Friedrich Engels 
Crimean movements 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4558, 28. November 1855 

Crimean movements. 

According to our last advices from the Crimea there is little reason to 
expect any very important war intelligence by the Atlantic due here to- 
day or to-morrow. Indeed, the indications are rather that so far as great 
movements are concerned the campaign is closed for the Autumn, unless 5 
fine weather to a degree quite unusual for the season in that country 
should afford an opportunity for prolonging the operations. What is 
most probable in such a case is, that Gorchakoff may undertake a de- 
monstration upon Eupatoria, though, as we have shown in a recent ex- 
amination of the subject, his chances of success are exceedingly exiguous. 10 
On the part of the Allies, not only the general tardiness of their move- 
ments since the fall of South Sevastopol but the fact that the strong 
reconnoissances they have lately undertaken on the Upper Belbek on the 
one hand, and from Eupatoria toward Sympheropol on the other have 
both produced no positive results also shows that they are not inclined to 15 
attempt further fighting for the present. Of the first of these reconnois- 
sances we have already given our readers a careful account, and we now 
proceed to complete our record of the campaign by describing the sec- 
ond. 

It seems that Gen. d'Allonville marched with 24 battalions of infantry, 20 
8 squadrons of cavalry, and 56 guns—in all about 25,000 men—toward 
Sak, on the road to Sympheropol. About four miles beyond Sak the 
road, running north-west to south-east, crosses the ravine of Chobotar. 
This is the first of a series of ravines, watered in the wet season by small 
rivers, which between Eupatoria and Sevastopol run generally due east 25 
and west from the interior toward the sea. These ravines form important 
military positions, as the Alma, the Belbek and the Chernaya have al- 
ready proved. The ravine of Chobotar, though less important in its ge- 

Crimean movements 

neral features, has this peculiarity, that it closes the direct road from 
Eupatoria to Sympheropol. As in the Crimea no long marches across the 
country can be undertaken, and the few military roads must generally be 
followed, the defiles of Chobotar offer a capital position for barring the 
access to Sympheropol. Accordingly, the Russians have entrenched it 
and armed their redoubts with 36 long thirty-two-pounders, whose ex- 
tensive range the French experienced as soon as they approached the 
position. There was a numerous body of Russian infantry in and behind 
the entrenchments, and Gen. d'Allonville did not venture a front attack. 
10 He maneuvered with his cavalry toward his left so as to threaten to turn 
the Russians by the head of the ravine, a few miles higher up. But the 
Russians did not stir, and his cavalry, on advancing further inland, ap- 
pears from the Russian report to have met with strong bodies of Russian 
horse maneuvering upon its flank, so as to prevent it from penetrating 
15 too far. This maneuvering lasted about a day and half, when d'Allonville, 
seeing no possibility of doing any good, retreated toward Eupatoria, 
under the pretext of a scarcity of water. 
There is however another road, of an inferior description, it is true, but 
not intersected by any military obstacle of importance, which runs a little 
20 north of Sak toward the road from Perekop to Sympheropol, leaving the 
first mentioned high-road about six or eight miles to the south. This road 
the Russians appear to hold by cavalry only. If it were possible to gain 
the high-road from Perekop by this route, the post at Chobotar would be 
useless to the Russians, the same object would be attained the commu- 
25 nication with Perekop being cut off and even that with Chongar men- 
aced. In such a case, the Russians would be obliged to send strong forces 
against the corps from Eupatoria; but this corps would always have a 
safe retreat either north or south of Lake Sasik, unless provided with an 
insufficient force of cavalry and acting incautiously. After the Eupatoria 
30 corps had retreated, the Russian reénforcements would very likely march 
back, particularly if Pélissier, as would be his duty, had made their ab- 
sence the signal of some threatening maneuvers. As soon as they had 
commenced their return, the Eupatoria corps might again advance, and 
thus this harrassing game, by which the Russians would be sure to suffer 
35 most, might be played until either a fit of impatience or a mistake on the 
part of the Russians opened a fair opportunity for a decisive blow. In this 
way Napoleon was harrassed by the allied armies in 1813, in his central 
position at Dresden, until his strength had suffered by repeated defeats of 
single corps, and the superiority gained by his opponents justified the 
40 concentric attack on Leipzic. The season is now, as we have said, too far 
advanced to carry out such a plan of campaign; but why it was not done 
as soon as Sevastopol was taken, it is difficult to understand. 

Nn 

Friedrich Engels 

General d'Allonville has indeed made some overtures toward a move- 
ment on this road; but he seems too weak, especially in cavalry, to go far 
from his base of operations. At least this is the best explanation for the 
extreme caution of his movements. Eighteen thousand infantry and five 
thousand cavalry are not enough for the purpose. He should have had 5 
double these numbers, and above all more than one solitary division of 
French infantry; for it must not be forgotten that among the disposable 
force under his command there are but nine battalions and twelve 
squadrons of French soldiers, with some ten squadrons of English; the 
rest, sixteen battalions and sixteen squadrons, consist of Turks, whose 10 
aptness for field-service has not yet been tried. At all events, the lateness 
of the season all but precludes every chance of his gaining important 
advantages in this direction; and if we are to judge from last year's ex- 
perience, we shall probably soon hear of the troops going into their 
Winter quarters. 15