Friedrich Engels 
The Campaign in the Crimea 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr.4246, 27. November 1854 

The Campaign in the Crimea. 

Our readers cannot but be struck with the novel spirit breathing through the 
intelligence from the seat of war in the Crimea, received by the Baltic 
yesterday, and published in our columns this morning. Hitherto an over- 
weening and arrogant confidence has distinguished the comments of the 
British press, and the reports of British and French correspondents con- 
cerningthe movements and prospects ofthe war. But now this has given way 
to a feeling of anxiety and even of alarm. It is confessed on all hands that 
there is no such superiority as has been claimed on the part of the allied 
armies over their antagonists. That Sevastopol is stronger, Menchikoff an 
abler General, and his army far more formidable than was supposed; and 
thatinstead of certain and decisive victory, the French and Englishnow stand 
exposed to possible failure and disgrace. Such is the feeling expressed by 
our correspondent at Liverpool, himself an Englishman, alive to all the 
patriotic impulses and prejudices of his country; and this feeling is equally 
manifested by the very energetic action of both the French and English 
Governments. Desperate efforts are making to hurry reénforcements to 
Sevastopol; the United Kingdom is drained of its last soldier; many steam- 
ships are taken up as transports; and 50,000 French troops are sent forward, 
all in the hope of arriving at the scene of action before it shall be too late 
to take part in the final, decisive struggle. 

We published on Saturday a copious quantity of documents, relating 
principally to the earlier stages of the siege, and the partially effective but 
yet disastrous cooperation of the fleets; and we now add the official reports 
concerning Liprandi's murderous attack on the allies near Balaklava, with 
other accounts of the subsequent progress of operations, all of them, we must 
say, quite unfavorable to the allies. From a careful examination of these 
documents we conclude that though the position is, as we have often stated, 
a difficult and even precarious one, it is hardly so bad as is implied by our 

Friedrich Engels 

Liverpool correspondent. We do not think that they are in danger of any 
worse disaster than a compulsory retreat and embarkation. And, onthe other 
hand, there is still the possibility of their carrying the town by a desperate 
and sanguinary assault. But however this may be, it must, we think, be 
decided long before the reénforcements leaving France and England can 
reach the Crimea. The campaign is evidently near its turning point; the 
movements, the errors and the omissions which have shaped its character 
and generated its results, are made; we are in possession of authentic and 
indisputable information as to the principal facts; and we accordingly pro- 
pose succinctly and briefly to review the course of the contest. 

It is now established that when the allies landed at Old Fort, Menchikoff 
had under his command in the field only forty-two battalions and two regi- 
ments of cavalry, besides some Cossacks, while Sevastopol was garrisoned 
by the marines and sailors of the fleet. These forty-two battalions were of 
the 12th, 16th and 17th divisions of infantry; and supposing each battalion 
to have had its full complement of 700 men, there were in all 29,400 men of 
infantry; with 2,000 Hussars, the Cossacks, artillery, sappers and miners; in 
all some 32,000 men in the field. With these he could not oppose the landing 
of the allies, as by so doing he would have exposed his troops, without a 
sufficient reserve, to the fire of the allied fleets. A powerful army, which 
could afford to have sacrificed a part of its strength, might have detached 
a force to open a petty war of surprises and night-attacks against the invaders 
while landing; the Russians, in this instance, required every man for the great 
battle to come; besides, the Russian foot soldier is the clumsiest fellow alive 
for petty war operations; his forte is the action in column by close order. 
As to the Cossacks, on the other hand, their mode of warfare is too petty, 
and is effective in proportion only as the chance of plunder increases. 
Besides, the campaign of the Crimea seems to prove that the regularization 
of the Cossacks, which has been gradually carried out for the last thirty years, 
has broken their individual spirit of enterprise, and reduced them to a sub- 
dued condition, in which they are spoiled for irregular and not yet fit for 
regular service. They seem incapable now either of outpost and detached 
duty, or of charging an enemy in line. The Russians, then, were quite right 
in reserving every sabre and bayonet for the battle of the Alma. 

On the banks of this river, the 32,000 Russians were attacked by 
55,000 allies. The proportion was almost one to two. When about 30,000 allies 
had been engaged, Menchikoff ordered the retreat. Of the Russians, up to 
then, not more than 20,000 were engaged; a further attempt to hold the 
position, would have converted the Russian retreat into a complete rout, for 
it would have required the engaging of the whole Russian reserve in the 
battle. The success of the allies, with their tremendous numerical superiority, 

The Campaign in the Crimea 

being established beyond doubt, Menchikoff broke off the battle, covered 
his retreat by his reserves, and after overcoming the first disorder created 
on his left by Bosquet's flank movement retired unpursued and unmolested, 
"in proud order," from the field. The allies say they had no cavalry for the 
pursuit; but since we know that the Russians had but two regiments of 
Hussars—less, if anything, than the allies—this excuse falls to the ground. As 
at Zorndorf, at Eylau, at Borodino, the Russian infantry, though beaten, 
behaved up to the character given them by General Cathcart, who com- 
manded a division against them, and who pronounced them "incapable of 
panic!" 

But if the Russian infantry remained cool and unterrified, Menchikoff 
himself was panic-struck. The great numerical force of the allies, coupled 
with their unexpected decision and impetuosity in the attack, deranged, for 
a moment, his plans. He abandoned the idea of retreating into the interior 

of the Crimea, and marched to the south of Sevastopol, in order to hold the 
line of the Chernaya. This was a great and unpardonable mistake. Over- 
looking, from the hights of the Alma, the whole allied position, he must have 
been able to make out the strength of his opponents within 5,000 men. He 
must have known that, whatever was their relative superiority over his own 
forces, they were not strong enough to leave an army to observe Sevastopol 
while following him into the interior. He must have known that if the allies 
were two to one against him onthe sea-shore, he could bring two against 
their one at Simferopol. And yet he marched, as he himself confesses, to 
the south side of Sevastopol. But, after this retreat had been effected, without 
any molestation from the allies, and his troops had rested a day or two on 
the hills behind the Chernaya, then Menchikoff resolved to redress his 
mistake. He did this by a perilous flank movement from the Chernaya to 
Bakshi-Serai. It was contrary to one of the first rules of strategy; yet it 
promised great results. When a blunder is once committed in strategy, you 
can seldom get over its consequences. The question then merely is, whether 
it is less disadvantageous to abide by them or to get over them by a second, 
but intentional, erroneous movement. In this case we think Menchikoff was 
perfectiy right in risking a flank-march within reach of the enemy, in order 
to get out of his absurdly "concentrated" position around Sevastopol. 
But in this contest between strategical mediocrities and routine generals, 
the movements of hostile armies assumed forms hitherto unknown in war- 
fare. The fancy for flank-marches, like the cholera, was epidemic in both 
camps. At the same time that Menchikoff resolved on a flank-march from 
Sevastopol to Bakshi-Serai, Saint Arnaud and Raglan took it into their heads 
to move from the Katchato Balaklava. The rear of the Russians and the van 
of the British met at Mackenzie's farm, (so called from a Scotchman, later 

Friedrich Engels 

an admiral in the Russian service,) and, as a matter of course, the van beat 
the rear. The general strategical character of the flank-march of the allies 
having already been criticised in The Tribune, we need not now revert 
to it. 

On the 2d or 3d of October Sevastopol was invested, and the allies took 
up that very position from which Menchikoff had just extricated himself. 
From that moment the memorable siege of Sevastopolbegan, and atthe same 
time a new era in the campaign. Hitherto the allies, by their uncontested 
superiority, had it all their own way. Their fleets, commanding the sea, 
insured their landing. Once landed, their superior numbers, and certainly also 
their superior storming qualities, insured the victory at the Alma. But now 
the equilibrium of forces, which sooner or later is sure of be brought about 
in operations distant from their base and in an enemy's country, began to 
develop itself. Menchikoff's army, it is true, did not show itself yet; but it 
made necessary the placing of a reserve on the Chernaya, fronting to the east. 
Thus the actual besieging army was seriously weakened, and reduced to 
numbers not much superior to those of the garrison. 

Want of energy, want of system, especially in the cooperation of the 
different departments of the British land and sea forces, difficulties of 
ground, and, above all, an invincible spirit of routine, inherent, it appears, 
in the British administrative and scientific departments, delayed the com- 
mencement of actual siege operations to the 9th of October. At last the 
trenches were opened on that day, at the enormous distance of from 1,500 
to 2,500 yards from the Russian works. Suchathing was never seen nor heard 
of in any previous siege. It proves that the Russians were still able to dispute 
the ground around the fortress, to the distance of at least a mile; and they 
actually held it up to the 17th. On the morning of that day the siege-works 
were far enough advanced to allow the allies to open their fire. Probably this 
would have been delayed a few days longer, as the allies were by no means 
in a fit position to do so with success on that day, had it not been for the 
arrival of the glorious news that all England and France were rejoicing at 
the capture of Sevastopol on the 25th of October. This news, of course, 
exasperated the armies, and, in order to tranquilize them, the fire had to be 
opened. But it turns out that the allies brought 126 guns against 200 or 250. 
Now, the great axiom of Vauban, which has been again and again used by 
the Anglo-French to keep public opinion quiet, viz.: "that a siege is an 
operation of mathematical certainty and success, a mere matter of time, 
unless interrupted from without." This great axiom is based upon that other 
axiom of the same engineer that "in a siege the fire of the attackcan be made 
superior to that of the defense." Now, here at Sevastopol, we have exactly 
the reverse; the fire of the attack, when opened, was decidedly inferior to 

The Campaign in the Crimea 

that of the defense. The consequences were very soon made apparent. In 
a couple of hours the Russians silenced the fire of the French batteries and 
kept up an almost equal contest, throughout the day, with the English. To 
create a diversion, a naval attack was made. But it was neither better con- 
ducted nor more successful. The French ships, attackingthe Quarantine Fort 
and Fort Alexander, supported the land attack upon these forts; and had it 
not been for their aid, there is no doubt the French would have been far more 
roughly handled. The English ships attacked the north side of the harbor, 
including Fort Constantine and the Telegraph battery, as wellas atemporary 
battery constructed to the north-east of Constantine. That cautious man, 
Admiral Dundas, had ordered his ships to anchor at 1,200 yards from the 
forts—he is evidently a friend of the long-range system. Now it is an old 
established fact, that in a combat between ships and batteries on shore, the 
ships are beat unless they can close up within 200 yards or less to the bat- 
teries, so that their shot is certain to tell, and with the greater effect. Con- 
sequently, Dundas got his ships knocked about in a terrible manner and 
would have suffered a glorious defeat, had it not been for Sir Edmund Lyons, 
who', it appears, almost in defiance of orders, got three ships-of-the-line as 
close as he could to Fort Constantine and did it some damage in exchange 
for what he received. As, however, the British and French Admirals' reports 
have not yet said a single word about the actual damage done to the forts, 
we must conclude that here, as well as [at] Bomarsund, Montalembert 
Coast—forts and casemated batteries—proved a match for twice their number 
of guns on board ship. This is the more remarkable, as itis now pretty certain 
that the exposed masonry of these forts, as was already partially proved at 
Bomarsund, cannot withstand the breaching fire of heavy ship guns, estab- 
lished on shore, for more than twenty-four hours. 
The French were almost silentfor a couple of days afterward. The English, 
having established their batteries at a greater distance from the Russian lines, 
and mounting heavier calibers than their allies, were enabled to maintain their 
fire and to silence the upper tier of guns in a masonry redoubt. The naval 
attack was not renewed—the best proof of the respect inspired by the 
casemated forts. The Russians made a defense which very much undeceived 
the conquerors of the Alma. For every dismounted gun a fresh one was 
brought up. Every embrasure destroyed during the day by the enemy's fire 
was restored during the night. Earthworks against earthworks, the contest 
was very nearly equal, until measures were taken to give the allies the 
superiority. Lord Raglan's ridiculous order "to spare the town" was revoked, 
and a bombardment opened which, by its concentric effect'upon crowded 
masses of troops, and by its harassing nature, must have done the garrison 
great harm. Skirmishers were, besides, sent out in advance of the batteries, 

Friedrich Engels 

to pick off, from any covered position they could find, the Russian gunners. 
As at Bomarsund, the Minie rifle did its work well. Ina few days, what with 
the heavy guns and the Minié rifles, the Russian artillerymen were mostly 
put hors de combat. So were the sailors from the fleet, the portion of the 
garrison best instructed in the use of heavy guns. The usual resource of 
besieged garrisons had then to be resorted to: the infantry were commanded 
to serve the guns, under the superintendence of the remaining artillerymen. 
But their fire, as may be imagined, was almost without effect, and thus the 
besiegers were enabled to push their trenches nearer and nearer the place. 
They have opened, it is stated, their third parallel at 300 yards from the 
outworks. We do not know yet what batteries they have erected in this third 
parallel ; we can only say that a third parallel, in regular sieges, is always made 
at the foot of the glacis of the works attacked, that is, about 50 or 60 yards 
from the ditch. If this distance has been exceeded before Sevastopol, we can 
but see in this fact a confirmation of a report contained in several British 
papers, that the irregularity of the lines of defense, instead of giving the 
British engineers fresh scope for their inventive capacities, has but discon- 
certed these gentlemen who can demolish, uponthe most approved principle, 
a regularbastioned front, but who seem to be badly off as soon as the enemy 
deviates from the rule prescribed by the best authorities on the subject. 
The southern attack once decided upon, the parallel and its batteries should 
have been directed against one, or at most two well-defined fronts of the 
defenses. Two of the outer forts next to each other—or, at the very outside, 
three—should have been attacked with concentrated forces; and, once de- 
molished, then all the other outworks would have been useless. In this way, 
the allies, by bringing all their artillery to bear upon one point, could have 
easily established at once a great superiority of fire, and shortened the siege 
considerably. As far as can be judged from plans and maps, the front, from 
the Quarantine Fort to the upper end of the inner harbor, or the front against 
which the French now direct their efforts, would have been the bestto attack, 
as its demolition would lay the town itself completely open. The one hundred 
and thirty guns of the allies would have at once insured them a superiority 
of fire on this limited front. Instead of this, the desire to let each army act 
independently of the other, produced this unprecedented mode of siege, in 
which the whole of the ramparts, extending over a length of three miles, is 
simultaneously cannonaded on its whole extent. Such a thing has never been 
seen before. Who ever heard of an attack which allowed the defense to bring 
into play at once, from plain bastioned works and lunettes the enormous mass 
of two hundred and fifty guns? A single bastioned front can hardly mount 
twenty guns; and in an ordinary siege no more than three or four fronts can 
contribute to the defense. Unless the allied engineers can show, hereafter, 

The Campaign in the Crimea 

very substantial reasons for their curious proceedings, we must conclude that 
they were unable to find out the weakest points of the defenses, and, there- 
fore, in order not to miss them, fired upon every portion of the line. 

In the mean time, reénforcements arrive to both parties. Liprandi's harass- 
ing and partially successful attacks on the allied out-posts have shown the 
presence of a stronger Russian force than Menchikoff had led to Bakshi 
Serai. As yet, he does not, however, appear strong enough for a relieving 
battle. Considering the progress made by the besiegers, considering that the 
damage done to the defense increases in a geometrical ratio as the besiegers 
approach the ramparts, considering that the out-works still hold out, but that 
the inner wall appears to be weak, we may expect that something decisive 
will have occurred from the 9thto the 15thof November; that either the south 
side of the tower has fallen, or that the allies have suffered a decisive defeat 
and been obliged to raise the siege. But it must be recollected that all such 
predictions depend upon circumstances which cannot be fully known be- 
forehand at such a distance from the spot.