Friedrich Engels 
The Crimean war. May 22, 1855 


The Crimean war. 


As we write, the field operations in the Crimea, to which we alluded some 
days since as in preparation, must have commenced. With these opera- 
tions, the war, so far as it is confined to the peninsula, enters into a new 
and probably decisive stage of development. The rapid arrival of the 
Piedmontese and French reserves, and particularly the sudden change by 
which Canrobert left his command for that of a single corps, while Pé- 
lissier takes the command in chief, are sure indications that the time for a 
change in the tactics of the Allies is at hand. 

For a general description of the ground to which the theater of op- 
erations is to be transferred and a general statement of the forces about to 
: be engaged we refer to our former article. It will be recollected that the 
Russian army of observation in communication with the north side of 
Sevastopol has its main position on the plateau between Inkermann and 
the point where the road from Balaklava to Sympheropol crosses the 
mountain-ridge, separating the valleys of the Chernaya and the Belbek. 
This position, of great natural strength, has been completely intrenched 
by the Russians. It extends for about four miles between the head of the 
bay of Sevastopol and the impassable range of mountains, and the Rus- 
sians will be able to concentrate there at least 50,000 or 60,000 men, of 
infantry and artillery, which number is fully sufficient for the defense. 

To attack this position in front would require a great numerical su- 
periority and involve terrible sacrifices, while the Allies cannot afford 
either. Even if they succeeded in carrying the intrenchments, their losses 
would be so severe as to disable them from an energetic continuance of 
the campaign. They must therefore attempt to draw a number of Rus- 
sians away from it and to find means to turn it. For this purpose the 
mysterious expedition to Kertch was sent out. About 15,000 allied troops 
embarked, were seen by the Russians to pass Yalta, sailed to Kertch, and ° 
returned again. Why they did not attempt a landing is sought to be A 
explained by a telegraphic order from Paris. At all events, this mere 
apology for a demonstration must be pronounced an utter failure; no 
General in his senses would be induced to divide his troops by an expe- 5 
dition which does not venture to show even a semblance of fight. An 
attempt on Kaffa, ifeven it was under contemplation at headquarters, 
seems also to have been finally abandoned. To transport troops to Eu- 
patoria and sally forth from that place cannot be under consideration, 
else the Piedmontese and French reserves would have been sent thither at of 
once. And, as there is no other harbor or good roadstead on the coast 
between Balaklava and Kaffa, nor between Sevastopol and Eupatoria, 
the idea of turning the Russians by sea seems to have been finally given 
up, and nothing remains but to turn them by land, which, as we have 
already stated, must prove an exceedingly difficult operation. \§ 
There is, beside the road occupied by the Russians above Inkermann, 
but one other high road leading from Balaklava to Sympheropol. It runs 
along the south coast as far as Alushta, where it turns to the interior, ° 
passes the mountains east of Chatyr Dagh or Tent Mountain, the highest 
in the Crimea, at a point 2,800 feet above the sea and descends to Sym- 20; 
pheropol by the valley ofthe Salghir, the main river ofthe Crimea. From 
Balaklava to Alushta there are four marches, from Alushta to Symphero“ 
pol three—together about 95 English miles. But as no side-roads exist 
allowing the troops to march in several parallel columns, the whole army :: 
would have to advance on this one road in one enormously extended 25 
column, requiring them to march at least for four or five days in one 
continuous defile. Near Alushta and on the pass there are some old .%4 
fortifications, and we may be sure that the pass itself will be found i/ 


strongly intrenched. Instead of seven days the army would perhaps re- J 
quire twelve before even the pass of Chatyr Dagh could be crossed—time 30' 
enough for the Russians to make an attempt on the corps remaining to 
protect the siege, or to march with the greater part of their forces against 
the enemy and meet him with superior numbers on debouching from the % 
hills, while light, movable columns sent along the footpaths of the Upper 
Katsha and Alma would fall upon his flank and rear. The greatest fault 35-" 
of a flank movement by way of Alushta would, however, be its utter e -\ 
want of a base of operations. The open roadstead of Alushta forbides the \ 
idea of turning that place even into a temporary base; so that even before a 
Alushta is passed, Russian light infantry descending by the foot-paths | 
across the hills, may interrupt the communication with Balaklava quite 40) 
effectually. 


The march by Alushta, therefore, can hardly be undertaken. Its risks 
far outweigh its possible advantages. There is, however, another way of 
turning the Russians. If in the march by Alushta all the advantages of- 
fered to the Allies by the high road are far outweighed by the means of 
attack given to the Russians by the foot-paths, cannot these same foot- 
paths be turned to the same advantage by the Allies? This would imply 
an entirely different operation. In this case the Allies would place the 
main body of their field-troops, including the corps destined to invest the 
north side of Sevastopol, directly opposite the Russian camp above In- 
10 kermann, forcing their opponents thereby to keep the great body of their 

troops concentrated in the intrenchments. Meantime, Zouaves, Chas- 

seurs, Light Infantry, British Rifles, and even the mounted Chasseurs 
d'Afrique, and what can be got together of mountain-artillery, would be 
formed into as many columns as there are foot-paths leading from the 
15 valley of Baidar and from the South Coast near Alupka, 30 miles from 
Balaklava, into the valleys of the Belbek and Katcha. A night march 
would conveniently bring the troops destined to turn the extreme Rus- 
sian left across the valley of Baidar to the South Coast, where the enemy 
could no longer perceive them. Another march would bring them to 
20 Alupka. Above Alupka is the steep range of the Yaila mountains, form- 
ing on their northern slope an elevated plain about 2,000 feet above the 
sea, affording good pasturage for sheep, and descends by rocky preci- 
pices into the glens of the rivulets Biuk Uzen and Uzen Bash, which by 
their junction form the Belbek river. Three foot-paths lead up to this 
25 plain near Alupka, and pass into the glens of the two Uzens. All this 
ground is perfectly practicable for infantry such as the Zouaves and 

Chasseurs, who in Africa have got accustomed to mountain warfare of a 

far more difficult character. Then, from the valley of the Upper Cher- 

naya, better known as the Baidar Valley, at least two foot-paths lead to 
30 the valley of the Upper Belbek, and finally one branches off from the 

Balaklava and Sympheropol road just before the mountain pass, and 

traverses the ridge three miles south-east of Mackenzie's farm, leading 

immediately to the left of the Russian intrenched position. Now if these 
paths be ever so difficult they must be practicable for the French light 
35 troops from Africa. "Where a goat passes, a man can pass; where a man, 

a whole battalion; where a battalion, a horse or so may get through with 

a little trouble; and finally, you will perhaps manage even to pass a 

field-gun." In fact we should not be at all astonished if these sheep-tracks 

and foot-paths marked on the maps, should even turn out to be country 
40 roads, bad enough, but quite practicable for a flanking movement, in 
which even artillery might accompany the columns. In that case the turn- 
ing should be carried out with as large a force as possible, and then the 
Russians will soon have to give up their intrenchments, even without a 
serious front attack. But if these paths should be impracticable for field- 
guns (rockets and mountain howitzers can go anywhere), the turning 
parties will take the character of mere movable columns, drive back the 5 
Russian troops as far as they can from the upper valleys of the Belbek. 
pass into that of the Katsha, menace the Russian rear, intercept their 
communications, destroy their convoys, collect trustworthy information, 
reconnoiter the country, draw upon themselves as many Russian detach- 
ments as possible, until that road which offers the least difficulties is 10 
made so far practicable as to admit of the passage of artillery. Then a 
strong force may be sent after them, and the Russian rear be so serioush 
menaced as to force an evacuation of the intrenchments. That an ad- 
vance of mere infantry and light cavalry across these mountains on the 
left flank and rear of the Russians can have that effect we do not belie\e, is 
as they could not seriously menace the Russian communications without 
descending into a country where artillery regains its full effect, and there- 
by secures the advantage to the party possessed of it. But there is no 
doubt that with a little ingenuity artillery can be made to follow the 
turning columns. At Jena, Napoleon exhibited what can be done with ,i 20 
simple foot-path winding up a steep hill; in five hours the road was wide 
enough for guns, the Prussians were taken in flank, and the next days œ 
victory secured. And where a Crimean araba can pass, a field-gun can 
pass too; some of the pathways in question, particularly those from 1 he 
Chernaya to the Belbek, appear to be such old araba country roads. 25 
But to carry out such a movement the possession of sufficient forces is 
the first condition. The Russians will certainly have the advantage of - 
numbers and of the better knowledge of the ground. The first may be 
done away with by a bold advance of Omer Pasha from Eupatoria to the 
Alma. Though the Russian superiority in cavalry will not allow him to 30 
move fast or far, yet by good maneuvering and well-secured communi- 
cations he may force Prince Gorchakoff to detach more infantry against 
him. But for the Allies to depend upon any such collateral operation 
would be a matter of great uncertainty. In order to carry out, therefore 
the advance from Balaklava, the best thing for them would be to transfer 35 
(as they were some time since reported to have done) a day or two befoie 
the actual attack, some 20,000 Turks to the Chersonese, where the\ 
would be worth twice their number in Eupatoria. This would allow them 
to attack the Russians with nearly 110,000 men, including about 6,000 
cavalry, to which force the Russians could oppose about 65,000 or 75,000 e 
infantry (including 15,000 to 20,000 men from the garrison of the north 
side) and 10,000 cavalry. But as soon as the turning corps should begin to 
tell upon the left flank and rear of the Russians, the force to be opposed 
to it would be comparatively weak, as the drafts from the north side 
' could not expose themselves to be cut off from their intrenched camp 
is around the citadel; and therefore the Allies, being enabled to employ the 
whole of their available field-army wherever they like, would have a great 
superiority. In this case then they might with certainty count upon suc- 
cess; but if they attack the Russians single-handed, and the numerical 
;. proportions of both armies as stated by the most trustworthy authorities 
to be correct, they stand but little chance. Their flanking corps would be too 
weak, and might be entirely neglected by the Russians, who by a bold 
sally from their lines could drive the weakened Allies down the precipices 
into the Chernaya. 
Another movement on the part of the Allies has been suggested—an 
15 immediate assault on the south side of Sevastopol. We are even told that 
a peremptory order to undertake this assault had been telegraphed from 
Paris, and that Canrobert resigned because he did not feel warranted in 
executing a movement which in his opinion would imply a loss of 40,000 
men. Now, from what we have seen of the military notions of Louis 
20 Bonaparte as displayed in his interference with the present campaign, it is 
not at all incredible that such an order should have been given. But what 
is less probable is that even a reckless sabreur like Pélissier should lend 
himself to execute such an order. The last month must have given the 
French soldiers a pretty good idea of what the resistance is like which 
25 they are to meet with on storming. And an operation which cannot be 
carried out without the loss of some 40,000 men—above one-third of the 
whole army available for the assault—has certainly very few favorable 
chances of success. Pélissier may eagerly wish to pick up the Marshal's 
baton which has slipped from the hands of Canrobert, but we very much 
30 doubt whether he is enough of a Bonapartist to stake his fortune and 
reputation against such odds. For supposing even that the assault was 
successful; that not only the first line of defense but also the second line 
was taken; that even the barricades, crenellated houses and defensive 
barracks forbidding the approach to the shore forts—that these shore 
‚35 forts too were carried and the whole of the south side in the hands of the 
Allies, at a loss we will say of only 30,000 to a Russian loss of 
20;900— what then? The Allies would have lost 10,000 men more than the 
Russians, the place would instantly have to be abandoned; and the cam- 
* paign in the field would become even more difficult than before. 
*4) But there is one fact which at once precludes the idea of an immediate 
general assault. From some half-official reports we were induced in a 
former article on the siege to admit, merely for argument's sake, that the * 
Russians had been driven out of their new outworks in front of the place. 
We stated at the same time that we had every reason to doubt the cor- 
rectness of such reports, as any such advantage gained would have been 
loudly and distinctly announced by the Allies. Now we are indeed posi- , 
tively informed by the Russians that the Kamtschatka (the Mamelon), ' 
Selenghinsk and Volynsk redoubts are still in their possession, while evi- 'I 
dence from the allied camp not only goes to confirm this, but also ac- 
knowledges that further outworks have been thrown up by the besieged. 
Thus the advantage gained by the Allies in pushing their advanced 10 
approaches nearer to the fortress has been fully made up for by the counter- 
approaches of the Russians, and the line where both parties can meet ; 
each other in equal strength is very distant yet from the main ditch. Now, 
an assault becomes advisable only when the line, where the force of the 
attack for common siege operations is equal to that of the defense, lies in 1 * 
the main ditch itself: otherwise it is clear that the storming columns '< 
would be broken down and shattered before they could reach the top of 
the breastwork. Thus as long as the Russians cannot be driven back 
across the main ditch, it will be impossible to assault the main rampart 
situated behind this main ditch. As to carrying the second line construe- 20 
ted behind that ditch, it is entirely out of the question at the present time. ;, 

There may be a chance for partial assaults on the left or town side - 
from the Quarantine to the Flagstaff Bastion where the main French 
attack is carried on. But here the policy of the French Government keeps ¿ 
us in utter darkness as to the extent and strength of the Russian out- 25 
works, and the recent Russian dispatches, of late being all telegraphic, 
contain no definite and detailed description. On the Flagstaff Bastion, 
however, it is acknowledged by the Russians themselves that the French 
works are close to the main rampart and that a mine has been sprung 
under it, though without any considerable results. Here, then, a local 30 
assault might be successful but from the salient position of this bastion 
and the commanding ground behind (the Russian Garden Battery) it is 
very doubtful whether anything would be gained by the conquest of the 
bastion, which must have been isolated from the remainder of the works 
by one or two cross-ramparts in its rear, thereby preventing the storming 35 
columns from establishing themselves in it or at least from penetrating + 
any further. 


Thus whether the assault is attempted, or field operations are under- 
taken, the Allies will have to struggle with considerable difficulties. But 
at any rate the drowsy style of warfare pursued since the arrival of the 40 
Allies before Sevastopol is drawing to a close; and more stirring events 
and operations of real military interest may now be looked for.