Friedrich Engels 
Ships and Forts 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr.4104, 13. Juni 1854 

Ships and Forts. 

In view of the fact that the success of the allied French and English and the 
defeat of Russia in the present war depends on the result of the conflict 
between the fleets of the former and the great f ortif ied sea-ports of the latter, 
an unusual degree of attention is now paid to the relative power of these 
opposing means of attack and defense. Itis admitted to be an open question 
whether places of such strength as Cronstadt and Sevastopol can be taken 
by any number of ships with any number of guns that can be brought against 
them. But, without expressing an opinion on that question at present, we wish 
to suggest that so far, the Russian military and navalresources have notbeen 
found, when brought to the test, exactly so contemptible as we used to be 
told they were before the war. The Russian armies were said to exist on paper 
only; we have found them excessively slow in marching, as they always were, 
but after all they arrived on the scene of action in pretty good condition and 
pretty full numbers. The Russian ships in the Black Sea, especially, were said 
to be badly built and miserably manned; and yet, in the chase of the Fury 
two Russian frigates, Russian built, nearly outsailed an English steamer, and 
both their build and handling were admired by the "rulers of the waves." 
If the casemates without ventilation, and the stone walls which cannot stand 
the concussion caused by their own guns being fired, which we are led to 
expect at Sevastopol and Cronstadt, should prove to be of the same nature 
as the ships and soldiers, many a true John Bull will be doomed to awful 
disappointment when it comes to an attack upon them. 
Cronstadt and Sevastopol, the two centers of the Russian naval establish- 
ment, are fortified inthe strongest manner known to modern military science. 
Both of them owe their formidable appearance mainly to the system of Count 
Montalembert, a French engineer of the last century. Montalembert 
proposed to strengthen both land and sea fortresses by erecting, in the place 
of simple ramparts, with guns forming one single line of fire, large stone 

Friedrich Engels 

buildings oftwo, three, andin some cases even six stories, every one ofthem 
to be vaulted in bomb-proof, and to contain an equal number of guns firing 
out of narrow embrasures. The details of his system— the partial exaggeration 
of its principles by the author—the objections urged against it, cannot, of 
course, be here debated. However, the evident superiority of a fire from a 

double or triple line, disposed in as many tiers of guns one above the other, 
has caused its application in almost all modern constructions wherever it 
could be done. Cherbourg in France, Alessandria in Italy, Ehrenbreitstein, 
Linz, Königsberg, Ulm in Germany, are more or less modified applications 
of some of Montalembert's fundamental principles. Large casemated build- 

ings with two or three tiers of guns have been found admirably adapted for 
detached forts, and especially for strand fortifications, where it is essential 
to oppose an equivalent fire to the mass of iron poured out from the broad- 
sides of two and three-deckers. Thus Cherbourg, Brest, and almost all exten- 
sive fortified harbors, are provided with casemated batteries of atleast two 

tiers; Sevastopol has almost all its batteries disposed in three tiers; Cronstadt 
has one, two, three tiers, and in two forts even as many as four tiers. 

The fact that these new-fashioned constructions have not as yet in any 
case undergone the test of real attack, would be alone sufficient to keep alive 
a doubt as to their actual defensive strength. But these new forts shock so 
much in every detail of their composition all the notions of men who admit 
in fortifications of no possible progress beyond Vauban and Cormontaigne, 
that even at the present day there are hundreds of good soldiers and sailors, 
nay, even engineers, who hold them in utter contempt. This is parüy the case 
even in France, where the Cormontaigne party carried their point when the 
plan of the fortifications of Paris was discussed. But nowhere do those 
prejudices prevail more than in England, where the large majority of officers 
are extremely deficient in theoretical knowledge, and dreadfully averse to 
study. Their old hand-books do not go beyond Cormontaigne; they them- 
selves, perhaps, never heard the name of Montalembert pronounced; the 
organization of the British army is very unfavorable to any improvement, 
either material or educational; the Duke made it a point not to alter an iota 
in the service if he could help it; and what wonder that dress, maneuvers, 
notions, are more old-fashioned in the British army than in any other? Thus 
it is that among British officers especially there will be found a great many 
who cherish the idea that John Bull can do anything, and a British fleet take 
Cronstadt be it ever so strong, combined with the other notion that Cronstadt 
is not very strong after all, because it is built according to that bore of a 
system which threatens to spread confusion in all authorized treatises, and 
to make gallant gentlemen begin their studies afresh. 

Now there is no doubt that with a good plan, a little knowledge of the 

Notizen von Jenny und Karl Marx 

über das Absenden einiger Artikel an die „New-York Tribune" 
im Mai und Juni 1854 

Ships and Forts 

ground, and an inspection of the ramparts and ditches of abastioned fortress 
on the old system, it is not very difficult to make a pretty fair estimate of 
its strength; but this is not the case with the new fortifications, not only 
because they have not yet been tried in war, but because there are so many 
considerations of detail in their construction that a mere outward inspection 
gives but a poor clue as to the point in question. There is, above all, the 
strength of the masonry, as far as regards both the effect of the enemy's shot 
and of the concussion caused by the fire of the casemates. There is the 
ventilation of the casemates, which, if not properly provided, may silence 
whole batteries at the most decisive moment by choking the men with smoke. 
There is the construction of the embrasures, which is very essential; the hight 
of the lowest tier above the level of the water, and other points. A minute 
knowledge of a whole fortress is required before, with the present want of 
practical experience, any opinion as to its real defensive efficiency can be 
pronounced. But this much is certain, even if there be some considerable 
faults in the plan and execution of these works, both Cronstadt and Sevas- 
topol must, under all the circumstances, be considered first-rate fortresses, 
which it will take an exceedingly strong, well-handled and resolute naval 
force to carry. An attack upon either of them is, therefore, an event of the 
highest military interest, and, whatever may be its result, some of the most 
important questions now remaining open for debate in military science will 
then approach their solution.