Friedrich Engels 

The new French commander 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4414, 12. Juni 1855 

The new French commander. 

It is certain that Gen. Canrobert's resignation of the command of the 
French army in the Crimea did not take place a moment too soon. The 
morale of the army was already in a very unsatisfactory and doubtful 
state. After they had been made to undergo the hardships and dangers of 
an unparalleled Winter campaign, the soldiers had been kept in some- 
thing like order and good spirits by the return of Spring and by ever- 
repeated promises of a speedy and glorious termination of the siege. But 
day after day passed away without making any progress, while the Rus- 
sians actually advanced out of their lines and constructed redoubts on the 
disputed ground between the two parties. This roused the spirit of the 
French soldiers, the Zouaves mutinied, and the consequence was that on 
March 23 they were led to the butchery on Mount Sapun. A little more 
bustling—it can hardly be called activity—was then shown on the part of 

is the allied commanders; but there was evidently no distinct aim, and no 

definite plan was followed up consistently. 

Again, the spirit of mutiny among the French was kept down by the 
continued sallies of the Russians and by the opening of the second bom- 
bardment which was—positively for the last time—to end in the grand 
spectacle of the assault. But the fire went on, slackened, and slackened 
still more, and at last ceased without any attempt at an assault. Then 
came engineering operations, slow, difficult and barren of those results 
which keep up the spirits of soldiers. Soon they get tired again of nightly 
trench-fighting, where hundreds fell to no visible purpose. Again the 
assault was demanded, and again Canrobert had to make promises which 
he knew he could not fulfill, Then Pélissier saved him from a renewal of 
disorderly scenes by the night attack of the Ist of May; it is stated that 
not only did Pélissier plan this attack, but even execute it in spite of a 

Friedrich Engels 

counter-order from Canrobert arriving the moment the troops were put 
in motion. This affair is said to have revived the courage of the soldiers. 

Meantime the reserve and the Piedmontese arrived. The Chersonese 
became crowded. The soldiers considered that these reénforcements en- 
abled them to do anything. Why was nothing done? The expedition to s 
Kertch was resolved upon, and sailed. But before it had reached the 
offing of that town a dispatch from Paris induced Canrobert to recall it. 
Raglan of course gave in at once. Brown and Lyons, the commanders of 
the British land and sea forces on this expedition, besought their French 
colleagues to attack the place in disobedience to the order; in vain—the 10 
expedition had to sail back, and it is even stated that Canrobert had in 
his hurry misread the order, which was merely conditional. Now the 
exasperation of the troops was no longer to be mastered. Even the Eng- 
lish spoke in unmistakable terms; the French were in a state bordering on 
mutiny. Accordingly there was nothing left for Canrobert but to resign 1 
the command of an army over which he had lost all control and influ- 
ence. The only possible successor was Pélissier. The soldiers were sick of 
these young generals, advanced to the highest honors in the quick hotbed 
of Bonapartism. They had all the while been clamoring for a leader of 
long standing of the old African schools—a man who had held a respon- 20' 
sible command in the Algerian wars, and held it with credit. Pélissier was 
almost the only man of the sort at the command of the Emperor; he had 
been sent there with the evident intention of being, sooner or later, made 
the successor of Canrobert. Whatever else his qualifications might be, he 
had the confidence of the troops, and that is a great deal. 25 

But he takes his command under difficult circumstances. He must act. 
and speedily too, before the men lose the freshness of the enthusiasm 
which the certainty of immediate action must have inspired them with. 
The assault being impossible, nothing remains but to take the field, and 
that can be done only by turning the Russian position in the manner we 3of 
have previously described. Indeed, we find our views on this subject con- 
firmed by a British officer in The London Morning Herald, who says that 
it is the general opinion among competent men that there is no other way 
to take the field with success. 

There is however one very serious difficulty in carrying out this plan. 35- 
The French with all their army have no more means of transport than 
will supply 30,000 men for a very short distance from the coast. As to the 
English, their means of transport would be exhausted if they had to 
supply one single division no further off than Chorgun on the Chernaj a. 
How then is the field to be taken, in case of success the north side of 40 
Sevastopol invested, the enemy pursued to Bakshiserai and a junction 

The new French commander 

effected with Omer Pasha? Of course the Russians will take very good 
care to leave nothing but ruins behind them, and a supply of carts, horses 
‚or camels can only be obtained after the Allies have completely routed 
their enemy. We shall see how Pélissier will extricate himself from this 
difficulty.