Sevastopol—the late bombardment. 


A careful examination of the English, German and Belgian journals re- 
ceived by the Asia has put us in possession of some more precise infor- 
mation respecting the second useless bombardment of Sevastopol, which 
may perhaps prove of interest to such of our readers as are disposed 
carefully to follow the course of this vast military fiasco. We accordingly 
proceed to explain the facts of the case in some detail. In so doing we 
shall assume that the reader is in possession of some one of the numerous 
diagrams of the place and of the besiegers' positions, which have been 
published since the beginning of the siege. 

The fortifications on the south side of Sevastopol are divided into two 
large fronts by the inner harbor creek which separates the city from the 
part called Karabelnaya or the shipping suburb. The western front runs 
from Quarantine Bay to the head of the inner harbor in a southeastern 
direction; its three prominent points are the Quarantine Fort, the round 
tower encircled by an earthwork bastion, and the southern or Flag-staff 
bastion, {Bastion du Mät of the French). These three projecting works 
have each and all been attacked by the French, according to the system 
condemned by all previous engineers but adopted by the besieger of Se- 
vastopol; not confining the attack to one portion of the lines but exten- 
ding it to the whole. The Round Tower, forming the center of this front, 
was partly demolished during the first bombardment, but the earthworks 
surrounding it remained unimpaired. They have again been subjected to 
fire, but with this improvement, that the attack against them this time 
appears to be simulated and merely destined either to draw off the at- 
tention of the Russians from the really menaced points, or to support the 
main attacks. Of these the first is directed against the Quarantine Fort; 
but as the front, flanks, and rear of this position are secured by the Bay 
and the continuation of the Russian lines, the French fire can have no 
other object than to demolish the front on the Quarantine Bay and to 
silence by enfilading fire the front which looks toward the great harbor. 
The real and serious attack, therefore, is that directed against the Flag- 
staff Bastion, the southernmost work of the Russian lines. Here the 
French had already completed three successive parallels before the sec- 
ond bombardment began, although the third and last parallel was still 
some 400 or 500 yards distant from the Russian ditch. This very respect- 
ful distance is sufficient to prove the activity of the defense and the 
extremely insignificant progress made in the siege during the last six 
months. The French must have concentrated on this point the fire of at 
least 70 or 80 guns; but still they have not been able to make much 
headway. As soon as the fire was opened on the 9th of April the French 
engineers broke out from the trenches with fresh saps, in order to com- 
plete new approaches under the protection of their artillery. But it ap- 
pears the Russians were not to be frightened by this terrific cannonade. 
They were not to be led astray so far as to direct their fire upon the 
French artillery, but very properly let them fire away and directed their 
guns on the new saps, and with such effect that all attempts to approach 
nearer to the place under cover proved completely abortive. This fact 
contains in itself the measure of the relative strength of situation of the 
two parties; for where the artillery of the attack is not so superior as to 
draw on itself the whole of the fire of the defense and thereby give the 
sapper a chance of working his approaches—there the very first condi- 
tion of a successful attack is wanting. Accordingly the French were driv- 
en to take a step which is resorted to in cases of the utmost necessity 
only. They abandoned—at the distance of 400 or 500 yards—the attempt 
to work by the full or even the double sap, and constructed a mine 
leading to some 50 or perhaps 80 yards in front of their third parallel. 
From this point they constructed a subterraneous parallel or mine, run- 
ning in the same direction as their trenches, and placed in it at short 
intervals weak charges of powder. The simultaneous explosion of these 
charges formed on the surface a long irregular ditch or first rudiment of a 
fourth parallel, affording sufficient cover to allow the sappers to establish 
themselves in it and to complete it by the aid of fascines and gabions. It 
was by this tedious and lengthened process that the French were enabled, 
on April 16 or 17, to boast of having opened the fourth parallel. How 
they could manage to get it completed and armed under the artillery and 
rifle fire of the Russians, remains to be seen. There are ten chances to one 
that before accomplishing it their ammunition was expended and the 
bombardment brought to a close; in which case a fourth parallel is a 
position worse than useless, as it is extremely exposed to strong sallies of 
the besieged and therefore serves as a continued inducement to bring on 
useless losses of men. 

On this left or exclusively French attack, we therefore find that the 
business has undoubtedly been conducted with more skill and sense than - 
during the first bombardment; that the fire has been concentrated upon 
one chief point in a far higher degree; and that no means has been left 
untried to push the trenches onward. But we also find that the means put 
into play were sorely deficient for the purpose, and consequently the total 
want of success which now seems established beyond a doubt is fully 
explained. 

The eastern front of defense inclosing the shipping suburb has but two 
prominent points: the so-called Redan fort, with a large bastion a few 
hundred yards east of the inner harbor, and the Malakoff bastion, erect- 
ed on the slope of a hill crowned by the tower of that name. The great 
extent of these bastions allows of their flanking effectively, not only the 
lines connecting them, but also those extending to the head of the inner 
harbor and that of the Careening Bay. Malakoff Hill from its elevation 
commands the ground both in front and rear, and may be considered the 
key of the whole suburb, as the Flagstaff bastion and the hill on the slope 
of which it is situated are in some degree the key to the city itself. It was 
therefore to strengthen this important point that the Russians threw up 
first the redoubts of Selenghinsk and Volhynsk, east of the Careening 
Bay and taking in flank any attack from the right upon Malakoff—and 
afterward the redoubt of Kamtschatka or the Mamelon, as a detached 
work immediately in front of it. 

The attack upon this south-eastern front was carried on in a manner 
not even deserving that very limited praise which may be bestowed upon 
the left attack. The key of the position was Malakoff, which originally 
was flanked on one side only by the Redan, while the other side toward 
the Careening Bay had no Russian work to support it. Consequently, the 
front to be attacked was the portion of the lines east of the point or 
salient angle of the Malakoff bastion. Thus, the occupation of the whole 
of the plateau and hills between the Careening Bay and the Chernaya was 
the first thing to be made sure of; a few batteries would have driven away 
the vessels in the Great Harbor and silenced the guns on the Russian side 
of the Careening Bay; and then the Mamelon, as a matter of course, 
should have been occupied before the Russians took possession of it. But 
all this was neglected, and the besieged were thus enabled to take pos- 
session of positions which during six months of siege they had not con- 
sidered it prudent to hold. This apparently unaccountable neglect on the 
part of the Allies is however accounted for by another fundamental error 
in the arrangement of the siege. Instead of confining their efforts to one 
portion of the lines they encircled the whole of them by their parallels, 
which now extend from the batteries near Inkermann to the great ravine 
forming the continuation of the Inner Harbor, and there joining the 
trenches of the left attack which complete the semicircle as far as the 
Quarantine Bay. 
This "right attack" against the Redan and Malakoff was carried on 
from four sloping plateaux separated by three deep ravines. Next to the 
batteries of the French against the Flagstaff Bastion was the "English left 
attack," (Chapman's Batteries,) the only one of which we are enabled to 
state (as we do from The London Times,) the exact number of guns. They 


were: 


24 32 8 in. 10 in. 10 in. 13 in. 


pdrs. pdrs. guns. guns. mort. mort. Total 

Battery No. 1 10 — 2 12 
Battery No. 2 (sailors) — 8 2 10 
Battery No. 3 (sailors) 8 8 
Battery No. 4 (sailors) 4 2: 2 1 — — 9 
Battery No. 5 (sailors) — — 11 — — 2 

Battery No. 6 2 — — 3 — 6 
Battery No. 7 — 6 6 
Battery No. 8 — 6 2 8 

T o the rear. a = as z _ 4 10 14 
Total 23 24 9 2 7 10 75 


All this heavy weight of metal was put to no other use than to engage 
one face ofthe Redan, together with the armed curtain connecting it with 
the head of the inner harbor, and to support in some degree the French 
attack upon the Flagstaff Bastion. 

The second plateau was occupied by the English right attack, or Gor- 

don's batteries. What the number of guns might be we do not know, but 
it could hardly be as large as Chapman's. This portion of the parallel 
engaged the left face of the Redan and the right face of Malakoff, and 
since the erection ofthe Kamtschatka redoubt it had to engage this work 
too. This attack was directed against a portion of the Russian works 

which in any case would have to be engaged by at least a simulated or 
secondary attack; besides, it enfiladed the left face of the Malakoff bas- 
tion and therefore contributed in an important degree to the attack 
upon this decisive position; but whether the number of guns employed on 
this section of the attack was barely sufficient, or exaggerated in pro- 

proportion to other more important points, we cannot judge until the ar- 
mament of the batteries is known. 
Next cornes the "right French attack" directed against the left face of 
Malakoff, enfilading its right face and engaging the new redoubts of 
Kamtschatka, Selenghinsk and Volhynsk. This was the real, decisive at- 
tack, and it had been the most shamefully neglected of all until the Rus- 
sians by their bold advance and erection of new works had created dif- 
ficulties which cannot be overcome, except by perhaps a fortnight of 
active and energetic extra siege. It now extends over a very long line, 
rather sparingly studded with batteries and very probably offering but 
few points from which the commanding hights, crowned by the new 
Russian works, can be effectually cannonaded. Had this section of the 
attack been pushed with sufficient energy as late as the middle of Feb- 
ruary the batteries about the Careening Bay and as far as Malakoff, 
might now be silenced; and as the Russians were able at that time to 
construct their redoubts it cannot be said that the weather and the state 
of the ground prevented the Allies from extending their works. Here was 
the key of the position, here the most advantageous front to assail, and 
here it was that first the English missed their opportunity by the foolish 
and timid desire of Raglan to keep as close as possible to the French chief 
attack, near the Flagstaff bastion; while subsequently when this section 
was handed over to the French they commited the same fault—whether 
from neglect or indolence does not appear. 

The right attack, as a whole, was now conducted upon the most faulty 
system imaginable, and the results are in consequence to be set down at 
zero. Indeed they even offer a minus—the Russians having pushed their 
works forward quicker than the Allies and made up largely for any prog- 
ress the latter may lay claim to. The new redoubts, so long as they are in 
the possession of the Russians, are a lasting disgrace to the whole of the 
army and generals engaged on this attack, and their sight must drive the 
blood into the cheeks of every sensible and brave officer of the allied 
forces. 

The only progress reported to have been made by the Allies on the 
right attack is that some of the pits and ditches dug out for the Russian 
riflemen have been taken and converted into what the Allies call a third 
parallel. This can only apply to the nearest range of rifle-pits, which 
certainly were very near to the allied lines. But still the Russians have 
gained far more ground, and put it to better use since the 20th February, 
than the Allies. 

With regard to the total number of pieces employed by the Allies in 
this bombardment, the best estimate we can make is that the French had 
about 220 and the English 130. In respect of the ammunition and balls 
employed, we find that the most sanguine opinion of the stock on hand 
at the beginning does not rate it above 350,000 projectiles—a quantity 
which requires us to rectify the figures we gave yesterday. Now, we find 
that after the 10th the British were instructed not to fire more than 120 
rounds per gun per day, the mortars firing about 40 or 50 rounds. Before 
this they had fired more. But taking the guns at 300 only, and the rounds 
on an average at 100 per day, we have 30,000 projectiles a day, which 
gives, up to the 15th inclusive, for seven days, 210,000 projectiles. On the 
16th and the following days the fire slackened; we will put down but 
20,000 projectiles per day, and thus obtain up to the 21st another 
120,000, or 330,000 in all. Thus, unless the fire was slackened to such a 
degree that it was no longer a bombardment but a common, slow siege 
cannonade, on the 22d at latest the ammunition of the Allies must have 
been so far exhausted as to render a stoppage of the firing necessary. 
But 350,000, or say 300,000, projectiles for 300 guns gives 1,000 shots 
per gun, and 1,200 to 1,400 rounds are sufficient to injure the bore and 
burn out the touch-hole of any brass or iron gun to a degree which 
precludes accurate practice. Even after 1,000 rounds some of the guns 
would be all but completely unfit for dismounting fire. Thus we again 
come to the conclusion that whatever the Allies may do they have no 
chance of taking Sevastopol by the series of blunders just crowned by this 
desperate and useless bombardment. Unless other measures are resorted 
to they will soon have to abandon the Crimea altogether. 
However, Louis Bonaparte is to go there early in May. He must do 
something. We shall soon see what. At all events if he does not carry with 
him better military ideas than those developed in his late military memoir 
'' in the Moniteur, he had better at once take with him a passport en règle 
to travel in foreign parts, for to France he will never have a chance to 
come.