Friedrich Engels 
The Crimean campaign. January 18, 1855 

Nr. 4304, 3. Februar 1855 

The Crimean campaign. 

We yesterday quoted The London Times to the effect that the British 
cavalry before Sevastopol had ceased to exist as a force. The reason for 
this appears to be the knocking up of the horses in dragging heavy guns 
and provisions from Balaklava, both the artillery and commissariat being 5 
destitute of draught animals. The mud, however, is so deep that the 
transportation of cannon and ammunition had ceased, and a supply of 
food, such as it was, was all that was being brought up. The average 
number of daily admissions to the hospitals was 150, and of deaths about 
50. In the meantime the trenches have been brought up nearer the ene- 10 
my's works, and a third parallel constructed, which cannot be armed yet, 
though it must be defended against sorties. How near the trenches are 
now to the nearest attacked points, it is impossible to say, as reports are 
so contradictory, while nothing official, of course, is published; some say 
140 or 150 yards, but a French report states that the nearest point is as 15 
far distant as 240 yards. The French batteries, which are completed and 
armed, have to wait, because the desultory, and as now appears, perfectly 
useless cannonade of November has reduced the stores of ammunition, 
and a repetition of such desultory firing would be equally useless. Thus 
the Russians have had ample time not only to repair all the damage done 20 
by the former attack, but to construct new works, and they have done so 
with such application, that Sevastopol is now stronger than ever. A de- 
cisive assault is entirely out of the question, where several succeeding 
lines of defense have to be taken in succession, and where, behind the last 
enceinte, the large stone buildings of the scattered town have been turned 25 
into as many redoubts. 

The siege, whenever it is recommenced, will have to be done over 
again, with the only difference that the batteries are considerably more 

The Crimean campaign. January 18, 1855 

advanced toward the town, and consequently more efficient. But at the 
price of how many lives, lost by the hand of the enemy or by sickness, has 
this advantage been bought! It is the very work of guarding these exten- 
sive trenches which, by depriving the men of sleep, has produced many of 
5 the casualties by sickness in the British army. And the Russians have 
been active enough in sorties, which, if not always successful, have had 
their full effect as far as harassing an already overworked enemy is con- 
cerned. 
It appears, too, that the reénforcements of the British and French have 
10 nearly all arrived, and unless fresh regiments are ordered for embarka- 
tion, very small additions will be made to the strength of either army in 
the Crimea. The Turkish army is getting very leisurely transported to 
Eupatoria, whence it is to operate toward Simpheropol, observing, at the 
same time, the north side of Sevastopol. This operation, by entirely sep- 
15 arating the Turks from their Allies, and forming two distinct armies, is 
another strategic blunder, inviting the Russians to defeat each army sep- 
arately. But it could not be avoided; it would have been still worse to 
collect more troops on the little Heracleatic Chersonese. Thus, we see, the 
consequences of the celebrated flank march to Balaklava are developing 
20 themselves again and again in fresh false moves. That the Turks will get 
well beaten is very likely; they are no longer the army of Kalafat and 
Silistria. Disorganization, neglect, and want of everything, have trans- 
formed that army, and Turkey had no second to replace it. Under these 
circumstances, nothing is so impropable as that the negotiations for 
25 peace should be disturbed by the fall of Sevastopol. There has been no 
time since the Allies landed when that event was not more likely than at 
present. It is not too much to say that in all military history there is no 
more signal failure than this Crimean campaign.