Friedrich Engels 
The state of the war. About September 25, 1855 




The state of the war. 


It is plain from the advices of the last Liverpool steamer that the Czar 
has no intention of making peace under the circumstances now existing. 
His sudden departure for Odessa instead of going to Warsaw, where he 
had arranged to meet the King of Prussia; the transfer of the residence of 
the Empress from St. Petersburg to Moscow, the heart and center of 
Holy Russia; the leaving the administration of affairs in the hands of the 
Grand Duke Constantine, the most warlike of his brothers; and the tak- 
ing of the other brothers with him to the seat of war—all this indicates a 


determination to prosecute the contest to some other end than can now 


be realized. At the same time extensive preparations are making for the 
defense of South Russia. Nicolaiéff and Kherson, the two most impor- 
tant fortified points, form the centers for an army of reserve now collec- 
ting in the government of Kherson, and that portion of Taurida situated 


north of Perekop. Beside a number of army reserves, (Fifth, Sixth, Sev- 


enth and Eighth battalions of the line-regiments,) whose number it is 
impossible to fix even approximately, forty thousand men of the militia 
are reported to be collected at Nicolaiéff. About twenty five thousand 
men are said to be at Odessa. Whether these rumors are exact or not, the 


fact of the Emperor's departure shows that a considerable force must be 


concentrating there. 

The plan of operations of the Russians seems to be elaborated with the 
same foresight for which all their grand strategic schemes are generally 
distinguished. Not only is the complete loss of the Crimea taken into 


account as a possible event, but even a campaign in South Russia. For 


this purpose the line of the Dnieper is chosen, very naturally, as the main 
line of defense; and Kherson and Nicolaiéff as the first, and Yekateri- 
noslav as the ulterior base of operations. Nicolaiéffis within reach of an 






attack by water; therefore, against an enemy in possession of the Black 
Sea, an inland base is absolutely necessary. Now, Yekaterinoslav is a 
position of great strategical importance. Situated on the very point 
where, by a bend on its course, the Dnieper forms an angle of about 
seventy-five degree, it is a capital center for an army which, in its retreat 
toward the interior, intends to cover itself first behind the southern course 
(N.E. to S.W.) and later on behind the middle course (N.W. to S.E.) 
of that river. An army advancing from Perekop into the interior of Rus- 
sia would first have to force the passage of the Dnieper somewhere about 
Kherson, and then, advancing toward Yekaterinoslav, to pass the same 
river again at that place. Any detachments advancing on the left bank of 
the Dnieper could easily be stopped a few leagues south of Yekaterino- 
slav, on the line of the Voltshya, a river which there empties into the main 
stream. Beside these advantages, the whole country to the south of Ye- 
katerinoslav is one vast steppe, two hundred miles in width, through 
which it is extremely difficult to convey and to feed an army; while that 
town itself, situated on the northern range of the steppe, and in close 
proximity to the rich and comparatively densely populated provinces of 
Kiew and Poltava, can receive any amount of provisions without diffi- 
culty. And lastly, Yekaterinoslav maintains the communications with the 
army of the center at Kiew and covers the road to Moscow. 
Yekaterinoslav, as we learn from trustworthy sources, is now being 
fortified and provided with the reserve magazines for the southern army. 
Stores of food, equipments, ammunition, are collected there; and if ever 
the Allies should venture to advance into the interior, they would have to 
force this point before they could proceed any further. But even under 
circumstances very unfavorable to the Russians, the chances are that the 
forces of either party would be at least pretty equally matched at Yeka- 
terinoslav. Such an advance, however, is out of the question in this cam- 
paign, and nearly so in that of 1856. Indeed, any movement of the Allies 
into the interior of Russia would be a blunder, unless the Crimea and all 
the countries south of the Caucasus, nay, even of the Kuban and Terek, 
were freed from Russian dominion, all the Russian coasts devastated, 
Ismail taken, the mouths of the Danube up to Galatch opened to trade, 
and, in short, everything done which could be attempted against the 
extremities of Russia on that side. Then even it would be a mistake to 
advance into the interior of the steppe, until the passive resistance of 
Russia, successfully maintained, left no other choice. It is evident that the 
probability of such an event occurring is not very great; but if the Rus- 
sians are already preparing against it, we have another proof of that 
comprehensive foresight which has of late distinguished the chief strate- 






gical management of their forces, and which is apparently due to the 
commanding influence of General Jomini. 

For the present, the conquest of the Crimea is still the great task of the 
Allies. On that head our latest intelligence was that they had sent a strong 
column of infantry and cavalry into the valley of the upper Chernaya, 
threatening to turn by Ai'todor or the upper Belbek, the Russian extreme 
right. Gorchakoff had telegraphed, besides, that the Allies were daily 
concentrating additional troops on the Chernaya. Now, this movement 
of the Allies toward the Russian right has evidently been made with such 
a degree of show, the Russians themselves having noticed it at once, that 
it cannot prelude a serious attempt at turning the Russians on that side. 

It may serve either to draw away from the camp at Mackenzie's farm a 
portion of the troops defending that intrenched position, or else to mask 
a great expedition to Eupatoria. The first supposition hardly seems like- 
ly, from the concentration of the allied troops on the Chernaya, noticed 
at the same time by Gorchakoff; the second supposition is more likely; 
and though, as we have before stated, a flank movement by the south 
coast would seem preferable, such an expedition, suddenly transporting a 
large force on the flank and rear of the Russians, cannot but be of great 
effect, and must decide the campaign. 

As to the actual position of the Russians in the Crimea we have no 
clear information. They are doing their best to maintain a bold front, and 
if the state of their stores allows, it is certainly the best they can do. Still 
we remain of opinion that they must soon leave the Crimea unless the 
Allies make great mistakes and they, themselves, receive provisions more 
plentifully than they have a right to expect. The great object of the Allies 
is to drive them away from the position of Mackenzie's hights, for that 
position once lost, the north side of Sevastopol, defended by a small 
garrison, must be abandoned to its fate, and the Crimea must be evac- 
uated; because between Mackenzie's farm and Sympheropol there is not 
a single tolerable position which cannot be turned with the greatest ease, 
and beyond Sympheropol the steppe, being untenable for large armies, 
offers no positions whatever. 

—One thing however is certain, namely, that there can be little delay in 
the decision of this question. The Atlantic, due here to-day, will most 
probably bring us intelligence of a battle in the field, which, if unfavor- 
able to the Russians, must be followed by their prompt retreat from the 
peninsula.