[Ideas— Reflections of Reality] 

All ideas are taken from experience, are reflections—true or 
distorted —of reality. 

Ch. III, pp. 33-34 
[Material World and Laws of Thought] 

Two kinds of experience—external, material, and internal— 
laws of thought and forms of thought. Forms of thought also 
partly inherited by development (self-evidence, for instance, of 
mathematical axioms for Europeans, certainly not for Bushmen 
and Australian Negroes). 

If our premises are correct and we apply the laws of thought 
correctly to them, the result must tally with reality, just as a 
calculation in analytical geometry must tally with the geometrical 
construction, although the two are entirely different methods. 
Unfortunately, however, this is almost never the case, and if so, 
only in very simple operations. 

The external world, in its turn, is either nature or society. 

Ch. IIL, pp. 33-34; Ch. IV, pp. 39-42; and Ch. X, pp. 88-89 
[Relation of Thinking and Being] 

The sole content of thinking is the world and the laws of 
thought. 

@ The part and chapter references, and also the page references for the 
corresponding excerpts from this volume, have been provided by the Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU.— Ed. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 597 

The general results of the investigation of the world are 
obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, 
points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter 
in one’s head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then 
reconstruct the world from them in one’s head 1s ideology, an 
ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto 
existing; because while in nature the relation of thinking to being 
was certainly to some extent clear to materialism, in history it was 
not, nor did materialism realise the dependence of all thought 
upon the historical material conditions obtaining at the particular 
time.— As Dthring proceeds from “principles” instead of facts he 
is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating 
his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they 
appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from 
them; one can only read something into them. Thus, for instance, 
the principle of sole being. The unity of the world and the 
nonsense of a hereafter are a result of the whole investigation of 
the world but are here to be proved a priori, proceeding from an 
axiom of thought. Hence bosh.—But without this turning around a 
philosophy apart is impossible. 

Ch. ILI, pp. 35-36 

[The World as a Coherent Whole. 
Knowledge of the World] 

Systematics* impossible after Hegel. The world clearly constitutes 
a single system, i.e., a coherent whole, but the knowledge of this 
system presupposes a knowledge of all nature and history, which 
man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill in the 
countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, 1.e., engage in 
irrational fancies, ideologise. 

Rational fantasy— alias combination! 

Ch. III, pp. 36-39 

[Mathematical Operations 
and Purely Logical Operations] 

Calculative reason— calculating machine!—Curious confusion of 
mathematical operations, which are capable of material demonstra- 

a Here in the sense of building up an absolutely completed system.— Ed. 

598 From the Preparatory Materials 

tion, of proof because they are based on direct, even if abstract, 
material contemplation, with purely logical ones, which are capable 
only of proof by deduction, hence are incapable of the positive 
certainty possessed by mathematical operations—and how many of 
them wrong! Machine for integration; cf. Andrews’ speech, Nature, 
Sept. 7, 76.27 

Scheme=stereotype. 

Ch. UI, pp. 36-38; Ch. IV, pp. 39-41 

[Reality and Abstraction] 

It is just as impossible for Ditihring to prove the exclusive 
materiality of all being with the aid of the proposition of the 
oneness of all-embracing being, which the Pope and the Sheikh-ul- 
Islam *'* can subscribe to without detracting from their infallibility 
and religion, as it is impossible for him to construct a triangle or a 
sphere or derive the Pythagorean theorem from any mathematical 
axiom. Both require real preconditions and it is only upon an 
investigation of these that the above results are arrived at. The 
certainty that no spiritual world exists separately, besides the 
material world, is the result of a long and wearisome investigation of 
the real world, y compris* of the products and processes of the 
human brain. The results of geometry are nothing but the natural 
properties of the various lines, planes and solids or their 
combinations, which for the most part occurred in nature long 
before man existed (Radiolaria, insects, crystals, etc.). 

Ch. VI, p. 55 et seqq. 

[Motion as the Mode of Existence of Matter] 

Motion is the mode of existence of matter, hence more than a mere 
property of it. There is no matter without motion, nor could there 
ever have been. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of 
smaller masses on a single celestial body, the vibration of 
molecules as heat, electric tension, magnetic polarisation, chemical 
decomposition and combination, organic life up to its highest 
product, thought—at each given moment each individual atom of 
matter is in one or other of these forms of motion. All equilibrium 
is either only relative rest or even motion in equilibrium, like that 

4 Inclusive.— Ed. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 599 

of the planets. Absolute rest is only conceivable in the absence of 
matter. Neither motion as such nor any of its forms, such as 
mechanical force, can therefore be separated from matter nor 
opposed to it as something apart or alien, without leading to an 
absurdity. 

Ch. VI, pp. 65-67 

[Natural Selection] 

Duhring ought to rejoice Over NATURAL SELECTION, aS it furnishes 
the best illustration of his theory of conscious end and means.— 
Whereas Darwin inquires into the form, natural selection, in which 
a slow alteration takes place, Duhring demands that Darwin 
should also name the cause of the alteration, of which Herr 
Duhring likewise knows nothing. No matter what progress science 
has made, Herr Dihring will always declare that something is still 
lacking and so will have ample grounds for grumbling. 

Ch. VII 
[On Darwin] 

How great is the stature of the thoroughly modest Darwin, who 
not only collects, arranges and elaborates thousands of facts from 
the whole of biology but takes delight in quoting any predecessor, 
however insignificant, even to the diminution of his own glory, in 
comparison with that braggadocio Duhring, who while contribut- 
ing nothing of value himself is over-exacting of others, and who.... 

Ch. VI, pp. 66-67; Ch. VIIL, p. 74 

Dihringiana. Darwinism, p. 115.’ 

Adaptation of plants is a combination of physical forces or 
chemical agents; hence, no adaptation. If, “in growing, a plant 
takes the path along which it will receive most light”, it does so in 
various ways and by various means, which differ according to its 
species and peculiarities. The physical forces and chemical agents, 
however, act differently here in each plant and help the plant, 

a The pages given refer to Diuhring’s Cursus der Philosophie ais  streng 
wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung.— Ed. 

600 From the Preparatory Materials 

which after all is something other than these “chemical and 
physical, etc.”, to get the light it needs in the way that has become 
peculiar to it by lengthy precedent evolution. Indeed, this light 
acts as a stimulus on the plant cells and sets in motion within 
them, as a response, precisely those forces and agents.* Since this 
process goes on in an organic cellular structure and assumes the 
form of stimulation and response, which occurs here just as it does 
in transmission by nerves in the human brain, the identical 
expression, adaptation, fits in both cases. And if adaptation is to 
be accomplished absolutely through the medium of consciousness, 
where do consciousness and adaptation begin and where do they 
end? With the moneron, with the insect-eating plant, with the 
sponge, with the coral, with the first nerve? Duhring would do a 
very great favour to natural scientists of the old stripe if he should 
draw this boundary line. Protoplasm stimulation and protoplasm 
response are to be found wherever there is living protoplasm. And 
since the influence of slowly changing stimuli calls forth change in 
the protoplasm too, otherwise it would perish, the same expres- 
sion, adaptation, must be applied to all organic bodies. 

Ch. VII, p. 66 et seqq. 
[Adaptation and Heredity] 

With regard to the evolution of the species, Haeckel perceives 
adaptation as negative, or altering; heredity as positive, or 
preserving factor. Dühring on the contrary states (p. 122) that 
heredity also has negative results, produces alterations. (Besides, 
nice trash about preformation.) Now nothing is easier than to 
turn such opposites, like all other opposites of this kind, around 
and prove that adaptation, precisely by altering the form, preserves 
the essence, the organ itself, while heredity, by the fact alone of the 
mixture of two individuals different each time, constantly brings 
about changes the accumulation of which does not exclude a 
change in species. As a matter of fact, the results of adaptation are 
also inherited! But this does not get us one step further. We must 
take the facts of the case as they are and investigate them, and then 
we shall of course find that Haeckel is quite right in considering 
heredity essentially the conservative, positive side of the process 
and adaptation, its revolutionising, negative side. Domestication 

* And among animals, too, spontaneous adaptation is most important. 
[Marginal note.] 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 601 

and breeding as well as spontaneous adaptation speak louder here 
than all of Dihring’s “subtle conceptions”. 

Ch. VIL, pp. 75-77 

Duhring, p. 141. 

Life. That exchange of matter is the most important phenomenon 
of life has been asserted innumerable times during the last twenty 
years by physiological chemists and chemical physiologists and is 
here repeatedly extolled as the definition of life. But neither an exact 
nor an exhaustive one. Exchange of matter is encountered also in the 
absence of life, e.g., in simple chemical processes which, given an 
adequate supply of raw material, constantly reproduce their own 
conditions, a definite body being the carrier of the process (for 
example, see Roscoe, 102, manufacture of sulphuric acid‘), in 
endosmose and exosmose (through dead organic and even inorganic 
membranes?), in Traube’s artificial cells**° and their medium. 
Exchange of matter, supposed to constitute life, itself requires more 
exact defining. Thus, despite all deeper foundations, subtle 
conceptions and closer investigations, we have not yet got to the 
bottom of this thing and still ask what life is. 

To science definitions are worthless because always inadequate. 
The only real definition is the development of the thing itself, but 
this is no longer a definition. To know and show what life is we 
must examine all forms of life and present them in their 
interconnection. On the other hand, for ordinary purposes, a brief 
exposition of the commonest and at the same time most significant 
features of a so-called definition is often useful and even 
necessary, and can do no harm if no more is expected of it than it 
can convey. Let us therefore attempt to give such a definition of 
life, an attempt in which so many people have racked their brains 
in vain (see Nicholson”). 

Life is the mode of existence of albuminous bodies and this 
mode of existence essentially consists in the constant renewal of 
their chemical constituents by nutrition and excretion... 

aH. E. Roscoe, Kurzes Lehrbuch der Chemie nach den neuesten Ansichten der 
Wissenschaft, p. 102.— Ed. 

b See H. A. Nicholson, A Manual of Zoology, General Introduction, Section 4: 
Nature and Conditions of Life, where the author gives various definitions of life.— Ed. 

21* 

602 From the Preparatory Materials 

Then, from the organic exchange of matter as the essential 
function of albumen and from its peculiar plasticity, are derived 
all the other most simple functions of life—irritability, which is 
already included in the mutual interaction between nutrition and 
albumen; contractibility in the consumption of food; possibility of 
growth, which at the lowest stage (moneron) includes propagation 
by fission; internal movement, without which neither swallowing 
nor assimilation of food is possible. But how the advance from 
simple plastic albumen to the cell and thus to the organism is 
accomplished must first be learnt from observation, yet such an 
inquiry is no part of a simple practical definition of life. (On 
p. 141 Dihring mentions besides a whole intermediate world, 
inasmuch as there is no real life without a system of circulation 
canals and a “germ scheme”. A superb passage.) 

Ch. X, pp. 89-95 
Duhring— Political Economy.—The Two Men 

As long as morality is the point at issue Duhring can set them 
down as equal, but as soon as political economy comes under 
discussion that ceases to be so. If, for example, the two men are a 
yankee Broken INTO ALL TRADES and a Berlin student who brings along 
nothing but his graduation certificate and the philosophy of reality, 
and in addition arms that on principle have never been strengthened 
by fencing, where does equality come in? The yankee produces 
everything, the student only helps here and there, but distribution 
takes place according to the contribution of each; soon the yankee 
will have the means capitalistically to exploit any eventual increase 
in the population of the colony (births or immigration). The whole 
modern order, capitalist production and all that, can therefore be 
brought into being by the two men without either of them needing 
a sabre. 

Ch. X, pp. 95-99 

Dihringiana. 

Equality— Justice—The idea that equality is the expression of 
justice, the principle of consummated political and social regula- 
tion, arose quite historically. It did not exist in primitive 
communities, or only very limitedly so, for full members of 
individual communities, and was saddled with slavery. Ditto in the 
democracy of antiquity. Equality of all people—Greeks, Romans 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 603 

and barbarians, freemen and slaves, subjects and aliens, citizens 
and peregrines, etc.—was not only insane but criminal to the mind 
of the ancients, and in Christendom its first beginnings naturally 
were persecuted.—In Christianity there was first the negative 
equality of all human beings before God as sinners, and, more narrowly 
construed, the equality of all children of God redeemed by the 
grace and the blood of Christ. Both versions are grounded in the 
role of Christianity as the religion of the slaves, the banished, the 
dispossessed, the persecuted, the oppressed. With the victory of 
Christianity this circumstance was relegated to the rear and prime 
importance attached next to the antithesis between believers and 
pagans, orthodox and heretics.— With the rise of the cities and 
thereby of the more or less developed elements of the bourgeoisie, 
as well as of the proletariat, the demand for equality as a condition 
of bourgeois existence was bound gradually to resurge, interlinked 
with the proletariat’s drawing of the conclusion to proceed from 
political to social equality. This naturally assumed a religious form, 
sharply expressed for the first time in the Peasant War.**!—The 
bourgeois side was first formulated by Rousseau, in trenchant 
terms but still on behalf of all humanity. As was the case with all 
demands of the bourgeoisie, so here too the proletariat cast a 
fateful shadow beside it and drew its own conclusions (Babeuf). 
This connection between bourgeois equality and the proletariat’s 
drawing of conclusions should be developed in greater detail. 

So it took almost all of past history to elaborate the principle of 
equality=justice, and this success was achieved only when a 
bourgeoisie and a proletariat had come into existence. The 
principle of equality signifies, however, that there must be no 
privileges, hence is essentially negative, pronounces all past history 
wretched. Because of its lack of positive content and its offhand 
rejection of the entire past it is just as suitable for proclamation by 
a great revolution, 1789-1796, as for the later blockheads engaged 
in manufacturing systems. But to represent equality=justice as the 
highest principle and ultimate truth is absurd. Equality exists 
only in opposition to inequality, justice—in opposition to injustice; 
hence they are still saddled with the opposition to old, past history, 
and hence to old society itself.* 

This suffices to bar them from constituting eternal justice and 
truth. A few generations of social development under a commu- 
nist regime and increased resources must bring mankind to a stage 

* The idea of equality [follows] from the equality of general human labour in 
commodity production. Das Kapital, p. 36. [Marginal note.]322 

604 From the Preparatory Materials 

where this boasting about equality and right appears as ridiculous 
as boasting of privileges of nobility and birth appears today, where 
the opposition to the old inequality and to the old positive law and 
even to the new, transitional law, disappears from practical life, 
where anyone who pedantically insists on being given his equal 
and just share of the products is laughed to scorn by being given 
twice as much. Even Dihring will find this to be “foreseeable”, 
and where else will there be room then for equality and justice if 
not in the lumber-room of historical reminiscences? The fact that 
such phrases make excellent propaganda material today will not 
turn them into an eternal truth by a long shot. 

(The content of equality must be elucidated.—Restriction to 
rights, etc.) 

Moreover, an abstract equality theory is still an absurdity today 
and will remain such for a considerable length of time. It would 
never occur to a socialist proletarian or theoretician to recognise 
the abstract equality between himself and a Bushman or Tierra del 
Fuegan, or even a peasant or semi-feudal agricultural day- 
labourer; and as soon as this has been overcome, even if only in 
Europe, the standpoint of abstract equality will also be overcome. 
With the introduction of rational equality that equality loses all 
meaning. If equality is now demanded, this is so in anticipation of 
the intellectual and moral equalisation which thus under present 
historical conditions follows of itself. Eternal morality must have 
been possible at all times and must everywhere be possible. But 
even Duhring does not maintain this in regard to equality; on the 
contrary, he allows for a provisional period of repression, hence 
admits that equality is not an eternal truth but a historical product 
and attribute of definite historical conditions. 

The equality of the bourgeoisie (abolition of class privileges) is 
very different from that of the proletariat (abolition of the classes 
themselves). If driven further than the latter, ie., if conceived 
abstractly, equality becomes an absurdity. And so Herr Duhring is 
finally compelled to reintroduce, by a back-door, both armed as 
well as administrative, judicial and police force. 

Thus the idea of equality is itself a historical product and its 
elaboration required the whole of preceding history; hence it did 
not exist from all eternity as a truth. The fact that now most 
people take it for granted—en principe*—is not due to its being 
axiomatic but to the spread of the ideas of the eighteenth century. And, 
therefore, if the two famous men today take their stand on the 

a In principle.— Ed. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 605 

principle of equality, that is to be explained by their being 
presented as “‘eddicated” people of the nineteenth century and its 
being “natural” with them. How real people behave and did 
behave depends and always did depend on the historical 
conditions under which they lived. 

Ch. IX, pp. 86-87; Ch. X, pp. 95-99 

[Dependence of Ideas on Social Relations] 

The notion that the ideas and conceptions of people create their 
conditions of life and not the other way round is contradicted by all 
past history, in which results constantly differed from what had 
been desired and in the further course of events were in most 
cases even the opposite. Only in the more or less distant future 
can this notion become a reality in so far as men will understand 
in advance the necessity of changing the social system [ Verfassung] 
(sit venia verbo*), on account of changing conditions, and will 
desire the change before it forces itself upon them without their 
being conscious of it or desiring it—The same is true of the 
conceptions of law, hence of politics (as rar as THAT GoEs, this point is 
to be dealt with under “Philosophy”, while “force” is reserved for 
political economy). 

Ch. XI, pp. 105-06 (cf. also Part III, Ch. V, pp. 300-02) 

Even the correct reflection of nature is extremely difficult, the 
product of a long history of experience. To primitive man the 
forces of nature were something alien, mysterious, superior. At a 
certain stage, through which all civilised peoples passed, he 
assimilates them by means of personification. It was this urge to 
personify that created gods everywhere, and the consensus gentium, 
as regards proof of the existence of God, proves after all only the 
universality of this urge to personify as a necessary transition 
stage, and consequently the universality of religion too. Only real 
knowledge of the forces of nature ejects the gods or God from 
one position after another (Secchi and his solar system).‘ This 

a If one may be permitted to use this word.— Ed. 

b Consensus of the peoples.— Ed. 
© See this volume, p. 480.— Fa. 

606 From the Preparatory Materials 

process has now advanced so far that theoretically it may be 
considered concluded. 

In the sphere of social phenomena reflection is still more 
difficult. Society is determined by economic relations, production 
and exchange, and besides by historical preconditions. 

Ch. XII, pp. 110-12 (see also Introduction, pp. 22-24) 

Antithesis—if a thing is saddled with its antithesis it is in 
contradiction with itself, and so is its expression in thought. For 
example, there is a contradiction in a thing remaining the same and 
yet constantly changing, being possessed of the antithesis of 
“inertness” and “change”. 

Ch. XII 
[Negation of the Negation] 

All Indo-Germanic peoples began with common property. 
Among almost all of them it was abolished, negated, in the course 
of social development, extruded by other forms—private proper- 
ty, feudal property, etc. To negate this negation, to restore common 
property on a higher plane of development, is the task of the 
social revolution. Or: the philosophy of antiquity was originally 
spontaneous materialism. The latter gave rise to idealism, spiritual- 
ism, negation of materialism, first in the shape of the antithesis of 
soul and body, then in the doctrine of immortality and in 
monotheism. This spiritualism was universally disseminated 
through the medium of Christianity. The negation of this negation 
is the reproduction of the old on a higher plane, modern 
materialism, which, in contrast with the past, finds its theoretical 
conclusion in scientific socialism... 

It goes without saying that these natural and historical processes 
have their reflection in the thinking brain and _ reproduce 
themselves in it, as is seen in the above examples: —a X ~a, etc.; 
and it is just the paramount dialectical problems that are solved by 
this method alone. 

But there is also a bad, barren negation.— True, natural, 
historical and dialectical negation (taken formally) is precisely what 
constitutes the driving principle of all development—the splitting 
into antitheses, their struggle and resolution. At the same time, on 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dthring 607 

the basis of the experience gained, the original point of departure 
is again arrived at (in history partly, in thought wholly), but on a 
higher plane.—A barren negation is a purely subjective, individual 
one. Not being a stage of development of the thing itself, it is an 
opinion introduced from without. And as nothing can result from 
it, the negator must be at loggerheads with the world, sullenly 
finding fault with everything that exists or ever happened, with 
the whole historical development. True, the Greeks of antiquity 
accomplished a few things, but they knew nothing of spectral 
analysis, chemistry, differential calculus, steam-engines, chaussées, 
the electric telegraph or the railway. Why dwell at length on the 
products of people of such minor importance? Everything is 
bad—so far this sort of negator is a pessimist—save our own 
exalted selves, who are perfect, and thus our pessimism resolves 
itself into optimism. And thus we ourselves have perpetrated a 
negation of the negation! 

Even Rousseau’s way of looking at history—original equality, 
deterioration through inequality, restoration of equality on a higher 
plane—is a negation of the negation. 

Duhring constantly preaches idealism— ideal conception, etc. If 
we draw conclusions about the future from existing relations, if we 
perceive and investigate the positive side of the negative elements 
operative in the course of history—and even the most narrow- 
minded progressist, the idealist Lasker, does that, in his own 
way — Duhring calls it “idealism” and deduces from it the right to 
design a plan for the future that provides even the curricula for 
schools, a plan that, however, is fantastic because based on 
ignorance. And he overlooks the fact that in doing so he, too, 1s 
committing a negation of the negation. 

Ch. XIII, pp. 127-28 
Negation of the Negation and Contradiction. 

The “nothing” of a positive is a definite nothing, says Hegel. 

“Differentials can be considered and treated as real zeros,» which stand in a 
relation to one another that is determined by the state of the question under 
discussion.” Bossut continues that mathematically this is not nonsense.323 

aG. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. In: Werke, Bd. 3, p. 74.— Ed. 
b Here and below italics by Engels.— Ed. 

608 From the Preparatory Materials 

O may represent a very definite value if obtained by the 

simultaneous disappearance of the numerator and the de- 

nominator. Ditto 0:0= A: B, where C28 , consequently changes with 
B 

a change in the value of A or B (p. 95, examples). And is it not a 
“contradiction” that zeros form ratios, i.e., can have not only value 
in general but even various values which are expressible in 
figures? 1:2=1:2; 1—1:2—2=1:2; 0:0=1:2. 

Dihring himself says that those summations of infinitely small 
magnitudes are the highest, etc., of mathematics, in plain words, 
integral calculus. And how is this done? I have two, three or more 
variable quantities, i.e., such as maintain a definite relation among 
themselves when changing—say, two quantities, x and y, and am to 
solve a definite problem which is not solvable by ordinary 
mathematics and in which x and y function. I differentiate x and y, 
i.e., I take x and y as so infinitely small that in comparison with 
any real quantity, however small, they disappear—that nothing is 

left of x and y but He reciprocal relation, without ay material 
basis; consequently c=8 =7 but < expressed in the ratio - . That this 
ratio between two quantities which have disappeared, the fixed 
moment of their disappearance, is a contradiction cannot disturb 
us. And now, what have I done but negate x and y, though not in 
such a way that I need not bother about them any more, but in 
the way that corresponds with the facts of the case? In place of x 
and y I have their negation, dx and dy, in the formulas or 
equations before me. I operate then with these formulas as usual, 
treating dx and dy as if they were real quantities, and at a certain 
point I negate the negation, i.e., I integrate the differential 
formula, and in place of dx and dy put the real quantities x and y, 
and am then not where I was at the beginning, but by using this 
method I have solved the problem on which ordinary geometry and 
algebra break their jaws in vain. 

To part II 
Ch. II 

Wherever slavery*** is the main form of production it turns 
labour into servile activity, consequently makes it dishonourable 
for freemen. Thus the way out of such a mode of production is 
barred, while on the other hand slavery is an impediment to more 
developed production, which urgently requires its removal. This 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dihring 609 

contradiction spells the doom of all production based on slavery 
and of all communities based on it. A solution comes about in 
most cases through the forcible subjection of the deteriorating 
communities by other, stronger ones (Greece by Macedonia and 
later Rome). As long as these themselves have slavery as their 
foundation there is merely a shifting of the centre and a repetition 
of the process on a higher plane until (Rome) finally a people 
conquers that replaces slavery by another form of production. Or 
slavery is abolished by compulsion or voluntarily, whereupon the 
former mode of production perishes and large-scale cultivation is 
displaced by small-peasant squatters, as in America. For that 
matter Greece too perished on account of slavery, Aristotle having 
already said that intercourse with slaves was demoralising the 
citizens, not to mention the fact that slavery makes work 
impossible for the latter. (Domestic slavery, such as exists in the 
Orient, is another matter. Here it forms the basis of production not 
directly but indirectly, as a constituent part of the family, and 
passes imperceptibly into the family (female harem slaves).) 

Ch. II 

In Duhring’s reprehensible history force holds sway. In the real, 
progressive historical movement, however, what dominates are the 
material gains which are retained. 

Ch. II 

How is force, the army, maintained? By money, hence again 
dependent on production. Cf. Athens’ fleet and policy of 380-340. 
The force exercised against the allies came to nought for lack of 
the material means to wage long and energetic wars. The English 
subsidies, granted by the new industry, modern GOS: defeated 
Napoleon. 

Ch. HI 
[The Party and Military Training] 

In considering the struggle for existence and Duhring’s declama- 
tions against struggle and arms it should be emphasised that a 
revolutionary party must know also how to struggle. It will have to 
make the revolution, possibly some day in the near future, but not 
against the present military-bureaucratic state. Politically that 
would be as insane as Babeuf’s attempt to jump from the 

610 From the Preparatory Materials 

Directorate immediately into communism; even more insane, for 
the Directorate was after all a bourgeois and peasant govern- 
ment.’ But in order to safeguard the laws issued by the 
bourgeoisie itself the Party may be compelled to take revolutionary 
measures against the bourgeois state which will supersede the 
present state. Hence the universal conscription is in our interest 
and should be taken advantage of by all to learn how to fight, but 
particularly by those whose education entitles them to acquire the 
training of an officer in one year’s voluntary service. 

Ch. IV 

On “Force” 

It is recognised that force also operates with revolutionary effect, 
namely, in all “critical” epochs of decisive importance, such as the 
transition to sociality, but even then only in self-defence against 
reactionary enemies abroad. However the upheaval in England in 
the sixteenth century depicted by Marx also had its revolution- 
ary side. It was a basic condition of the conversion of feudal 
landed property into bourgeois landed property and of the 
development of the bourgeoisie. The French Revolution of 1789 
likewise applied force to a considerable extent; August 4 merely 
sanctioned the peasants’ deeds of violence and was supplemented 
by the confiscation of the estates of the nobility and church.**’ The 
forcible conquest by the ancient Germans, the foundation, on 
conquered territory, of states in which the country, and not the 
town, dominated, as in antiquity, was accompanied— precisely for 
the latter reason—by the transformation of slavery into the milder 
serfdom, or feudal dependence (in antiquity the transformation of 
tilled land into pastures was a concomitant feature of the 
latifundia). 

Ch. IV 

[Force, Community Property, Economics and Politics] 

When the Indo-Germans migrated to Europe they ejected the 
aboriginal inhabitants by force and tilled the land, which was owned 
by the community. Among the Celts, Germans and _ Slavs 
community ownership can still be traced historically and among the 
Slavs, Germans and also the Celts (RuNpALE) it still exists even in 
the form of direct (Russia) or indirect (Ireland) feudal bondage. 
Force ceased as soon as the Lapps and Basques had been driven 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dihring 611 

off. In internal affairs equality or voluntarily conceded privilege 
prevailed. Where private ownership of land by individual peasants 
arose out of common ownership, this division up to the sixteenth 
century took place purely spontaneously among the members of 
the community. It occurred in most cases quite gradually and 
remnants of common possession could be encountered very 
frequently. There was no idea of using force; it was applied only 
against these remnants (England in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Germany mainly in the nineteenth century). Ireland is a 
special case. This common ownership quietly persisted in India and 
Russia under the most diverse forcible conquests and despotisms, 
and formed their basis. Russia is proof of how the production 
relations determine the political relations of force. Up to the end of 
the seventeenth century the Russian peasant suffered little 
oppression, enjoyed the right of movement and was hardly a 
bondsman. The first Romanov attached the peasants to the soil. With 
Peter began the foreign trade of Russia, which had only agricultural 
products to export. This brought on the oppression of the peasants. 
It grew in the same measure as exports, for the sake of which it had been 
introduced, until Catherine made the oppression complete and 
completed legislation on the subject. This legislation, however, 
permitted the landed proprietors to grind down the peasants more 
and more, so that their yoke became ever harder to bear. 

Ch. IV 

If force is the cause of social and political conditions, what is the 
cause of force? The appropriation of products of the labour of others 
and of labour-power of others. Force was able to change the 
consumption of products but not the mode of production itself; it 
could not transform bond labour into wage-labour unless the 
requisite conditions existed and bond labour had become a fetter on 
production. 

Ch. IV 

Hitherto force—from now on sociality. Purely a pious wish, a 
demand of “justice”. Thomas More set up this demand already 350 
years ago,” but it has not yet been met. Why should it be fulfilled 
now? Duhring is at a loss for an answer. In reality, modern industry 

* See Th. More, Utopia.—Ed. 

612 From the Preparatory Materials 

sets up this demand not as a demand of justice but as a necessity of 
production, and that changes everything. 

TO PART III 
Ch. I 

Fourier (Nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire).°” 

Element of inequality: “man, being by instinct an enemy of equality”, [p.] 59. 

“This swindling mechanism, which is called civilisation”, [p.] 81. 

“One should avoid relegating them” (women), “as we are wont to do, to thankless 
tasks, to the menial roles assigned to them by the philosophy which claims that women 
were made only to wash pots and patch old trousers”, [p.] 141. 

“God has endowed manufacturing labour with a doze of attractiveness which 
corresponds to only one quarter of the time which social man can give to work.” The 
rest is to be devoted to agriculture, cattle raising, the kitchen, the industrial armies, 
[p.] 152. 

“Tender morality, the kind and pure friend of trade”, [p.] 161. “Critique of 
Morality”, [p.] 162 et seqq. 

In present-day society, “in the civilised mechanism”, “duplicity of action, 
contradiction between individual and collective interests” dominate; it is ‘‘a universal 
war of the individuals against the masses. And our political sciences dare to speak of 
unity of action!” (p.] 172. 

“The moderns failed everywhere in the study of nature because they did not know 
the theory of exceptions or transitions, the theory of hybrids.” (Examples of “hybrids”: 
“the quince, nectarine, eel, bat, etc.”) [p.] 191. 

PART TWO 

(The second part of the MS of the preparatory writings for Anti-Dühring consists 
of excerpts from Dühring’s Cursus der National- und Socialékonomie. We give here only 
some of Engels’ marginal notes and briefly explain to which of Dihring’s statements 
they refer.] 

[On Duhring’s assertion “that the volitional activity by means of which the various 
forms of human association are created is itself subject to natural laws” [1], Engels 
remarked:] 

And so, no mention of historical development. Mere eternal law of 
nature. Everything is psychology and the latter unfortunately is 
much more “backward” than politics. 

[In connection with Dihring’s disquisition on slavery, wage bondage and property 

based on force as “social-economic constitutional forms of a purely political nature” [5], 
Engels wrote:] 

Always the belief that political economy has only eternal laws of 
nature and that all change and distortion are brought about by 
wicked _ politics. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Ditihring 613 

Hence this much is correct in the whole theory of force that 
hitherto all forms of society needed force to maintain themselves and 
to some extent or other were even established by force. This force, in 
its organised form, is called state. So we have here the banal idea that 
as soon as man rose above the wildest conditions states existed 
everywhere and the world did not wait for Duhring to learn 
this.— But state and force are precisely what all hitherto existing 
forms of society have had in common, and if I should try to explain, 
for instance, the Oriental despotisms, the republics of antiquity, the 
Macedonian monarchies, the Roman Empire and the feudalism of 
the Middle Ages by stating that they were all based on force, I have 
explained nothing as yet. The various social and political forms must 
therefore be explained not as due to force, which after all is always 
the same, but as due to that to which the force 1s applied, as due to that 
which is being robbed —the products and productive forces of the 
epoch in question and their distribution, resulting from them 
themselves. It would then appear that Oriental despotism was 
founded on common property, the antique republics on the cities 
engaged in agriculture, the Roman Empire on the latifundia, 
feudalism on the domination of the country over the town, which 
had its material causes, etc. 

[Engels quoted the following from Dihring: “The natural laws of economy can be 
revealed in all their strictness only by mentally obliterating the effects of the state and 
social institutions” (!) “particularly those of property based on force and connected 
with wage bondage, and by being careful not to regard the latter as necessary 
consequences of man’s abiding nature (!)...” [5]. Engels made the following comment 
on this descourse of Dühring’s:] 

So then the natural laws of economy are discovered only when one 
abstracts one’s mind from all hitherto existing economy; until now they 
have never manifested themselves undistortedly!— Abiding nature 
of man—from ape to Goethe! 

Duhring is supposed to explain by this theory of “force” how it 
happens that everywhere from time immemorial the majority has 
consisted of those subjected to force and the minority of those 
applying force. This alone is proof that the relation of force is 
based on the economic conditions, which it is not so simple to 
upset by political means. 

In Duhring rent, profit, interest and wages are not explained; it 
is merely stated that they have been instituted by force. Whence 
force? Non est. 

4 There is none, namely, no reply.— Ed. 

614 From the Preparatory Materials 

Force gives rise to possession and possession to economic power. 
Hence force=power. 

Marx has shown in Capital (Accumulation) how at a certain 
stage of development the laws of commodity production necessari- 
ly engender capitalist production with all its chicanery and that no 
force whatever is needed for that purpose.’ 

When Duhring considers political action to be the ultimate 
decisive power of history and would have you believe it was 
something new, he merely repeats what was said by all former 
historians who also held the view that social forms are determined 
solely by political forms and not by production. 

C'est trop bon!” The whole Free Trade school, beginning with 
Adam Smith, indeed, all pre-Marxian political economy regards 
the economic laws, in so far as it understands them, as “natural 
laws” and maintains that their action is being distorted by the 
state, by the “action of the state and social institutions”! 

Anyhow, this entire theory is merely an attempt to let Carey 
substantiate socialism: economics by itself 1s harmonious, the state 
by its interference spoils everything. 

Eternal justice is a complement of force; it will appear on p. 282. 

[Duhring’s views, developed in his criticism of Smith, Ricardo and Carey, were 
characterised as follows by Engels: “In its most abstract form production may be 
studied quite well by taking Robinson as an example; distribution, by taking two 
people alone on an island and imagining all stages intermediate between complete 
equality and complete opposition between master and slave...” Engels quotes the 
following sentence from Dühring: “The point of view which in the last analysis is 
really decisive for the theory of distribution can be arrived at only by serious social”’(!) 
“meditation” [10]. To which Engels remarked:] 

So one first abstracts from real history the various legal relations 
and separates them from the historical basis on which they arose 
and on which alone they make sense and transfers them to two 
individuals, Robinson and Friday, where they naturally appear 
wholly arbitrary. After they have thus been reduced to pure force 
they are transferred back to real history, and thus one proves that 
here too everything is based on sheer force. That force must be 
applied to a material substratum and that the point is precisely to 
establish where this came from, leaves Dihring unaffected. 

{Engels quoted the following passage from Dihring’s Cursus der National- und 
Socialékonomie: “The traditional view shared by all systems of political economy 

@ See K. Marx, Das Kapital, pp. 607-08. See present edition, Vol. 35, Part VII, 
Chapter XXIV, Section 1. See this volume, pp. 150-51.— Ed. 
b That is too good!— Ed. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dihring 615 

considers distribution only what may be called a transient process which is 
concerned with a mass of products created by production and considered as 
finished joint output; ... a deeper foundation must rather scrutinise a distribution 
which is concerned with the economic or economically operating laws themselves 
and not only with the transient and accumulative consequences of these laws” 
[10-11]. Engels commented on this as follows:] 

Thus it is not enough to investigate the distribution of current 
production. 

Land rent presupposes landed property, profit—capital, 
wages—propertyless workers, possessors of labour-power only. 
Inquiry should therefore be made where this comes from. In so 
far as this was his concern, Marx did this in Volume I with regard 
to capital and propertyless labour-power; investigation of the 
origin of modern landed property belongs to land rent, and is 
therefore part of his Volume II.**—Dühring’s investigation and 
historical foundation is confined to the single word: force! Here 
there is direct mala fides“ For Duhring’s explanation of big landed 
property see Wealth and Value; these had better be dealt with 
here. 

And so it is force that creates the economic, political, etc., 
conditions of life of an epoch, a people, etc. But who creates 
force? Organised force is primarily the army. And nothing depends 
more on economic conditions than precisely the composition, 
organisation, armament, strategy and tactics of an army. Arma- 
ment is the foundation, and it in turn is directly dependent on the 
level of production. Arms of stone, bronze and iron, armour, 
cavalry, gunpowder, and then that tremendous revolution which 
modern industry had brought about in warfare by means of the 
rifled breech-loader and artillery—products which only modern 
industry with its rhythmically working machines that turn out 
almost absolutely identical products could manufacture. Composi- 
tion and organisation, strategy and tactics, in their turn, depend 
on armament. Tactics also on the means of communication—the 
disposition of the troops and successes achieved in the battle of 
Jena would be impossible with the present chaussées—and lastly 
the railways! Hence it is precisely force that is dominated more 
than anything else by the existing conditions of production, 
something even Captain Jahns has realised. (Kélnische Zeitung— 
Machiavelli, etc.) 

4 (Acting, done) in bad faith.— Ed. 
b M. Jahns, Macchiavelli und der Gedanke der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht.— Ed. 

616 From the Preparatory Materials 

Particular stress is to be laid on modern methods of warfare, 
from the rifle and bayonet to breech-loader, where the issue is 
decided not by the man with the sabre but by the weapon; the 
line, or the column when the troops are bad, but it must be 
covered by riflemen (Jena: contra Wellington),* and finally the 
general dispersion into skirmishers and the change from the slow 
march to the double. 

[According to Dihring, “a skilled hand and a clever head must be regarded as a 
means of production belonging to society, as a machine whose output belongs to 
society” [D. C. 260]. To which Engels remarked:] 

But while a machine does not add value, a skilled hand does! The 
economic law of value, quant a cela,” is therefore being prohibited 
and yet it is to remain in force. 

[On Dihring’s conception of the “politico-juridical foundation of the whole of 
sociality” [D. C. 320-21] Engels had the following comment to make:] 

Thus at once the idealist measuring stick is applied. Not 
production itself, but law. 

[Concerning Duhring’s “economic commune” [322] and the system of division 
of labour, distribution, exchange and money system obtaining in it, Engels 
remarked:] 

Hence also payment of wages [324] to the individual worker by 
society. 

Hence also hoarding, usury, credit and all consequences up to 
and including money crises and money scarcity. Money explodes 
the economic commune as inevitably as at the present moment it is 
about to explode the Russian commune, and the family commune 
as well, once exchange between the individual members is brought 
about by the agency of money. 

[Engels quoted the following sentence from Duthring, giving his comment in 
parentheses: ‘Real work in any form therefore constitutes the social law of nature 
governing healthy organisations [15] (from which it follows that all prior ones were 
unhealthy)... This occasioned Engels to observe:] 

Labour is here conceived either as economic, materially produc- 
tive labour, in which case the sentence is nonsense and is at 
variance with all past history. Or labour is conceived in a more 
general form, so as to comprise every kind of activity necessary or 

2 See this volume, p. 627.— Fd. 
b As far as that goes.— Ed. 

From Engels’ Preparatory Writings for Anti-Dühring 617 

useful in a period, such as governance, administration of justice 
and military exercises, in which case it is an enormously inflated 
platitude and has nothing to do with political economy. But to try 
to impress the socialists with this old trash by styling it ‘natural