The journey of the Emperor of Russia to Odessa; the removal of his consort from St Petersburg to the heart of holy Russia, to Moscow; the leaving behind of Constantine, the most warlike of his brothers, at the seat of government; all these circumstances are taken as so many proofs that Russia is resolved to offer the utmost resistance. Nikolayev and Kherson, the two most fortified points of South Russia, now form the centre of a reserve army which is being assembled at this moment in the governments of Taurida and Kherson. Besides the army reserves (troops belonging to the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th battalions), whose number is indeterminable, 40,000 militiamen are said to be concentrated in Nikolayev, while about 25,000 men are in Odessa. It is impossible to test the correctness of these statements. So much is certain: considerable forces are being concentrated in South Russia. Russia’s strategic plan takes into account not only the loss of the Crimea, but even an enemy invasion of South Russia. For this reason the Dnieper line has been chosen as the main line of defence, with Kherson and Nikolayev as the first, and Yekaterinoslav as the next base of operations. Since Kherson and Nikolayev lie within the range of not only gunboats but even armed launches, a base belonging to the interior of the country is necessary. Yekaterinoslav provides this. Situated at a point where the Dnieper, by a bend in its course, forms an angle of about 75 degrees, it is an excellent centre for an army retiring into the interior, which intends to cover itself first behind the southern (north-east to south-west) and then behind the middle course (north-west to south-east) of this river. An army advancing from Perekop into the interior of Russia would first have to force the Dnieper at Kherson and then advance to Yekaterinoslav, in order to cross the same river there once more. Any detachment advancing on the left bank of the Dnieper could easily be held up a few miles south of Yekaterinoslav, on the line of the Volchya, where this river flows into the main stream. To these advantages is added the fact that the whole country south of Yekaterinoslav is a vast steppe, 200 miles in extent, where it is as difficult to move an army as to feed it, while the city itself, situated on the northern edge of the steppe and close to the rich, relatively densely populated provinces of Kiev and Poltava, can draw any required quantity of provisions without difficulty. Finally, Yekaterinoslav maintains communication with the army of the centre at Kiev and covers the road to Moscow. Yekaterinoslav is therefore being fortified and supplied with everything necessary for the provisioning of the southern army. Depots of provisions, equipment, and munitions are being accumulated here. Now, if this speaks, on the one hand, for the strategic acumen of the Russians – and the old general and deserter Jomini has certainly not schooled them for nothing all this time – it proves, on the other hand, just as clearly that they do not believe in successes for a considerable period. Were the Allies to advance into the interior of Russia (from Perekop), they would certainly have to force Yekaterinoslav. But there can be no question of this in the present campaign, and hardly in the campaign of 1856. Russia would first have to have evacuated the Crimea, the whole of Transcaucasia, the Caucasus as far as the Terek and the Kuban, Odessa would have to be a prey to the flames, the harbour of Nikolayev destroyed, and the Danube cleared as far as Galatz – all these external extremities would first have to be amputated before the Allies could even conceive the idea of undertaking a campaign into the interior of Russia. The far-sighted strategic plan of the Russians therefore seems *de mauvais augure*. The allied troops are moving up the valley of the upper Chernaya in order to turn the extreme right flank, at Aitodor or the upper Belbek. Thus the dispatches of Gorchakov and Pélissier unanimously report. To us this manoeuvre of the Allies seems to be carried out too ostentatiously for it really to be intended in this manner.

The task of the Allies now obviously consists in dislodging the Russians from the entrenched position on the Mackenzie Heights. If they succeed in this, the Russians must evacuate the North Fort, and with it the Crimea. For between the Mackenzie Heights and Simferopol there is no position that can be turned, and beyond Simferopol the steppe, untenable for large armies, offers no position at all. Whether the Russians will hold the Crimea therefore depends on their ability to hold their present position, specifically on the Mackenzie Heights.