No. 145, March 27, 1855.  
Midday Edition  

X. London, March 24. (On the History of the French Alliance.) The Press, Disraeli’s organ, last week raised a storm in a glass of water by the assertion that “Emperor Louis” was the only obstacle to the conclusion of peace and had fettered Austria to himself by a secret “agreement” which it was striving to get rid of. The Tories had so far vindicated the Anglo-French alliance as their own handiwork. Had not their Lord Malmesbury sealed the bond with Bonaparte? Did not Disraeli in Parliament pour out his sarcasms on Graham and Wood, who had wickedly slandered the coup d’état of December 2 before their constituents? Had not the Tories, for two years, on the platform and in the press, been the loudest heralds of the war? And now suddenly, without transition, entirely without any extenuating circumstances, insinuations against the French alliance, sneers at “Emperor Louis,” and homilies on peace? The decrepit organ of the Old Tories, the Morning Herald, uninitiated into the secret of the party leaders, shook its head dubiously and muttered vehement protests against the hallucinations of The Press, which were incomprehensible to it. The Press, however, returns to the fateful theme today. On its head it has posted the following, large-print announcement: “Important circumstances have transpired. When we wrote the other day, there was a prospect that the Congress would break up re infecta and Lord John Russell would suddenly return to England. The altered tone of Austria towards Russia since the death of Emperor Nicholas — and especially the declaration of the Austrian Emperor to Alexander II — have undoubtedly contributed to this result. We have reason to believe that the Emperor of the French has removed the obstacles that stood in the way of a general pacification, and that France is willing to agree to the complete evacuation of the Crimea without any conditions as to the destruction or reduction of the fortifications of this province.” To elucidate this oracle, The Press refers to “the authentic details of its leading article.” Strangely enough, it is precisely these details that refute the conclusion which is based on them and which they precede. “Affairs in Vienna,” the leading article says, “are becoming hourly less rational and satisfactory; and it is important that enlightened opinion on both sides of the Channel should exert its influence to avoid results that might turn out equally vexatious and deplorable. ... Had the Anglo-French alliance been sincere on the part of our Ministers in 1853, the opportunity for war would probably have been lacking; but, if necessary, its prosecution would in all probability have been victorious and successful. Instead of such a cordial alliance with France, a year was wasted by the British Government on what it called the adhesion of the great German states. Nothing could justify a war with Russia on the part of the Western Powers except the firm determination materially to curtail its empire in the South. That is the only solution of the Eastern Question. In 1853 the opportunity was favourable; it has been lost. Time, treasure, armies, reputation have been squandered in equal measure. Had we acted cordially with France in 1853, the German powers would have had to follow in our footsteps. What has happened now? The Emperor of Austria has assured the Emperor Alexander of Russia ‘that Austria seeks neither to curtail the frontiers of his empire nor to impose any disgrace upon his territory.’ These words admit of only one interpretation. As regards the secret agreement between France and Austria to which we earlier alluded, we are assured by high authority that, although it points to a probably permanent connection between the two empires, it contains nothing that must necessarily lead to an invasion of Russia by Austria. The Emperor of Russia is prepared to accept peace terms which, while offering no solution of the Eastern Question, are undoubtedly an admission of frustrated aggression and to some extent an atonement for the act of violence. We believe that the opportunity for a grander policy has been lost, and that the combination of circumstances which could have secured the independence of Europe will not soon return; but a peace, on the whole advantageous for Europe, useful for Turkey, and not dishonouring for the Western Powers, can still be obtained now. We have reason to fear that such a peace will not be negotiated. What is the obstacle? ... The Emperor of the French. If he were of the opinion that, despite the now unfavourable circumstances, the solution of the Eastern Question should be undertaken, we would not say that England should withdraw; but we learn that the views of the Emperor are of an entirely different nature. ... Between the curtailment of the Russian frontiers and the negotiation of the projected peace, the Emperor of the French has devised a mezzo termine which is dangerous and can become fateful. He intends a campaign full of brilliant feats, which would restore prestige (lustre) and then conclude with a peace that would not alter the territorial constitution of Europe or Asia one whit more than the Austro-Russian proposals, to which the extraordinary British plenipotentiary at Vienna was prepared to accede. Apart from the part of the plan which would sacrifice many thousands of human lives for the mere restoration of prestige ..., we hold the inexpediency of this project to be as glaring as its immorality. Suppose the campaign of prestige is not successful? ... Besides the obstacles which the Russian army in the Crimea opposes, pestilence threatens as much as the weapons. If the campaign of prestige fails, what will become of England and France? On which side will the Great German Powers then be? The prospect is none other than the decay and fall of Europe. Even if the odds were not against us, are we justified in running such dangers, not even for the sake of a definite policy but of a mere demonstration? It may be tormenting for the ruler of France that a great opportunity has been lost; it is no less so for the English people. But statesmen must take circumstances as they are. Neither France, nor England, nor Russia are in 1855 in the same positions as in 1853. Woe to the men who have betrayed the highest interests of Europe. May the fate they deserve overtake them. The ruler of France and the Queen of England are guiltless; but they must not, like distraught gamblers, insist on forcing their misfortune in a frenzy of disappointment and a paroxysm of despair.”

In the same paper, reference is made to Girardin’s pamphlet: “La Paix,” in which the simultaneous disarmament of Sebastopol and Gibraltar is celebrated as the true peace solution. “Reflect,” exclaims The Press, “that this pamphlet, or rather its sale, is authorised by the French Government, and its author is the dear and intimate friend, adviser, and companion of the presumptive heir to the throne!”

Here let it only be hinted that the Derbyites, whose organ is The Press, are working for a coalition with the (peace-loving) Manchester School, and that the Ministry for its part is seeking to win over the Manchester School through the Newspaper Stamp Bill (to which we shall return). The idea of a mere demonstration campaign, of a European war not to endanger the enemy’s power but to salvage one’s own prestige, of a piece-of-spectacle war, must indeed throw any sober Englishman off his balance. Question: Is it not one of the “idées napoléoniennes” as the restored Empire understands and must understand them?