Friedrich Engels 
The battle of the Chernaya 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4494, 14. September 1855 

The battle of the Chernaya. 

Contrary to our expectation the mail of the Africa, which we received 
late on Wednesday night, failed to bring the report of Prince Gorchakoff 
concerning the battle of the Chernaya, fought on the 16th ult. However, 
5 the French and English accounts which we printed yesterday afford suf- 
ficient information for a tolerably correct judgment of the affair. In the 
French report one is struck by the absence of that tendency to bluster 
which but too often is innate in a French sabreur, and which was so 
prominent in Pélissier's first bulletins. The old General is now uncom- 
10 monly clear, business-like, and to the point; he even gives the Russians 
full credit for the bravery they displayed on that occasion; and his report 
very favorably contrasts with General Simpson's amusing calculations as 
to the numbers engaged, by which it would appear that without any great 
effort some 15,000 French and Sardinians defeated 60,000 Russians. The 
15 facts of the case appear to have been as follows: 

On the morning of Aug. 16, before daybreak, the Russians descended 
from the Mackenzie hights and took up a position on the edge of the hills 
descending toward the Chernaya. They were commanded by Prince Gor- 
chakoff in person, under whom Gen. Read commanded the right wing, 

20 (7th and 12th divisions,) while Liprandi with the 5th division appears to 
have occupied the center, while the 17th division formed the Russian left. 
Portions of the 4th and 6th divisions were also present, and seem to have 
acted as reserves. The 5th division, along with the troops belonging to the 
4th and 6th, form part of the second (Paniutin's) corps, which had but 

25 just arrived in the Crimea; the remainder were old Crimean troops, and 
must have figured with effective numbers very much reduced. 

The ground on the opposite side of the Chernaya is mostly level, a 
continuation of the plain of Balaklava toward the river; but close to its 

Friedrich Engels 

banks this plain is interrupted by two groups of hillocks, rising gradually 
from the Balaklava side, but falling off toward the Chernaya, thus of- 
fering a good defensible position against an enemy crossing the river. 
Between these two groups of hillocks lies the valley into which the British 
Light Cavalry charged in the battle of Balaklava. The eastern group of 5 
hillocks, forming the right wing of the position, was occupied by La 
Marmora with his two Sardinian divisions; the other, toward the north- 
west, by three French divisions, which thus formed the center and left of 
the position. The French were commanded by General d'Herbillon, who 
had disposed Camou's division to the left, his own in the center, and 10 
Faucheux's division to the right, where it joined the Sardinian division of 
Trotti. The position gained additional strength from the two obstacles in 
its immediate front: first, the Chernaya, which river at the time was 
certainly fordable, but still obliged the Russians to cross at certain places 
only, and with a small front; and secondly, the aqueduct, cut in most 15 
places into the rock, and thus offering, even after its passage, a steep wall 
of scarped rock to be climbed. On the brink of the hills the French and 
Piedmontese had thrown up some light breastworks just sufficient to 
shelter their cannon. The two groups of hillocks formed, so to speak, 
several bastions flanking each other with their artillery. Beyond the Cher- 20 
naya, which was crossed by brigdes at Chorgun, on the Sardinian ex- 
treme right, and at an inn (in Russian Traktir) in front of the French 
center, the Piedmontese had two companies as outposts, while the bridge 
of Traktir was covered by a slight bridge-head occupied by the French. 
The French outposts were still beyond this. 25 
On the morning of the 16th the Russians having got their artillery in 
position on the hights east of the Chernaya, sent their advanced troops 
down into the valley. Day had not yet broken and a dense fog facilitated 
a surprise, as at Inkermann. The allied outposts were driven in in a 
moment, and by daybreak the bridge-head and the whole eastern side of 30 
the river were in their hands, while they were fighting for the passage of 
the bridges with two French regiments. Then the 7th and 12th Russian 
divisions, placed exactly opposite the French divisions of Camou and 
d'Herbillon, descended in two columns into the valley; and here they 
formed their columns of attack and advanced in two distinct masses—the 35 
7th division, passing river and aqueduct, partly by fords, partly by flying- 
bridges constructed in all haste, against Camou; while the 12th division, 
part of which remained in reserve, advanced against d'Herbillon by the 
bridge of Traktir, the defenders of which were in an instant thrown back 
by the overwhelming masses of the Russians. They advanced with greater 40 
rapidity and spirit than were ever shown by Russians through the aque- 

The battle of the Chernaya 

duct and up the hill-side. The 7th Russian division came up nearly to the 
brink of the hill, when Camou's troops, deployed in line, gave them a 
volley and charged them in flank and rear with such vehemence that the 
Russians instantly turned, recrossed the river under a murderous fire, 
and, if we may believe Pélissier, that 7th division never showed itself 
again during the battle. In the center, the 12th division succeeded in 
scaling the hights and driving in several French regiments. The fate of the 
battle appeared uncertain for a moment, when d'Herbillon ordered a 
brigade from Faucheux's division to attack the left flank of the Russian 

Nn 

10 columns, and after a short struggle, the Russians were driven down the 
declivity, followed by the French, who for a moment retook the bridge. 
Gorchakoff, however, had prepared a fresh attack. The remainder of 
the 12th division and the 5th division had descended into the valley, 
where they sheltered the fugitives who re-formed; and now the whole of 
15 the 12th and 5th divisions moved forward for a second charge. They 
passed by the bridge, and close to the right and left of it, and advanced 
with great vivacity against the allied center, (d'Herbillon's and Fau- 
cheux's divisions). But by this time the French had got all their artillery 
into position; it fired in front against the Russian columns, while the 
20 Sardinian artillery took them in flank. In spite of this murderous fire they 
advanced steadily and rapidly, and again reached the hights. There they 
found the French collected, deployed in line a little behind the edge of the 
hill. As soon as the heads of the columns were fairly on the edge, the 
French gave them a volley, and charged them with the bayonet in front 
25 and flank. The struggle was as short as before. The Russians gave way 
and fled in disorder across the river, pursued by the musketry and artil- 
lery-fire of the Allies. This second defeat of the Russians virtually decid- 
ed the battle. They had three-fifths of their infantry engaged, and could 
not hope to see any fresh reénforcements arrive on the field; the Allies, 
30 too, had three divisions out of five engaged, but fresh troops were hur- 
rying to support them from the camp before Sevastopol. Pélissier had 
sent for two more divisions of the line and one of the Guards, and they 
were coming up. It was now about 8 o'clock in the morning. 
Gorchakoff, in spite of these odds, resolved upon another attack. The 
35 17th division now had to come forward and to form a nucleus for such 
part of the beaten troops as were still fit to be brought against the enemy. 
The line of attack was again shifted to the left; it was Faucheux's division 
upon which the Russians fell this time. But in vain. The cross-fire of the 
French and Sardinian artillery decimated them before they could reach 
40 the summit of the hills, and again the French lines broke their columns 
and drove them back to the other side of the river, while the Piedmontese 

Friedrich Engels 

(Trotti's division) took them in flank and completed the victory. There 
remained but the troops of the 4th and 6th divisions intact, amounting to 
the effective strength of about one division. To launch these would have 
served no purpose whatever. The defeat was unmistakable; and accord- 
ingly the Russians, bringing forward their artillery, commenced the re- 5 
treat. Their own position was so strong that Pélissier deemed an attack 
upon it out of the question; and therefore they were molested by the 
artillery and rifles only. The loss of the Russians in this affair was enor- 
mous in comparison with that of the Allies. The former lost about 5,000 
in killed, wounded and prisoners; the latter about 1,500 only. The reason 10 
of this was, that the Russians had to make all their charges under the 
most effective fire of the allied artillery, especially the Piedmontese, 
whose 16-pounders, though slow to move, are of the highest effect when 
once in position. 

The Russian attack was here made exclusively in front. To turn the 15 
French left by Inkermann, appeared impossible from the command ex- 
ercised by the French batteries in the spur of the ridge opposite that 
place. To turn the Allies by their right would have necessitated that the 
main body of the Russians should descend into the valley of Baidar, 
where the ground is evidently too intricate for such clumsy troops. Thus 20 
the front attack was chosen, and very properly a surprise attempted. The 
surprise partially succeeded, but was not carried out with the necessary 
energy. When the Russians were once masters of the passages of the 
Chernaya, they should have pushed forward their masses just as they 
happened to be at hand, in order to follow up their advantage before the 25 
French could recover from the first blow. Instead of that, they allowed 
their opponents the time necessary to bring their troops and artillery into 
position, and the effect of the surprise which might have brought into 
their hands the hights occupied by the French ceased almost as soon as 
the Russians had reached the Chernaya. This is another proof of the 30 
difficulty of moving Russian troops under circumstances where they 
should be expected to act rapidly and where inferior commanders must 
use their own judgment. 

The French have always been notorious for a certain contempt of 
outpost duty. Even in their best estate an active enemy could any night 35 
surprise their outposts and alarm their camps without any great risk. On 
this occasion they showed that even the slowly-moving Russians might 
do it. Their main position was so close on the Chernaya that their ad- 
vanced troops should have been either pushed much further forward, or, 
if the ground did not allow this, that they should have been reenforeed so 40 
strongly as to be able to hold out until the camp could be got under arms. 

The battle of the Chernaya 

As it was, the French were encamped without any proportionate ad- 
vanced guard, and in consequence the Russians were able to advance on 
their main position before they had time to bring their full powers of 
resistance into play. More active opponents than the Russians would 
5 have brought forward superior numbers so rapidly that the hights oc- 
cupied by the French must have been carried before any regular and 
systematic resistance could have been made. But the Russians themselves 
were afraid of risking a division or two of their troops in twilight-fight- 
ing, and thus they lost every advantage the surprise had gained for them. 
10 The decisive and easily-bought successes of the French in repelling the 
Russian columns when they had already scaled the hights, were due to a 
system of tactics hitherto not often followed by them. They have evident- 
ly learnt this mode of fighting from the English, who are masters in it. In 
defending a range of hills, the great advantage consists in concealing your 
15 troops just behind the crest, where they are fully sheltered, deploying 
them in line, and awaiting the appearance of the hostile columns. As 
soon as the heads of the columns appear on the crest, your line pours a 
volley into them, to which but a few muskets can reply, and then your 
rush upon them, in front and flank, with the bayonet. The English fought 
20 thus at Busaco, Pampeluna, Waterloo, and other battles, with constant 
success. Yet the continental troops of Europe appear to have lost all trace 
of this all but infallible mode of defending a range of hights. In the 
manuals of tactics it figured, but in practice it had almost disappeared 
before the universal predilection for columns covered by skirmishers. The 
25 French deserve great credit for having adopted from their old opponents 
this plain and effective maneuver. Had they been disposed in columns 
there is little doubt the Russians would have had greater advantages over 
them and perhaps even carried the day. But as it was, the fire of a 
deployed line of infantry, acting upon an enemy disorganized by a telling 
30 artillery fire and the fatigue of mounting a steep hill, proved overwhelm- 
ing; and a hearty advance with the bayonet was quite sufficient to hurl 
back the masses that had already spent their spirits before the glittering 
steel was close upon them. 
This is the third pitched battle of this war, fought in the open field, and 
35 like Alma and Inkermann, it is distinguished by its comparatively short 
duration. In Napoleon's wars a great deal of preliminary skirmishing 
characterized a battle; each party sought to feel the enemy before en- 
gaging him on decisive points and with decisive masses; and it was after 
each party had engaged the greater number of its troops only that the 
40 decisive blow was attempted. Here we see, on the contrary, no time lost, 
no fencing to tire out the enemy; the blow is struck at once, and upon the 

Friedrich Engels 

result of one or two attacks the fate of the battle depends. This looks a 
great deal braver than Napoleon's mode of fighting; yet, if a superiority 
of two to one, as the Allies possessed on the Alma, or if the known 
clumsiness of the Russians in maneuvering may seem to justify such 
straightforward action, the fact is that it shows in both parties a great 5 
want of generalship; and whenever the sabreurs who act upon this prin- 
ciple happen to be opposed to a general who properly understands how 
to occupy their troops, how to lay snares for them and invite them to run 
into them, they will very soon find themselves in a very unenviable po- 
sition. 10 

Finally, we repeat what we have often said: bravery in the soldiers and 
mediocrity in the generals are the chief characteristics, on both sides, of 
the present war.