Karl Marx 
Austria and the war 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4493, 13. September 1855 

Austria and the war. 

We communicate to our readers on another page an account by an Aus- 
trian officer of a tour of inspection of the Galician Army recently made 
by the Emperor Francis Joseph. The writer, in narrating the events of 
this tour, and in stating the dislocation of the Imperial forces, confirms 
the opinion we have on former occasions taken care to explain, that in 
the preparations she last year made for war Austria was by no means 
engaged in a comedy for the delusion of the Western Powers. Certainly 
she could never have made such sacrifices merely to throw dust in the 
eyes of the world. 

It is true that the utmost necessity alone induced her to arm against 
Russia; and indeed, as long as it was possible to procrastinate, Austria 
clung to the cobweb thread of a prospective peace which Russian di- 
plomacy held out for a bait. At last, however, her patience was exhaust- 

5 

ed, and St. Petersburg learned with surprise, not unmingled with terror, 15 

that the Austrian columns were drawn up along the Galician frontier. 
This was before the bare possibility of such an armament had been ad- 
mitted; and to concentrate an army of equal strength on the Russian side, 
within an equally short time, was altogether out of the question. The arts 

of diplomacy had therefore again to be resorted to. In what manner, and 20 

with what success this was done, need not be repeated. The whole of the 
immense army lately gathered on the Galician frontiers was dissolved at 
once, and the apprehensions of Russia in that quarter were partly allay- 
ed. We say partly, because two important elements have risen with that 

army which are not dissolved along with it. These are the fortifications 25 

and railways erected, renewed, or completed, during the stay of the army 
in Galicia. 

Austria and the war 

While in all other parts of the Empire the Government was guided by 
the principle of abandoning railway enterprise to private speculators, 
while the Western Railway, intended to connect Vienna with Munich, 
was even strikingly neglected, Baron Hess, the commander-in-chief in 

5 Galicia, was employing thousands of soldiers in the construction of a line 
of which however great the strategical value the commercial advantages 
are questionable, at least for the present—a line, too, which otherwise 
might have remained in the desks of private engineers for thirty years to 
come. To Russia nothing could have been more disagreeable than the 

10 construction of these railways, by which Austria is now able to recon- 
centrate the army just dissolved within less than a fifth part of the time 
required by Russia to bring up a similar army. Whoever will take the 
pains to inquire into the statistics of Austrian railway enterprise, and 
compare what has been done in the east to meet purely political views 

15 with the little attention paid to the interests of commerce in the west, he 
cannot fail to disbelieve that these Galician railways were thus hurried 
into premature existence for the mere deception of the world. Indeed, it is 
plain that such a purpose would have been much better answered by the 
speedy completion of the western lines connecting Austria with Bavaria. 

20 Our opinion is also confirmed in a still higher degree by the recent 
extensive improvements and additions in the fortifications of the eastern 
provinces of Austria. If railways may or may not be constructed from 
strategical considerations, the erection and completion of a system of 
fortifications, and the unproductive outlay occasioned by such works, 

25 certainly admit of no explanation beyond the immediate necessities of the 
case. What we have said about the comparative extent of railway-works 
in the east and west of Austria applies with much greater force to these 
fortifications. Of the thirty-six fortresses of the Austrian Empire seven 
belong directly, and nine indirectly, to the eastern line of defense, most of 

30 them having only recently been raised to a high perfection—as for in- 
stance Cracow, Przemysl and Czaleszczyk. The two former, together with 
Lemberg, which on account of its situation cannot be made of great 
strength, command the road to Warsaw; the latter is at the easternmost 
extremity of Galicia, opposite the important Russian fortress of Chotin. 

35 Cracow has been made a fortress of the first order, and all the works of 
this, as well as of the other Galician fortifications, have been put in 
complete readiness for war. It was once the custom in the Austrian army 
to give the command of fortresses to old worn-out generals, as a sort of 
honorable retirement; and such places were looked upon as a sort of exile 

40 for officers in disgrace at the Court; but we now find in the whole east 
and north-east really efficient men, generals of merit and distinguished 

Karl Marx 

staff-officers in command of fortresses. Cracow is commanded by Field- 
Marshal Wolter; Przemysl by Major-General Ebner; Zaleszczyk by Ma- 
jor-General Gläser; Carlsburg, in Transylvania, by Field-Marshal Sedl- 
mayer; and Olmütz, on the north-western flank, by General Von Böhm. 
At the same time the state of things in the west is the very reverse—men 5 
and things all but ruins tranquilly made over to further decay. How 
different would be the aspect there if the Western Powers could even 
pretend to call Austria's policy ambiguous! How the Austrian authorities 
would hasten to restore Linz with its forty Maximilian towers, now scarce- 

ly treated as a fortress—and Salzburg, once a stronghold of the first 10 
order? Instead of this, what do we behold?—dead quiet and perfect ab- 
sence of all military preparations. The very soldiers returning from the 
East, where they expected to reap their laurels, are invalided as fast as 
they approach the Bavarian frontier. 

These being facts which speak for themselves, there remains only one 15 
question to be settled: namely, through whose fault was the policy of 
Austria baffled and that country saddled with an enormous additional 
debt, without any immediate advantage either to itself or to its ostensible 
allies? We know it to be an opinion current at Vienna and reechoed 
throughout Germany, that Austria shrank back for fear of creating a 20 
second adversary in Prussia, and because a war undertaken without the 
aid of Germany, offered no guaranty of as speedy a termination as the 
exceptional position of the empire requires. We must however insist upon 
the contrary view. It is ourjudgment that if Austria had boldly attacked 
the Russian army, Prussia and the rest of Germany would have been 25 
compelled to follow, more or less slowly and reluctantly, in her track. 

Who, then, is to be held responsible for the present Austrian pol- 
icy?—England, under the guidance of that brilliant boggier and loqua- 
cious humbug, Lord Palmerston. To prove this proposition it is necessary 
to leave the military camp and to enter the diplomatic labyrinth. On the 30 
23d of July Mr. Disraeli asked Lord John Russell the authority for his 
statement that "one of the principal causes of the expedition to the Cri- 
mea was the refusal of Austria to cross the River Pruth." Lord John 
could not recollect—that is he said his "authority was his general recol- 
lection." Mr. Disraeli then put the question to Lord Palmerston, who 35 
"would not answer questions like these, picked out piecemeal from a long 
course of negotiations between her Majesty's Government and the Gov- 
ernment of one of the Sovereigns in alliance to a certain degree with her 
Majesty. All he could say with regard to himself was, that he had always 
thought the Crimea was the place where the most effective blow could be 40 
struck at the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and if there had 

Austria and the war 

been no other reason that would, in his mind, be amply sufficient for the 
expedition." "My opinion," he declared, "was that the expedition to the 
Crimea was the best step to take." 
Thus we learn from Lord Palmerston that the Crimean campaign ori- 
5 ginated not with Austria, not with Bonaparte, but with himself. On Ju- 
ne 26 Lord Lyndhurst, making a fierce onslaught on Austria, stated that 
"early in June she resolved on making a demand upon Russia to evacuate 
the Principalities. That demand was made in very strong terms, with 
something like an intimation that if it were not complied with Austria 
10 would resort to forcible means to secure this object." After some histor- 
ical observations, the learned lord went on to say: "Did Austria then 
immediately carry into effect any attack upon Russia? Did she attempt to 
enter the Principalities?—Far from it. She abstained from doing anything 
for a period of several weeks, till the moment when the siege of Silistria 
15 had been raised and the Russian army was in retreat, and when Russia 
herself had served a notice that she would within a certain time leave the 
Principalities and retire behind the Pruth." Lord Lyndhurst thus re- 
proaches Austria for saying one thing and doing another. He was fol- 
lowed in the debate by Lord Clarendon, and from him we may get some 
20 idea of the genius which transformed the Austria of May and June into 
the Austria of July and August. He says that "when Austria entered into 
those successive engagements with England and France, and when she 
made those extensive and costly preparations for war—when, moreover, 
she urgently proposed that military commissions should be sent by 
25 France and England to the headquarters of Gen. Hess, I have no doubt 
she intended and expected war. But she also expected that long before the 
season for military operations began the allied armies would have obtain- 
ed decisive victories in the Crimea—that they would be free, and would 
be able to undertake other operations in concert with her own forces. 
30 That unfortunately was not the case; and if Austria had at our invitation 
declared war, she would in all probability have had to wage that war 
single-handed." The explanation of Lord John Russell is thus in direct 
Opposition to the statement of Lord Clarendon. Lord John stated that 
the Crimean expedition sailed because Austria refused to cross the 
35 Pruth—that is, to take part against Russia. Lord Clarendon tells us that 
Austria could not take part against Russia because of the expedition to 
the Crimea. 
Next, we may consult with profit an uncontradicted statement of Lord 
Ellenborough: "Before the expedition to the Crimea was dispatched, Aus- 
40 tria proposed to communicate with the allied Powers on the subject of 
future military operations; acting, however, upon preconceived opinions, 

Karl Marx 

the Allies sent that expedition, and then Austria at once said that she 
could not meet the Russians single-handed, and that the expedition to the 
Crimea rendered it necessary for her to adopt a different course of ac- 
tion. At a subsequent period, just at the commencement of the Conferen- 
ces at Vienna, when it was of the greatest possible importance that Aus- 
tria should act with us—at that time, still looking to nothing but the 
success of your operations in the Crimea, you withdrew from the im- 
mediate vicinity of Austria 50,000 good Turkish troops, thus depriving 
Austria of the only assistance on which she could rely in the event of a 

military expedition against Russia. It is clear, therefore, my lords, and 10 

also from the statements of the noble earl, that it is our ill-advised ex- 
pedition to the Crimea which has paralyzed the policy of Austria, and 
which has reduced her to a position of such difficulty as to prevent her at 
once adopting a course which is essential for her honor, her dignity, and 

her interest. Before that expedition sailed to the Crimea I ventured to 15 

counsel the Government as to what the necessary consequences of it 
would be. I counseled them as to the effect which that expedition would 
produce upon the policy of Austria." 

The advice of Lord Ellenborough was not heeded. Palmerston sent off 

the Sevastopol expedition at the very moment when its sailing was best 20 

calculated to prevent and avert Austrian hostilities against Russia. It 
almost looks as if he had meant to render aid to the great enemy of 
England, and as if he had purposely entrapped Austria into her present 
ambiguous position in the Principalities, delivered her over to Russian 
diplomacy, and crowded her still nearer to the brink of that abyss into 25 
which she must ultimately sink. In this matter, as in so many others 
during his long and inglorious career, Palmerston has brilliantly succeed- 
ed, whatever may have been his real purpose, in serving the interest of 
Russia alone.