held or whether the 
peninsula should be abandoned; and Gorchakoff in reply proclaims his 
intention to remain where he is. The two divisions of grenadiers, with 
their division of artillery, have arrived in Sympheropol; they are said to 
be twenty-two thousand strong, and to have brought a convoy of eight 
thousand bullock-carts with them, which furnishes ample supplies for six 
or eight months. According to some reports Gorchakoff is even prepa- 
ring to take the offensive again, and to operate against Eupatoria. 
That the grenadiers may muster about twenty-two thousand men is 
possible enough. They belong to those portions of the Russian army the 
ranks of which are always best filled up. Their march from Poland to 
Perekop was executed pretty slowly and in the best season of the year. 
That a division of twelve battalions (for the grenadier regiments, like the 
guards, have but three battalions to the regiment) should therefore even 
now muster ten thousand effectives or about eight hundred and thirty 
men per battalion, is not at all improbable. But it must not be thought 
that this number is so much net increase to the Crimean army; for, as we 
have before mentioned, sundry portions of that army have been sent to 
Nicolaiéff and Cherson, especially a portion of the sailors and marines 
(five equipages or battalions) and the fourteenth reserve division (eight 
reserve battalions). Estimating these bodies at ever so low a figure we still 
must put them down at from five thousand to seven thousand in all, so 
that the net numerical increase will amount to about fifteen thousand. 
The total Russian infantry of the line and grenadiers now in the Crimea 






cannot exceed one hundred and forty thousand men, to which perhaps 
twenty-six thousand reserves, Chornomor Cossacks, sailors, marines, 
militia and volunteers may be added; the cavalry of the line may number 
ten thousand, the Cossack cavalry another ten thousand, the artillery in 
all fifteen thousand, making a total of one hundred and seventy-five 
thousand men, which at a rough guess we think is the very outside of 
what the Russians now have in the Crimea. 

The Allies are not much superior in numbers. The fourteen divisions of 
French infantry will not muster above 100,000, their three divisions cav- 
alry 6,000, their artillery, etc., 12,000—in all 118,000 men. The English, 
according to semi-official statements, are 56,000 strong—from which 
number there are, however, to be deducted some 5,000 sick and wound- 
ed, and some 6,000 of those parasitical non-combatants whom the Bri- 
tish always carry about with themselves over and above other armies, so 
that their actual force cannot be put down at more than 45,000 men. The 
Sardinians muster rather less than 10,000, and the Turks at Eupatoria 
certainly do not exceed 20,000 men. The grand total for the Allies is thus 
about 190,000 men. Considering that the Russians occupy a central po- 
sition while the Allies are scattered over three distinct positions without 
any direct land communication between each other—at Eupatoria, Se- 
vastopol and Kertch—the Russians are, after the arrival of the gren- 
adiers, fully equal to the Allies, in physical strength; but morally they must 
be infinitely inferior. In spite of this moral inferiority, it is likely enough 
that Gorchakoff may risk an attack upon Eupatoria. The terror caused 
among his troops by the loss of south Sevastopol must have worn off 
long since through the incapacity of the Allies in following up that suc- 
cess; and the arrival of élite troops like the grenadiers must have still 
more elated them with renewed hopes of success. But unless the Allies 
allow themselves to be caught unawares, which with their recent cautious 
proceedings is not very likely, Gorchakoff will most probably only send 
his grenadiers to the same fate to which the Third and Fourth corps were 
sent at Inkermann, the Second corps at the Chernaya, and the Caucasian 
troops at Kars. And he will have to mind what he does; for one more 
defeat, ifincurred after an obstinate struggle, and well followed up by the 
victors, may necessitate that disastrous retreat through the steppes, of 
which we have spoken on former occasions. 

Before the arrival of the grenadiers, according to the statements given 
above, the Allies mustered 190,000 against 160,000 Russians—a far more 
favorable proportion for active operations. The Heracleatic Chersonese 
and the Baidar valley could have been held by a force fully equal to what 
the Russians could bring against them, while of the surplus of 30,000 at 






least 20,000 might have been sent to Eupatoria; so that, by the inactivity 
of the Allies, not only the favorable season but even the favorable pro- 
portion of numbers has been lost. And as Eupatoria menaced the Rus- 
sian communications, every increase of the allied forces there was sure to 

draw off more Russians from the front opposite the allied main army, 
and thereby again to liberate fresh troops for Eupatoria, or to render 
feasible an attack upon some point of that Russian front. But nothing 
was done, and now Winter sets in and leaves everything to chance and 
accident. 

We have previously alluded to the disastrous consequences a severe 
Winter may bring on this large Russian army in the Crimea, with most of 
the regiments bivouacking and short of firewood. But it seems John Bull 
is determined to give the Russians fair play. If they have to bivouac, his 
own troops must do the same. The British army is expected, as a matter 

of course, to lose from sickness a proportionate number with the Rus- 
sians. About one-third of the Britons are going to have hut accommo- 
dations. The remainder must look out for themselves. We had Balaklava 
last winter, we may have something worse now. In the meantime the 
British army diverts itself from all unpleasant thoughts by getting tipsy. 

The soldiers get 7% d. a day in cash out of their pay, then the "Queen's 
sixpence," or daily allowance to troops before the enemy, and eight pence 
are allowed for work done on the roads and the like. This makes one 
shilling nine pence half-penny a day, a sum on which a man can get as 
drunk as a fiddler in any part of her Britannic Majesty's dominions, but 

especially at Balaklava were spirits are as cheap as they are strong, and 
where nothing else beside spirits is to be bought. Consequently the sol- 
diers get drunk as fast and as often as they can. Drunkenness is the rule, 
sobriety the exception; and this The London Times admits. What the 
effect of this is upon the discipline, efficiency and health of the army, 

may well be imagined. The officers are powerless. The cat-o'-nine works 
day and night to no purpose. Flog a British soldier once for drunkenness, 
and next time he is tipsy he will report himself and request to be put 
down for another dozen. In fact, as a disciplined, organized body, the 
British army may be said not to exist for the moment, its existence being, 

as it were, suspended. And yet no other army, except the Russian, applies 
such severe means to ensure discipline! 

The abundance of money, and the inability to procure other useful and 
agreeable commodities for it, is at the bottom of all this. Now, nothing 
would be plainer for the Commander-in-Chief than at once to suspend 

the payment of the Queen's sixpence, and to do away with the ridiculous 
allowance for a labor which is part and parcel of a soldier's duty. But no; 






sooner let him flog whole regiments out of existence than employ such 
revolutionary measures! The Government has ordained that the soldier 
shall have his Queen's sixpence there and then; the allowance for working 
parties is customary, and sooner be the whole army drowned in a sea of 
gin and raki than that such sacred regulations and hallowed customs 
should be touched! 

All idea of a movement in advance seems to have been given up by the 
Allies. They are occupied with nothing but preparations for the Winter. 
The grand result of the late reconnoissances is, that nothing more is to be 
done. Meantime, the Russians give us some information about these 
mysterious reconnoissances. It appears that the French advanced from 
Urkusta at the head of the Baidar, or rather Upper Chernaya valley, 
across the hills toward the ravines sloping down to the Upper Belbek. 
Slowly, very slowly, they advanced, about two miles a day, sometimes 
retiring again for a few days. They occupied Kokuluz and Yansu, and at 
last attempted a combined movement on three roads; two French co- 
lumns penetrateci—the one by Kokuluz to Yenisala; the other by Uzunju 
toward Markul and then to Yenisala; a Piedmontese column attempted 
to force a passage from the Upper Chulin and Adim Chokrak toward 
Karlu. In other words, three parallel columns marched across the hills 
concentrically toward Foti-Sala on the Upper Belbek. The Piedmontese 
columns, which formed the left of the movement, was stopped at once 
before it could cross the hills; it were so near the Russian front that its 
advance would have amounted to a flank march along and within reach 
of that front, and it had to halt. The two French columns occupied 
Yenisala without serious resistance, and gained the line of the Belbek. 
They even penetrated beyond it, occupied Foti-Sala, and attempted to 
scale the hights in its rear. But here, toward Airgul, they saw the Russian 
columns drawn up on the plateau and fell back again to Foti-Sala. Mean- 
time the Russians had not been idle. While their troops from Airgul 
demonstrated against the French front, strong detachments from Kut- 
shuk and Biuk-Sivren, where the Belbek enters the Russian front, ascend- 
ed that river toward Albat, thence marching up a side valley to their 
right, by which they turned the left of the French advance. At the same 
time, other columns from Ulusala, on the Upper Katsha, crossed over 
toward Tatar Osmankoi, near the source of the Belbek, from which point 
they menaced the French right. Finally, the Russian irregular troops still 
occupied the plateau of Mount Yaila, which overhangs to the south the 
valley of the Upper Chernaya, and thereby menaced to some extent the 
French rear—at all events confining their lines of operation to a very 
narrow strip of ground. But before the net was closed around them, the 






French withdrew to the hights above Urkusta, where they still are, unless 
they have retired still further. 

The whole of these maneuvers were undertaken by the French with a 
force amounting to no less than four divisions of infantry, or at least 
26,000 to 28,000 men. From the particulars given in the Russian reports 
we should judge that two divisions acted while the other two remained in 




reserve. Now such a force, in mountain warfare, is very considerable and 
about the maximum of what can be usefully employed on two converging 
roads, or in the narrow valley of an Alpine river. The force, then, was 
amply sufficient for any work to be cut out for it; but the whole of the 
maneuvers of this corps, commanded, we believe, by General De Salles, 
bear an unmistakable character of groping hesitation, and of a complete 
absence of any definite purpose to be pursued resolutely. In all mountain 
warfare it is of the highest importance to begin, if possible, by mastering 
the main ridge from which the chief valleys descend. This ridge was, here, 
the Ya'ila. The Ya'ila could be easily cleared of Russians, as it runs parallel 
and close to the south coast, which again is under the fire of the allied 
ships of war. The Ya'ila, besides, is not a mere rocky ledge, but a plateau 
affording good pasturage for sheep, and therefore, for some time at least, 
for a moderate number of horses also. The Russians, indeed, have oc- 
cupied it with Cossack cavalry, and, if we are to judge by the maps, the 
ground is very well adapted for light cavalry maneuvers, though 2,000 
feet above the level of the sea. Before any attempts were made to descend 
into the valley of the Upper Belbek that valley might have been turned 
completely by a few squadrons taking possession of the Ya'ila plateau, 
and opening the road for a column ofinfantry which might have descend- 
ed, partly by the Biuk-Uzen, partly by the Uzen Bash (the two rivers 
forming, by their junction, the Belbek). The longest march to be made, 
from Uzunyu to Tatar Osmankoi, does no exceed 24 miles. The whole 
could be easily done in two days, and troops carrying four days’ provi- 
sions, could have undertaken it with perfect safety. The Ya'ila plateau 
once secured, the march of this turning column would, of course, have to 
be supported by columns advancing on the ground where De Salles ac- 
tually did advance. But then, what a different position would the corps 
have been in! Instead of being threatened by Tatar Osmankoi, that im- 
portant position would be in its hands, and along with the possession of 
the Ya'ila, would afford to it the means of even threatening the right of 
the Russians on the Upper Katsha. Then the Russian columns above 
Foti-Sala, near Airgul, would themselves have been outflanked, and the 
flanking march now made by the Russians toward the French left would 
have been isolated and without any importance whatever. By such a 






combination the French might not only have gained far more extensive 
information and reconnoitered a greater extent of ground than they now 
have done by pushing two isolated columns right into a narrow valley in 
front of the enemy's center; they might even have gained some actual 
success, and compelled the Russians to abandon many a square mile of 
valuable territory. We will not at present say that General De Salles 
might not have had reasons, unknown to us, which would justify him in 
preferring the mode of operation he adopted; but the surprising slowness 
with which he executed his reconnoissance of about four miles of ground 
(it took him nearly a week) and the irresolution and over-caution man- 
ifest in every step he made, induce us to believe that there was such an 
original vice as we have tried to explain in this last field operation of the 
main army of the Allies.