Friedrich Engels 
The War 

The People's Paper. 
Nr. 108, 27. Mal 1854 

The War. 

At last, then, we have to report an exploit of the "British Tar." The fleet of 
Admiral Napier has destroyed, after eight hours' bombardment, the fort of 
Gustavsvaern (which translated from the Swedish means "Gustav's de- 
fence" or "stronghold," "Gustav's Wehr") and taken the garrison prisoners 

of war, to the number of 1,500. This is the first serious attack upon Imperial 
Russian property, and compared withthe drowsy and torpid affair at Odessa, 
shows at least that Charles Napier is not going to sacrifice his own renown 
and that of his family if he can help it. The fort of Gustavsvaern is situated 
on the extremity of a peninsula, forming the south-west corner of Finland, 

close to the lighthouse of Hango-Udd, well known as a landmark to all 
skippers going up the Finnic Gulf. Its military importance is not very great; 
it defends a very small area either of land or water, and might have been left 
in the rear by the attacking fleet without any risk whatever. The fort itself 
cannot have been large, as is evident from the numbers of its garrison. But 

in the present blessed ignorance existing even in the British Admiralty and 
War Office as to the real strength and importance of the Baltic Coast de- 
fences of Russia, we may be excused if we delay any comments upon the 
tactical merits of the affair until fuller particulars have arrived. We can, for 
the present, only say this much: the eight hours' duration of the cannonade 

proves a brave, if not over-skilful defence on the part of the Russians, and 
forebodes a greater obstinacy than may have been expected, inthe defence 
of the first class fortresses in that same gulf. On the other hand, the fifteen 
hundred prisoners of war are no appreciable loss at all to Russia (they make 
up about two average days' loss by sickness on the Danube), while they must 

prove a serious embarrassment to Napier. What in the world will he do with 
them? He cannot release them on parole; or without parole; and there is no 
place nearer to bring them to than England. For a safe transport of these 
1,500 men he would require at least three ships of the line or twice that 

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London. Nr. 108, 27. Mai 1854. 

The People's Paper. 

Artikel „The War" 

Titelseite (Ausschnitt) mit Engels 

The War 

number of steam frigates. The very effects of his victory cripple him for a 
fortnight or three weeks. Lastly, as he has no landing troops, can he hold 
the ground he has conquered? I do not see how he could, without again 
crippling his thinly-manned fleets by a further weakening of each ship's 
contingent of sailors and marines. This circumstance brings us to a subject 
which is discussed with great vehemence in the British press, although far 
too late as usual. The British press has, all at once, found out that a fleet, 
however powerful, is of very little avail unless it has troops on board, strong 
enough to go on shore and complete the victory which ships' guns, in the 
best case, can obtain only very incompletely against land defences. It appears 
there was not a man in the British official world directing the war, nor in 
the official world directing British public opinion—who was ever struck by 
this idea up to the end of last month. Now, all available troops and means 
of transport are engaged for the Black Sea, and the whole land force under 
orders for the Baltic, of which not a man has been sent off, the very staff 
of which has not yet been organised, consists of one brigade of 2,500 men! 
As to the French, they are woefully limping behind. Their Baltic fleet—you 
recollect the pompous report of secretary Ducos: "Your majesty ordered 
the equipment of a third fleet; the orders of your majesty are executed"—this 
splendid armament which was to be ready for the seaby the middle of March 
to the tune of ten ships of the line, has never consisted of more than five 
ships of the line, which with frigates and small vessels, are at present creeping 
slowly along the mouth of the Great Belt, to reach which from Brest, it has 
taken them fully three weeks, westerly winds prevailing all the time. The 
grand Camp of Saint Omer, to contain 150,000, in case of need, 200,000 troops 
pretended for [a] Baltic expedition, has been formed, on paper, three or four 
weeks ago, and not a brigade is, as yet, concentrated. The French, however, 
might easily spare some ten to 15,000 infantry and field artillery from their 
coast-garrisons, without the fuss and pomp of a large theatrical camp demon- 
stration; but where are the means of transport? British merchantmen would 
have to be chartered; they would, according to the rate of sailing of the 
French fleet, require from four to six weeks to arrive, one by one, on the 
scene of action; and where should the troops be landed, the brigade and 
division concentrated, the staffs and commissariats organised? That is the 
vicious circle in which the allies move; in order to have a land-army in the 
Baltic, they must first conquer an island or peninsula where to concentrate 
arid organise itfor attack; and in order to conquer this desideratum, they must 
first have a landing force on the spot. There is no difficulty in getting out 
of this scrape, as soon as you have a good admiral who knows as much of 
land-warfare as is necessary to enable him to command a land-force; and 
there is no doubt Charles Napier is quite up to that, as he has fought a great 

Friedrich Engels 

deal on shore. But with an Aberdeen reigning supreme, with four different 
ministries meddling with the fighting force, with the eternal antagonism of 
army and navy, and with French and English forces combined, and jealous 
of each other's glory and comforts, how can you expect anything like unity 
of action? Then, there cannot now be brought up any effective land-force 
to the Baltic before the end of June; and unless the war is decided and peace 
concluded in four months, the whole of the conquests made will have to be 
given up, troops, guns, ships, provisions, all will have to be withdrawn, or 
abandoned, and for seven winter months the Russians will be again in 
possession of all their Baltic territory. This shows clear enough, that all 
serious and decisive attacks upon Baltic Russia are out of the question for 
the present year; itis too late. Only when Sweden joins the WesternPowers, 
have they a base of operations in the Baltic which will admit of their carrying 
on a winter campaign in Finland. But here again we have a vicious circle, 
though vicious only, as the former one, to the pusillanimous. How can you 
expect the Swedes to join you, unless you show them by sending aland-force, 
and taking part of Finland, that you are in earnest? And, on the other side, 
how can you send that force thither without having made sure of Sweden 
as a base of operations? 

Verily, Napoleon the Great, the "butcher" of so many millions of men, 
was a model of humanity in his bold, decisive, home-striking way of warfare, 
compared to the hesitating "statesman-like" directors of this Russian war, 
who cannot but eventually sacrifice human life and hard cash to a far greater 
amount if they go on as they do. 

Turning to the Black Sea, we find the combined fleets before Sebastopol 
amusing themselves with a little harmless long-range exercise against some 
paltry outworks of that fortress. This innocent game, we are informed, has 
been carried on for four days by the majority of the ships, and during all this 
time the Russians, having only twelve ships of the line ready for Sea, did not 
show their faces outside the harbour, to the great astonishment of Admiral 
Hamelin—(vide his report, May 1-5.) That heroic sailor is, however, old 
enough to recollect the time when French squadrons were not only blocked 
up, but even attacked in harbour by English squadrons of far inferior 
strength; and certainly it is expecting a little too much, that the inferior 
Russian squadron should come out of Sebastopol to be shattered and sunk 
by twice their number of ships, and thus offer themselves up in expiation 
for the "hideous crime" of Sinope! 

In the meantime, two ships of the line (screws), and seven steam-frigates 
are on their road to Circassia. They were to explore the coasts of the Crimea, 
and then to destroy the forts on the Circassian coast. But in this latter attack 
only three steam-frigates were to participate, the remaining four being in- 

The War 

structed to return to the fleet as soon as the Crimea was duly reconnoitred. 
Now the three forts the Russians still occupy on the Circassian coast, 
viz.—Anapa, Sukhum Kaleh, and Redut Kaleh, are, as far as we know of 
considerable strength, built upon heights which entirely command the offing 
(except Redut Kaleh), and it may be doubted whether the force sent will be 
sufficient to effect their purposes, especially as it is not accompanied by 
landing troops. The squadron, which is commanded by Rear-Admiral Lyons, 
is at the same time to communicate with the Circassians, and especially with 
their chief, Shamyl. What Rear-Admiral Lyons is to communicate to him the 
report telleth not, but there is this certain that he cannot bring him what he 
wants most, viz—arms and ammunitions, for men-of-war on active service 
have no room to spare for goods shipped to order. Two paltry merchant brigs 
or schooners freighted with these valuable articles would be far more ac- 
ceptable than all the moral but perfectly useless support of five men-of-war. 
At the same time we learn that the Turkish fleet has sailed for the same 
destination, this time carrying along with it the articles required for arming 
the Circassians. Thus two allied fleets are going on the same errand, the one 
not knowing of the other. This is unity of planand of action witha vengeance. 
May be, each may take the other for Russians, and a famous sight it will be 
for the Circassians, these two squadrons firing one into the other. 

The allied land-forces, in the meantime, fraternise at Gallipoli and Scutari 
in their own way, annihilating enormous quantities of the strong and sweet 
wine of the country. Those who happen to be sober, are employed upon the 
construction of field-works, so situated and so constructed, that they will 
be either never attacked, or never defended, If a proof was wanted, that 
neither the British or French Government have any intention of doing Friend 
Nicholas any serious harm, it is given to the very blindest in their way of 
spending the time of the troops. In order to have a pretence to keep their 
troops away from the field of action, the allied commanders set them to dig 
a continous line of field-works across the neck of the Thracian Chersonesus. 
Everybody, and particularly every French engineer, knows that continuous 
lines of defence are under almost all circumstances to be rejected in field 
fortification; but it was reserved to the Anglo-French army of Gallipoli to 
employ continuous lines upon a ground, two-thirds of which are commanded 
by heights, situated on the side where the enemy is expected from. However, 
as the slow-coach system cannot be carried on without making at least a 
snail-like sort of progress, we are informed that 15,000 French are to go to 
Varna, there to form what? The garrison of the place. And to do what? To 
die of fever and ague. Now, if there is any sense in this warfare, the chiefs 
must know that what the Turks are deficient in, is the art of manoeuvring 
in the open field, in which again the Anglo-French troops are masters, and 

Friedrich Engels 

that, on the other hand, the Turks are fit for the defence of walls, ramparts, 
and even breaches, against stormers, in a degree which neither the British 
nor the French can lay any claim to. Therefore, and because Varna, with a 
Turkish garrison, did that which no fortress before it had ever done, thatis, 
held out for twenty-nine days after three practical breaches had been laid 
in the rampart—therefore the half-disciplined Turks, are taken out of Varna 
and sent to meet the Russians in the open field, while the well-drilled French, 
brilliant in attack, but unsteady in lengthy defence, are sent to guard the 
ramparts of Varna. 

Other reports inform us thatallthese movements are mere gammon. They 
say that great things are in preparation. The combined troops are not intended 
to act on the Balkans, but they are to execute, with the help of the fleets, 
tremendous exploits on the rear of the Russians. They are to land at Odessa, 
to cut off the retreat of the enemy, and to combine on his rear with the 
Austrians in Transylvania. They are, besides, to send detachments to Circas- 
sia; they are, finally, to furnish 15 to 20,000 men for the attack of Sebastopol 
on the land-side, while the fleets are to force the harbour. If you cast a glance 
at the whole past history of the war and the diplomatic transactions preceding 
it, you will no doubt very soon dispose of these rumours. They came from 
Constantinople, shortly after the arrival of Marshal Leroy, commonly called 
Saint-Arnaud. Whoever knows the past history of this worthy, recognises 
in these bravadoes the man who blustered himself up to the rank occupies, 
although three times cashiered as an officer of the army. 

The long and the short of this waris this: England, and particularly France, 
are being dragged, "unavoidably, though reluctantly," into engaging the 
greater part of their forces in the East and the Baltic, that is, upon two 
advanced wings of a military position which has no centre nearer than 
France. Russia sacrifices her coasts, her fleets, and part of her troops, to 
induce the Western Powers to engage themselves completely into this anti- 
strategical move. As soon as this is done, as soon as the necessary number 
of French troops are sent off to countries far from their own, Austria and 
Prussia will declare in favour of Russia, and at once march with superior 
numbers upon Paris. If this plan succeeds, there is no force at the disposal 
of Louis Napoleon to resist that shock. But there is a force which can 
"mobilise" itself upon any emergency, and which can also "mobilise" Louis 
Bonaparte and his minions as it has mobilised many a ruler before this. That 
force is able to resist all these invasions, and it has shown it once before to 
combined Europe; and that force, the Revolution, be assured, will not be 
wanting the day its action is required. 

K.M. 

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