Friedrich Engels 
From Sevastopol. June 28, 1855 


From Sevastopol. 


Contrary to public expectation the mail of the Pacific, which arrived 
yesterday morning, brings no detailed account of the repulse of the Allies 
at Sevastopol on the 18th of June. We have, it is true, some bare state- 
ments respecting the number of killed and wounded in that affair, on 
which we briefly comment below. But instead of the expected dispatches, 
we have at last Gen. Pélissier's detailed account of the capture of the 
Mamelon and Quarries. Even this however is not of a nature to distinctly 
show the drift of the military policy of the man who now virtually com- 


mands the 200,000 allied troops in the Crimea. We have to trust to ne- 


gative rather than positive evidence if we desire to come to a conclusion 
on that subject. To guess what Pélissier intends to do, we must look not 
so much at what he does as at what he refrains from doing. But let us 
look again at the capture of the Mamelon; it has some features that repay 
examination. 

The 6th and 7th of June were devoted to a cannonade on the whole 
line of the allied batteries. But while on the left attack (the Flagstaff to 
the Quarantine Bastion) this cannonade was a mere demonstration, on 
the right attack (Redan to Mount Sapun) it was in good earnest. Here 


the Russian outworks were particularly subjected to a heavy fire. Their 


fire appearing to be sufficiently silenced and their defenders sufficiently 
weakened, on the evening of the 7th the assault was ordered. The French 
had two distinct positions to carry, forming two plateaux, separated from 
each other by a ravine; the English one plateau, with a ravine on either 


side. The mode in which the two armies prepared for the assault was 


characteristic of their peculiar qualities and traditions. The French set 
apart four divisions, two for each separate attack. Thus, against the Ma- 
melon Vert (Kamtschatka redoubt) two divisions were collected, and two 


more against Mount Sapun; each attack having two brigades, in distinct 
columns, in front for the charge, and two brigades in reserve. Thus eight- 
een battalions were to charge and eighteen to support—in all at least 
28,000 to 30,000 men. This disposition was perfectly in accordance with 
the regulations and traditions of the French army, which in grand char- 
ges always attacks in columns, and sometimes in rather too unwieldy 
ones. The English, if formed in the same way, would have required two 
divisions for their part of the business; two brigades for the attack and 
two for the reserve. True to their own system, however, they told off for 
the charge about 1,000 men, or about two battalions—hardly equal to 
half a French brigade. They had strong reserves no doubt; but, never- 
theless, where the French would have employed three men they employed 
only one. This is a consequence partly of the British system of attacking 
in line instead of in column, and partly of the great tenacity of the British 
soldier in defensive positions. These 1,000 British soldiers were not even 
let loose all at once; at first 200 charged and carried the Russian works; 
then 200 more were sent as a reénforcement; the remainder followed in 
the same way; and then 1,000 British soldiers, once established in the 
Russian position, held it against six successive attacks, and under the 
continuous front and enfilading fire of the Russian works. When the 
morning dawned, of their number above one-half were dead or wounded; 
but the place was theirs, and some of them had even now and then 
followed the Russians into the Redan. This was an exploit which no 
1,000 Frenchmen could have achieved. But the passive endurance of the 
British soldier under fire knows hardly any bounds; and when, as in that 
night, the hand-to-hand combat takes the form of his favorite amuse- 
ment, the street-row, then he is in his own element, and will fight six to 
one with all the reckless delight in the world. 
As to the French attack, Gen. Pélissier gives us a long account of the 
brigades and regiments engaged, and has a complimentary word for each 
of them; but his statements as to the respective positions and lines of 
attack of each column are very indistinct, while his narrative of the de- 
velopment of the action is almost incomprehensible, and an indication of 
the losses is entirely wanting. By comparing this official bulletin with 
other accounts, we are enabled to make out that the French took the 
Mamelon in the first onset, followed the retiring Russians up to the 
Malakoff bastion, entered it here and there, were repulsed by the Rus- 
sians, again lost the Mamelon, drew up in a semi-circle behind it, and by 
another advance finally took possession of it. On the other side of the 
Careening Bay ravine the Volhynsk redoubt was taken with little loss; the 
struggle at the Selinghinsk redoubt, which is situated to its rear, was 


more severe, but nothing like that at the Mamelon. Owing to the exag- 
gerated number of troops which Pélissier brought to bear upon the points 
attacked, and to the unwieldy columns they must have formed, the 
French loss must have been very great. The fact that no official statement 
of it has been made, is sufficient to prove this. We should say from 1,500 
to 2,000 would not be exaggerated. 

As to the Russians, they were placed in peculiar circumstances. They 
could not garrison these outworks with great numbers of men, as this 
would have been to expose them to certain destruction by the enemy's 
artillery, even before the assault was attempted. Thus, they could only 
keep a minimum of defenders in these redoubts, and had to trust to the 
commanding fire of their artillery in the Malakoff and the Redan, as well 
as to the action of their reserves in the place. They had two battal- 
ions*—about 800 men—in the Mamelon. But the redoubts once taken, 
they never got into them again so as to establish themselves properly. 
They discovered that a besieged army may very quickly loose a position, 
but cannot easily regain it. Beside this, the Mamelon redoubt was so 
complicated in its construction, by traverses and blindages, forming a 
sort of impromptu casemates, that although exceedingly well covered 
against artillery, its garrison was almost helpless against an assault—each 
compartment being scarcely capable of holding a gun and the men to 
serve it. As soon, therefore, as the guns were dismounted, the infantry 
who had to defend the work against an assault, had no space for a 
position from which they could act upon the assaulting columns by si- 
multaneous fire in masses. Broken up into small detachments they sue- 
cumbed to the impetuosity of the assailants, and again proved that where 
they cannot fight in large masses, the Russian infantry neither equals the 
intelligence and quickness of glance of the French, nor the desperate 
bull-dog valor of the English. 

The engagement of the 7th was followed by a ten day's repose, during 
which trenches were finished and connected, batteries traced, and guns 
and ammunition brought up. At the same time two reconnoissances were 
pushed into the interior of the country. The first, to Baidar, 12 miles 
from Balaklava, on the road which leads down to the south coast, was 
merely preliminary; the second, toward Aitodor, six miles beyond Chor- 
gun, on the Chernaya, was made in the right direction. Aitodor is situa- 
ted on the high ground leading toward the valley of the Upper Belbek, by 
which alone, as we have stated long ago, the Russian position at Inker- 
mann can be effectually turned. But then, to send a reconnoitering col- 
umn thither, and not to follow it up by occupying the ground in force 
and commencing operations at once, is nothing but putting the enemy on 


his guard by pointing out to him from which side he is menaced. Now, it 
may be that the country about A'itodor was found impracticable, but we 
doubt it; and even in that case, the intention of a flank march to turn the 
enemy is too plainly indicated in this maneuver. If this flank march could 

be used as a mere feint, well and good; but we are convinced that it must 
be made the chief movement, and therefore it should not be hinted at 
before the Allies really mean to undertake it. 

Instead, however, of following up these weak demonstrations in the 
field, General Pélissier attempted something very different. The 18th of 

June, Waterloo-day, saw the English and French troops marching 
abreast to storm the Russian lines on the right attack. The English at- 
tacked the Redan, the French Malakoff. Waterloo was to be thus 
avenged; but unfortunately the affair went wrong. They were both re- 
pulsed with terrific slaughter. The official lists state their loss at about 

5,000, but from the known want of veracity in the French accounts we 
are induced to calculate it about 50 per cent higher. As no particulars 
have been received, the tactical features of this battle must be left entirely 
aside for the present. What we can take into consideration now is its 
strategical and political nature. 

Pélissier is held up by the entire press of Europe as a man who will not 
be commanded by telegraph from Paris, but who acts unflinchingly by 
his own judgment. We have had reasons to doubt this peculiar sort of 
obstinacy, and the fact of his attempt to avenge Waterloo "nobly," that is 
by a common victory of the French and English, fully confirms our 

doubt. The idea of such a feat could only come from his Majesty, the 
Emperor of the French—the great believer in anniversaries, the man who 
cannot let the 2d of December pass by in any year without attempting 
some extraordinary trick; the man who, before the Chamber of Peers, 
said that his special vocation was to avenge Waterloo. That Pélissier had 

the strictest orders to celebrate the Battle of Waterloo by a splendid 
anniversary there can be no doubt. The way in which he did it is the only 
part of the business for which he is responsible. 

The assault upon the lines of the redoubt of Karabelnaya must, as we 
are more than ever convinced, be considered a blunder. But until we 

know the man thoroughly, we will continue to give Pélissier the benefit of 
every circumstance which at this distance from the spot may appear to 
involve a doubt. Now, it may be that the sanitary state of the Heracleatic 
Chersonese—a subject to which we long since called attention—is such 
that a speedy termination of the operations in that small space of ground 

is highly desirable. The exhalations from the decomposing bodies of 
25,000 men and 10,000 horses are such as to seriously affect the health of 


the army during Summer. Of the other abominations accumulated there 
we will not speak. Pélissier may think that it is possible in a short time to 
drive the Russians from the south side, to destroy the place completely, 
to leave but a few men to guard it, and then to take the field with a 
strong army. We make this supposition because we prefer to see at least 
some rational motive in the actions of an old soldier. But if this is the 
case he mistook the strength of the place. We said at the time, that any 
attempt to follow up the successes of the 7th against the town itself 
would be defeated; our opinion is confirmed by events. We said the key 
to Sevastopol lay north of Inkermann; the engagement of the 18th seems 
to prove it. 


Thus we are ready to admit that Gen. Pélissier was lead by perfectly 
logical considerations to prefer an assault on Karabelnaya to an advance 
into the field; but at the same time we must equally admit that people on 
the spot are very apt to take minor facts for the premises of their con- 
elusions, and that Pélissier, by the repulse of the 18th, appears to be 
convicted of having given in to this weakness; for if it shows strength of 
character to stick obstinately to the business in hand, it equally shows 
weakness of intellect to follow up that business in a roundabout way, 
because it has once been entered upon. Pélissier would be right in 
attempting to take Sevastopol at all hazards; but he is evidently wrong in 
not seeing that the nearest road into Sevastopol leads through Inker- 
mann and the Russian army defending that position. 


Unless the allied armies take good care to profit without delay by their 
superiority, they will before long find themselves in a very awkward po- 
sition. The necessity of reénforcing her force in the Crimea has long been 
recognized by Russia. The completion of the reserve battalions of the 
regular army, and the levy and organization of the militia in 200 battal- 
ions, but more especially the reduction of the Austrian army of obser- 
vation to 180,000 men—the rest being either dismissed on furlough or 
stationed in the interior of the empires—now offer an opportunity to do 
this. In consequence a reserve army has been formed at Odessa, about 
25,000 men of which are said to be stationed at Nicolaiéff, some twelve to 
fifteen day's march from Sevastopol. Two divisions of grenadiers are also 
said to be on the march from Volhynia. By the middle of July therefore, 
and perhaps sooner, the Russians may again have recovered the superio- 
rity of numbers, unless decisive defeats of the troops now opposing the 
Allies occur in the mean time. We are, indeed, informed that 50,000 more 
Frenchmen are marching to Toulon and Marseilles for embarkation; but 
they will certainly be too late, and can hardly do more than fill up the 
gaps which battle and sickness (now reappearing in the allied camp) have 
made in the ranks. 


The operations in the Sea of Azoff have destroyed one source of sup- 
ply for the Russians; but as the Dnieper is far more than the Don the 
natural outlet of the Russian corn districts, there is no doubt that great 
quantities of it are at Cherson—more than the Russians in the Crimea 

require to feed them. Thence the transport to Sympheropol is so not very 
difficult. Whoever expects from the Azoff expedition a serious and im- 
mediate effect on the provisioning of Sevastopol, labors under a great 
error. 

The scales, though for some time past turned in favor of the Allies, 

may yet be balanced again, or even be turned against them. The Crimean 
campaign is far from being decided, if the Russians act promptly.