Lord Palmerston

(As published in the "People's Paper")

The People's Paper,
No. 77, 22 October 1853

Lord Palmerston.

First Article.

Ruggiero is again and again fascinated by the false charms of Alcine, which,
he knows to disguise an old witch—
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything,
and the knight-errant cannot withstand falling in love with her anew whom
he knows to have transmuted all her former adorers into asses and other
beasts. The English public is another Ruggiero, and Palmerston is another
Alcine. Although a septuagenarian, and since 1807 occupying the public
stage, almost without interruption, he contrives to remain a novelty, and to
evoke all the hopes that used to centre on an untried and promising youth.
With one foot in the grave, he is supposed not yet to have begun his true
career. If he were to die to-morrow, all England would be surprised at learn-
ing that he has been a Secretary of State half this century.
If not a good statesman of all work, he is at least a good actor of all work.
He succeeds in the comic as in the heroic—in pathos as in familiarity—in the
tragedy as in the farce; although the latter may be more congenial to his
feelings. He is no first class orator, but he is an accomplished debater.
Possessed of a wonderful memory, of great experience, of a consummate
tact, of a never-failing présence d'esprit, of a gentlemanlike versatility, of
the most minute knowledge of parliamentary tricks, intrigues, parties, and
men, he handles difficult cases in an admirable manner and with a pleasant
volubility, sticking to the prejudices and susceptibilities of his public, secured
from any surprise by his cynic impudence, from any self-confession by his
selfish dexterity, from running into a passion by his profound frivolity, his
perfect indifference, and his aristocratic contempt. Being an exceedingly
happy joker, he ingratiates himself with everybody. Never losing his temper,
he imposes on an impassioned antagonist. When unable to master a subject,

he knows how to play with it. If wanting of general views, he is always ready
to tissue elegant generalities.

Endowed with a restless and indefatigable spirit, he abhors inactivity, and
pines for agitation, if not for action. A country like England allows him, of
course, to busy himself in every corner of the earth. What he aims at is not
the substance, but the mere appearance of success.

If he can do nothing, he will devise anything. Where he dares not interfere,
he intermeddles. Not able to vie with a strong enemy, he improvises a weak
one.

Being no man of deep designs, pondering on no combinations of long
standing, pursuing no great object, he embarks in difficulties with a view to
disentangle himself in a showy manner. He wants complications to feed his
activity, and when he finds them not ready, he will create them. He exults
in show-conflicts, show-battles, show-enemies, diplomatical notes to be
exchanged, ships to be ordered to sail, the whole movement ending for him
in violent parliamentary debates, which are sure to prepare him an ephemeral
success, the constant and the only object of all his exertions. He manages
international conflicts like an artist, driving matters to a certain point, re-
treating when they threaten to become serious, but having got, at all events,

the dramatic excitement he wants. In his eyes, the movement of history itself 20

is nothing but a pastime, expressly invented for the private satisfaction of
the noble Viscount Palmerston of Palmerston.

Yielding to foreign influence in facts, he opposes it in words. Having
inherited from Canning England's mission to propagate Constitutionalism
on the Continent, he is never in need of a theme to pique the national preju-
dices, and, to counteract revolution abroad, and, at the same time, to hold
awake the suspicious jealousy of foreign powers. Having succeeded in this
easy manner to become the bête noire of the continental courts, he could
not fail in being set up as the truly English minister at home. Although a Tory
by origin, he has contrived to introduce into the management of foreign
affairs all the shams and contradictions that form the essence of Whiggism.
He knows how to conciliate a democratic phraseology with oligarchic views,
how to cover the peacemongering policy of the middle classes with the
haughty language of England's aristocratic past—how to appear as the ag-
gressor, where he connives, and as the defender where he betrays—how to
manage an apparent enemy, and how to exasperate a pretended ally—how
to find himself, at the opportune moment of the dispute, on the side of the
stronger against the weak, and how to utter brave words in the act of running
away.

Accused by the one party of being in the pay of Russia, he is suspected
by the other of Carbonarism. If, in 1848, he had to defend himself against

the motion of impeachment for having acted as the minister of Nicholas, he
had, in 1850, the satisfaction of being persecuted by aconspiracy of foreign
ambassadors, which was successful in the House of Lords, but baffled in
the House of Commons. If he betrayed foreign peoples, he did it with great
politeness—politeness being the small coin of the devil, which he gives in
change for the life-blood of his dupes. If the oppressors were always sure
of his active support, the oppressed did never want a great ostentation of
his rhetorical generosity. Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Germans, found him
in office, whenever they were crushed, but their despots always suspected

him of secret conspiracy with the victims they had allowed him to make. Till
now, in all instances, it was a probable chance of success to have him for
one's adversary, and a sure chance of ruin to have him for one's friend. But,
if this art of diplomacy does not shine in the actual results of his foreign
negotiations, it shines the more brilliantly in the construction he induced the

English people to lay upon them, by accepting phrases for facts, phantasies
for realities, and high sounding pretexts for shabby motives.

Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, deriving his title from a peerage
of Ireland, was nominated Lord of the Admiralty in 1807, on the formation
of the Duke of Portland's Administration. In 1809, he became Secretary of

War, and he continued to hold this office till May, 1828. In 1830 he went over,
very skilfully too, to the Whigs, who made him their permanent Secretary
for Foreign Affairs. Excepting the intervals of Tory administration, from
November 1834 to April 1835, and from 1841 to 1846, he is responsible for
the whole foreign policy, England has pursued from the revolution of 1830
to December 1851.

Is it not a very curious thing to find, at first view, that Quixote of "free
institutions," and that Pindarus of the "glories of the constitutional system,"
a permanent and an eminent member of the Tory administrations of Mr. Per-
ceval, the Earl of Liverpool, Mr. Canning, Lord Goderich, and the Duke of
Wellington, during the long epoch of the Anti-Jacobin war carried on, the
monster-debt contracted, the Corn Laws promulgated, foreign mercenaries
stationed on the English soil, the people—to borrow an expression from his
colleague, Lord Sidmouth—"bled," from time to time, the press gagged,
meetings suppressed, the mass of the nation disarmed, individual liberty

suspended together with regular jurisdiction, the whole country placed as
it were in a state of siege—in one word, during the most infamous and most
reactionary epoch of English history?

His debutin parliamentary life is a characteristic one. On February 3,1808,
he rose to defend—what?—secrecy in the working of diplomacy, andthe most
disgraceful act ever committed by one nation against another nation, viz.,
the bombardment of Copenhagen, and the capture of the Danish fleet, at the

time when England professed to be in profound peace with Denmark. As
to the former point, he stated that, "In this particular case, his Majesty's
Ministers are pledged (by whom?) to secrecy;" but he went farther: "I also
object generally to making public the working of diplomacy, because it is
the tendency of disclosures in that department to shut up future sources of
information." Vidocq would have defended the identical cause in the identi-
cal terms. As to the act of piracy, while admitting that Denmark had evi-
denced no hostility whatever towards Great Britain, he contended that they
were right in bombarding its capital and stealing its fleet, because they had
to prevent Danish neutrality from being, perhaps, converted into open
hostility by the compulsion of France. This was the new law of nations,
proclaimed by my lord Palmerston.

When again speechifying, we find that English minister par excellence,
engaged in the defence of foreign troops, called over from the continent to
England, with the express mission of maintaining forcibly the oligarchic
rule, to establish which William had, in 1688, come over from Holland, with
his Dutch troops. Palmerston answered to the well-founded "apprehensions
for the liberties of the country," originating from the presence of the King's
German Legion, in a very flippant manner. Why should we not have 16,000
of those foreigners at home; while you know, that we employ "a far larger
proportion of foreigners abroad." (House of Commons, March 10, 1812.)

When similar apprehensions for the constitution arose from the large
standing army, maintained since 1815, he found "a sufficient protection of
the constitution in the very constitution of our army," a large proportion of
its officers being "men of property and connexions." (House of Commons,
March 8, 1816.)

When the large standing army was attacked from a financial point of view,
he made the curious discovery that "much of our financial embarrassments
had been caused by our former low peace establishment." (House of Com-
mons, April 25, 1816.)

When the "burdens of the country," and the "misery of the people" were
contrasted with the lavish military expenditure, he reminded parliament that
those burdens and that misery "were the price which we (viz., the English
oligarchy) agreed to pay for our freedom and independence." (House of
Commons, May 16, 1820.)

In his eyes, military despotism was only to be apprehended from the
exertions of "those self-called, but misled Reformers, who demand that sort
of reform in the country which, according to every first principle of govern-
ment, must end, if it were acceded to, in a military despotism." (House of
Commons, June 14, 1820.)

While large standing armies were thus his panacea for maintaining the

constitution of the country, flogging was his panacea for maintaining the
constitution of the army. He defended it in the debates on the Mutiny Bill,
on the 5th of March, 1824, he declared it to be "absolutely indispensable"
on March 11, 1825, he recommended it again on March 10, 1828; he stood
by itinthe debates of April, 1833, and he proved an amateur of flogging on
every subsequent occasion.

There existed no abuse in the army, he did not find plausible reasons for,
if it happened to foster the interests of aristocratic parasites. Thus, for
instance, in the debates on the Sale of Commissions. (House of Commons,
March 12, 1828.)

Lord Palmerston likes to parade his constant exertions for the establish-
ment of religious liberty. Now, he voted against Lord Russell's motion for
the Repeal of Test and Corporation Acts. Why? Because he was "a warm
and zealous friend to religious liberty," and could, therefore, not allow the

Dissenters to be relieved from "imaginary grievances, while real afflictions
pressed upon the Catholics." (House of Commons, Feb. 26, 1828.)

In proof of his zeal for religious liberty he informs us of his "regret to see
the increasing numbers of the Dissenters. It is my wish that the Established
Church should be the predominant Church in this country," and it is his wish
"that the Established Church should be fed at the expense of the misbe-
lievers." His jocose lordship accuses the rich Dissenters of affording
churches for the poor ones, while "with the Church of England it is the poor
alone who feel the want of Church accommodation ... It would be pre-
posterous to say, that the poor ought to subscribe for churches out of their
small earnings." (House of Commons, April 9, 1824.)

It would be, of course, more preposterous yet to say, that the rich members
of the Established Church ought to subscribe forthe church out of their large
earnings.

Let us now look at his exertions for Catholic Emancipation, one of his great
"claims" on the gratitude of the Irish people. I shall not dwell upon the
circumstances, that, having declared himself for Catholic Emancipation,
when a member of the Canning Ministry, he entered, nevertheless, the
Wellington Ministry, avowedly hostile to that emancipation. Perhaps Lord
Palmerston considered religious liberty as one of the Rights of Man, not to
be intermeddled with by Legislature. He may answer for himself, "Although
I wish the Catholic claims to be considered, I never will admit those claims
to stand upon the ground of right... K I thought the Catholics were asking
for their right, I, for one, would not go into the committee." (House of
Commons, March 1, 1813.)

And why is he opposed to their asking their right? "Because the Legislature
of a country has the right to impose such political disabilities upon any class

of the community, as it may deem necessary for the safety and the welfare
of the whole... This belongs to the fundamental principles on which civilised
government is founded." (House of Commons, March 1, 1813.)

There you have the most cynic confession ever made, that the mass of
the people have no rights at all, but that they may be allowed that amount
of immunities, the Legislature—or, in other words, the ruling class —may deem
fit to grant them. Accordingly, Lord Palmerston declared in plain words,
"Catholic Emancipation to be a measure of grace and favour." (House of
Commons, Feb. 10, 1829.)

It was then entirely upon the ground of expediency that he condescended
to discontinue the Catholic disabilities. And what was lurking behind this
expediency?

Being himself one of the great Irish proprietors, he wanted to entertain
the delusion, that "other remedies for Irish evils than Catholic Emancipation
are impossible," that it would cure absenteeism, and prove a substitute for
Poor Laws.—(House of Commons, March 18, 1829.)

The great philanthropist, who afterwards cleared his Irish estates of their
Irish natives could not allow Irish misery to darken, even for amoment, with
its inauspicious clouds, the bright sky of the landlords and moneylords. "It
is true," he said, "that the peasantry of Ireland do not enjoy all the comforts
which are enjoyed by all the peasantry of England," (only think of all the
comforts enjoyed by a family at the rate of 7s. a week.) "Still," he continues,
"still however, the Irish peasant has his comforts... He is well supplied with
fuel, and is seldom, (only four days out of six), at a loss for food. What a
comfort! But this is not all the comfort he has—he has a greater cheerfulness
of mind than his English fellow sufferer!"-(House of Commons, May 7,
1829.) .

As to the extortions of Irish landlords, he deals with them in as pleasant
a way as with the comforts of the Irish peasantry. "It is said that the Irish
landlord insists on the highest possible rent that can be extorted. Why Sir,
I believe that is not a singular circumstance ; certainly in England the landlord
does the same thing."—(House of Commons, May 7, 1829.)

Are we then to be surprised that the man, so deeply interested in the
mysteries of the "glories of the English constitution," and the "comforts of
her free institutions," should aspire at spreading them all over the Con-
tinent?

The People's Paper,
No. 78, 29 October 1853

Second Article.

When the Reform Movement had grown irresistible, Lord Palmerston de-
serted the Tories, and slipped into the Whiggery camp. Although he had
apprehended the danger of military despotism springing up, not from the
presence of the King's German legion on the English soil, nor from keeping
large standing armies, but only from the "self-called Reformers," he patron-
ised, nevertheless, already in 1828, the extension of the franchise to such
large industrial places as Birmingham, Leeds, and Manchester. But why?
"Not because I am a friend to Reform in principle, but because I am its
decided enemy."

He had persuaded himself that some timely concessions made to the
overgrown manufacturing interest might be the surest means of escaping
"the introduction of general reform." (House of Commons, June 27th, 1828.)
Once allied with the Whigs, he did not even pretend that the Reform Bill

15 aimed at breaking through the narrow trammels of the Venetian Constitution;

but, on the contrary, atthe increase of its strength and solidity, by disjoining
the middle classes from the people's opposition. "The feelings of the middle
classes will be changed, and their dissatisfaction will be converted into that
attachment to the constitution, which will give to it a vast increase of strength
and sohdity." He consoled the peers with the prospect of the Reform Bill
not really endangering the "influence of the House of Lords," and their
"interfering in elections." He told the aristocracy that the constitution was
not to lose its feudal character, "the landed interest being the great founda-
tion upon which rests the fabric of society, and the institutions of the
country." He allayed their fears by throwing out the ironical hint that "we
have been charged with not being in earnest or sincere in our desire to give
to the people a real representation," that "it was said, we only proposed to
give a different kind of influence to the aristocracy and the landed interest."
He went even as far as to own that, besides the inevitable concession to be
made to the middle classes, "disfranchisement," viz., the disfranchisement
of the old Tory rotten boroughs for the benefit of new Whig boroughs, "was
the chief and leading principle of the Reform Bill." (House of Commons,
March 24th, 1831, and May 14th, 1832.)
It is now time to return to the performances of the noble lord in the foreign
branch of policy:
In 1823, when, consequent on the resolutions of the Congress of Verona,
a French army was marched into Spain, in order to overturn the constitution
of that country, and to deliver it up to the merciless revenge of the Bourbon

idiot and his suite of bigot monks, Lord Palmerston disclaimed any "Quixotic
crusades for abstract principles,"
whose heroic resistance had saved England from the sway of Napoleon. The
words he addressed on that occasion to his Whig adversaries are a lively and
true picture of his own foreign policy, after he had turned himself into the

any interventionin "favour of the people,"

permanent Minister of Foreign Affairs for those who then were his op-
ponents. He said,

"Some would have had us use threats in negotiation, without being pre-
pared to go to war, if negotiation failed. To have talked of war, and to have
meant neutrality; to have threatened an army, and to have retreated behind
a state paper; to have brandished the sword of defiance in the hour of
deliberation, and to have ended in a penful of protests on the day of battle,
would have been the conduct of a cowardly bully, and would have made us
the object of contempt, and the laughing stock of Europe."—(House of
Commons, April 30, 1823.)

At last, we arrive at the Grecian-Turkish debates, affording to Lord
Palmerston the first opportunity for displaying his unrivalled talents, as the
unflinching and persevering advocate of Russian interests, in the Cabinet and
in the House of Commons. One by one, he re-echoed all the watch words
given out by Russia of Turkish cruelty, Greek civilisation, religious liberty,
Christianity, and so forth. At first, we meet him repudiating, in his ministerial
capacity, any intention of passing "a censure" upon the meritorious conduct
"of Admiral Codrington," which had caused the destruction of the Turkish
fleet at Navarino, although he admits that "this battle took place against a
power with which we are not at war," and that it was "an untoward
event."—(House of Commons, January 31, 1828.)

Then, having retired from office, he opens the long series of his attacks
upon Aberdeen, by reproaching him with having been too slow in executing
the orders of Russia.

"Has there been much more energy and promptitude in fulfilling our
engagements to Greece? July, 1829, is coming fast upon us, and the treaty
of July, 1827, is still unexecuted ... The Morea, indeed, has been cleared of
the Turks ... But why were the arms of France checked at the Isthmus of
Corinth? ... The narrow policy of England stepped in, and arrested her
progress ... But why do not the allies deal with the country north of the
Isthmus, as they have done with that to the south, and occupy at once all
that which must be assigned to Greece? I should have thought that the allies
had had enough of negotiating with Turkey about Greece."—(House of
Commons, June 1, 1829.)

Prince Metternich was, as is generally known, at that time opposing the
encroachments of Russia, and accordingly her diplomatic agents—I remind

you of the despatches of Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Liewen—had been
advised to represent Austria as the great enemy of Grecian emancipation and
of European civilisation, the furtherance of which was the exclusive object
of Russian diplomacy. The noble lord follows, of course, in the beaten
track.

"By the narrowness of her views, the unfortunate prejudices of her policy,
Austria almost reduced herself to the level of a second-rate power;" and
consequent on the temporising policy of Aberdeen, England is represented
as "the key-stone ofthatarch of which Miguel, Spain, Austria, and Mahmoud
are the component parts ... People see in the delay in executing the treaty
of July not so much fear of Turkish resistance as invincible repugnance to
Grecian freedom."— (House of Commons, June 11, 1829.)

Again he assails Aberdeen because of his anti-Russian diplomacy: "I, for
one, shall not be satisfied with anumber of despatches from the government
of England, which will no doubt read well and smooth enough, urging, in
general terms, the propriety of conciliating Russia, but accompanied, per-
haps, by strong expressions of the regard which England bore to Turkey,
which, when read by an interested party, might easily appear to mean more
than was really intended... I should like to see that, whilst England adopted
a firm resolution—almost the only course she could adopt—upon no con-
sideration and in no event to take part with Turkey in that war—that that
decision was fairly and frankly communicated to Turkey... There are three
most merciless things—time, fire, and the Sultan."—(House of Commons,
Feb. 16, 1830.)

Arrived at this point, I must recall to memory some few historical facts,
in order to leave no doubt about the meaning of the noble lord's philo-
Hellenic feelings.

Russia, having seized upon Gokcheh, a strip of land bordering on the Lake
of Sevan, which was an indisputed possession of Persia, demanded as the
price of its evacuation the abandonment of Persia's claims to another portion
of her own territory, the lands of Kapan. Persia not yielding, she was overrun,
vanquished, and forced to subscribe to the treaty of Turcomanchai, in
February, 1828. According to this treaty Persia had to pay an indemnity Of
two millions sterling to Russia to cede the provinces of Erivan and Nuktcha-
van, including the fortresses of Erivan and Abassabad, the exclusive purpose
of this arrangement being, as Nicholas stated, to define the common frontier
by the Araxes, the only means, he said, of preventing any future dispute of
the two empires, although he refused simultaneously to give back Talish and
Moghan, which are situated on the Persian bank of the Araxes. Finally, Persia
pledged herself to maintaining no navy on the Caspian Sea. Such were the
origin and the results of the Russo-Persian war.

As to the religion and the liberty of Greece, Russia cared at that epoch
as much about them as the god of the Russians cares now about the key of
the "Holy Sepulchre" and the famous "Cupola." It was the traditionary
policy of Russia, to excite the Greeks to revolt, and, then, to abandon them
to the revenge of the Sultan. So deep was her sympathy for the regeneration
of Hellas, that she treated them as rebels on the congress of Verona, acknow-
ledging the right of the Sultan to exclude all foreign intervention between
himself and his Christian subjects. Yea, the Czar offered "to aid the Porte in
suppressing the rebellion;" a proposition which was, of course, rejected.
Having failed in that attempt, he turned round upon the Great Powers with
the opposite proposition, "To march an army into Turkey, for the purpose of
dictating peace under the walls of the Seraglio." In order to hold his hands
bound by a sortof common action, the other Great Powers concluded atreaty
with him at London, July 6, 1827, by which they mutually engaged in en-
forcing, if need be, by arms, the adjustment of the differences between the
Sultan and the Greeks. A few months after she had signed that treaty, Russia
concluded another treaty with Turkey, the treaty of Akerman, by which she
bound herself to renounce all interference with Grecian affairs. This treaty
was brought about, after Russia had induced the crown prince of Persia to
invade the Ottoman dominions, and after she had inflicted the greatest in-
juries on the Porte, in order to drive her to arupture. After all this had passed,
the resolutions of the London treaty of July 6,1827, were presented to the
Porte by the English Ambassador, or in the name of Russia and the other
Powers. By virtue of the complications resulting from these frauds and lies,
Russia found at last the pretext for beginning the war of 1828 and 1829. That
war terminated with the treaty of Adrianople, whose contents are resumed
in the following quotations from McNeill's celebrated pamphlet on the
"Progress of Russia in the East": "By the treaty of Adrianople the Czar
acquired Anapa and Poti with a considerable extent of coast on the Black
Sea, a portion of the Pashalik of Akhilska, with the fortresses of Akhilska,
and Akhilkillak, the islands formed by the mouths of the Danube, the stip-
ulated destruction of the Turkish fortress of Georgiova, and the abandon-
ment by Turkey of the right bank of the Danube to the distance of several
miles from the river ... partly by force, and partly by the influence of the
priesthood, many thousand families of the Armenians were removed from
the Turkish provinces in Asia to the Czar's territories ... He established for
his own subjects in Turkey an exemption from all responsibility to the natio-
nal authorities, and burdened the Porte with an immense debt, under the
name of expenses for the war and for commercial losses—and, finally retain-
ed Moldavia, Wallachia, and Silistria, in pledge for the payment... Having by
this treaty imposed upon Turkey the acceptance of the protocol of March 22,

which secured the suzerainty of Greece, and a yearly tribute from that
country, Russia used ail her influence to procure the independence of
Greece, which was erected into an independent state, of which Count Capo
d'Istria, who had been a Russian Minister, was named President."

Such are the facts. Now look at the picture drawn ofthem by Lord Palmer-
ston's hand:— "It is perfectly true that the war between Russia and Turkey
arose out of aggressions made by Turkey on the commerce and rights of
Russia, and violations of treaties."—(House of Commons, Feb. 16,1830.)

When the Whig-incarnation of the office of Foreign Affairs, he improved
on this statement:—"The honourable and gallant member (Col. Evans) has
represented the conduct of Russia as one of unvarying aggression, upon other
States from 1815 to the present time. He adverted more particularly to the
wars of Russia with Persia and Turkey. Russia was the aggressor in neither
of them, and although the result of the Persian war was an aggrandisement

15 of her power, it was not the result of her own seeking... Again, in the Turkish

war, Russia was not the aggressor. It would be fatiguing to the house to detail
all the provocations Turkey offered to Russia; but I believe there cannot be
a doubt that she expelled Russian subjects from her territory, detained
Russian ships, and violated all the provisions of the treaty of Akerman, and
then, upon complaint being made, denied redress—so that, if there ever was
a just ground for going to war, Russia had it for going to war with Turkey.
She did not, however, on any occasion, acquire any increase of territory, at
least in Europe. I know there was a continued occupation of certain
points"—(Moldavia and Wallachia are only points, and the mouths of the
Danube are mere zeros)—"and some additional acquisitions on the Euxine
in Asia; but she had an agreement with the other European powers that
success in that war should not lead to any aggrandisement in Europe."—
(House of Commons, August 7, 1832.)

Your readers will now understand Sir Robert Peel's telling the noble lord,
in a public session of the house, that "he did not know whose representative
he was."

The People's Paper,
No. 79, 5 November 1853

Third Article.

The noble viscount is generally known as the chivalrous protector of the
Poles, and never fails to give vent to his painful f eelings with regard to Poland
before the deputations that wait upon him once every year by "dear, dully,

deadly" Dudley Stuart, "a worthy who makes speeches, passes resolutions,
votes addresses, goes up with deputations, has at all times the necessary
quantity of confidence in the necessary individual, and can, also, if neces-
sary, give three cheers for the Queen."

The Poles had been in arms for about a month when the noble lord came
into office, in November, 1830. As early as August 8th, 1831, Mr. Hunt
presents to the House of Commons a petition from the Westminster Union,
in favour of the Poles, and "for the dismissal of Lord Palmerston from his
Majesty's councils." Mr. Hume stated on the same day he concluded from
the silence of the noble lord that the government "intended to do nothing
for the Poles, but allow them to remain at the mercy of Russia." Lord
Palmerston replied that, "whatever obligations existing treaties imposed,
would at all times receive the attention of the government." Now, what sort
of obligation was there imposed in his opinion upon England by existing
treaties? "The claims of Russia," he tells us himself, "to the possession of
Poland bear the date of the treaty of Vienna."-{House of Commons, July 9,
1833.)

And that treaty makes this possession dependent upon the observance of
the Polish constitution by the Czar, but "the mere fact of this country being
a party to the treaty of Vienna, was not synonymous with our guaranteeing
that there would be no infraction of that treaty by Russia. 'MHouse of
Commons, March 25, 1834.)

If you guarantee a treaty, you do by no means guarantee the observance
of the treaty. Thus answered the Milanese to the Emperor Barbarossa: "You
have had our oath, but remember we did not swear to keep it."

For one thing, however, the treaty of Vienna is good. It gives to the British
government, as one of the contracting parties, "a right to entertain and
express an opinion on any act which tends to a violation of that treaty ...
The contracting parties to the treaties of Vienna had a right to require that
the constitution of Poland should not be touched, and this was an opinion
which I have not concealed from the Russian government. I communicated
it by anticipation to that government previous to the taking of Warsaw, and
before the result of hostilities was known. I communicated it again when
Warsaw fell. The Russian government, however, took a different view of
the question."—{House of Commons, July 9, 1833.)

He is quietly anticipating the downfall of Poland, and watches this op-
portunity for expressing and entertaining an opinion on certain articles of
the treaty of Vienna, persuaded as he is that the magnanimous Czar waits
only for having crushed the Polish people by armed force, in order to honour
a constitution trampled upon when they were yet possessed of unbounded
means of resistance. Simultaneously the noble lord charges the Poles with

having "taken the uncalled-for, and, in his opinion, unjustifiable step ofthe
dethronement of the Emperor."— (House of Commons, July 9, 1833.)

"He could also saythatthe Poleswere the aggressors,for they commenced
the contest."—(House of Commons, August 7, 1832.)

5 When the apprehensions for the extinction of Poland became troublesome,

he declared that "to exterminate Poland, either morally or politically, is so
perfectly impracticable that I think there need be no apprehension of its being
attempted."—(House of Commons, June 28, 1832.)

When reminded afterwards of the wayward expectations thus held out,
he assures that he had been misunderstood, that he had said so not in the
political but in the Pickwickian sense of the word, meaning that the Emperor
of Russia was unable "to exterminate nominally or physically so many
millions of men as the Polish kingdom in its divided state contained."—
(House of Commons, April 20, 1836.)

When the house makes a pretence of interfering during the struggle of the
Poles, he appeals to his ministerial responsibility. When the thing is done,
he coolly tells them that "no vote of this house would have the slightest effect
in reversing the decision of Russia."—(House of Commons, July 9, 1833.)

When the atrocities committed by the Russians, after the fall of Warsaw,
are denounced, he recommends to the house great tenderness towards the
Emperor of Russia, declaring that "no person could regret more than he did,
the expressions which had been uttered," (House of Commons, June 28,
1832,) that "the present Emperor of Russia was a man of high and generous
feelings"—that "where cases of undue severity on the part of the Russian
government to the Poles have occurred, we may set this down as a proof
that the power of the Emperor of Russia is practically Umited, and we may
take it for granted that the Emperor has, in those instances, yielded to the
influence of others, rather than followed the dictates of his spontaneous
feelings."—(House of Commons, July 9, 1833.)

When the doom of Poland was sealed on the one hand, and on the other
the dissolution of the Turkish empire became imminent, from the rebellion
of Mehemet Ali, he assured the house that "affairs in general were proceed-
ing in a satisfactory train."—(House of Commons, January 26, 1832.)

A resolution for granting subsidies to the Polish refugees having been
moved, it is "exceedingly painful to him to oppose the grant of any money
to those individuals which the natural and spontaneous feelings of every
generous man would lead him to acquiesce in; but, it is not consistent with
his duty to propose any grant of money to those unfortunate persons."—
(House of Commons, March 25, 1834.)

The same tender-hearted man had defrayed as we shall see by and bye,
the cost of Poland's fall, to a great extent, out of the pockets of the British
people.

The noble lord has taken good care to withhold all state papers on the
Polish catastrophe from the parliament. But statements made in the House
of Commons which, he did never as much as attempt to controvert, leave
no doubt as to the game he played at that fatal epoch.

After the Polish revolution had broken out, the Consul of Austria did not
quit Warsaw, and the Austrian government went so far as to send a Polish
agent, M. Walewski, to Paris, with the mission of negotiating with the govern-
ments of France and England about the re-establishment of a Polish kingdom.
The Court of the Tuileries declared "it was ready to join England in case
of her consenting to the project." Lord Palmerston rejected the offer. In 1831
M.de Talleyrand, the Ambassador of France, at the Court of St. James,
proposed a plan of combined action on the part of France and England, but
met with a distinct refusal, and with a note from the noble lord, stating that
"an amicable intermediation on the Polish question would be declined by
Russia. The powers had just declined a similar offer on the part of France;
the intervention of thetwo Courts of France and England could only be by
force in case.of a refusal on the part of Russia, and the amicable and satis-
factory relations between the Cabinet of St.James and the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg, would not allow his British Majesty to undertake such an
interference. The time was not yet come to undertake such a plan with
success against the will of a sovereign, whose rights were indisputable" This
was not all. On February 23,1848, Mr. Anstey made the following declaration
in the House of Commons:—"Sweden was arming her fleet for the purpose
of making diversion in favour of Poland, and of regaining to herself the
provinces in the Baltic, which have been so unjustly wrested from her in the
last war. The noble lord instructed our ambassador at the Court of Stock-
holm, in a contrary sense, and Sweden discontinued her armaments. The
Persian Court had, with similar purpose, despatched an army three days on
its march towards the Russian frontier, under the command of the Persian
crown prince. The Secretary of Legation, at the Court of Teheran, Sir John
McNeill followed the prince, at a distance of three days' marchfrom his head
quarters, overtook him, and there, under instructions from the noble lord,
and in the name of England, threatened Persia with war if the prince ad-
vanced another step towards the Russian frontier. Similar inducements were
used by the noble lord to prevent Turkey from renewing war on her side."

To Colonel Evans asking for the production of papers with regard to
Prussia's violation of her pretended neutrality in the Russo-Polish war, the
noble lord objected, "that the ministers of this country could not have
witnessed that contest without the deepest regret, and it would be most

satisfactory for them to see it terminated."—(House of Commons, August 16,

1831.)

Certainly he wished to see itterminated as soon as possible, and Prussia
shared in his feelings.

On a subsequent occasion, Mr. H. Gaily Knight thus resumed the whole
proceedings of the noble lord with regard to the Polish insurrection:—"There

5 is something curiously inconsistent in the proceedings of the noble lord when

Russia is concerned ... On the subject of Poland, the noble lord has dis-
appointed us again and again. Remember when the noble lord was pressed
to exert himself in favour of Poland, then he admitted the justice of the
cause—the justice of our complaints; but he said, 'Only restrain yourselves
at present, there is an ambassador fast setting out of known liberal senti-
ments, you may be sure we will do all that is right; you will only embarrass
his négociation, if you incense the power with whom he has to deal. So, take
my advice, be quiet at present, and be assured that a great deal will be
effected.' We trusted to those assurances; the Uberai ambassador went;
whether he ever approached the subject or not, was never known, but all
we got were the fine words of the noble lord, and no results."—(House of
Commons, July 13, 1840.)

The so-called kingdom of Poland having disappeared from the map of

Europe, there remained still, in the free town of Cracow, a fantastic remnant
of Polish nationality. The Czar Alexander had, during the general anarchy
resulting from the fall of the French empire, not conquered the Duchy of
Warsaw, but simply seized it, and wished, of course, to keep it, together with
Cracow, incorporated with the Duchy by Bonaparte. Austria, once possessed
of Cracow, wished to have it back. The Czar being unable to obtain it himself

and unwilling to concede it to Austria, proposed to constitute it as a free town.
Accordingly the treaty of Vienna stipulated in article VI., "that the town of
Cracow with the territory is to be for ever a free, independent, and strictly
neutral city, under the protection of Austria, Russia, and Prussia," and in
its article IX. "that the Courts of Russia, Austria, and Prussia engage to
respect, and to cause to be always respected, the neutrality of the free town
of Cracow and its territory. No armed force shall be introduced upon any
pretence whatever."

Immediately after the close of the Polish insurrection of 1830-31, the
Russian troops suddenly entered Cracow, the occupation of which lasted two
months. This, however, was considered as a transitory necessity of war, and
in the turmoil of that time, was soon forgotten.

In 1836, Cracow was again occupied by the troops of Austria, Russia, and
Prussia, on the pretext of forcing the authorities of Cracow to deliver up the
individuals concerned in the Polish revolution five years before. The con-

stitution of Cracow was abrogated, the three consular residencers assumed
the highest authority—the police was entrusted to Austrian spies—the senate

was overthrown—the tribunals were destroyed—the university of Cracow put
down in consequence of the prohibitions to the neighbouring provinces—and
the commerce of the free city with the surrounding countries destroyed.

On March 18th, 1836, when interpellated on the occupation of Cracow,
the noble viscount declared that occupation to be of a merely transitory
character. Of so palliative and apologetic akind was the construction he put
on the doings of his three northern allies, that he felt himself obliged suddenly
to stop and to interrupt the even course of his speech by the solemn declara-
tion "I stand not up here to defend the measure, which, on the contrary, I
must censure and condemn. I have merely stated those circumstances
which, though they do not excuse the forcible occupation of Cracow, might
yet afford a justification, etc___" He admits that the treaty of Vienna bound
the three Powers to abstain from any step without the previous consent of
England, but, "they may be justly said to have paid an in voluntary homage
to the justice and plain dealing of this country, by supposing that we would
never give our assent to such a proceeding."

Mr.Patrick M.Stewart having, however, found out that there existed
better means for the preservation of Cracow than the "abstention from
remonstrance," moved on April 20, 1836, that the government should be
ordered to send a representation to the free town of Cracow as consul, there
being three consuls there from the three Northern Powers. The joint arrival
of an English and French consul at Cracow would prove an event. The noble
viscount seeing that the majority of the house was for the motion, induced
Mr. Stewart to withdraw it by solemnly pledging himself that the government
"intended to send a consular agent to Cracow." On March 22, 1837, being
reminded by Lord Dudley Stuart of his promise, the noble lord answered
that "he had altered his intention, and had not sent a consular agent to
Cracow, and it was not at present his intention to do so." Lord D. Stuart
having given notice that he should move for papers elucidatory of this singu-
lar declaration, the noble viscount succeeded in defeating the motion by the
simple process of being absent and of causing the house to be counted out.

In 1840, the "temporary" occupation continued, and the people of Cracow
had addressed a memorandum to the governments of France and England,
which says, amongst other things:—"The misfortunes which overwhelm the
free city of Cracow and its inhabitants, are such that the undersigned see
no further hope for themselves and their fellow citizens than in the powerful
and enlightened protection of the governments of France and England. The
situation in which they find themselves placed, gives them a right to invoke
the intervention of every power that subscribed to the treaty of Vienna."

Being interrogated on July 13th, 1840, about this petition from Cracow,
the noble viscount declared "that between Austria and the British govern-

ment the question of the evacuation of Cracow remained only a question of
time." As to the violation of the treaty of Vienna "there were no means of
enforcing the opinions of England, supposing that this country was disposed
to do so by arms, because Cracow was evidently a place where no English
action could possibly take place." Be it remarked thattwo days after this
declaration the noble lord concluded a treaty with Russia, Austria, and
Prussia for closing the Black Sea to the English navy, probably in order that
no English action could take place in those quarters. It was at the very same
time that the noble lord renewed a Holy Alliance withthose Powers against

France. As to the commercial loss sustained by England, consequent upon
the occupation of Cracow, the noble lord demonstrated that "the amount of
general exports to Germany had not fallen off," which, as Sir Robert Peel
justly remarked, had nothing to do with Cracow. As to his intentions onthe
subject and to the consular agent to be sent to Cracow, "he thought that his

experience of the manner in which his unfortunate assertion (made by the
noble lord in 1836, in order to escape from the censure of a hostile house)
of an intention to appoint a British Consul at Cracow, had been taken up by
honourable gentlemen opposite, justified him in positively refusing to give
any answer to such a question, which might expose him to similar un-
justifiable attacks." On August 17,1846, he stated that "whether the treaty
of Vienna is, or is not executed and fulfilled by the Great Powers of Europe,
depends not upon the presence of a consular agent at Cracow." On Janu-
ary 28,1847, when again asked for the production of papers relative to the
non-appointment oi a British Consul at Cracow, he declared that "the subject

had no necessary connexion with the discussion on the incorporation of
Cracow, and he saw no advantage in reviving an angry discussion on a subject
which had only a passing interest." He proved true to his opinion on the
production of state papers, pronounced on March 17,1837:—"If the papers
bear upon questions now under consideration, their production would be
dangerous; if they refer to questions that are gone by, they can obviously
be of no use."

The British government was very exactly informed of the importance of
Cracow, not only from a. political but also from a commercial point of view,
their own Consul at Warsaw, Colonel Duplat having reported to them that

"Cracow, since its elevation into an independent state, has always been the
depot of very considerable quantities of English merchandise sent thither
by the Black Sea, Moldavia, and Gallicia, and even via Trieste; and which
afterwards find their way to the surrounding countries. In the course of years
it came into railway communication with the great Unes of Bohemia, Prussia,

and Austria ... It is also the central point of the important line of railway
communication between the Adriatic and the Baltic. It will come in direct

communication of the same description with Warsaw... Looking, therefore,
to the almost certainty of every great point ofthe Levant, and even of India
and China, finding its way up the Adriatic, it cannot be denied that it must
be of the greatest commercial importance, even to England, to have such
a station as Cracow, in the centre of the great net of railways connecting the
Western and Eastern Continent."

Lord Palmerston himself was obliged to confess to the house that the
Cracow insurrection of 1846 had been intentionally provoked by the Three
Powers. "I believe the original entrance of the Austrian troops into the
territory of Cracow was in consequence of an application from the govern-
ment. But, then, those Austrian troops retired. Whythey retired has never
yet been explained. With them retired the government and the authorities
of Cracow ; the immediate, at least, the early consequence of that retirement,
was the establishment of a provisional government at Cracow." (House of
Commons, Aug. 17, 1846.)

On the 22nd of February, 1846, the army of Austria, and afterwards of
Russia and Prussia, took possession of Cracow. On the 26th of the same
month the Prefect of Tarnow issued his proclamation calling upon the
peasants to murder their proprietors, and promising them "a sufficient
recompence, in money," which proclamation was followed by the Gallician
atrocities, and the massacre of about 2,000 proprietors. On March the
12th appeared the Austrian proclamation to the "faithful Gallicians having
aroused themselves for the maintenance of order and law, and destroyed the
enemies of order." In the official "Gazette" of April 28th, Prince Frederick
of Schwarzenberg stated that "the acts that had taken place had been
authorised by the Austrian government," which, of course, acted on a
common plan with Russia and with Prussia, the footman of the Czar. Now,
after all these abominations had passed, Lord Palmerston thought fit to
declare in the house, "I have too high an opinion of the sense of justice and
of right that must animate the governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia,
to believe that they can feel any disposition or intention to deal with Cracow
otherwise than Cracow is entitled by treaty-engagements to be dealt with."
(House of Commons, Aug. 17th, 1846.)

For the noble lord the only business in hand was to get rid of parliament,
the session drawing to a close. He assured the Commons that "on the part
of the British government everything shall be done to ensure a due respect
being paid to the provisions of the treaty of Vienna." Mr. Hume, giving vent
to his doubts about Lord Palmerston's "intention to cause the Austro-Rus-
sian troops to retire from Cracow," the noble lord begged of the house not
to give credence to the statements made by Mr. Hume, as he was in posses-
sion of better information, and was convinced that the occupation of Cracow

was onlya "temporary" one. The parliament of 1846 having been got rid
of, inthe same manner as that of 1853, out came the Austrian proclamation
of November 11th, 1846, incorporating Cracow into the Austrian dominions.
When parliament re-assembled on January 19th, 1847, it was informed by
the Queen's Speech that Cracow was gone, but that there remained in its
place a protest on the part of the brave Palmerston. To deprive this protest
of even the appearance of a meaning, the noble lord contrived at that very
epoch to engage, on the occasion of the Spanish marriages, England in a
quarrel with France, very near setting the two countries by the ears, as he
was twitted in the teeth by Mr. Smith O'Brien. The French government
having applied to him for his co-operation in a joint protest against the
incorporation of Cracow, Lord Normanby, under instructions from the noble
viscount, answered that the outrage of which Austria had been guilty in
annexing Cracow was not greater than that of France in effecting a marriage

15 between the Duke of Montpensier and the Spanish Inf anta—the one act being

a violation of the treaty of Vienna, and the other of the treaty of Utrecht.
Now, the treaty of Utrecht, renewed in 1782, was definitively abrogated by
the Anti-Jacobin war; and had, therefore, ever since 1792 ceased to exist.
There was no man in the house better informed of this circumstance than
the noble lord, as he had stated himself on the occasion of the blockades of
Mexico and Buenos Ayres, that "the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht have
long lapsed in the variations of war, with the exception of the single clause
relating to the boundaries of Brazil and French Guyana, because that clause
had been expressly incorporated in the treaty of Vienna."

We have not yet done with the exertions of the noble lord for resisting
the encroachments of Russia on Poland.

There existed a curious convention between England, Holland, and Rus-
sia—the so-called Russian Dutch loan. During the Anti-Jacobin war the Czar
Alexander had contracted aloan with Messrs. Hope and Co., at Amsterdam ;

and after the fall of Buonaparte, the King of the Netherlands "deshed to
make a suitable return to the Allied Powers for having delivered his territo-
ries," and for having annexed to his own Belgium, upon which he had no
claim whatever, and engaged himself—the other Powers waiving their com-
mon pretensions in favour of Russia, then in great need of money—to execute
a convention with Russia for paying her by successive instalments the
twenty-five millions of florins she owed to Messrs. Hope and Co. England,
in Order to cover the robbery she had comitted on Holland, of her colonies
at the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, became a
party to that convention, and bound herself to pay a certain proportion of
the subsidies granted to Russia. This stipulation became part of the treaty
of Vienna, but upon the express condition "that the payment should cease

if the union between Holland and Belgium were broken prior to the liquida-
tion of the debt." When Belgium separated itself by revolution from Holland,
she of course refused to pay her portion to Russia. On the other hand, there
remained, Mr.Herries stated, "not the smallest iota of a claim on the part
of Russia for the continuance of debt by England." (House of Commons,
Jan. 26, 1832.)

Lord Palmerston, however, found it quite natural that, "atone time Russia
is paid for supporting the union of Belgium with Holland, and that atanother
time she is paid for the separation of these countries." (House of Com-
mons, July 16th, 1832.)

He appealed in a very tragical manner to the faithful observance of
treaties—and above all, of the treaty of Vienna; and he contrived to carry
a new convention with Russia, dated 16th November, 1831, in the preamble
of which it is expressly stated that it is contracted "in consideration of the
general arrangement’ of the Congress of Vienna which remain in full
force."

When the convention relating to the Russo-Dutch loan, had been inserted
in the treaty of Vienna, the Duke of Wellington exclaimed—"This is a
master-stroke of diplomacy on the part of Lord Castlereagh; for Russia has
been tied down to the observance of the Vienna treaty by a pecuniary
obligation." When Russia, therefore, withdrew her observance of the Vienna
treaty by the Cracow confiscation, Mr. Hume moved to stop any further
payment to Russia from the British Treasury. The noble viscount, however,
thought that although Russia had a right to violate the treaty of Vienna with

regard to Poland, England remained tied to the treaty with regard to Russia.

But this is not the most extraordinary incident of the noble lord's proceed-
ings. After the Belgian revolution had broken out, and before parliament had
sanctioned the new loan to Russia, the noble lord defrayed the costs of the
Russian war against Poland, under the false pretext of paying off the old debt
contracted by England in 1815, although we may state, on the authority of
the greatest English lawyer, Sir E. Sugden, now Lord St. Leonards, that
"there was not a single debatable point in that question, and the government
had no power whatever of paying a shilling of the money." (House of
Commons, Jan. 26, 1832.) And on the authority of Sir Robert Peel that "the
noble lord was not warrantable bylaw in advancing the money." (House of
Commons, July 12, 1832.)

Now we understand why the noble lord is reiterating on every occasion
that "nothing can be more painful to a man of proper feeling than discussions
upon the subject of Poland."

The People's Paper,
No. 80, 12 November 1853
Fourth Article.

The great and eternal themes of the noble viscount's self-glorification are
the services he has rendered to the cause of constitutional liberty aU over
the continent. The world owes him, indeed, the invention of the "con-

5 stitutional" kingdoms of Portugal, Spain, and Greece, —three political phan-
toms, only to be compared with the homunculus of Faust's "Wagner."
Portugal, under the yoke of that huge hill of flesh, Donna Maria da Gloria,
backed by a Coburg, "must be looked upon as one of the substantive powers
of Europe." (House of Commons, March 10, 1837.)

10 At the very time the noble viscount uttered these words, six British ships
of the line anchored at Lisbon, in order to defend the "substantive" daughter
of Don Pedro from the Portuguese people, and to help her to destroy the
constitution she had sworn to defend. Spain, at the disposition of another
Maria, who, although a notorious sinner, has never found a Magdalen, "holds

15 out to us a fair, a flourishing, and even a formidable power among the
European kingdoms." (Speech of Lord Palmerston, H. of C, March 10,
1837.)

Formidable, indeed, to the holders of Spanish bonds. The noble lord has
even his reasons ready for having delivered the native country of the Pericles

20 and the Sophocles to the nominal sway of an idiot Bavarian boy. "King Otho
belongs to a country where there exists a free Constitution." (H. of C,
August 8, 1832.)

A free constitution in Bavaria, the German Bceotia! This passes the licentia
poetica of rhetorical flourish, the "legitimate hopes" held out by Spain, and

25 the "substantive" power of Portugal. As to Belgium, all Lord Palmerston did
for it was, burdening it with a part of the Dutch debt, reducing it by the
Province of Luxemburg, and adding to it a Coburg dynasty. As to the entente
cordiale with France, waning from the moment he pretended to give it the
finish by the Quadruple Alliance of 1834, we have already seen how far the

30 noble lord understood to manage it in the instance of Poland, and we shall
hear, by and bye, what became of it in his hands.

One of those facts, hardly adverted to by contemporaries, but broadly
marking the boundaries of historical epochs, was the military occupation of
Constantinople by the Russians, in 1833.

35 The eternal dream of Russia was at last realised. The barbarian from the
icy banks of the Newa held in his grasp luxurious Byzantium, and the sunlit
shores of the Bosphorus. The self-styled heir to the Greek Emperors occu-
pied, however temporarily, the Rome of the East.

"The occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops sealed the fate of
Turkey as an independent power. The fact of Russia having occupied Con-
stantinople even for the purpose (?) of saving it, was as decisive a blow to
Turkish independence as if the flag of Russianow waved on the Seraglio."
(Speech of Sir Robert Peel, H. of C, March 17, 1834.)

In consequence of the unfortunate war of 1828-29, the Porte had lost her
prestige in the eyes of her own subjects. As usual with Oriental empires,
when the paramount power is weakened, successful revolts of Pachas broke
out. As early as October, 1831, commenced the conflict between the Sultan
and Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, who had supported the Porte during
the Greek insurrection. In the spring of 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, his son, marched
his army into Syria, conquered that province, by the Battle of Horns, crossed
the Taurus, annihilated the last Turkish army at the battle of Coniah, and
moved on the way to Stamboul. The Sultan was forced to apply to St. Peters-
burgh, on Feb. 2,1833. On February 17, the French Admiral Roussin arrived
at Constantinople, remonstrated with the Porte two days afterwards, and
engaged for the retreat of the Pasha on certain terms, including the refusal
of Russian assistance; but, unassisted as he was, he was, of course, unable
to cope with Russia. "You have asked for me, and you shall have me." On
February 20, a Russian squadron sailed from Sebastopol, and disembarked
a large force of Russian troops on the shores of the Bosphorus, and laid siege
to the capital. So eager was Russia for the protection of Turkey, that a
Russian officer was simultaneously dispatched to the Pashas of Erzerum and
Trebizond, to inform them that, in the event of Ibrahim's army marching
towards Erzerum, both that place and Trebizond should be immediately
protected by a Russian army. At the end of May, 1833, Count Orloff arrived
from St. Petersburgh, and intimated to the Sultan that he had brought with
him a little bit of paper, which the Sultan was to subscribe to, without the
concurrence of any minister, and without the diplomatic agent, at the Porte.
In this manner the famous treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was brought about and
concluded for eight years to come. By virtue of it the Porte entered into an
alliance, offensive and defensive with Russia, resigned the right of entering
into any new treaties with other powers, except with the concurrence of
Russia, and confirmed the former Russo-Turkish treaties, especially that of
Adrianople. By a secret article, appended to the treaty, the Porte obliged
herself, "in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia, to close the Straits of
the Dardanelles—viz., not to allow any foreign man-of-war to enter it under
any pretext whatever."

Whom was the Czar indebted to for occupying Constantinople by his
troops, and for transferring, by virtue of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the
supreme seat of the Ottoman empire, from Constantinople to StPeters-

burgh? To nobody else but to the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount
Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of His Majesty's
Most Hon. Privy Council, Knight ofthe Great Cross ofthe Most Honourable
Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and His Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was concluded on July 8th, 1833. On July
11th, 1833, Mr. H. L. Bulwer moved for the production of papers withrespect
to the Turco-Syrian affairs. The noble lord opposed the motion, "because
the transactions to which the papers called for referred, were incomplete,
and the character of the whole transaction would depend upon its termina-
tion. As the results were not yet known, the motion was premature."—(H.
of C, July 11, 1833.)

Accused by Mr. Bulwer of not having interfered for the defence of the
Sultan against Mehemed Ah, and not having thus prevented the advance of
the Russian army, he began that curious system of defence and of confession,
developed on later occasions, the membra disjecta of which I shall now
gather together.

"He was not prepared to deny, that the latter part of last year an application
was made on the part of the Sultan to the country for assistance."—(H. of
C, July 11, 1833.)

The Porte made formal application for assistance in the course of Au-
gust.-(H. of C, August 24, 1833.)

No, notin August. "The request of the Porte for naval assistance had been
made in the month of October, 1832."-(H. of C, August 28, 1833.)

No, it was not in October. "Its assistance was asked by the Porte in
November 1832."-(H. of C, March 17, 1834.)

The noble lord is as uncertain of the day when the Porte implored his aid,
as Falstaff was of the number of rogues in buckram suits, who came at his
back, in Kendal green. He is not prepared, however, to deny that the armed
assistance offered by Russia was rejected by the Porte, and that he was
applied to. He refused to comply with her demands. The Porte did again apply
to the noble lord. First she sent M. Maurojeni to London; then she sent
Nehmik Pasha, who entreated the assistance of a naval squadron on the
condition of the Sultan undertaking to defray all the expenses of that squad-
ron, and promising in future requital for that succour, the grant of new
commercial privileges, and advantages to British subjects in Turkey. So sure
was Russia of the noble lord's refusal, that she joined the Turkish Envoy
in praying his lordship for the affording of the demanded succour. He tells
us himself, "It was but justice that he should state, that so far from Russia

40 having expressed any jealousy as to this government granting this assistance,

the Russian Ambassador officially communicated to him, while the request

was still under the consideration, that he had learned that such an application
had been made, and that, from the interest taken by Russia in the main-
tenance and preservation ofthe Turkish empire, it would afford satisfaction
if ministers could find themselves able to comply with that request."—(H.
of C, August 28, 1833.)

The noble lord remained, however, inexorable to the demands of the Porte,
although backed by disinterested Russia herself. Then, of course, the Porte
knew what she was about. She understood that she was doomed to make
the wolf shepherd. Still she hesitated, and did not accept the Russian assist-
ance till three months later. "Great Britain," says the noble lord, "never
complained of Russia granting that assistance, but, onthe contrary, was glad
that Turkey had been able to obtain effectual relief from any quarter."—(H.
of C, March 17, 1834.)

At whatever epoch the Porte may have implored the aid of Lord Palmer-
ston, he cannot but own, "No doubt if England had thought fit to interfere,
the progress of the invading army would have been stopped, and the Russian
troops would not have been calledin."-(H. of C, July 11, 1833.)

Why then did he not "think fit" to interfere and to keep the Russians out?

First he pleads want of time. According to his own statement the conflict
between the Porte and Mehemed Ali arose as early as October 1831, while
the decisive battle of Koniah was not fought till December 21,1832. Could
he find no time during all this period? A great battle was won by Ibrahim
Pasha in July 1832, and again he could find no time from July to December.
But he was all that time waiting for a formal application, which, according
to his last version, was not made till the 3rd of November. "Was he then,"
asks Sir Robert Peel, "so ignorant of what was passing in the Levant, that
he must wait for a formal application?" (H. of C, March 17,1834.) And from
November, when the formal application was made, to the latter part of
February, there elapsed again four long months, and Russia did not arrive
until February 20, 1833. Why did not he?

But he has better reasons in reserve.

The Pasha of Egypt was but a rebellious subject, and the Sultan was the
Suzerain. "As it was a war against the sovereign by a subject, and that
sovereign was in alliance with the King of England, it would have been
inconsistent with good faith to have had any communication with the Pasha."
(H. of C, August 28,1833.) Etiquette prevented the noble lord from stop-
ping Ibrahim's armies. Etiquette forbade him giving instructions to his
Consul at Alexandria to use his influence with Mehemed Ali. Like the
Spanish Grandee, the noble lord would rather let the Queen burn to ashes
than infringe on etiquette and interfere with the petticoats. Perchance it so
appears that the noble lord had already in 1832, accredited consuls and

diplomatic agents to the "subject" of the Sultan without the consent of the
Sultan, that he entered into treaties with Mehemed altering existing regula-
tions and arrangements touching matters of trade and revenue and establish-
ing other ones in their rooms; that he did so without the consent of the Porte
beforehand, or caring for its approbation afterwards—(H. of C, February
23, 1848.)

Accordingly, we are told by Earl Grey, the then chief of the noble viscount
that "They had at the moment extensive commercial relations with Mehemed
Ali which it would not have been their interest to disturb."—(House of Lords,
February 4, 1834.)

What commercial relations with the "rebellious subject."

But the noble viscount's fleets were occupied in the Douro, and the Tagus,
and blockading the Scheldt, and doing the service of the midwife at the birth
of the constitutional empires of Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and he was,
therefore, not in a situation to spare one single ship.—(H. of C., March 17,
1834, and House of Lords, February 4, 1834.)

But what the Sultan insisted on was precisely naval assistance. For argu-
ment's sake we will grant the noble lord to have been unable to dispose of
one single vessel. But there are great authorities assuring us that what was

20 wanted was not a single vessel, but only a single word on the part of the noble

lord. There is Admiral Codrington, the destroyer of the Turkish fleet at
Navarino. "Mehemed Ah," he states, "had of old felt the strength of our
representations on the subject of the evacuation of the Morea. He had then
received orders from the Porte to resist all applications to induce him to
evacuate it at the risk of his head, and he did resist accordingly, but at last
prudently yielded and evacuated the Morea."—(H. of C, April 20,1836.)

There is the Duke of Wellington. "If, in the session of 1832 or 1833, they
had plainly told Mehemed Ali, that he should not carry on his contestin Syria
and Asia Minor, they would have put an end to the war without the risk of
allowing the Emperor of Russia to send a fleet and an army to Con-
stantinople."—(House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1834.)

But there are better authorities. There is the noble lord himself. "Al-
though," he says, "his Majesty's government did not comply with the de-
mand of the Sultan for naval assistance, yet the moral assistance of England
was afforded; and the communications made by the British government to
the Pasha of Egypt, and to forahim Pasha, commanding in Asia Minor, did
materially contribute to bring about that arrangement (of Kutayah) between
the Sultan and the Pasha, by which that war was terminated.'"—(H. of C,
March 17,1834.) There is Lord Derby, then Lord Stanley, and a member of
the Palmerston Cabinet, who "boldly asserts that what stopped the progress
of Mehemet AU, was the distinct declaration of France and England that they

would not permit the occupation of Constantinople by his troops."—(H. of
C, March 17, 1834).

Thus then, according to Lord Derby and to Lord Palmerston himself, it
was not the Russian squadron and army at Constantinople, but it was a
distinct declaration on the part of the British consular agent at Alexandria,
that stopped Ibrahim's victorious march upon Constantinople, and brought
about the arrangement of Kutayah, by virtue of which Mehemed Ali ob-
tained, besides Egypt, the Pashalik of Syria, of Adana and other places,
added as an appendage. But the noble lord thought fit not to allow his consul
at Alexandria to make this distinct declaration till after the Turkish army was
annihilated, Constantinople overrun by the Cossack, the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi signed by the Sultan, and pocketed by the Czar.

If want of time and want of fleets, forbade the noble lord to assist the
Sultan, and a superfluity of etiquette to check the Pasha, did he at least
employ his ambassador at Constantinople to guard against excessive in-
fluence on the part of Russia, and to keep her influence confined to narrow
bounds? Quite the contrary. In order not to clog the movements of Russia,
the noble lord took good care to have no ambassador at all at Constantinople
during the most fatal period of the crisis.

"If ever there was acountry in which the weight and station of an ambassa-
dor were useful—or a period in which that weight and station might be
advantageously exerted—that country was Turkey, during the six months
before the 8th of July."-(Speech of Lord Mahon, H. of C, April 20,1836.)

Lord Palmerston tells us, that the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford
Canning, left Constantinople in September, 1832—that Lord Ponsonby, then
at Naples, was appointed in his place in November and that "difficulties
experienced in making the necessary arrangements for his conveyance,"—
although a man-of-war was in waiting for him—"and the unfavourable state
of the weather, did prevent his getting to Constantinople, until the end of
May, 1833."-(H. of C, March 17, 1834.)

The Russian was not yet in, and Lord Ponsonby was accordingly ordered
to require seven months for sailing from Naples to Constantinople.

But why should the noble lord prevent the Russians from occupying
Constantinople? "He for his part had great doubts that any intention to
partition the Ottoman Empire at all entered into the policy of the Russian
government."-(H. of C, July 11, 1833.)

Certainly not. Russia wants not to partition the empire but to keep the
whole of it. Besides the security Lord Palmerston possessed in this doubt
he had another security "in the doubt, whether it enters into the policy of
Russia at present to accomplish the object," and a third "security" in this
third doubt "whether the Russian nation (just think of a Russian nationt)

would be prepared for that transference of power, of residence, and authority
to the southern provinces which would be the necessary consequence of the
conquest by Russia of Constantinople."—(H. of C, July 11, 1833.)
Besides these negative arguments the noble lord had an affirmative one:
"if they had quietly beheld the temporary occupation of the Turkish capital
by the forces of Russia, it was because they had full confidence in the honour
and good faith of Russia. ... The Russian government in granting its aid to
the Sultan had pledged its honour, and in that pledge he reposed the most
implicit confidence."-(H. of C, July 11, 1833.)

So inaccessible, indestructible, integral, imperishable, inexpugnable, in-
calculable, incommensurable, and irremediable; so boundless, dauntless, and
matchless was the noble lord's confidence, that still on March 17,1834, when
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had become a fait accompli, he went on de-
claring that, "in their confidence ministers were not deceived." Not his is

the fault if nature has developed his protuberance of confidence to altogether
anomalous dimensions.

The People's Paper,
No. 81, 19 November 1853

Fifth Article.

The contents of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi were published by the "Morn-
ing Herald," on Aug. 21, 1833. On August 24, Sir Robert Inglis asked Lord
Palmerston in the House of Commons, "whether there really had been
concluded a treaty, offensive and defensive, between Russia and Turkey?
He hoped that the noble lord would be prepared, before the prorogation of
parliament to lay before the house, not only the treaties that had been made,
but all communications connected with the formation of those treaties
between Turkey and Russia." Lord Palmerston answered that "when they
were sure that such a treaty as that alluded to really did exist; and when they
were in possession of that treaty, it would then be for them to determine what
was the course of policy they ought to pursue ... It could be no blame to
him if the newspapers were sometimes beforehand with the government."
(House of Commons, August 24, 1833.)

Seven months afterwards he assures that "it was perfectly impossible that
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, not to be ratified at Constantinople until the
month of September, should have been officially known to him in August."
(H. of C, March 17, 1834.)

He did know the treaty, but not officially. "The British government was
surprised to find that when the Russian troops quitted the Bosphorus, they

carried that treaty with them." (Speech of Lord Palmerston, H. of C,
March 1, 1848.) Yea, the noble lord was in possession of the treaty before
it had been concluded.

"No sooner had the Porte received it (viz., the draftof the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi), than the treaty was communicated by them to the British Em-
bassy at Constantinople, with the prayer for our protection against Ibrahim
Pasha, and against Nicholas. The application was rejected—but that was not
all. With an atrocious perfidiousness, the fact was made known to the
Russian Minister. Next day the very copy of the treaty which the Porte had
lodged with the British Embassy, was returned to the Porte by the Russian
Ambassador, who ironically advised the Porte—'to choose better another
time its confidants'." (H. of C, Feb. 8, 1848.)

But the noble viscount had obtained aU he cared for. He was interrogated
with respect to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, of whose existence he was not
sure on August 24,1833. On August 29, parliament was prorogued, receiving
from the throne the consolatory assertion that "the hostilities which had
disturbed the peace of Turkey had been terminated, and they might be
assured that the king's attention would be carefully directed to any events
which might affect the present state or the future independence of that
empire."

Here we have the key to the famous Russian treaties of July. In July they
are concluded; in August, something about them is transpiring through the
public press. Lord Palmerston is interrogated in the Commons. He, of course,
is aware of nothing. Parliament is prorogued—and, when it reassembles, the
treaty has grown old, or, as in 1841, has already been executed, in spite of
public opinion.

Parliament was prorogued on August 29, 1833, and it reassembled on
Feb. 5,1834. The interval between the prorogation and its reassembling was
marked by two incidents intimately interwoven with each other. On the one
hand, the united French and English fleets proceeded to the Dardanelles,
displayed there the tricolour, and the national flag of England, sailed then-
way to Smyrna, and returned from thence to Malta. On the other hand, a
new treaty was concluded between the Porte and Russia, on January 29,1834,
the treaty of St. Petersburgh. This treaty was hardly signed when the united
fleet was withdrawn.

This combined manceuvre was intended to stultify the British people and
Europe into the belief that the hostile demonstration on the Turkish seas and
coasts, directed against the Porte, for having concluded the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi, had enforced upon Russia the new treaty of St. Petersburgh. This
treaty, by promising the evacuation of the Principalities, and reducing the
Turkish payments to one-third of the stipulated amount, apparently relieved

the Porte from some engagements enforced on her by the treaty of Adria-
nople. In all other instances it was a ratification of the treaty of Adrianople,
not at all relating to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, nor dropping a word about
the passage of the Dardanelles. On the contrary, the alleviations it granted
to Turkey, were the purchase-money for the exclusion of Europe, by the
treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, from the Dardanelles.

"The very day on which the demonstration (of the British fleet) was being
made, an assurance was given by the noble lord to the Russian Ambassador
at this court, that this combined movement of the squadrons was not intended

in any sense hostile to Russia, nor to be taken as a hostile demonstration
against her; but, that in fact, it meant nothing atall. I say this on the authority
of Lord Ponsonby, the noble lord's own colleague, the Ambassador, at
Constantinople."-(Speech of Mr. Anstey, H. of C, Feb. 23, 1848.)

After the treaty of St. Petersburgh had been ratified, the noble lord ex-
pressed his satisfaction with the moderation of the terms imposed by Rus-
sia.

When Parliament had re-assembled, there appeared in the "Globe," the
organ of the Foreign Office, a paragraph stating that "The treaty of St. Pe-
tersburgh was a proof either of the moderation or good sense of Russia, or

of the influence which the union of England and France, and the firm and
concerted language of those two powers had acquired in the councils of
St. Petersburgh."-("Globe," Feb. 24, 1834.)

Thus public attention was to be diverted from the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,
and the animosity it had aroused in Europe against Russia, to be soothed
down.

Artful as the dodging was, it would not do. On March 17,1834, Mr. Sheil
brought in a motion for "the copies of the treaties between Turkey and
Russia, and of any correspondence between the English, Russian, and
Turkish Governments, respecting those treaties, to be laid before the house."
The noble lord resisted this resolution to his utmost, and succeeded in
baffling it by assuring the house that "peace could be preserved only by the
house reposing confidence in the government," and refusing to accede to
the motion. So grossly inapt were the reasons he stated to prevent him from
producing the papers, that Sir Robert Peel called him, in his parliamentary

language "a very unconclusive reasoner," and his own Colonel Evans could
not help exclaiming: "The speech of the noble lord appeared to him the most
unsatisfactory he had ever heard from him."

Lord Palmerston strived to convince the house that, according to the
assurances of Russia, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was to be looked upon

"as one of reciprocity," that reciprocity being, that if the Dardanelles should
be closed against England in the event of war they should be closed against

Russia also. The statement was altogether false, but if true, this certainly
would have been Irish reciprocity, for it was all on one side. To cross the
Dardanelles is for Russia not the means to get atthe Black Sea, but on the
contrary, to leave it.

So far from refuting Mr. Sheil's statement, "the consequence of the treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi was the same as if the Porte surrendered to Russia the
possession of the Dardanelles," Lord Palmerston owned that the treaty
closed the Dardanelles to British men-of war, and that "under its provision
even merchant vessels might, in effect, be practically excluded from the
Black Sea," in the case of a war between England and Russia. But if the

"

government acted with a "temper," if it "showed no unnecessary distrust,"
that is to say, if it quietly submitted to all further encroachments of Russia,
he was "inclined to think that the case might not arise in which that treaty
would be called into operation; and that therefore it would, in practice,
remain a dead letter."-(H. of C, March 17, 1834.)

Besides, "the assurance and explanations" which the British government
had received from the contracting parties to that treaty greatly tended to
remove its objections to it. Thus then it was not the articles of the treaty of
Unkiar Skelessi, but the assurances Russia gave with respect to them, not
the acts of Russia, but her language, he had in his opinion to look upon. Yet,
as on the same day his attention was called to the protest of the French
Charge d'Affaires, M. Lagrené, against the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the
offensive and contumelious language of Count Nessehode, answering in the
"St. Petersburgh Gazette" that "the Emperor of Russia would act as if the
declaration contained in the note of M. Lagrené had no existence," then the
noble lord, eating up his own words, propounded the opposite doctrine that
"it was on all occasions the duty of the English government to look rather
to the acts of Foreign power, than to the language which the power might
hold on any particular subject or occasion." One moment he appealed from
the acts of Russia to her language, and the other from her language to her
acts. Still in 1837 he assured that "the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was a treaty
between two independent powers."—(H. of C, December 14, 1837.)

Ten years later, the treaty having long since elapsed, and the noble lord
being just about acting the play of the Truly English Minister and the "civis
romanus sum, "he told the house plainly, "the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was
no doubt to a certain degree forced upon Turkey by Count Orloff, the
Russian Envoy, under circumstances"—created by the noble lord him-
self—"which rendered it difficult for Turkey to refuse acceding to it.... It
gave practically to the Russian government a power of interference and
dictation in Turkey, not consistent with the independence of that state."
(H. of C, March 1, 1848.)

During the whole course of the debates about the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,
the noble lord, like the clown in the comedy, had an answer of most mon-
strous size, that must fit all demands and serve all questions—the Anglo-
French alliance. When his connivance with Russia was pointed at, in sneers,
he gravely retorted: "If the present relations established between this
country and France, were pointed at in these sneers, he would only say, that
he should look with feelings of pride and satisfaction at the part he had acted
in bringing about that good understanding."-{H. of C, July 11, 1833.)

When the production of the papers relating to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi
was demanded, he answered that "England and France had now cemented
a friendship which had only grown stronger."—(H. of C, March 17,1834.)

"He could but remark," exclaimed Sir Robert Peel, "that whenever the
noble lord was thrown into a difficulty as to any part of our European policy,
he at once formed aready means of escape, by congratulating the house upon
the close alliance between this country and France." Simultaneously the
noble lord was strengthening the suspicions of his Tory opponents that
"England was compelled to connive at an aggression upon Turkey, which
France had directly encouraged."

At that time, then, the ostensible alliance with France was to cover the

secret infeoffment to Russia, as, in 1840, the clamorous rupture with France
was to cover the official alliance with Russia.

While the noble lord fatigued the world with ponderous folios of printed
negotiations on the affairs of the constitutional empire of Belgium and with
ample explanations, verbal and documentary, withregard to the "substantive
power" of Portugal; to this moment it has proved quite impossible to wrest
out of him any document whatever relating to the first Syro-Turkish war,
and to the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. When the production of the papers was
first demanded, on July 11th, 1833, "The motion was premature, the trans-
actions incomplete, and the results not yet known." On August 24th, 1833,

"the treaty was not officially signed, and he was not in possession of it."
On March 17th, 1834, "Communications were still carrying on ... the dis-
cussions, if he might so call them, were not yet completed." Still, in 1848,
when Mr. Anstey told him that, in asking for the papers, he did ask for the
proof of the noble lord's collusion with the Czar, the chivalrous minister

preferred killing time by a five hours speech to killing suspicion by self-
speaking documents. Notwithstanding all this, he had the cynic impudence
to assure Mr. T. Attwood, on December 14th, 1837, that "the papers con-
nected with that treaty, viz., the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, were laid before
the house three years ago," that is to say in 1834, when "peace could be
preserved only" by withholding the papers from the house. On the same day
he told Mr. Attwood that "this treaty was a matter which had gone by, that

it was entered into for a limited period, and that period having expired, its
introduction by the honourable member was wholly unnecessary and un-
called for." According to the original stipulation, the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi was to expire on July 8th, 1841. Lord Palmerston tells Mr. Attwood
that it had already expired on December 14th, 1837. 5

"What trick, what devise, what starting hole, can'st thou now find to hide
thee from this open and apparent shame? Come let's hear, Jack—what trick
hast thou now?"

The People's Paper,
No. 84, 10 December 1853

Sixth Article.

There is no such word in the Russian vocabulary as "honour." Astothething 10
itself, it is considered to be a French delusion.

"Schto takoi honneur? Eto Fransusski chimere," is aRussian proverb. For
the invention of Russian honour the world is exclusively indebted to my Lord
Palmerston, who, during a quarter of a century, used, at every critical
moment, to pledge himself, in the most emphatical manner, for the "honour" 15
of the Czar. So he did at the close of the Session of 1853, as at the close of
the Session of 1833.

Now it happens that the noble lord, while he expressed "his most implicit
confidence in the honour and good faith" of the Czar, had just got into
possession of documents, concealed from the rest of the world, and leaving 20
no doubt, if any existed, about the nature of Russian honour and good faith.

He had not even to scratch the Muscovite in order to find the Tartar. He
had caught the Tartar in his naked hideousness. He found himself possessed

of the self-confessions of the leading Russian ministers and diplomatists,
throwing off their cloaks, clapping out their most secret thoughts, unfolding, 25
without constraint, their plans of conquest and subjugation, scornfully railing

at the imbecile credulity of European Courts and Ministers, mocking the
Villéles, the Metternichs, the Aberdeens, the Cannings, and the Wellingtons ;
and devising, in common, with the savage cynicism of the barbarian, mitigat-

ed by the cruel irony of the courtier, how to sow distrust against England 30
at Paris, and against Austria at London, and against London at Vienna, how

to set them all by the ears, and how to make all of them the mere tools of
Russia.

At the time of the insurrection of Warsaw, the vice-royal archives kept
in the palace of Prince Constantine, and containing the secret cor- 35
respondence of Russian ministers and ambassadors from the beginning of

Lord Palmerston, Sixth Article

this century down to 1830, fell into the hands of the victorious Poles. Polish
Refugees brought these papers over first to France, and, at a later period,
Count Zamoy ski, the nephew of Prince Czartoryski, placed them in the hands
of Lord Palmerston, who buried them in Christian oblivion. With these
papers in his pockets, the noble viscount was the more eager to proclaim in
the British Senate and to the world "his most implicit confidence in the
honour and good faith of the Emperor of Russia."

Not the fault of the noble viscount, that those startling papers were at
length published at the end of 1835, through the famous "Portfolio." King
William IV., whatever he was in other respects, was a most decided enemy
of Russia. His private secretary, Sir Herbert Taylor, was intimately con-
nected with David Urquhart, introducing this gentleman to the King himself,
and from that moment royalty was conspiring with those two friends against
the policy of the "truly English" minister.

"William TV* ordered the above-mentioned papers to be given up by the
noble lord. They were given up and examined at the time at Windsor Castle,
and it was found desirable to print and publish them. In spite of the great
opposition of the noble lord, the king compelled him to lend the authority
of the Foreign Office to their publication, so that the editor, who took the
charge of revising them for the press, published not a single word which had
not the signature or initials attached. I, myself, have seen the noble lord's
initial attached to one of those documents, although the noble lord has denied
these facts. Lord Palmerston was compelled to place the documents in the
hands of Mr. Urquhart for publication. Mr. Urquhart was the real editor of
the 'Portfolio'." (Speech of Mr. Anstey, House of Commons, February 23rd,
1848.)

After the death of the king, Lord Palmerston refused to pay the printer
of the "Portfolio," and disclaimed, publicly and solemnly, all connexion on
the part of the Foreign Office, and induced, in what manner is not known,

30 Mr. Backhouse, his under secretary, to set his name to those denials. We read

in the "Times" of January, 26th, 1839:—"It is not for us to understand how
Lord Palmerston may feel, but we are sure there is no misapprehending how
any other person in the station of a gentleman, and in the position of a
minister, would feel, after the notoriety given to the correspondence between
Mr. Urquhart, whom Lord Palmerston dismissed from office, and Mr. Back-
house, whom the noble viscount has retained in office, by the 'Times' of
yesterday. There never was a fact apparently better established through this
correspondence than that the series of official documents contained in the
well-known publication, called the 'Portfolio,' were printed and circulated
by Lord Palmerston's authority, and that his lordship is responsible for the
publication of them, both as a statesman to the political world here and

abroad, and as an employer of the printers and publishers, for the pecuniary
charge accompanying it."

In consequence of her financial distress, resulting from the exhaustion of
the treasury by the unfortunate war of 1828—29, and the debt to Russia
stipulated by the treaty of Adrianople, Turkey found herself compelled to
extend that obnoxious system of monopolies by which the sale of almost all
articles was granted only to those who had paid government licenses. Thus
a few usurers were enabled to seize upon the entire commerce of the country.
Mr. Urquhart proposed to King William IV., a commercial treaty to be

concluded with the Sultan, which treaty, while guaranteeing great advantages 10

to British commerce, intended at the same time to develop the productive
resources of Turkey, to restore her Exchequer to health and thus to emanci-
pate her from the Russian yoke. The curious history of this treaty cannot
be better related than in the words of Mr. Anstey:

"The whole of the contest between Lord Palmerston on the one hand, and
Mr. Urquhart on the other, was directed to this treaty of commerce. On the
third of October, 1835, Mr. Urquhart obtained his commission as Secretary
of Legation at Constantinople, given him for the one purpose of securing
the adoption there of the Turkish commercial treaty. He delayed his de-
parture however till June or July, 1836. Lord Palmerston pressed him to go.
The applications to him urging his departure were numerous, but his answer
invariably was: I will not go until I have this commercial treaty settled with
the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office; and then I will accompany it,
and procure its acceptance at the Porte ... Finally, Lord Palmerston gave
his approbation to the treaty, and it was forwarded to Lord Ponsonby, the
Ambassador at Constantinople. (In the meantime the latter had been in-
structed by Lord Palmerston to take the negotiations entirely out of the hands
of Mr. Urquhart into his own, contrary to the engagement entered into with
Mr. Urquhart.) As soon as the removal of Mr. Urquhart from Constantinople
had been effected through the intrigues of the noble lord, the treaty was
immediately thrown overboard. Two years later the noble lord resumed it,
giving Mr. Urquhart before Parliament, the compliment of being the author
of it, and disclaiming for himself all merits in it. But the noble lord had
destroyed the treaty, falsified it in every part, and converted it to the ruin
of commerce. The original treaty of Mr. Urquhart placed the subjects of
Great Britain in Turkey, upon the footing of the most favoured nation—viz.,
the Russians. As altered by Lord Palmerston, it placed the subjects of Great
Britain upon the footing of the taxed and oppressed subjects of the Porte.
Mr. Urquhart's treaty stipulated for the removal of all transit duties, monopo-
lies, taxes, and duties of whatever character, other than those stipulated by
the treaty itself. As falsified by Lord Palmerston, it contained a clause,

declaring the perfect right of the Sublime Porte to impose whatever regula-
tions and restrictions it pleased, with regard to commerce. Mr. Urquhart's
treaty left importation subject only to the old duty of three shillings; that
of the noble lord raised the duty from three shillings to five shillings.
Mr. Urquhart's treaty stipulated for an ad valorem duty in this manner, that
if any article of commerce was so exclusively the production of Turkey, as
to insure it a ready sale, at the prices usually received under the monopoly
in foreign ports, then the export duty to be assessed by two commissioners
appointed on the part of England and Turkey, might be a high one, so as to
be remunerative and productive of revenue, but that, in the case of com-
modities produced elsewhere than in Turkey, and not being of sufficient
value in foreign ports to bear a high duty, a lower duty should be assessed.
Lord Palmerston's treaty stipulated a fixed duty of twelve shillings ad valo-
rem upon every article whether it would bear the duty or not. The original
treaty extended the benefit of Free Trade to Turkish ships and produce;
the substituted treaty contained no stipulation whatever on the sub-
ject ... I charge these falsifications, I charge also the concealment of them,
upon the noble lord, and further—I charge the noble lord with having
falsely stated to the house that his treaty was that which had been
arranged by Mr. Urquhart."—(Speech of Mr.Anstey, H. of C,
February 23rd, 1848.)

So favourable to Russia, and so obnoxious to Great Britain, was the treaty
as altered by the noble lord, that some English merchants in the Levante
resolved to trade henceforth under the protection of Russian firms, and
others, as Mr. Urquhart states, were only prevented from so doing by a sort
of national pride.

With regard to the secret relations between the noble lord and William IV.,
Mr. Anstey stated to the house, "The king forced the question of the process
of Russian encroachment in Turkey, upon the attention of the noble
lord ... Ican prove that the noble lord was obliged to take the directions in
this matter from the late king's private secretary, and that his existence in
office depended upon his compliance with the wishes of the monarch... The
noble lord did on one or two occasions, as far as he dared, resist, but his
resistance was invariably followed by abject expressions of contrition and

compliance. I will not take upon myself to assert that, on one occasion, the
noble lord was actually out of office for a day or two, but I am able to say
that the noble lord was in danger of a most unceremonious expulsion from
office on that occasion. I refer to the discovery which the late king had made,
that the noble lord consulted the feelings of the Russian government as to

40 the choice of an English ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburgh, and that

Sir Stratford Canning, originally destined for the embassy, was set aside to

make room for the late Earl of Durham, an ambassador more agreeable to
the Czar."-(H. of C, Feb. 23, 1848.)

It is one of the most astonishing facts that, while the king was vainly
struggling against the Russian policy of the noble lord, the noble lord and
his Whig-allies succeeded in keeping alive the public suspicion that the
king— who was known as a Tory— was paralysing the anti-Russian efforts of
the "truly English" minister. The pretended Tory predelection of the
monarch for the despotic principles of the Russian Court, was of course made
to explain the otherwise inexplicable policy of Lord Palmerston. The Whig-
Oligarchs smiled mysteriously when H. L. Bulwer informed the house, that
"no longer ago than last Christmas Count Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador
at Paris, stated, in speaking of the affairs of the East, that this Court had
a greater apprehension of French principles than of Russian ambition."—(H.
of C, July 11, 1833.)

They smiled again, when Mr. T. Attwood interrogated the noble lord "what
reception Count Orloff, having been sent over to England after the treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi, had met with at his Majesty's Court."—(H. of C, Au-
gust 28, 1833.)

The papers intrusted by the dying king, and his Secretary, the late Sir
Herbert Taylor, to Mr. Urquhart "for the purpose of vindicating, upon the
fitting opportunity, the memory of William IV."—will, when published, throw
a new light upon the past career of the noble lord and the Whig Oligarchy,
of which the public generally know little more than the history of their
pretensions, their phrases, and their so-called principles—in a word, the
theatrical and fictitious part—the mask.

This is a fitting occasion to give his due to Mr. David Urquhart, the inde-
fatigable antagonist for twenty years of Lord Palmerston, who has proved
his only adversary—one not to be intimidated into silence, bribed into con-
nivance, charmed into suitorship, while, what with cajoleries, what with
seductions, Alcine Palmerston contrived to change all other foes into fools.
We have just heard the fierce denunciation of his lordship by Mr. Anstey.
"A circumstance most significant is that the accused minister sought the
member—viz., Mr. Anstey—and was content to accept his co-operation and
private friendship without the forms of recantation or apology. Mr. Anstey's
recent legal appointment by the present government speaks for itself."
(D. Urquhart's "Progress of Russia.")

On February 8th, 1848, the same Mr. Anstey had compared the noble
viscount with "the infamous Marquis of Carmarthen, Secretary of State to
William II., whom, during his visit to his court, the Czar, Peter I., found
means to corrupt to his interests with the gold of British merchants."—(H.
of C, February 8th, 1848.)

Who defended Lord Palmerston on that occasion against the accusations
of Mr. Anstey? Mr. Sheil; the same Mr. Sheil who had, on the conclusion of
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, in 1833, acted the same part of accuser against
his lordship as Mr. Anstey in 1848. Mr. Roebuck, once his strong antagonist,
procured him the vote of confidence in 1850. Sir Stratford Canning having
denounced during a decennium the noble lord's connivance with the Czar,
was content to be got rid of as Ambassador at Constantinople. The noble
lord's own dear Dudley Stuart was intrigued out of Parliament for some years
for having opposed the noble lord. When returned back to it, he had become
the dme damnée of the truly English minister. Kossuth, who might have
known from the Blue Books that Hungary had been betrayed by the noble
viscount, called him "the dear friend of his bosom" when landing at South-
ampton.

The People's Paper,
No. 85, 17 December 1853

Seventh Article.

One glance at the map of Europe will show you on the Western litoral of

the Black Sea the outlets of the Danube, the only river which, springing up
in the very heart of Europe, may be said to form a natural highway to Asia.
Strictly opposite, on the Eastern side, to the south of the river Kuban, begins
the mountain-range of the Caucasus, stretching from the Black Sea to the
Caspian in a south-easterly direction for some seven hundred miles and
separating Europe from Asia.

If you hold the outlets of the Danube, you hold the Danube, and with it
the highway to Asia, and a great part of the commerce of Switzerland,
Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and above all of Moldo-Wallachia. If you hold
the Caucasus too, the Black Sea becomes your property, and to shut up its
door, you only want Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The possession of
the Caucasus mountains makes you at once master of Trebizonde, and
through their domineering the Caspian Sea, of the northern seaboard of
Persia.

The greedy eyes of Russia embraced at once the outlets of the Danube
and the mountain-range of the Caucasus. There, the business in hand was
to conquer supremacy, here to maintain it. The chain of the Caucasus sepa-
rates Southern Russia from the luxurious provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia,
Immeretia, and Gouriel, wrested by the Muscovite from the Musselman.
Thus the foot of the monster empire is cut off from its main body. The only
military road deserving to be called such winds from Mozdok to Tiflis,

through the aeng-pass of Dariel, fortified by a continuous line of entrenched
places, but exposed on both sides to the never-ceasing attacks from the
Caucasian tribes. The union of those tribes under one military chief might
even endanger the bordering country of the Cossacks. "The thought of the
dreadful consequences which a union of the hostile Circassians under one
head would produce in the south of Russia fills one with terror"—exclaims
M. Kupffer, a German, who presided over the scientific commission, which,
in 1829, accompanied the expedition of General Emmanuel to Elbruz.

At this very moment our attention is directed with equal anxiety to the
banks of the Danube, where Russia has seized the two-corn magazines of
Europe, and to the Caucasus, whence she is menaced in the possession of
Georgia. It was the treaty of Adrianople, that prepared Russia's usurpation
of Moldo-Wallachia, and recognised her claims to the Caucasus.

Article IV. of that treaty stipulates, "All the countries situated north and
east of the line of demarcation between the two empires (Russia and Turkey),
towards Georgia, Immeretia, and the Gouriel, as well as all the litoral of the
Black Sea, from the mouth of the Kuban, as far as the port of St. Nicholas
inclusively, shall remain under the domination of Russia." With regard to
the Danube the same treaty stipulates, "The frontier line will follow the
course of the Danube to the mouth of St. George, leaving all the islands
formed by the different branches in the possession of Russia. The right bank
will remain as formerly in the possession of the Ottoman Porte. Itis however
agreed that thatright bank from the point where the arm of St. George departs
from that of Sulina, shall remain uninhabited to a distance of two hours (six
miles) from the river, and that no kind of structure shall be raised there, and
in like manner, onthe islands which still remain in the possession of the Court
of Russia. With the exception of quarantines which will be there established,
it will not be permitted to make any other establishment or fortification."

Both these paragraphs, inasmuch as they secure to Russia an "extension
of territory and exlusive commercial advantages," openly infringed upon the
protocol of April 4,1826, drawn up by the Duke of Wellington at St. Peters-
burgh, and on the treaty of July 6,1827, concluded between Russia and the
other Great Powers at London. The English Government, therefore, refused
to recognise the treaty of Adrianople. The Duke of Wellington protested
against it. (Speech of Lord Dudley Stuart, H. of C, March 17, 1837.)

Lord Aberdeen protested. "In a dispatch to Lord Heytesbury dated
October 31st, 1829, he commented with no small dissatisfaction on many
parts of the Treaty of Adrianople, and especially notices the stipulations
respecting the islands of the Danube. He denies that that peace (the Treaty
of Adrianople), has respected the territorial rights of the Sovereignty
of the Porte, and the condition and the interests of all maritime states

in the Mediterranean."—(Speech of Lord Mahon, H. of C, April 20,
1836.)

He declared that "the independence of the Porte would be sacrificed, and
the peace of Europe endangered by this treaty being agreed to."-(Speech
of Earl Grey, H. of L., Feb. 4th, 1834.)

Lord Palmerston himself informs us, "As far as the extension of the
Russian frontier is concerned in the south of the Caucasus, and the shores
of the Black Sea, it is certainly not consistent with the solemn declaration
made by Russia in the face of Europe, previous to the commencement of
the Turkish war." (H. of C, March 17th, 1837.)

The Eastern litoral of the Black Sea, by blockading of which and cutting
off supplies of arms and gunpowder to the north-western districts of the
Caucasus, Russia could alone hope to realise her nominal claim to those
countries—this litoral of the Black Sea and the outlets of the Danube are
certainly no places "where an English action could possibly take place," as
was lamented by the noble lord in the case of Cracow. By what mysterious
contrivance, then, has the Muscovite succeeded in blockading the Danube,
in blocking up the litoral ofthe Euxine, and in forcing Great Britainto submit,
not only to the Treaty of Adrianople, but at the same time to the violation
by Russia herself of that identical treaty?

These questions were put to the noble viscount, in the House of Commons,
on April 20th, 1836, numerous petitions having poured in from the merchants
of London, of Glasgow, and other commercial towns, against the fiscal
regulations of Russia in the Black Sea, and her enactments and restrictions
tending to intercept English commerce onthe Danube. There had appeared,
on February 7th, 1836, a Russian ukase, which, by virtue of the Treaty of
Adrianople, established a quarantine on one of the islands formed by the
mouths of the Danube. In order to execute that quarantine, Russia claimed
a right of boarding and search, of levying fees, and seizing and marching off
to Odessa refractory ships, proceeding on their voyage up the Danube.
Before the quarantine was established, or rather before a custom-house and
fort were erected, under the false pretence of a quarantine, the Russian
authorities threw out their feelers, to ascertain the risk they might run with
the British government. Lord Durham, acting upon instructions received
from England, remonstrated with the Russian Cabinet, for the hindrance
which had been given to British trade. "He was referred to Count Nesselrode,
Count Nesselrode referred him to the Governor of South Russia, and the
Governor of South Russia again referred him to the Consul at Galatz, who
communicated with the British Consul at Ibraila, who was instructed to send

down the captains from whom toll had been exacted, to the Danube, the scene
of their injuries, in order that inquiry might be made on the subject, it being

well known that the captains thus referred to were then in England."—(H.
of C, April 20, 1836.)

The formal ukase of the 7th Feb., 1836, aroused, however, the general
attention of British commerce. "Many ships had sailed, and others were
going out, to whose captains strict orders had been given, not to submit to
the right of boarding and search, which Russia claimed. The fate of these
ships must be inevitable, unless some expression of opinion was made on
the part of that house. Unless that were done, British shipping, to the amount
of not less than 5,000 tons, would be seized and marched off to Odessa, un-
til the insolent commands of Russia, were complied with." (Speech of Mr.
Patrick M. Stewart, H. of C, April 20, 1836.)

Russia required the marshy islands of the Danube, by virtue of a clause
of the Treaty of Adrianople, which clause itself was a violation of the treaty
she had previously contracted with England, and the other powers in 1827.
The bristling the gates of the Danube with fortifications, and these forti-
f ications with guns, was a violation of the Treaty of Adrianople itself, which
expressly prohibits any fortification to be erected within six miles of the
river. The exaction of tolls, and the obstruction of the navigation, was a
violation of the Treaty of Vienna, declaring that "the navigation of rivers
along their whole course, from the point where each of them becomes
navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free," that "the amount of the duties
shall in no case exceed those now (1815) paid;" and that "no increase shall
take place, except with the common consent of the states bordering on the
river." Thus, then, all the argument on which Russia could plead not guilty
was the treaty of 1827, violated by the Treaty of Adrianople, the Treaty of
Adrianople violated by herself, the whole backed by a violation of the Treaty
of Vienna.

It proved quite impossible to wring out of the noble lord any declaration,
whether he did or did not recognise the treaty of Adrianople. As to the
violation of the Treaty of Vienna, he had "received no official information
that anything has occurred which is not warranted by the treaty. When such
a statement is made by the parties concerned, it shall be dealt with in such
manner as the law advisers of the Crown shall deem consistent withthe rights
of the subjects of this country." (Speech of Lord Palmerston, H. of C,
April 20, 1836.)

By the treaty of Adrianople, Art. 5, Russia guarantees the "prosperity" of
the Danubian Principalities and full "liberty of trade" for them. Now,
Mr. Stewart proved that the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were
objects of deadly jealousy to Russia, as their trade had taken a sudden
development since 1834, as they vied with Russia's own staple production,
as Galatz was becoming the great depot of all the grain of the Danube, and

driving Odessa out of the market. "If," answered the noble lord, "if my
honourable friend had been able to show that whereas some years ago we
had had a large and important commerce with Turkey, and that that com-
merce had, by the aggression of other countries, or by the neglect of the
government of this, dwindled down to an inconsiderable trade, then there
might have been ground to call upon parliament." In lieu of such an occur-
rence, "my honourable friend has shown that during the last few years the
trade with Turkey has risen from next to nothing to a very considerable
amount."

Russia obstructs the Danube navigation, because the trade of the Princi-
palities is growing important, says Mr. Stewart. But she did not so when that
trade was next to nothing, retorts Lord Palmerston. You neglect to oppose
the recent encroachments of Russia on the Danube, says Mr. Stewart. We
did not so at the epoch these encroachments were not yet ventured upon,
replies the noble lord. What "circumstances" have, therefore, "occurred
against which the government are not likely to guard, unless driven thereto
by the direct interference of this house?" He prevented the Commons from
passing a resolution by assuring them that, "there is no disposition of her
Majesty's government to submit to aggressions on the part of any power,
be that power what it may, and be it more or less strong," and by warning
them that, "we should also cautiously abstain from anything which might be
construed by other powers, and reasonably so, as being a provocation on
our part." A week after these debates had taken place in the House of
Commons, a British merchant addressed a letter to the Foreign Office with
regard to the Russian Ukase. "I am directed by Viscount Palmerston,"
answered the Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, "to acquaint you that
his lordship has called upon the law adviser for the Crown for his opinion
as to the regulations promulgated by the Russian Ukase of Feb. 7,1836; but
in the meantime Lord Palmerston directs me to acquaint you, with respect
to the latter part of your letter, that it is the opinion of his Majesty's govern-
ment, that no toll is justly demanded by the Russian authorities, at the mouth
of the Danube, and that you have acted properly in directing your agents to
refuse to pay it."

The merchant acted according to this letter. He is abandoned to Russia
by the noble lord; a Russian toll is, as Mr. Urquhart states, now exacted in
London and Liverpool by Russian Consuls, on every English ship sailing for
the Turkish ports of the Danube; and "the quarantine still stands on the island
of Leti."

Russia did not limit her invasion on the Danube to a quarantine established,
to fortifications erected, and to tolls exacted. The only mouth of the Danube
remaining still navigable, the Sulina mouth, was acquired by her through

the treaty of Adrianople. As long as possessed by the Turks, there was kept
a depth of water in the channel of from fourteen to sixteen feet. Since in
the possession of Russia, the water became reduced to eight feet, a depth
wholly inadequate to the conveyance of the vessels employed in the corn
trade. Now Russiais a party tothe treaty of Vienna, andthattreaty stipulates
in Art. 113, that "each state shall be atthe expense of keeping in good repair
the Towing Paths, and shall maintain the necessary work in order that no
obstruction shall be experienced by the navigation." For keeping the channel
in a navigable state, Russia found no better means than gradually reducing
the depth of the water, paving it with wrecks, and choking up its bar with
an accumulation of sand and mud. To this systematic and protracted in-
fraction of the treaty of Vienna she added another violation of the treaty of
Adrianople, which forbids any establishment at the mouth of the Sulina,
except for quarantine and light-house purposes, while, at her dictation, a
small Russian fort has there sprung up, living from the extortions upon the
vessels, the occasion for which is afforded by the delays and expenses for
lighterage, consequent upon the obstruction of the channel.

Cum principia negante non estdisputandum-ot whatuse is itto dwell upon
abstract principles with despotic governments, who are accused of measur-
ing right by power, and of ruling their conduct by expediency, and not by
justice.-(Speech of Lord Palmerston, April 30, 1823.)

According to his own maxim the noble viscount was contented to dwell
upon abstract principles with the despotic government of Russia; but he went
farther. While he assured the house on July 6,1840, that the freedom of the
Danube navigation was "guaranteed by the treaty of Vienna"—while he
lamented on July 13,1840, that the occupation of Cracow, being a violation
of the treaty of Vienna, "there were no means of enforcing the opinions of
England, because Cracow was evidently a place where no English action
could possibly take place;" two days later he concluded a Russian treaty,
closing the Dardanelles to England "during times of peace with Turkey," and
thus depriving England of the only means of "enforcing" the treaty of
Vienna, and transforming the Euxine into a place where no English action
could possibly take place.

"

This point once obtained, he contrived to give a sham satisfaction to public
opinion by firing off a whole battery of papers, reminding the "despotic
government, which measures right by power, and rules its conduct by ex-
pediency, and not by justice," in a sententious and sentimental manner, that
"Russia, when she compelled Turkey to cede to her the outlet of a great
European river, which forms the commercial highway for the mutual inter-
course of many nations, undertook duties and responsibilities to other states
which she should take a pride in making good. " To this dwelling upon abstract

principles Count Nesselrode was giving the inevitable answer that, "the
subject should be carefully examined," and expressing from time to time "a
feeling of soreness on the part of the imperial government at the mistrust
manifested as to their intentions."

Thus, through the management of the noble lord, in 1853 things arrived
at the point where the navigation of the Danube was declared impossible,
and corn rotting atthe mouth of the Sulina, while famine threatened to invade
England, France, and the South of Europe. Thus Russia was not only adding,
as the "Times" says, "to her other important possessions, that of an iron gate
between the Danube, and the Euxine," she possessed herself of the key to
the Danube, of a breadscrew, which she can put on, whenever the policy of
Western Europe becomes obnoxious to punishment.

The People's Paper,
No. 86, 24 December 1853

Eighth Article.

The petitions presented to the House of Commons, on April 20th, 1836, and

the resolution moved by Mr. Patrick M. Stewart in reference to them, did not
only refer to the Danube, but to Circassia too, the rumour having spread
through the commercial world that the Russian government, on the plea of
blockading the coast of Circassia, pretended to exclude English ships from
landing goods and merchandise in certain ports of the Eastern litoral of the

20 Black Sea. On that occasion Lord Palmerston solemnly declared :—"Ji parlia-

ment will place their confidence in us—if they will leave it to us to manage
the foreign relations of the country—we shall be able to protect the interests,
and to uphold the honour of the country, without being obliged to have
recourse to war."—(House of Commons, April 20th, 1836.)

Some months afterwards, on October 29th, 1836, the "Vixen," a trading
vessel belonging to Mr. George Bell, and laden with a cargo of salt, set out
from London on a direct voyage for Circassia. On November 25th, she was
seized in the Circassian Bay of Soudjouk-Kale, by a Russian man-of-war,
for "having been employed on a blockaded coast." (Letter of the Russian
Admiral Lazareff to the English Captain, Mr. Childs, December 24th, 1836.)
The vessel, her cargo, and her crew were sent to the port of Sebastopol,
where the condemnatory decision of the Russians was received on Janu-
ary 27th, 1837. This time, however, no mention was made of a "blockade,"
but the "Vixen" was simply declared a lawful prize, because "it was guilty
of smuggling;" the importation of salt being prohibited, and the Bay of
Soudjouk-Kale, a Russian port, not provided with a Custom House. The

condemnation was executed in an exquisitely ignominious and insulting
manner. The Russians, who effected the seizure, were publicly rewarded
with decorations. The British flag was hoisted, then hauled down, and the
Russian flag hoisted in its stead. The master and crew, put as captives on
board the "Ajax"—the captor—were despatched from Sebastopol to Odessa,
and from Odessa to Constantinople, whence they were allowed to return to
England. As to the vessel itself, a German traveller, who visited Sebastopol
a few years after this event, wrote, in a letter addressed to the "Augsburg
Gazette":-"After all the Russian ships of the line which I visited, no vessel
excited my curiosity more than the 'Soudjouk-Kale,' formerly the 'Vixen,'
under Russian colours, she has now quite changed her appearance. This little
vessel is now the best sailer in the Russian fleet, and is generally employed
in transports between Sebastopol and the coast of Circassia."

The capture of the "Vixen" certainly afforded Lord Palmerston a great
occasion for fulfilling his promise "to protect the interests, and to uphold
the honour of the country." Besides the honour of the British flag and the
interests of British commerce there was another question at stake—the inde-
pendence of Circassia. At first Russia justified the seizure of the "Vixen"
on the plea of an infraction of the blockade proclaimed by her; but the ship
was condemned on the opposite plea of a contravention against her Custom
House regulations. By proclaiming a blockade, Russia declared Circassia a
hostile foreign country, and the question was whether the British government
had ever recognised that blockade? By the establishment of Custom House
regulations, Circassia was, on the contrary, treated as aRussian dependency,
and the question was whether the British government had ever recognised
the Russian claims to Circassia?

Before proceeding, let it be remembered that Russia was at that epoch,
yet far from having completed her fortifications of Sebastopol.

Any Russian claim to the possession of Circassia could only be derived
from the treaty of Adrianople, as explained in a previous article. But the
treaty of July 6th, 1827, bound Russia to not attempting any territorial ag-
grandisement, nor securing any exclusive commercial advantage from her
war with Turkey. Any extension, therefore, of the Russian frontier, attendant
on the treaty of Adrianople, openly infringed the treaty of 1827, and was,
as shown by the protest of Wellington and Aberdeen, not to be recognised
on the part of Great Britain. Russia, then, had no right to receive Circassia
from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey could not cede to Russia what she
never possessed, and Circassia had always remained so independent of the
Porte that, at the time when a Turkish Pasha yet resided at Anapa, Russia
herself had concluded several conventions with the Circassian chieftains as
to the coast-trade, the Turkish trade being exclusively and legally restricted

to the port of Anapa. Circassia being an independent country, the munici-
pal, sanatory, or customs' regulations with which the Muscovite might
think fit to provide her were as binding as his regulations for the port of
Tampico.

On the other hand, if Circassia was a foreign country hostile to Russia,
the latter had only a right to blockade, if that blockade was no paper block-
ade—if Russia had the naval squadron present to enforce it, and really
domineered the coast. Now, on acoast extending 200 miles, Russia possessed
but three isolated forts; all the rest of Circassia remaining in the hands of

the Circassian tribes. There existed no Russian fort in the bay of Soudjouk-

Kale. There was in fact, no blockade, because no maritime force was em-
ployed. There was the offer of the distinct testimony of the crew of two
British vessels who had visited the bay—the one in September, 1834—the
other, that of the "Vixen" itself—confirmed subsequently by the public
statements of two British travellers who visited the harbour inthe years 1837
and 1838, that there was no Russian occupation whatever of the coast.—(Port-
folio VIII, March 1, 1844.)

When the "Vixen" entered the harbour of Soudjouk-Kale, "there were no
Russian ships of war in sight nor in the offing ... A Russian vessel of war
came into the harbour 36 hours after the 'Vixen' had cast anchor, and at the
moment when the owner and some of the officers were on shore in fixing
the dues demanded by the Circassian authorities, and payable on the value
of the goods ... The man-of-war came not coast-wise, but from the open
sea."-(Speech of Mr. Anstey, H. of C, Feb. 23, 1848.)

But need we give further proofs than the St. Petersburgh Cabinet itself
seizing the "Vixen" en pretext of blockade, and confiscating it, en pretext
of custom-house regulations?

The Circassians thus appeared the more favoured by accident, as the
question of their independence coincided with the question of the free
navigation of the Black-Sea—the protection of British commerce, and an
insolent act of piracy committed by Russia on a British merchant ship. Then-
chance of obtaining protection from the mistress of the seas seemed less
doubtful as "the Circassian declaration of independence had a short time ago
been published after mature deliberation and several weeks' correspondence

with different branches of the government, in a periodical ("The Portfolio")

connected with the foreign department, and as Circassia was marked out as
an independent country in a map, revised by Lord Palmerston himself."—
(Speech of Lord Stanley, H. of C, June 21,1838.)

Will it then be believed that the noble and chivalrous Viscount knew how
to handle the case so masterly, that the very act of piracy committed by
Russia against British property afforded him the long sought-for occasion

of formally recognising the treaty of Adrianople, and the extinction of
Circassian independence?

On March 17,1837, Mr. Roebuck moved, withreference to the confiscation
of the "Vixen," for "a copy of all correspondence between the government
of this country and the governments of Russia and Turkey relating to the
treaty of Adrianople, as well as all transactions or negotiations connected
with the ports and territories on the shores ofthe Black Sea by Russia since
the treaty of Adrianople."

Mr. Roebuck, from fear of being suspected of humanitarian tendencies,
and of defending Circassia on the ground of abstract principles, plainly
declared:—"Russia may endeavour to obtain possession of all the world, and
I regard her efforts with indifference; but the moment she interferes with
our commerce, I call upon the government of this country (which country
exists in appearance somewhere beyond the limits of all the world), to punish
the aggression." Accordingly he wanted to know "if the British government
had acknowledged the treaty of Adrianople?"

The noble lord, although pressed very hard, had ingenuity enough to make
a long speech, and "to sit down without telling the house who was in actual
possession of the Circassian coast at the present moment—whether it really
belonged to Russia, and whether it was by right of a violation of fiscal
regulations, or in consequence of an existing blockade, that the 'Vixen' had
been seized, and whether or not he recognised the Treaty of Adrianople."
(Speech of Mr. Hume, H. of C, March 17th, 1837.)

Mr. Roebuck stated that, before allowing the "Vixen" to proceed to Cir-
cassia, Mr. Bell had applied to the noble lord, in order to ascertain whether
there was any impropriety or danger to be apprehended of a vessel landing
goods in any part of Circassia, and that the Foreign Office answered in the
negative. Thus, Lord Palmerston found himself obliged to read to the house
the correspondence exchanged between himself and Mr. Bell. Reading these
letters, one would fancy he was reading a Spanish comedy on the cloak and
the sword, rather than an official correspondence between a minister and
a merchant. When he heard the noble lord read the letters respecting the
seizure of the "Vixen," Daniel O'Connell exclaimed, "He could not help
calling to his mind the expression of Talleyrand that language had been
invented to conceal thoughts."

For instance, Mr. Bell asks, "whether there were any restrictions on trade
recognised by His Majesty's government—as, if not, he intended to send
thither a vessel with a cargo of salt?" "You ask me," answers Lord Palmer-
ston, "whether it would be for your advantage to engage in a speculation in

salt," and informs him "that it is for commercial f irms to judge for themselves 40

whether they shall enter or decline a speculation." "By no means," replies

Mr. Bell. "All I want to know is, whether or not His Majesty's government
recognise the Russian blockade on the Black Sea to the South of the river
Kuban?" "You must look at the London 'Gazette'," retorts the noble lord,
"in which all the notifications, such as those alluded to by you, are made."
The London "Gazette" was, indeed, the quarter to which a British merchant
had to refer for such information, instead of the ukases of the Emperor of
Russia. Mr. Bell, finding no indication whatever in the "Gazette" of the
acknowledgement of the blockade or of other restrictions, despatched his
vessel. The result was, that some time after he was himself placed in the
"Gazette."

"I referred Mr. Bell," says Lord Palmerston, "to the 'Gazette,' where he
would find that no blockade had been communicated or declared to this
country by the Russian government—consequently, none was acknowl-
edged." By referring Mr. Bell to the "Gazette," Lord Palmerston did not only
deny the acknowledgement on the part of Great Britain of the Russian
blockade, but simultaneously affirmed that, in his opionion, the Coast of
Circassia formed no part oi the Russian territory, because blockades of their
own territories by foreign states—as for instance against revolted subjects-
are not to be notified in the "Gazette." Circassia forming no part of the

20 Russian territory could not, of course, be included in Russian Custom House

regulations. Thus, according to his own statement, Lord Palmerston denied,
in his letters to Mr. Bell, Russia's right to blockade the Circassian Coast, or
to subject it to commercial restrictions. It is true that, through his speech,
transpired the desire to induce the house to infer that Russia had possession
of Circassia. But, on the other hand, he stated plainly, "As far as the ex-
tension of the Russian frontier is concerned, on the South of the Caucasus
and the shores of the Black Sea, it is certainly not consistent with the solemn
declaration made by Russia in the face of Europe, previous to the com-
mencement of the Turkish war." When he sat down, pledging himself ever
"to protect the interests and to uphold the honour of the country," he seemed
to labour beneath the accumulated miseries of his past policy, rather than
hatching treacherous designs for the future. On that day he met with the
following cruel apostrophe:—
"The want of vigorous alacrity to defend the honour of the country which
the noble lord had displayed was most culpable; the conduct of no former
minister had ever been so vacillating, so hesitating, so uncertain, so cowardly,
when insult had been offered to British subjects. How much longer did the
noble lord propose to allow Russia thus to insult Great Britain, and thus to
injure British commerce? The noble lord was degrading England by hold-
ing her out in the character of a bully—haughty and tyrannical to the weak,
humble and abject to the strong."

Who was it that thus mercilessly branded the truly English Minister?
Nobody else than Lord Dudley Stuart.

On November 25th, 1836, the "Vixen" was confiscated. The stormy
debates of the House of Commons, just quoted, took place on March 17th,
1837. It was not till April 19th, 1837, that the noble lord requested the Russian
government "to state the reasons on account of which it had thought itself
warranted to seize, in time of peace, a merchant vessel belonging to British
subjects." On May 17th, 1837, the noble lord received the following despatch
from the Earl of Durham, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: —

"My Lord,—With respect to the military de facto occupation of Soudjouk-
Kale, I have to state to your lordship that there is a fortress in the bay which
bears the name of the Empress (Alexandrinski), and that it has always been
occupied by a Russian garrison.

I have, etc., Durham."

It need hardly be remarked that the fort Alexandrinski had not even the
reality of the pasteboard towns exhibited by Potemkin, before the Empress
Katharine II., on her visit to the Crimea. Five days after the receipt of this
despatch, Lord Palmerston returns the following answer to StPeters-
burg:-

"His Majesty's government, considering in the first place that Soudjouk-
Kale, which was acknowledged by Russia in the treaty of 1783 as a Turkish
possession, now belongs to Russia, as stated by-Lord Nessehode, by virtue
of the Treaty of Adrianople, see no sufficient reason to question the right
of Russia to seize and confiscate the 'Vixen'."

There are some very curious circumstances connected with the negoti-
ation. Lord Palmerston requires six months of premeditation for opening,
and hardly one to close it. His last despatch, of May 23d, 1837, suddenly and
abruptly cuts off any further transactions. It quotes the date before the
Treaty of Kudschuk-Kainardji, not after the Gregorian, but after the Greek
chronology. Besides, "between April 19th, and May 23rd," as Sir Robert Peel
said, "a remarkable change, from official declaration to satisfaction, oc-
curred—apparently induced by the assurance received from Count Nessel-
rode, that Turkey had ceded the coast in question to Russia by the Treaty
of Adrianople. Why did he not protest against this ukase?" (H. of C,
June 21st, 1838.)

Why all this? The reason is very simple. King William IV. had secretly
instigated Mr. Bell to despatch the "Vixen" to the Coast of Circassia. When
the noble lord delayed negotiation, the King was still in full health. When
he suddenly closed the negotiations, William IV. was in the agonies of death,
and Lord Palmerston disposed as absolutely of the Foreign Office, as if he
was himself the Autocrat of Great Britain. Was it not a master-stroke on the

part of his jocose lordship to formally acknowledge by one dash of the pen
the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia's possession of Circassia, and the con-
fiscation of the "Vixen," in the name of the dying king, who had despatched
that saucy "Vixen," with the express view to mortify the Czar, to disregard
the Treaty of Adrianople, and to affirm the independence of Circassia?

Mr. Bell, as we stated, went into the "Gazette," and Mr. Urquhart thenthe
first secretary of the Embassy at Constantinople, was recalled, because of
"having persuaded Mr. Bell to carry his 'Vixen' expedition into execu-
tion."

As long as King William IV. was alive, Lord Palmerston dared not openly
countermand the "Vixen" expedition, as is proved by the Circassian declara-
tion of independence, published in the Portfolio, by the Circassian map-
revised by his lordship—by his uncertain correspondence with Mr. Bell, by
his vague declarations in the house, by the supercargo of the "Vixen,"

Mr. Bell's brother, receiving, when setting out, despatches from the Foreign
Office for the Embassy at Constantinople, and direct encouragement from
Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte.

In the earlier times of Queen Victoria, the Whig ascendancy seemed to
be safer than ever, and accordingly the language of the chivalrous viscount
suddenly changed. From deference and cajolery, it became at once haughty
and contemptuous. Interrogated by Mr. T. H. Attwood, on Dec. 14,1837, with
regard to the "Vixen" and Circassia—"As to the 'Vixen,' Russia had given
such explanations of her conduct as ought to satisfy the government of this
country. That ship was not taken during a blockade. It was captured because
those who had the management of it contravened the municipal and customs'
regulations of Russia." As to Mr. Attwood's apprehension of Russian en-
croachment— "I say that Russia gives to the world quite as much security for
the preservation of peace as England." (Speech of Lord Palmerston, H. of
C, Dec. 14, 1837.)

At the close of the session the noble lord laid before the house the cor-
respondence with the Russian government, the two most important parts of
which we have already quoted.

In 1838 party-aspects had again changed, and the Tories recovered an
influence. On June 21st they gave Lord Palmerston a round charge, Su-
Stratford Canning, the present Ambassador at Constantinople, moving for
a Select Committee to inquire into the allegations made by Mr. George Bell
against the noble lord, and in his claims of indemnification. At first his
lordship was highly astonished that Sir Stratford's motion should be of "so
trifling a character." "You," exclaimed Sir Robert Peel, "are the first English

minister who dares to call trifles the protection of the British property and
commerce." "No individual merchant," said Lord Palmerston, "was entitled

to ask Her Majesty's government to give an opinion on questions of that sort,
as the right of Russia to the sovereignty of Circassia, or to establish those
customs and sanatory regulations, she was enforcing by the power of her
arms." "If that be not your duty, what is the use of the Foreign Office at
all?" asked Mr. Hume. "It is said," resumed the noble lord, "that Mr. Bell,
this innocent Mr. Bell, was led into a trap by me by the answers I gave him.
The trap, if there was one, was laidnotfor Mr. Bell, but by Mr. Bell," namely,
by the questions he put to innocent Lord Palmerston.

In the course of these debates (June 21st, 1838), out came at length the
great secret. Had he been willing to resist in 1836 the claims of Russia, the
noble lord had been unable to do so from the very simple reason that, already
in 1831 his first act on coming into office was to acknowledge the Russian
usurpation of the Caucasus, and thus, in a surreptitious way, the treaty of
Adrianople. Lord Stanley (now Lord Derby) stated that, on August 8th, 1831,
the Russian Cabinet informed its representative at Constantinople of its
intention "to subject to sanatory regulations the communications which
freely exist between the inhabitants of the Caucasus and the neighbouring
Turkish provinces," and that he was "to communicate the above-mentioned
regulations to the foreign missions at Constantinople as well as to the Otto-
man Government." By allowing Russia the establishment of so-called sana-
tory and custom-house regulations on the coast of Circassia, although exist-
ing nowhere except in the above letter, Russian claims to the Caucasus were
acknowledged, and consequently the treaty of Adrianople, on which they
were grounded. "Those instruction," said Lord Stanley, "had been com-
municated in the most formal manner to Mr. Mandeville (Secretary to the
Embassy), at Constantinople, expressly for the information of the British
merchants, and transmitted to the noble Lord Palmerston." Neither did he,
nor dared he, "according to the practice of former governments, com-
municate to the committee at Lloyd's the fact of such a notification having
been received." The noble lord made himself guilty of "a six years' con-
cealment," exclaimed Sir Robert Peel.

On that day his jocose lordship escaped from condemnation by a majority
of sixteen; 184 votes being against, and 200 for him. Those sixteen votes will
neither out-voice History nor silence the mountaineers, the clashing of whose
arms proves to the world that the Caucasus does not "now belong to Russia,
as stated by Count Nessehode," and as echoed by Lord Palmerston!

(To be continued).