{The Pall Mall Gazette, No. 1788, November 5, 1870] 

Like other great men in bad luck, Louis Napoleon appears 
aware that he owes the public an explanation of the causes which 
led him, much against his will, from Saarbrücken to Sedan; and 
consequently we have now been put in possession of what 
professes to be this explanation of his.” As there is no evidence, 
either external or internal, to fix any suspicion of spuriousness 
upon the document, but rather to the contrary, we take it, for the 
present,to be genuine. Indeed, we are almost bound to do so, out 
of mere compliment; for if ever there was a document confirming, 
both generally and in detail, the view taken of the war by The Pall 
Mall Gazette, it is this Imperial self-justification. 

Louis Napoleon informs us that he was perfectly aware of the 
great numerical superiority of the Germans; that he hoped to 
counteract it by a rapid invasion of Southern Germany in order to 
compel that country to remain neutral, and to secure, by a first 
success, the alliance of Austria and Italy. For this purpose 150,000 
men were to be concentrated at Metz, 100,000 at Strasbourg, and 
50,000 at Chalons. With the first two rapidly concentrated, the 
Rhine was to be passed near Karlsruhe, while the 50,000 men 
from Chalons advanced on Metz to oppose any hostile movement 
on the flank and rear of the advancing forces. But this plan 
evaporated as soon as the Emperor came to Metz. He found there 
only 100,000 men, at Strasbourg there were only 40,000, while 

Canrobert’s reserves were anywhere and everywhere except at 
Chalons, where they ought to have been. Then the troops were 
unprovided with the first necessaries for a campaign, knapsacks, 
tents, camp-kettles, and cooking-tins. Moreover, nothing was 
known of the enemy’s whereabouts. In fact, the bold, dashing 
offensive was from the very beginning turned into a very modest 
defensive. 

There will be scarcely anything new in all this to the readers of 
The Pall Mall Gazette. Our “Notes on the War” sketched out the 
above plan of attack as the most rational the French could pursue, 
and traced the causes why it had to be abandoned.* But there is 
one fact, which was the proximate cause of his first defeats, for 
which the Emperor does not account: why he left his several corps 
in the faulty position of attack close to the frontier, when the 
intention of attack had been long given up. As to his figures, we 
shall criticize them by-and-by. 

The causes of the breakdown of the French military administra- 
tion the Emperor finds in 

“the defects of our military organization such as it has existed for the last fifty 
years.” 

But surely this was not the first time that this organization was 
put upon its trial. It had answered well enough during the 
Crimean war. It produced brilliant results at the outset of the 
Italian war, when it was held up in England, not less than in 
Germany, as the very model of army organization. No doubt it was 
shown to have many shortcomings even then. But there is this 
difference between then and now: then it did work, and now it 
does not. And the Emperor does not profess to account for this 
difference, which was the very thing to be accounted for—but, at 
the same time, the most tender point of the Second Empire, which 
had clogged the wheels of this organization by all manner of 
corruption and jobbery. 

When Metz was reached by the retreating army, 

“its effective force was brought up to 140,000 by the arrival of Marshal 
Canrobert with two divisions and the reserve.” 

This statement, compared with the numbers who have just laid 
down their arms at Metz, compels us to look a little more closely 
into the Imperial figures. The army of Strasbourg was to be 
composed of MacMahon’s, De Failly’s, and Douay’s corps, in all 
ten divisions, and should number 100,000 men; but it is now said 

not to have exceeded 40,000. Leaving Douay’s three divisions 
entirely out of the question, although one of them came to 
MacMahon’s assistance at or after Woerth, this would give less 
than 6,000 men per division (13 battalions), or barely 430 men per 
battalion, even if we do not count one single man for cavalry or 
artillery. Now, with all the credit we are inclined to give the 
Second Empire in the matter of jobbery and dilapidation, we 
cannot bring ourselves to believe that there should have been 
ninety battalions in the army the effective strength of which, 
twenty days after the calling out of the reserves and men on 
furlough, averaged 430 men instead of 900. As to the army of 
Metz it comprised, in the Guards and ten divisions of the line, 161 
battalions; and if we take the 100,000 men given in the pamphlet 
as consisting of infantry only, without allowing anything for 
cavalry or artillery, that would still give not more than 620 men 
per battalion, which is undoubtedly below the reality. More 
wonderful still, after the retreat to Metz, this army was raised to 
140,000 men by the arrival of two divisions of Canrobert and the 
reserves. The new additions thus consisted of 40,000 men. Now, as 
the “reserves” arriving at Metz after Spicheren could consist of 
cavalry and artillery only, the Guards having arrived there long 
before, they cannot be set down at more than 20,000 men, leaving 
another 20,000 for Canrobert’s two divisions, which, for twenty- 
five battalions, would give 800 men per battalion; that is to say, 
Canrobert’s battalions, which were the most unready of all, are 
made by this account to be far stronger than those which had been 
concentrated and got ready long before. But, if the army of Metz, 
before the battles of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August, counted 
but 140,000 men, how comes it that after the losses of these three 
days—certainly not less than 50,000 men—after the losses of the 
later sorties, and the deaths from sickness, Bazaine could still hand 
over 173,000 prisoners to the Prussians? We have entered into 
these figures merely to show that they contradict each other and 
all the known facts of the campaign. They can be dismissed at 
once as totally incorrect. 

Besides the army organization, there were other circumstances 
hampering the Imperial eagle’s flight towards victory. There was, 
firstly, “the bad weather;” then “the encumbrance of baggage;” 
and finally, 

“the absolute ignorance in which we always remained concerning the position 
and the strength of the hostile armies.” 

Three very untoward circumstances indeed. But the bad 
weather was there for both parties, for in all his devout references 

to Providence King William has not once mentioned the fact that 
the sun shone on the German positions while rain fell on those of 
the French. Nor were the Germans unencumbered with baggage. 
As to the ignorance of the whereabouts of the enemy, there exists 
a letter of Napoleon’s to his brother Joseph,*? who complained in 
Spain” of the same hardship, and which is anything but 
complimentary to generals making such complaints. It says that if 
generals are ignorant of the whereabouts of the enemy it is their 
own fault, and proves that they do not understand their business. 
One sometimes doubts, in reading these excuses for bad general- 
ship, whether this pamphlet is really written for grown-up people. 
The account given of the part played by Louis Napoleon himself 
will not please his friends very much. After the battles of Woerth 
and Spicheren he “resolved immediately to lead back the army to 
the camp of Chalons.” But this plan, though first approved by the 
Council of Ministers, two days afterwards was considered likely “to 
produce a deplorable effect on the public mind;” and, on the 
reception of a letter from M. E. Ollivier (!) to that effect, the 
Emperor abandoned it. He leads the army to the left bank of the 
Moselle, and then—‘“not foreseeing a general battle, and only 
looking for partial engagements’ —leaves it for Chalons. Scarcely 
is he gone when the battles of the 16th and 18th of August take 
place, and shut up in Metz Bazaine and his army. In the 
meantime, the Empress and the Ministry, exceeding their powers, 
and behind the Emperor’s back, convoke the Chamber; and, with 
the meeting of that eminently powerful body, the Corps Législatif 
of Arcadians,” the fate of the Empire was sealed. The Opposi- 
tion—there were twenty-five of them, you know—became all- 
powerful, and “paralyzed the patriotism of the majority and the 
progress of the Government”—which Government, we all recol- 
lect, was not that of mealy-mouthed Ollivier but of rough Palikao. 

“From this period Ministers appeared to be afraid to pronounce the name of 
the Emperor; and he, who had quitted the army, and had only relinquished the 
command in order to resume the reins of government, soon discovered that it 
would be impossible for him to play out the part which belonged to him.” 

In fact, he was made to see that he was virtually deposed, that 
he had become impossible. Most people with some self-respect, 
under the circumstances, would have abdicated. But no; his 
irresolution, to use the mildest possible expression, continues, and 

b J. Bonaparte’s letter to Napoleon I of August 14, 1808, ibid.— Ed. 

he follows MacMahon’s army, a mere clog, powerless to do good, 
but not to prevent its being done. The Government in Paris insist 
upon MacMahon making a move to relieve Bazaine. MacMahon 
refuses, as this would be tantamount to running his army into the 
jaws of perdition; Palikao insists. 

“As to the Emperor, he made no opposition. It could not enter into his views to 
oppose the advice of the Government and of the Empress Regent, who had shown 
so much intelligence and energy under the greatest difficulties.” 

We admire the meekness of the man who for twenty years had 
maintained that submission to his own individual will was the only 
road to salvation for France, and who now, when “a plan of 
campaign is imposed from Paris, contrary to the most elementary 
principles of the art of war,” makes no opposition, because it 
could never enter into his views to oppose the advice of the 
Empress Regent, who had, &c. &c.! 

The description of the state of the army with which this fatal 
march was undertaken is an exact confirmation in every particular 
of our estimate of it at the time.* There is only one redeeming 
feature in it. De Failly’s corps, during its retreat by forced 
marches, had at least managed to lose, without a fight, “almost all 
its baggage;” but the corps does not appear to have appreciated. 
this advantage. 

The army had gone to Reims on the 21st of August. On the 
23rd it advanced as far as the river Suippe, at Bétheniville, on the 
direct road to Verdun and Metz. But commissariat difficulties 
compelled MacMahon to return without delay to a line of railway; 
consequently, on the 24th, a movement to the left is made and 
Rethel is reached. Here the whole of the 25th is spent in 
distributing provisions to the troops. On the 26th, head-quarters go 
to Tourteron, twelve miles further eastward; on the 27th, to Le 
Chéne Populeux, another six miles. Here MacMahon, finding out 
that eight German army corps were closing in around him, gave 
orders to retreat again towards the west; but during the night 
positive orders from Paris arrived that he was to march to Metz. 

“Unquestionably, the Emperor could have countermanded this order, but he 
was resolved not to oppose the decision of the Regency.” 

This virtuous resignation compelled MacMahon to obey; and so 
he reached Stonne, six miles further east, on the 28th. But “these 
orders and counter-orders occasioned delays in the movements.” 

In the meantime 

“the Prussian army had made forced marches, while we, encumbered with 
baggage [again!], had occupied six days with fatigued troops in marching 
twenty-five leagues.” 

Then came the battles of the 30th, 31st [of August], and Ist of 
September, and the catastrophe, which is narrated very fully, but 
without giving any new particulars. And then comes the moral to be 
drawn from it:— 

“Certainly the struggle was disproportionate; but it would have been longer 

sustained, and less disastrous for our arms, if military operations had not been 
unceasingly subordinated to political considerations.” 

It is the fate of the Second Empire and everything connected 
with it to fall without being pitied. The commiseration which is the 
least that falls to the lot of great misfortunes does not, somehow 
or other, appear to be extended to it. Even the “honneur au 
courage malheureux”* which you cannot nowadays use in French 
without a certain irony, seems to be denied to it. We doubt 
whether, under the circumstances, Napoleon will derive much 
benefit from a document according to which his eminent 
strategical insight is in every case set at nought by absurd orders, 
dictated by political motives, from the Government at Paris, while 
his power to cancel these absurd orders is again set at nought by 
his unlimited respect for the Regency of the Empress. The best 
that can be said of this uncommonly lame pamphlet is, that it does 
acknowledge how necessarily things must go wrong in war “if 
military operations be unceasingly subordinated to political consider- 
ations.”