Friedrich Engels 
Before Sevastopol 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4371, 23. April855 

Before Sevastopol. 

The position of the Allies before Sevastopol has not improved during the 
last week. Better weather has certainly abated a good deal of the sickness, 
and restored a more cheerful character to the camp. But these are ad- 
5 vantages in which the Russians equally participate; and the more both 
armies are in a state to resort to their military duties, the more important 
become the purely military events. 
Our readers know that about the 20th of February, the Russians, be- 
coming aware of their superiority, occupied a hill, known as Mount Sa- 
io pun, east of the Careening Bay, and in spite of the Allies, succeeded in 
erecting a redoubt called Selenghinsk on it. They were attacked on the 
morning of the 24th by French columns, but maintained their ground, 
and very soon had that redoubt armed with guns. On the 11th of March 
they took a still bolder step. They occupied another hill a little south-east 
-, 15 of the Malakoff, or Round-Tower Hill, which latter forms the main fea- 
ture in the Russian lines south-west of the Careening Bay; they threw up 
? aredoubt or other work on this point, and thus had the Malakoff Hill 
covered by two new outworks, one in front, the other in the left flank of 
it. Malakoff, being considered by the allied generals the key of the Rus- 
20 sian lines from its commanding position, was thus effectively screened 
and the defenses strengthened in a way which even if defended by a less 
tenacious and skillfully-conducted garrison, could only be overcome by a 
week's or ten days’ extra labor. It will remain a lasting disgrace to the 
men who conducted the siege to have allowed the construction of these 
25 works by the besieged, under the very ramparts of their batteries. 
In the mean time, the Russians not only armed this second and more 
advanced redoubt with sixteen guns, but also threw up a range of rifle- 
pits in front of it. These rifle-pits, six in number, are small trenches, with 

Friedrich Engels 

the earth out of them forming a breastwork, covered by sand-bags. They 
were occupied by about sixty of the best marksmen, firing through loop 
holes, and very grievously annoying the opposite trench guards and bat- 
teries. Against these rifle-pits the French in vain directed three night-at- 
tacks, undertaken under the protection of their batteries, and with con- 5 
siderable forces. But in every instance, they were obliged, in the end, to 
give up the attempt, and the pits, abandoned by them, were soon re- 
occupied by the Russian rifles, in whose possession they have remained 
since the 17th of March. The aggregate losses suffered by the French in 
these combats must have been severe, as they had to fight uncovered 10 
under the close cross fire of the Russian batteries. 

On the night of the 22d another attack appears to have been in prep- 
aration, when the Russians anticipated it by a sally. This night's engage- 
ment was again carried on with great obstinacy on both sides, and must 
have caused great loss. In the short telegraphic reports concerning it, 15 
both parties claim the victory, and Canrobert even adds that the Allies 
lost 600, the Russians 2,000 men. But evidently a much truer account of 
the affair is given by the correspondent of The London Morning Herald, 
whose narrative we publish, and who is confirmed in all points by Lord 
Raglan's official dispatch. It appears that the Russian attack extended 20 
along the entire allied line on the eastern side of the town, the attempt 
being to occupy and destroy the French and English advanced works. 
The struggle began at a little after 10 in the evening, under cover of a 
heavy cannonade from the place. The English line was defended by a 
guard of some 1,500 men, who fought with that classic valor and dogged 25 
obstinacy which the English soldier has shown in every hand-to-hand 
encounter since the expedition first landed in the Crimea. The Russian 
onslaught was desperately resisted, and no damage was done to the Eng- 
lish works. But the French were not so fortunate. They were driven from 
their trenches, which were occupied by the Russians for full half an hour. 30 
During this time a considerable portion of the works was destroyed; and 
as the English writer says, had the columns attacking the English line not 
been promptly and signally repulsed, the consequences to the Allies must 
have been very serious. The fighting in the trenches is described as ter- 
rife, the combatants firing volleys at each other when no more than 354 
twenty yards apart. The English loss is stated by Lord Raglan at 68 
officers and men, killed, wounded and missing; the French loss is esti- ; 
mated at 500 killed and wounded, while the Russians suffered still more ; 
severely, though their loss could not have approached the figure given in ; 
Canrobert's dispatch. The correspondent of The Times estimates it at 600 40: 
or 700. Some prisoners were taken on both sides. j 

Before Sevastopol 

The advantage in this affair was evidently with the Russians. They 
penetrated the hostile lines, overthrew a part of the works and spiked 
three of the batteries; and this was what they intended, as is proved by 
the fact that they had not more than 15,000 men engaged. This appears 

5 from the statement of the English writer, that the columns attacking the 
English numbered about 6,000, which is probably exaggerated. They re- 
treated, as a matter of course, since every sortie ends in a retreat and 
their loss was heavier than that of the Allies; but they achieved their 
purpose, of forestalling an attack on their own works, and damaging 

10 those of their enemies. A victory, in the sense claimed by Canrobert, it 
certainly was not. Nor was there about it any such character of success as 
could satisfy and suppress the rebellious and disorderly spirit of the 
French troops. 

To this spirit we have before alluded, but perhaps not in sufficient 

15 detail to impress the facts upon our readers. Indeed, the state of the 
French army, as far as discipline is concerned, is indeed alarming. Con- 
tinued inactivity, or what is worse, fruitless activity, will finally dissolve 
the bonds of order and obedience in any army, but more particularly, 
and very soon, in a French army. On the other hand, success and the 

20 unmistakable presence of an energetic and intelligent directing hand, will 
sooner restore discipline among the French than among any other 
troops. Now, since 1849, the French army has passed through many 
stages, all tending to the weakening of military discipline. The army was 
flattered first by the middle class, then by Louis Bonaparte, as the savior 

25 of order, as the élite of the country. It was openly proclaimed as the 
arbiter of the destinies of France. Its mass was bribed by the sausages 
and brandy, the fowls and champagne of Louis Bonaparte. To attach it 
still more to the cause of Bonapartism, discipline was relaxed, amnesties 
for military culprits were repeatedly issued; on one head only great se- 

30 verity was introduced, and that was politics. Bonapartism, with its con- 
comitants, glory, plunder, and chances of advancement, looming in the 
distance, became the normal religion of the army; republicanism and 
socialism were proscribed, and their supporters transported to Africa, 
where they filled the penal companies and battalions used for the hardest 

35 work and the most dangerous posts. The mass of the army was very little 
affected by this proceeding. What occasion was there to talk about lib- 
erty so long as the soldier had the liberty of getting drunk as often as he 
liked, and could even come home after tattoo without being punished! 
Liberty there was for the soldier more than ever before. The Empire 

40 having been proclaimed, they tried to check this license; but what influ- 
ence could be exercised over the soldiers by men like St. Arnaud and 

Friedrich Engels 

Magnan, whose appropriations of public money were in the mouths of 
everybody, or by Espinasse, who earned his General's epaulettes by an 
act of downright military treason? Respect for the officers was declining, 
and the paladins of the Lower Empire were just the men to destroy the 
last vestige of it. In this deplorable state was the French army when the 
war broke out. The very first reverse—a reverse without having seen the 
enemy—the stupid expedition to the Dobrodja, was sufficient to cause 
almost an open insurrection in a whole division. The Zouaves, composed 
almost entirely of substitutes, men of doubtful career, of no principle 
whatever, of adventurous and unruly spirits, but of great physical 
strength and courage—the Zouaves, upon this as upon all opportunities, 
took the lead in loudly expressing their discontent, and enacting scenes 
which, under other circumstances, would have ended in the forcible dis- 
solution and summary punishment of the corps, but which, as things 
stood, had to pass unnoticed. Alma and Inkermann for a while allayed 
the rebellious troops, but the long inactivity and the sufferings of winter, 
the hard work without any result, very soon brought out again the spirit 
of insubordination. Monster deputations demanding the assault, and 
other sorts of votes of no confidence in the generals were resorted to, and 
on one occasion the Zouaves even came to threaten the Commander-in- 
Chief. The late reverses have brought this state of insubordination to the 
highest pitch, and unless a decisive advantage is gained, or some other 
successful occupation given to the troops, there is no telling what the 
result may be.