Friedrich Engels 
The European war 


New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4316, 17. Februar 1855 


The European war. 


As the term approaches for the opening of the new Conference at Vien- 
na, the probability of any concessions on the part of Russia dwindles 
away into misty and most uncertain tenuity. The brilliant success of that 
5 great diplomatic coup, the prompt acceptance by the Czar of the pro- 
posed basis of negotiations, puts him, for the moment at least, in a com- 
manding position, and renders it certain that, under whatever appear- 
ances he may agree to proposals for peace, the only real basis on which he 
will now consent to arrange the quarrel is substantially that of the status 
10 quo. By accepting the Four Points he has thrown Austria back into a 
doubtful position, while he retains Prussia in his leading strings, and 
gains time to bring all his reserves and new formations of troops to the 
frontier before hostilities can begin. The very fact of negotiations having 
been agreed upon, sets free at once as many Russian soldiers of the army 
15 of observation on the Austrian frontier as can be replaced in two months 
or ten weeks—that is, at least sixty to eighty thousand men. As the whole 
of the late Danubian army has ceased to exist as such, the fourth corps 
having been in the Crimea since the end of October, the third corps 
having arrived there in the latter part of December, and the rest of the 
20 fifth corps, beside cavalry and reserves now being on the way thither, 
these troops must be replaced on the Bug and Dniester by fresh men, to 
be taken from the western army in Poland, Volhynia and Podolia. Ac- 
cordingly, if the war is to be transferred to the center of the Continent, 
two or three months’ time are of the utmost importance to Russia; for, at 
25 the present moment, the forces she has scattered on the long line from 
Kalish to Ismail are no longer sufficient, without reénforcements, to 
withstand the increasing number of Austrian troops opposed to them. 
That time she has now gained, and we proceed to show what is the 
present state of her military preparations. 


77 


Friedrich Engels 


We have, on former occasions, given an outline of the Russian military 
organization. In the great active army, the one destined to act against the 
South and West of Europe, there were originally six army-corps, of forty- 
eight battalions each; two corps of selected troops, of thirty-six battalions 
each, beside a comparatively strong force of cavalry, regular and irre- 
guiar, with artillery. As we have before stated, the Government has not 
only called in the reserves to form the fourth, fifth and sixth battalions of 
the select troops, and the fifth and sixth of the other six army-corps; but 
even the seventh and eighth battalions of each regiment had been formed 


by new levies, so that the number of battalions has been doubled for the 10 


six corps of the line, and more than doubled for the select troops (Guards 
and Grenadiers). These forces may now be approximatively estimated as 


follows: 


Guards and Grenadiers—the first 
four battalions per regiment.... 
Guards and Grenadiers—the last 
four battalions per regiment ,. 


First and Second Corps (not yet 
engaged)—the first, or active, 
four battalions per regiment 


First and Second Corps—the last 
four battalions per regiment 


Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Corps— 
the active battalions................ 


Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Corps— 
the last four battalions per reg't. 
Corps of Finland........................ 


Add: Cavalry, regular 
Cavalry, irregular 


Total 


A part ofthese estimates may appear high, but in reality they are not so. 
The enormous recruiting which has taken place since the war began, 


96 bats. 


96 bats. 


96 bats. 


96 bats. 


192 bats. 


192 bats. 
16 bats. 


784 


at 900 men .. 


at 700 men .. 


at 900 men .. 


at 700 men .. 


at 500 men .. 


at 700 men .. 
at 900 men .. 


86,400 


67,200 


86,400 


67,200 


96,000 


134,400 
14,400 
552,000 
80,000 
46,000 
80,000 
758,000 


15 


20 


25 


30 


should have swelled the ranks of the army higher than this, in spite of the 35 


losses sustained, which, all of them, fell upon the 96 active battalions of 
the third, fourth, fifth and sixth corps; but we have allowed amply for the 
many recruits who die before they reach their regiments. Besides, for 


cavalry our estimate is very low. 


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Russian defenses 


20th 1855. London 1855. 


Sevastopol. Sketch of the Mamelon and news 


The European war 


Of the above troops, 8,000 men (one division of the fifth corps) are in 
the Caucasus, and must, therefore, be deducted; for we leave unnoticed 
here the forces employed out of Europe. The remaining 750,000 troops 
are distributed nearly as follows:—On the shores of the Baltic, the Baltic 
Army, under Gen. Sievers, consisting of the Finland corps, and reserves 
of the Guards, Grenadiers, and sixth corps, amounting, with cavalry and 
artillery, to about 135,000 men, part of whom, however, may be consid- 
ered as raw recruits and battalions hardly organized. In Poland and on 
the frontier of Galicia, from Kalish to Kamienietz, the Guards, the Gren- 
10 adiers, the first corps, one division of the sixth corps, and some reserves 

of the Grenadiers and first corps, with cavalry and artillery, about 

235,000 men. This army is the finest part of the Russian troops; it con- 

tains the select troops, and the best of the reserves. In Bessarabia, and 

between the Dniester and Bug, are two divisions of the second corps, and 
15 part of its reserves, about 60,000 men. These formed part of the army of 
the West, but upon the army of the Danube being sent to the Crimea, 
they were detached to take its place. They now oppose the Austrian 
troops in the Principalities, and are commanded by Gen. Paniutin. For 
the defense of the Crimea are destined the third and fourth corps, one 
20 division of the fifth corps, two divisions of the 6th, and some reserves 
already there, beside one division each of the second and fifth corps on 
the march, the whole composing, with cavalry and artillery, a force which 
can hardly be estimated at less than 170,000 men, under Menchikoff. The 
remainder of the reserves and new formations, especially of the first, 
25 second, third, fourth and fifth corps, are now being organized into a 
grand army of reserve by Gen. Tsheodayeff. They are concentrating in 
the interior, and must count about 150,000 men. How many of them are 
on the march to Poland or the South, is, of course, impossible to tell. 
Thus the Emperor Nicholas, who, last summer, had less than 500,000 
30 troops on the western frontier of his Empire, from Finland to the Cri- 
mea, now has 600,000 men placed there, beside a reserve forming in the 
interior to the number of 150,000. For all that, he is weaker now against 

Austria than he was then. In August or September there were in Poland 

and Podolia 270,000 Russians, and on the Pruth and Dniester the army 
35 of the Danube, counting about 80,000 men; for this latter was also kept 

there more for the sake of the Austrians than for anything else. This 
made a total of 350,000 men who might have operated against Austria. 

Now there are, as we have seen, only 295,000 men concentrated along the 

Austrian line of outposts, while Austria must by this time have 320,000 
40 men directly opposed to them, and 70,000 to 80,000 men in Bohemia and 

Moravia to support these. This momentary inferiority of numbers on the 


Nn 


81 


Friedrich Engels 


Russian side, and the great uncertainty as to the time of arrival of fresh 
formations from the interior, in the present season, and in a country 
where the whole administration is corrupt, are quite sufficient causes to 
make the Russian Government try to gain as much time as possible. Such 
an inferiority of numbers disables the Russians for offensive operations; 5 
and in an open country like Poland, with no great river-lines between the 
two armies, this means the necessity of a retreat, on the first encounter, 
to a tenable position. In this especial case it means the cutting of the 
Russian army in two portions, one of which would have to retreat upon 
Warsaw, and the other upon Kiéff; and between these two halves would 10 
there lie the impassable Polesian moors, extending from the Bug (tribu- 
tary to the Vistula, not the Southern Bug,) to the Dnieper. In fact, it 
would be better luck than the Russians generally have on such occasions, 

if large numbers escaped being driven into these morasses. Thus, even 
without a battle, the greater part of Southern Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, 15 
Bessarabia, the country from Warsaw to Kiéff and Cherson would have 
to be evacuated. On the other hand, a superior Russian army could quite 
as easily drive the opposing Austrians, without their risking a decisive 
battle, out of Galicia and Moldavia, and force the passes into Hungary, 
and the consequences of such a result can easily be imagined. Indeed, in 20 
such a war between Austria and Russia, the first successful offensive 
movement is of the highest importance to either party; and either will do 
the utmost to establish itself first on the other's territory. 

We have often said that this war would not have that military interest 
which properly attaches to European wars, until Austria should declare 25 
herself against Russia. Even the efforts in the Crimea are nothing but a 
great war upon a small scale. The enormous marches of the Russians, the 
sufferings of the Allies, have hitherto reduced the contending armies to 
such numbers, that no really great battle has been fought. What are 
fights where but from fifteen to twenty-five thousand men on a side are 30 
engaged? What strategical operations of really scientific interest can oc- 
cur within the small space from Cape Cherson to Bakshiserai? And even 
there, whatever occurs, there are never troops enough to occupy the 
whole line. The interest consists more in what is not done, than in what is 
done. For the rest, it is anecdote, instead of history, that is performed. 35 

But it will be a different thing should the two grand armies, now facing 
each other on the Galician frontier, come into play. Whatever the inten- 
tions and capabilities of the commanders may be, the very magnitude of 
the armies and the nature of the ground admit of no sham war and of no 
indecision. Rapid concentrations, forced marches, stratagems and out- 40 
flankings of the largest kind, changing bases and lines of operation—in 


82 


The European war 


fact, maneuvering and fighting in a grand scale, and according to real 
military principles, here became a necessity and a matter of course; and 
then the chief who is influenced by political considerations or who acts 
with a want of resolution must lose his army. War on such a scale and in 
5 such a country takes a serious and a business-like turn at once; and it is 
this which will make the Austro-Russian war, ifit does break out, one of 
the most interesting events since 1815. 
As to the prospect of peace, that is by no means so clear as it seemed a 
few weeks since. If the Allies are willing to put an end to the struggle on 
10 the terms, substantially, of the status quo, it may be done; but how little 
hope there is of that, our readers cannot require to be informed. Certain- 
ly, with half of Germany acting, morally at least, in her favor, and after 
having put on foot the enormous armies whose strength we have above 
exhibited, we cannot expect Russia to agree to any terms which France 
15 and England are likely to propose or consent to. The almost uninterrup- 
ted series of profitable treaties of peace, from Peter the Great to the 
peace of Adrianople, will hardly now be followed by a treaty surrende- 
ring the dominion of the Black Sea, before Sevastopol is taken, and when 
only one-third of the Russian forces have as yet been engaged. But if 
20 peace cannot be concluded before the fate of Sevastopol or of the allied 
expedition is fully developed, it will be less probable after this Crimean 
campaign is decided. If Sevastopol falls, the honor of Russia—if the 
Allies are defeated and driven into the sea, their honor—will not admit of 
a settlement until more decisive results are obtained. Had the prepara- 
25 tions for the Conference been attended by an armistice, as we intimated 
on hearing of the Czar's acceptance of the Four Points, there would have 
been reason for continuing to entertain hopes of peace; but, under pres- 
ent circumstances, we are compelled to admit that a great European war 
is much more probable.