Friedrich Engels 
War prospects 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4459, 4. August 1855 

War prospects. 

At our last advices there was a lull in the warlike operations in the 
Crimea. No more assaults had taken place; the guns were all but silent; 
and but for the rifle-firing carried on constantly between the two lines of 
intrenchments, for the sapping and mining by which the Allies were 5 
pushing on toward the Malakoff hill, and for an occasional sortie by the 
Russians, we might suppose that hostilities had been suspended. But this 
can be nothing but the calm that precedes the storm; and ere this, that 
storm must have burst. There is every probability that a struggle more 
savage than Inkermann, the Mamelon Vert, or the assault of June 18, has 10 
already been consummated at Sevastopol. 

In fact the month of August must to a certain degree decide the result 
of the campaign. By this time the great part, if not all of the Russian 
reénforcements must have arrived, while the ranks of the Allies cannot 
but be thinned by sickness. If they hold their ground on the plateau of 15 
the Chersonesus it will be as much as they can do. That they will not take 
the south side of Sevastopol this year is a notion abandoned now even by 
the British press. They are reduced to the hope of knocking the place to 
pieces bit by bit, and if they manage to proceed at the speed they have 
hitherto exhibited, the siege will equal in duration that of Troy. There is 20 
no reason to expect that they will do their work with increased rapidity, 
for we are now all but officially informed that the vicious system hitherto 
followed is to be obstinately continued. The Crimean correspondent of 
the Constitutionnel of Paris, a man of high rank in the French army, and 
believed to be Gen. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Commander of the 25 
Guards, has announced the fact, that the public may spare themselves the 
trouble of making speculations as to a field campaign and eventual in- 
vestment of the north side of Sevastopol. Under present circumstances, 

War prospects 

he says, this could not be done without raising the siege and abandoning 
to the Russians the entire plateau; and therefore it has been decided to 
knock away as hard as possible at the position already attacked, until it 
is completely destroyed. Now, the announcements of this letter may be 
5 relied on, as there is every reason to believe that the French Emperor not 
only approves, but even revises every letter from this source before it is 
printed, and as Regnault is one of his special pets. 
What is to be the consequence of all this we can easily discover. The 
Russian army at and about Sevastopol now consists of the third and 
10 fourth corps, two divisions of the fifth and one of the sixth corps, beside 
marines, sailors, local troops, Cossacks and cavalry—presenting a force 
under arms of 180 battalions, or 90,000 infantry, with 30,000 artillery 
and cavalry, beside about 40,000 sick and wounded. Even the French 
Moniteur estimates their effective strength under arms at 110,000 men. 
15 Now the whole of the second corps (50 battalions, 32 squadrons, 96 
guns) and two divisions of grenadiers, with one division of cavalry, (24 
battalions, 32 squadrons, 72 guns,) are on the march or already at Se- 
vastopol, representing an additional force of 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cav- 
alry and Cossacks, and 5,000 artillery. The Russians thus will shortly 
20 have concentrated a force of at least 175,000 men or considerably more 
than the Allies can have left after their recent losses by combats and 
disease. That with these the Russians should be able at least to hold their 
own, particularly as they can constantly relieve the garrison by fresh 
troops after the old ones are exhausted by fatigue, is certainly the least 
25 that is to be expected from them. 
The Allies, on the other hand, have no chance of receiving similar 
reénforcements. They now number 21 divisions of infantry, (12 French, 
4 English, 3 Turkish, 2 Piedmontese,) or about 190 battalions; 3 divisions 
of cavalry, (1 French, 1 English, 1 Turkish,) or about 60 squadrons; and a 
30 corresponding number of guns. But as their battalions, and especially 
their squadrons, are very much thinned by the losses of the campaign, the 
whole force will not exceed 110,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 20,000 to 
25,000 artillery, train, and non-combatants fit for duty. Now if the forces 
of the two contending parties were so nicely balanced before the arrival 
35 of the Russian reénforcements, the scale must evidently turn against the 
Allies as soon as they arrive. All the allied reénforcements arrived and 
now being sent out are merely detachments from the depots to keep up 
the battalions and squadrons engaged; and they are not very strong if we 
are to believe the statements of the Press. However, three divisions are 
40 said to be on the march to Marseilles and Toulon, where steamers are 
concentrating; while, in England, the regiments intended for the Crimea 

Friedrich Engels 

are ordered to be ready for immediate embarkation. They will perhaps 
amount to another division of infantry and one of cavalry. Thus about 
33,000 infantry, with perhaps 2,500 cavalry and artillery may be gradu- 
ally arriving in the Crimea during August and September; but all this 
depends very much upon the celerity with which they are got off. At all 5 
events, the Allies will find themselves once more in a numerical inferior- 
ity, and may again be locked up on the plateau where they spent the last 
dreary Winter. Whether the Russians can now succeed in driving them 
off that stronghold we will not undertake to say. But to hold their own is 
evidently the only thing the Allies can except, until they receive 10 
reénforcements on a gigantic scale. Thus the war promises to be reduced 
to a series of resultless and bloody encounters, in which each party will 
send forth fresh bodies of troops, day after day, to meet the enemy in 
hand-to-hand struggles, whether on the ramparts of the town, on the 
parapets of the trenches, or on the escarped hights around Inkermann 15 
and Balaklava. No position of hostile armies can be imagined in which 
the shedding of more blood can lead to results less important than we 
must expect from such fights. 

There is, however, one chance of something decisive occurring. If the 
Russians, beside the troops they have sent, can afford to send another 20 
50,000 men, so as to insure to their army an incontestable superiority, 
serious defeats may be incurred by the Allies, so as to force them to 
reémbark. To judge of this possibility we must look at the force the 
Russians have under arms on the whole extent of their frontier. The 
Crimean army, including the reénforcements mentioned above, we set 25 
down at about 175,000 men. In the Caucasus, where, beside the local 
troops and Cossacks, the 16th and 17th divisions are engaged, they may 
have about 60,000 men. In Bessarabia they are said to have 60,000 men 
under Liiders—mostly combined battalions and reserves, as we should 
say, since only one division of the infantry of the fifth corps is there, and 30 
nothing has ever been stated about troops of the first or second corps 
having marched in that direction. In Poland and Volhynia there would 
remain two divisions of guards, one of grenadiers, three of the first ar- 
my-corps, and various reserves—amounting to about 160,000 men. The 
greater portion of the reserves and part of the guards are concentrated on 35 
the Baltic in the following manner: 50,000 men under Sievers in the Ger- 
man Baltic provinces, 30,000 in Finland under Berg, and 50,000 men in 
and about St. Petersburg, as an army of reserve under Rüdiger; in all 
about 585,000 men. The remainder of the Russian forces, about 65,000 
men, are in the interior; and thus the total armed force would make up 40 
650,000 men. Considering the enormous levies made by Russia, this num- 
ber does not appear at all exaggerated. 

War prospects 

Now, it is clear that at this advanced season of the year no serious 
danger of a landing on the Baltic coast is to be apprehended, and a 
general shifting toward the south of the various detachments placed there 
might be effected so as to liberate say 30,000 men, to be replaced by the 

5 militia or other troops from the interior. These 30,000 men marching 
toward Poland, would liberate in that country an equal number, and by 
the time the Austrians have reduced their army on the frontier to the 
harmless number of 70,000 or 80,000 men, which must soon be the case, 
another 30,000 to 40,000 men from the Polish army might be spared. 

10 Thus the troops might be found for such a reénforcement as would pre- 
clude all possibility of the Allies ever mastering the Crimea singlehanded, 
and they might be brought to the scene of war by the middle of October. 
But the question arises whether it will be possible for the Government to 
feed such a large number of troops during the Winter, especially since the 

15 Sea of Azoff has been cleared of Russian vessels. As to this we have not 
sufficient data to venture an opinion; but if that can be done, and the 
measure be adopted, the Allies might as well batter away at the rocks 
that surround Balaklava harbor as at the ramparts of Sevastopol defen- 
ded directly and indirectly by a force of 250,000 men. 

20 Russia has hitherto been held in check by 300,000 Austrians on the 
flank of her line of communication with the Crimea. Let her once get rid 
of that trammel, and the Allies will soon see what a power they have to 
deal with. They have allowed the time to slip away when, aided indirectly 
by Austria, they might have taken Sevastopol. Now, that Russia begins 

25 to be safe on that side, and has only the Allies to deal with, it is too late.