Friedrich Engels 
The war news 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4540, 7. November 1855 

The war news. 

The war news brought by the Arago, namely the taking of Kinburn by 
the Allies, is the most important forward step they have made since the 
fall of the south side of Sevastopol. It gives them an unassailable position 
on the peninsula between the Dnieper and the Crimea; a position com- 
manding the entrance of the Liman (estuary) of that river and menacing 
at the same time the communications between Perekop and Cherson. 
There is a rumor mentioned in the Vienna papers that the Allies had 
landed thirty thousand men on the spit of Tendra, a long, narrow island 
10 stretching within a few miles distance along the southern shore of the 
peninsula of Kinburn. If the fact of the landing be true, the numbers are 
evidently exaggerated. But if even a small body only of the allied troops 
had occupied this spit, it would show their intention of establishing 
themselves on the peninsula and of seriously menacing the Russian lines 
15 of communications. They might from this position prove as troublesome 
to Russian convoys as the corps of Gens. D'Allonville and Paget, from 
Eupatoria, might to the convoys coming down from Perekop to Sym- 
pheropol. They might even, by rapidly concentrating a strong force on 
this peninsula, make a dash at Cherson, and burn everything with the 
20 exception of the small citadel—unless, indeed, the Russians have fortified 
that town too and can spare a strong garrison to defend it. Anyhow, 
Kinburn and the long, flat sandy islands along the shore of the gulf 
leading to Perekop, form a series of positions which the Allies can easily 
hold by small bodies of troops, and each of which they can turn at any 
25 moment into a base for ulterior and rapid operations. The Russians may 
thus, by a few battalions, be obliged to disseminate a great number of 
their troops in order to secure most important points from sudden irrup- 
tions; and so long as the allied fleets hold command of the sea, these 
newly gained possessions cannot be attacked by any Russian land force. 

Nn 

Friedrich Engels 

The few details yet known respecting the taking of Kinburn confirm 
the experience of former episodes in this war, while they again tend to 
prove the intentional incorrectness of the Russian charts. On all the best 
charts there is no water of sufficient depth for ships-of-the-line or heavy 
frigates to be found anywhere within some miles of Kinburn. Yet when 5 
the allied fleets sent out gun-boats to take soundings within easy range of 
Kinburn, they found fully four and a half fathoms at sixteen hundred 
yards from the walls—at least, so it appears, on the north side within the 
Liman. Nine heavy steam-frigates could approach to that distance and 
shell the place; and while the mortar-boats did the same from far nearer 10 
stations, the gun boats enfiladed the faces of the bastions, and the float- 
ing batteries—which must have approached to some six hundred or seven 
hundred yards, if not closer—succeeded in laying several breaches in the 
sea-walls. 

What the precise nature of the defenses of Kinburn was, we cannot as 15 
yet make out very distinctly. The small town stretching right across the 
narrow spit was defended by a sort of continuous rampart of masonry, 
something like a bastioned pentagon or square, with guns firing en bar- 
bette, or through masonry embrasures. The guns for the most part stood 
uncovered, but on the points where their fire was to act with the greatest 20 
force were two tiers, the lower one casemated, the upper one firing 
through masonry embrasures in a wall erected on the flat roof of the 
casemates. As at Bomarsund, the masonry, as soon as it was acted upon 
by a vastly superior fire from the ships, crumbled away, and three 
breaches, it appears, were formed by the floating batteries in six to eight 25 
hours. This is explained by the very small number of guns in the fortress, 
of which there were only seventy; and, as the attack could be expected 
from any side, every front of the fortress had to be armed, so that against 
the main attack no more than from sixteen to twenty guns could be 
brought to bear. That their fire must have soon been silenced by the 30 
vertical fire of the mortar-boats, the enfilading shots of the gun-boats, 
the shell-storm of the steam-frigates, and the breaching front fire of the 
floating batteries, bringing into action at least eight to tenfold the num- 
ber of guns, is not to be wondered at. And as the day was exceedingly 
calm, the fire from the floating batteries was as steady as it would have 35 
been from any shore battery; it therefore could really act as breaching 
fire. These unwieldly, floating masses, helpless and useless as soon as the 
least amount of swell destroys their steadiness, must necessarily be able 
to do great execution in perfectly calm weather, and in situations where 
the large vessels can approach within range, and thereby draw upon 40 
themselves the principal fire of the enemy. Such favorable circumstances, 

The war news 

however, occur but seldom; and where fortresses like Cronstadt, Swea- 

borg, or the sea-forts of Sevastopol, were the object of their attack, the 

floating batteries would prove more cumbersome than useful. Thus on 

the whole, the affair at Kinburn cannot be said to have proved anything 
5 in favor of these clumsy sea-monsters. 

The allied troops who landed to the south-east of Kinburn must have 
amounted to a couple of thousand: for of the English alone there were six 
battalions on board the fleet numbering, with artillery, nearly four thou- 
sand men, of which but a portion however, was landed; while the French 

10 had another brigade on board their ships. The part taken by the troops in 
this action was very inconsiderable; they sent skirmishers and field guns 
against the place, but as there was a broad wet ditch in front of it, the 
Russians appear to have treated this impotent demonstration with sov- 
ereign contempt, and not even opened a heavy fire on them, for we do 

15 not hear that the allied troops lost anything to speak of. It was the 
overwhelming fire of the fleets alone which forced the place to surrender, 
and as soon as the guns ofthe place had been silenced, the fleets offered a 
capitulation, which was accepted. The garrison marched out with the 
honors of war and surrendered themselves prisoners. Then it was found 

20 that the whole force in the fortress consisted of thirteen hundred or four- 
teen hundred men; and this at once proves what sort of a fortress Kin- 
burn was. In bastioned fortresses, especially small ones, it is generally 
considered that one weak battalion, or from five hundred to six hundred 
men, is required for every bastion; a bastioned square, the smallest for- 

25 tification possible in the bastioned system, requiring from two thousand 
to two thousand five hundred men for its defense. Here a little over 
one-half of that number only were present, and yet they had to defend 
not only plain ramparts, but also to save the guns in the casemates. Thus, 
either the fortifications, then, must have been very insignificant indeed, 

30 or else very weakly defended; and in either case, the success of the allied 
fleets before Kinburn does not in any way affect the generally adopted 
opinion that one gun ashore, well sheltered behind earth ramparts, is 
worth more than six on board ship coming to attack it. 

The entrance to the Liman of the Dnieper once having been forced by 

35 the Allies, and the pretended existence of a bar of great shallowness at 
that point having been proved to be a mere Russian stratagem, the whole 
Liman is opened to the action of the French and English fleets. The 
interior of the Liman is known to have a great depth of water, at least in 
the central channel, though nearer to the shores it abounds in sand- 

40 banks, none of which, however, are formidable to gun-boats and other 
light vessels. Thus Otshakoff, Glubakoye and other points on the shores 

Friedrich Engels 

of the estuary are exposed to the attacks of the Allies and very likely will 
have to suffer from them. 

That the entrance to the Liman is not the shallow channel indicated on 
the charts, the allied admirals might have inferred from the history of the 
campaign of 1788. And here we may be allowed to refer again to that 5 
campaign, not only because it gives us a clear insight into what the nature 
of this estuary is with reference to naval warfare, but also because it was 
then the scene of some of the exploits of our Revolutionary hero, Paul 
Jones. 

At that time, Kinburn and the south shore were held by the Russians, 10 
and Otshakoff and the north shore, by the Turks. The Russians had a 
fleet at Glubakoye, between the mouths of the Dnieper and of the Bug; 
its sailing vessels of deep draught were commanded by Rear-Admiral 
Paul Jones, and consisted of five ships of the line of eighty guns, and 
eight frigates, while the rowing flotilla of sixty-five light vessels was under 15 
the orders of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen. The Turks had about Otsha- 
koff, under Hassan-Pasha, ten ships of the line, six frigates and fifty-three 
vessels of light draught. A second Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, 
eight frigates, and twenty-four smaller sail was cruising in the offing. 
After a few preliminary engagements, Hassan-Pasha, on the 27th of June, 20 
entered the Liman with the whole of his first fleet, sailed up as far as 
Glubakoye, (thus proving that ships of the line, with their full armament 
on board, could come up so far,) and formed in order of battle, the large 
vessels in the first line. The Russians, on the contrary, covered their liners 
and frigates by the row-boats. On the morning of the 28th the battle 25 
began. The Turkish line advanced, and soon came up within range of the 
Russian liners. Within an hour a Turkish ship of seventy guns was 
aground; the admiral's flag-ship, carrying eighty guns, was ashore a few 
moments after. Two frigates of forty guns went so succor them, but one 
of them struck on a shoal almost immediately; while Paul Jones's large 30 
vessels kept the remainder of the Turkish vessels engaged, the row-boats 
closed up with the stranded vessels, boarded and set fire to them. The 
remainder of the Turkish fleet soon retired in no enviable state; but still 
their large ships made such a bold front that their retreat was pretty 
unmolested by the Russian gun-boats and galleys. 35 

But the measure of their disaster was not yet filled. Hassan-Pasha, 
having collected the remains of his fleet at Otshakoff, resolved to join the 
fleet cruising in the Black sea, and to effect this, he had to pass round the 
point of the Kinburn spit. Here Suvoroff, who commanded in the penin- 
sula, had constructed a masked battery of twenty-four guns; and when 40 
the Turks, in the night of the 30th of June, 1788, attempted to double 

The war news 

that cape, the battery opened upon them with great effect. Before 
daybreak, the fire of the Russians, favored by a bright moonlight, had 
brought into great distress the Turkish fleet, whose ships had to pass one 
after the other through the narrow channel, and were all the while within 
5 easy range of the battery. Several vessels got ashore, others showed sig- 
nals of distress, some went down or were in flames, and as day broke the 
Russian fleet bore down upon them. Paul Jones very wisely kept his large 
ships back, as there was no room for them to maneuver; and indeed the 
liner Vladimir, venturing too much forward, was lost on a shoal. But the 
10 rowing flotilla closed with the Turks, and destroyed a great many of their 
ships, so that before noon the whole action was at an end. Three sail of 
the line, five frigates, and seventeen smaller sail were destroyed, and one 
liner and two frigates were taken by the Russians. Of the two sail of the 
line which were saved by the Turks, one went down before it could reach 
15 Constantinople, and a frigate sank as soon as she had reached the island 
of Peresan. A portion of the Turkish fleet sought shelter under the guns 
of Otshakoff, but even here Prince Nassau-Siegen attacked and destroyed 
them on the Ist and 2nd August. 
This campaign shows clearly what sort of a naval battle-field the Dnie- 
20 per Liman is. The smaller sort of ships of the line, or at least the large 
fifty and sixty gun frigates, can enter it; but whether they will be able to 
maneuver in it with any degree of safety, though they be propelled by 
steam, remains doubtful. But that corvettes, sloops and vessels of lighter 
draught, especially steamers, can easily maneuver in these waters, while 
25 the larger vessels may serve, when once moored, as stationary batteries, 
there is not the slightest doubt whatever. And with the means of naval 
warfare now in the possession of the Allies, with due activity they should 
be able to scour the Liman from Otshakoff to the mouth of the Dnieper 
and the Bug.