Friedrich Engels 
The Crimean war. October 9, 1855 


The Crimean war. 


The steamer Baltic is due here to-day from Liverpool with a week's later 
news, which may very likely prove to be of great importance. It is true 
that if the same deliberation were to be observed forever in the movement 
of the Allies, Marshal Pélissier, with his advanced age, could scarcely 
hope to reach Perekop during the term of his mortal career. But we may 
be sure that this tardy pace will presently give way to more impetuous 
movements; and meanwhile it may be worth our while to examine more 
in detail some of the recent features of the campaign, to which we have 
not before been able to give all the attention they merit. 

We have already noticed the battle fought at a distance of fifteen miles 
from Eupatoria, between the French cavalry under d'AUonville and the 
Russian cavalry under Korff, in which the latter were routed, with heavy 
losses of guns and ammunition wagons taken from their mounted artil- 

lery. The details of this affair are not yet at hand; but we know that the 
Russians have long had a considerable body of horse observing Eupa- 
toria, and that this force should be so signally beaten by a few French 
regiments augurs badly for them. That, under such circumstances, they 
should lose so much more than the French is not surprising. In a cavalry 

action the principal loss is undergone by the defeated party during the 
pursuit, after all tactical order, and with it all force of resistance, has 
vanished. The Russian horse-artillery appears to have exposed itself very 
bravely in order to redeem the check inflicted on the cavalry, otherwise 
the; loss of nearly a whole battery is hardly to be explained. Any how, 

even before the details arrive, we think we may say that this first action 
has decidedly proved the superiority of the French over the Russian 
cavalry. Moreover, with this peculiar arm moral impulse is everything, 
and all the physical elements are subordinate. Therefore we shall very 

likely find that while the allied horse-men will henceforth always attack 
the Russians with that dash and intrepidity which made the charge of 
Balaklava an exploit even more grand than stupid, the Russian cavalry 
will be very shy in meeting them, and shy cavalry are worse than none at 
all. 
On the opposite wing of the allied position, the cautious reconnais- 
sances up the valley of Baidar and the hights encircling it have, after 
many gropings, at last led them, as we recently explained, across the ridge 
of hills which divides the waters of the Upper Chernaya from those of the 
Upper Belbek. The Allies have twice descended into the valley of the 
Belbek, but both times they retired before nightfall to the Baidar hights. 
These facts we know from Gorchakoff himself. Now a glance on the map 
shows that as soon as the ridge separating the Baidar valley from the 
Belbek valley is once passed, the flank of the position of Inkermann and 
Mackenzie is as good as turned; for though the singular formation of the 
Crimean hills, invariably steep on their south-eastern, and gradually de- 
scending on their north-western slope, and other features of the ground, 
might favor the Russians in attempting to bar the valley, yet in all moun- 
tainous countries the commanding position always belongs to the party 
who descend from the higher ground, and this advantage, with sufficient 
forces, will always outweigh all minor, local and accidental advantages. 
Therefore, if the Allies follow up at once, and with a force adequate to 
the purpose, the advantages once gained, they must succeed in turning 
and thereby making untenable the present strong position of their op- 
ponents. It is true the valley of the Belbek may be so fortified that any 
attempt to force its lower course will be attended with a loss equaling 
that of a front attack on Mackenzie's hights; but once the Upper Belbek 
secured, the road into the interior of the Crimea is opened. So that this 
apparently modest advantage, if properly followed up, gives the Allies 
the certainty of driving the Russians out of the Crimea very shortly. 
There are, as we have repeatedly shown, great advantages in the at- 
tempt to turn the Russian position by the left, either by the Baidar hights 
or by the south coast. There the main body of the Allies can be concen- 
trated without the knowledge of the Russians, who can see every vessel 
sailing to Eupatoria; and when the proper time has arrived, it can be 
brought against them at once. In that case, neither Balaklava nor the 
plateau of the Chersonese can be menaced, for the Russians will be at 
once attacked on their most vital point; and even a check cannot end in a 
disaster, as the base of operation is near, and the south coast under the 
command of the fleets. A demonstration from Eupatoria, with the inten- 
tion of following up energetically the first symptoms of approaching re- 

treat in the Russian camp, is very proper; but the main attack should, we 
think, be made from the south-east on the Russian left. It would appear 
that Pélissier has adopted this plan, though perhaps rather late. The third 
corps, (d'Herbillon's,) the two Sardinian divisions, and the Turkish di- 
vision had hitherto occupied the line of the Chernaya, with d'Allonville's 
cavalry in the Baidar valley. Since d'Allonville's removal to Eupatoria, 
other detachments of cavalry have been sent, along with infantry, to 
Baidar; the first French corps (de Salles’) has marched down, four divi- 
sions strong, to the Chernaya, and since then considerable bodies, drawn 
from this new-formed army, have occupied Baidar, and reconnoitered as 
far as the Belbek. Seven French, two Sardinian and one Turkish division 
of infantry, one English and one Turkish division, beside a French and a 
Sardinian brigade of cavalry, and the necessary field artillery, form an 
army of some 100,000 men, and they all appear destined to act against 
the center and left of the Russians. They now have secured the road into 
the interior; if they follow it up as they ought to do, the Crimea ought to 
be theirs in a fortnight. 
Whatever may be said of the slowness of Pélissier's movements, there 
is one thing which must be acknowledged: the reign of the gossiping old 
women that flourished in the allied camp till very lately, he has effectu- 
ally put a stop to. He has reintroduced some military discipline among 
the field-officers and generals, not only of his own, but of the other 
armies. No staff-officer, not even the English commander-in-chief, is any 
longer allowed to telegraph, for the edification of the world, any news 
about the plans, projects and preparatory movements agreed upon at 
headquarters. What we know of the movements of the Allies we know by 
newspaper correspondents whose letters are a fortnight on the road to 
London, or else from the dispatches of Gorchakoff. Neither Pélissier, nor 
La Marmora, nor old Father Simpson give us any clue; for the latter 
worthy this seems, indeed, a relief, tojudge from his previous dispatches. 
But the introduction of this system, at all events, shows that a man is at 
the head of the French army, who, by his own moral superiority, can 
command the deference of the other generals-in-chief, nominally his 
equals, and who can at the same time afford to treat with a certain degree 
of contempt the craving for news exhibited by the allied governments at 
home. Pélissier seems to know that since the fall of Sevastopol he, and 
not Louis Bonaparte, is Emperor in the Crimea. From that event his tone 
has remarkably changed; and he is perfectly right. Every government will 
turn any piece of news that looks favorable into a political engine, a 
moyen de gouvernement; and if a commander before the enemy has to 
deal with two such reckless and meddling individuals as Louis Bonaparte 

and Lord Palmerston, he has every reason to give them no more news 
than he can help. On the other hand, as to intelligence of real interest to 
the public, Pélissier has given us more than any other of the allied gene- 
rals in the Crimea. His reports, and that of General Niel, on the taking of 
the south side, were models of their kind, clear, lucid, detailed without 
being over-professional; they put to the shade even those Russian reports 
whose business-like style we have had occasion more than once to men- 
tion favorably. 

After all, Pélissier has so far proved himself the best soldier in the 
Crimea. Whether he is as good a strategist, he has yet to show.