Friedrich Engels 
From the Crimea. October 12, 1855 


From the Crimea. 


We have sought carefully through the files of European journals, which 
reached us late yesterday afternoon by way of Boston, for any decisive 
indications as to the course of the Crimean campaign, and we must con- 
fess have sought nearly in vain. Perhaps the most important fact estab- 
lished is that the Allies have been able repeatedly to penetrate into the 
valley of the upper Belbek without meeting with any resistance in the 
mountain passes between that valley and that of Baidar. This shows what 
is the real defensive position of the Russians on their left flank. From 
Aitodor and Mangup Kalé, a steep line of rocky hights runs, by Chufut 
Kalé (the Jewish suburb of Bakshiserai) to Sympheropol, where it loses 
itself in the plain. This ridge, steep toward the south-east, as all moun- 
tains in the Crimea are, slopes off very gently toward the north-west, 
forming a plateau which extends uninterruptedly to the sea toward the 
west, while on the north it gradually loses itself in the lower steppes of the 
Northern Crimea. The rocks forming the edge of this plateau toward the 
south-east, and the plateau itself, are pierced by a few passes only, prin- 
cipally where the Belbek, the Katsha, the Alma, and their tributaries, 
force their passage toward the sea. Thus, while the ridge itself, at least as 
far as Chufut Kalé, may be considered impassable to troops, the few 
passes leading through it form defiles easily defended, and which, if in- 
trenched, may be considered as almost impregnable. The line from Ma- 
ckenzie by Aitodor to Chufut Kalé is rather more than fifteen miles, which 
is certainly a good length of front; but the main points of possible attack 
being known, the mass ofthe troops can be stationed toward the rear, so 
as to be able to march down to any menaced point. It is certainly a 
disadvantage that Bakshiserai, the nearest chief depot, is situated almost 
in the very front of defense, and another disadvantage, that Symphero- 


pol, the principal depot of the whole Crimea, and in fact the whole line of 
retreat, is situated in the prolongation of the front, not behind it; but the 
greatest disadvantage is that the whole of this line can be turned by a few 
days' march. 

Our readers may remember we stated long ago, all the possible modes 
of turning the Russian position, and that even then the more advanta- 
geous course seemed to be a turning march by Alushta, along the coast, 
round by the Chatyr Dagh, and down the valley of the Salghir direct 
upon Sympheropol. What we then stated is still our opinion, and the late 
events, together with the certainty now acquired respecting the Russian 
defensive position, have still more confirmed it. 

All the possible approaches to the Russian position from the south and 
south-east are by mere Tartar country-roads or sheep-tracks, unfit for the 
movements of an army in a season when rain may be expected, as a day's 
rain renders them completely impassable. They are two highroads only, 
that from Traktir bridge to Mackenzie's and that from Alushta to Sym- 
pheropol. It is true the French are constructing roads toward Aitodor, 
but to make a road before operating on it would be to give up operations 
for this year at once. Now, however a macadamized road may be spoiled, 
cut up and destroyed, it can always be easily repaired in a country rich in 
stone and wood, such as the south-eastern coast and hills of the Crimea. 
Thus, if it can be shown that the road by Alushta is acceptable on mili- 
tary grounds, it must certainly have the preference before all other ap- 
proaches to the Russian position. 

The Upper Belbek is open to the French, because they have been there. 
From the Upper Belbek there are several country roads toward the Up- 
per Katsha; thence others lead into the valley of the Upper Alma, and the 
country between the Upper Alma, the Upper Salghir and the coast is 
intersected by more roads and paths, encircling Chatyr Dagh on all sides, 
than any other part of the Crimean hills. The distance from Baidar valley 
to the village of Salghir, on the river of that name and on the northern 
foot of Chatyr Dagh, is about thirty miles, an extent of front not large 
for a country of Alpine conformation and with comparatively few passes 
from valley to valley. In the Alpine and Spanish mountain-wars, armies 
of less strength than the Allies could spare, were almost always expected 
to occupy far more ground. As the impracticability of the roads in that 
neighborhood is confined to artillery only, and but partially to cavalry, 
while infantry and light cavalry would everywhere be able to move, 
though perhaps after rains with difficulty; and as plenty of passes lead 
down toward the south coast, thus securing the retreat, there could be no 
difficulty in gradually extending the allied outpost as far as the Upper 


Alma, keeping supports of infantry, and perhaps mountain artillery 
among the hills to the rear, and pushing a column along the coast toward 
Alushta. If this has been carried out, and the Russian position thorough- 
ly reconnoitered, the system of false attacks would have to be extensively 
employed, until finally the chief column advances upon the pass of the 
Chatyr Dagh, where no doubt it will find itself arrested by strong in- 
trenchments well guarded. But here the detachments of the Upper Ka- 
tsha and Alma would be ready to march by the country roads down into 
the valley of the Salghir, and turn these intrenchments. This might be 
done, unless the season be too far advanced; it is nothing more than what 

has been done in every instance of mountain warfare. That this move- 

ment, if properly executed, would force the Russians to open the pass, is 


certain; and at every point where the Russians make a stand it can be 
repeated, until the whole of the Salghir valley as far as Sympheropol, 

where the plain begins, is opened; and then either the Russians would 
have to offer battle, or to retreat in haste. 

There are only three reasons why the allied generals may avoid this 
course of action. First, the Russians might, while the main force of the 
Allies is on the south coast, detach a strong body from any point of their 

position, and by the Upper Belbek and Katsha, march upon the hills, 
cross them and descend to the coast road, thus cutting off and turning 
the position of the allied army intended to turn them. This maneuver 
would, however, be so full of risk to the corps executing it, that it is not 
likely to be attempted. The allied troops cut off by it, would be able to 

reembark on board the fleets, which would of necessity have to be about 
the south coast during the whole of the operation, or to march toward 
Kertch, where no troops of equal strength could stop them on the road. 
And if the troops remaining west of the Russian corps that would have 
so descended to the coast were to attack it in flank and rear, its doom 

would soon be fixed. 

Then it may be possible that while the main body of the Allies is 
engaged in an operation which cannot be decided in less than six or eight 
days, the main body of the Russians may attack the troops left to defend 
Chernaya, Balaklava and Inkermann. But here a sufficient force could be 

left, and the Russians have a too lively remembrance of previous at- 
tempts of the kind to repeat them readily. Besides, if their main body 
should be defeated there, while their rear is menaced from Eupatoria and 
from Alushta, their retreat would be a route ending at Perekop only. And 
even if they were to succeed, what then? Sympheropol, Bakshiserai, &c, 

would be almost sure to fall, all their magazines would be lost, and they 
would be in Sevastopol again, but without stores, and without commu- 


nication with the interior, the armies of Alushta and Eupatoria being in 
possession of the Crimea. Thus, in any case, the march by Alushta, even 
if not altogether successful, could not end in disaster so long as the 
present forces of the Allies were well managed, and the plan properly 
executed. A third difficulty might be found in the weather and the ad- 
vanced season. As to this we can only say, that if it had been undertaken 
immediately after the fall of the south side of Sevastopol, such an expe- 
dition would have been but certain to succeed.