Friedrich Engels 
Napoleon's apology 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4377, 30. April 1855 

Napoleon's apology. 

Napoleon III, in his quality as chief editor of the Moniteur, has published 
a long leading article on the Crimean Expedition, the important portions 
of which we have duly published. The purpose of this manifesto is evi- 
dently to console the French nation for the failure of the enterprise, to 5 
shift the responsibility of it from the Imperial shoulders, and at the same 
time to reply to the famous pamphlet lately issued by Prince Napoleon. 
In that half familiar, half dignified style, characteristic of the man who 
writes at the same time for French peasants and for European Cabinets, 
a sort of history of the campaign is given, with the alleged reasons for 10 
each step. Some of these reasons merit a special examination. 

The Imperial adventurer informs us that the allied troops were brought 
up to Gallipoli, because otherwise the Russians might have crossed the 
Danube at Rustchuk, and turning the lines of Varna and Shumla, passed 
the Balkan and marched upon Constantinople. This reason is the worst 15 
ever given for the landing at Gallipoli. In the first place Rustchuk is a 
fortress, and not an open town, as the illustrious editor of the Moniteur 
seems to fancy. As to the danger of such a flank march of the Russians, it 
is well to recollect that an army of 60,000 Turks, firmly established bet- 
ween four strong fortresses, could not safely be passed without leaving a 20 
strong corps to observe them; that such a flank march would have ex- 
posed the Russians, in the ravines of the Balkan, to the fate of Dupont at 
Baylen, and of Vandamme at Culm; that in the most favorable case they 
could not bring more than 25,000 men to Adrianople; and that whoever 
thinks such an army dangerous to the Turkish metropolis, may have his 25 V. 
opinions corrected by reading Major Moltke's well-known observations 
on the campaign of 1829 lately republished in English at London. 

Napoleon's apology 

In case there should be no danger to Constantinople, the Allies were, 
as we learn from the Moniteur, to push some divisions to Varna, and to 
end any attempt at besieging Silistria. This done, two other operations 
would offer themselves—a landing near Odessa, or the seizure of the 

5 Crimea. Both were to be discussed by the allied Generals on the spot. 
Such were the instructions to St. Arnaud, which wound up with some 
sound military advice in the form of maxims and apothegms:—Always 
know what your enemy is doing; keep your troops together, divide them 
on no account; or if you must divide them, manage so that you can 

10 reunite them on a given point in twenty-four hours—and so forth. Very 
valuable rules of conduct, no doubt, but so trite and common-place, that 
the reader must at once conclude St. Arnaud to have been, in the eyes of 
his master, the greatest dunce and ignoramus in the world. After this, the 
instructions wind up with: "You have my entire confidence, Marshal. Go, 

15 for I am certain that, under your experienced leadership, the French 
eagles will earn new glory!" 

As so the main point, the Crimean Expedition, Mr. Bonaparte confes- 
ses that it was certainly a favorite idea with him, and that at a later 
period he sent another batch of instructions to St. Arnaud respecting it. 

20 But he denies having elaborated the plan in its details, and sent it to 
headquarters; according to him the Generals still had the choice of land- 
ing near Odessa. As a proof of this, a passage from his fresh instructions 
is given. In it he proposes a landing at Theodosia, (Kaffa,) on account of 
its offering a safe and capacious anchorage of the fleets, which must form 

25 the base of operations of the army. What a base of operations is he had 
explained to St. Arnaud in his first instructions, in terms which leave no 
doubt that the illustrious Marshal was supposed never to have read any 
standard work whatever upon his profession. From this point—Kaf- 
fa—the army was to march upon Sympheropol, drive the Russians into 

30 Sevastopol, before the walls of which a battle would probably be fought, 
and, finally, to besiege Sevastopol. "Unfortunately" this "plan was not 
followed up by the allied generals"—a circumstance very fortunate for 
the Emperor, as it allows of his shuffling off the responsibility of the 
whole affair, and leaving it on the shoulders of the Generals. 

35 The plan of landing 60,000 men at Kaffa and marching thence upon 
Sevastopol is indeed original. Taking as a general rule that the offensive 
strength of an army in an enemy's country decreases in the same ratio as 
its distance from its base of operations increases, how many men would 
the Allies have brought to Sevastopol after a march of more than 120 

40 miles? How many men were to be left at Kaffa? How many to hold and 
fortify intermediate points? How many to protect convoys, and to scour 

Friedrich Engels 

the country? Not 20,000 men could have been collected under the walls 
of a fortress requiring three times that number barely to invest it. If Louis 
Napoleon ever goes to the war himself, and conducts it upon this prin- 
ciple, he may as well order quarters at Mivart's Hotel, London, at once, 
for he will never see Paris again. 

As to the safety of the anchorage at Kaffa, every mariner in the Black 
Sea knows, and every chart shows, that it is an open roadstead, with 
shelter against northerly and westerly winds alone, while the most dan- 
gerous storms in the Black Sea are from the south and south-west. Of 
this the storm ofthe 14th of November is an instance. Had the fleets then 10 
been at Kaffa they would have been driven upon a lee-shore. In this way 
our hero clears himself from the responsibility thrown upon him by his 
cousin; but it would never do to sacrifice Raglan and Canrobert. Accord- 
ingly, to show the cleverness of the said Generals, a very decent sketch 
is given of siege-operations according to Vauban—a sketch which, from 15 
the total ignorance of the suject it supposes in the reader, might have 
been written for the benefit of Marshal St. Arnaud. This sketch, however, 
but serves to show how Sevastopol was not to be taken, for it winds up 
with the assertion that all these rules were inapplicable to Sevastopol. 
For instance, "in a common siege where one front is attacked, the length 20 
of the last parallel would be about 300 yards, and the whole length of 
trenches would not exceed 4,000 yards; here the extent of parallel is 3,000 
yards, and the whole linear length of all the trenches is 41,000 yards." 

This is all true enough, but the question here is why has this enormous 
extent of attack been adopted, when every circumstance called for the 25 
greatest possible concentration of fire upon one or two determined 
points? The answer is: "Sevastopol is not like any other fortress. It has 
but a shallow ditch, no masonry scarps, and these defenses are replaced 
by abattis and palisades; thus our fire could make but little impression on 
the earth breastwork." If this was not written for St. Arnaud, it is surely 30- 
written for the French peasantry alone. Every sub-lieutenant in the 
French army must laugh at such nonsense. Palisades, unless at the bot- 
tom of a ditch, or at least out of the sight of the enemy, are very soon 
knocked over by shot and shell. Abattis may be set on fire, and must be 
at the foot of the glacis, about 60 or 80 yards from the breastwork, else 35;' 
they would obstruct the fire of the guns. Moreover, these abattis must be 
large trees laid on the ground, the pointed branches toward the enemy, 
and the whole firmly connected together; but where such trees could have 
come from, in a woodless country like the Crimea, the Moniteur does not 
say. The absence of masonry scarps has nothing to do with the protract- 40%« 
ed siege, for according to the description in the Moniteur itself, they only 

Napoleon's apology 

come into play when the breaching batteries have been established on the 
top of the glacis—a position from which the Allies are yet far distant. 
That palisades are an improvement upon masonry scarps, is certainly 
new; for these wooden ramparts can be very easily destroyed by enfi- 

5 lading fire, even at the bottom of the ditch; and thus they allow of an 
assault as soon as the defending guns are silenced. 

In conclusion, we are told by this new military authority, that all the 
facts show that the allied Generals have done what they could—have 
done more than, under the circumstances, could have been expected from 

10 them—and have, indeed, covered themselves with glory. Ifthey could not 
properly invest Sevastopol—if they could not drive away the Russian 
army of observation—if they are not yet in the place—why, it is because 
they are not strong enough. This is also true: but who is responsible for 
this greatest of all faults? Who but Louis Bonaparte! Such is the final 

15 conclusion which the whole French public must inevitably draw from this 
wordy, round-about, shuffling, and ridiculous explanation of their Em- 
peror.