That the American Civil War, given the inventive spirit of the 
nation and the high technical level of engineering in America, 
would lead to great advances and usher in a new epoch in the 
technical side of warfare was only to be expected. The battle 
between Monitor and Merrimac,’ to which the Allgemeine Militar- 
Zeitung again returned,” has justified this expectation. We now 
have some new facts to put on record. 

Although the final outcome was in favour of the turret ship, the 
battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac still did nothing to 
decide the question of which class of battleships was superior: 
turret ships or broadside battery ships. A short while ago,‘ 
however, a battle took place which will, to all appearances, settle 
the matter once and for all, and which we are all the more pleased 
to examine since it is, to our knowledge, hardly known in England 
and France, and not at all in Germany. 

The Confederates had had a commercial steamer of Scottish 
construction, the Fingal, armoured with 4-inch deal, 4-inch oak 
and 4-inch iron, in the harbour of Savannah. The iron plating 

1863” in the Allgemeine Militar-Zeitung, No. 20, May 16, 1863.— Ed. 

© On June 17, 1863.— Ed. 

consisted of two layers of 6” wide and 2” thick slabs, the bottom 
layer horizontal and the top layer vertical, secured with strong 
bolts. After the fashion of the Merrimac the armour plating was 
laid aslant or roof-like over the ship, though flattened out on top, 
so that the ship resembled a lopped-off pyramid. It carried 4 
six-inch broadside and two 7-inch pivot cannons (fore and aft). 

The Atlanta, as the ship was called, came sailing down the 
Savannah River early one morning and soon ran into the two 
blockade ships, two turret ships, the Weehawken and the Nahant, 
which immediately headed for her. (For our description of the 
battle, we follow the report in the New York Harper’s Weekly of 
July 11.°) The Atlanta opened the engagement by firing three 
shots at the Weehawken, which came closer without firing and then 
replied with solid shells of 440 Ibs (English) from her 15-inch 
Dahlgren gun.* The first shot went right through both sides of the 
Atlanta and laid low about 40 men partly with the splinters, partly 
with shock. Among the latter was a lieutenant, who afterwards said 
that he had not been able to stand up for ten minutes. The second 
shot smashed through the iron cover of a gun port, killing or 
injuring 17 men. The third shell smashed the upper section of the 
armoured bridge on the upper deck, killing both pilots and 
knocking down the two helmsmen. The fourth hit the edge, where 
the side of the ship meets the deck, and seems to have bounced 
off without causing any damage. The fifth went through the 
funnel just as the Atlanta was hoisting the white flag to surrender, 

* The Dahlgren gun is a comparatively short gun of some 12-14 calibre length. 
Its external shape was determined by Dahlgren (now admiral in command of 
Charleston) in the following way: at equal distances from one another, holes of rifle 
calibre were drilled perpendicularly on the axis of the bore from the outside, and 
loaded with rifle bullets, while the gun was loaded and fired as usual. The initial 
velocity of the individual bullets was established in the normal way and taken as a 
measure of the pressure of the explosion gases at the corresponding spot on the 
wall of the gun barrel. The corresponding abscissas were drawn on the axis of the 
bore as ordinates, and the curve connecting these indicated the external shape of 
the gun. Guns constructed on this principle are very thick at the breech and in the 
region of the trunnions, and only taper sharply towards the muzzle. They look 
rather like a soda water bottle. They are smoothbored and are cast hollow, over a 
hollow plug through which cold water runs during cooling. This cooling from 
inside gives the guns such strength—even in cast iron—that it is possible to cast 
guns of 15” and even 20” bore which are able to withstand 500 shots with a 
powerful charge without danger. Initially intended only for hollow shells, they have 
subsequently been strengthened so that solid shells can be fired from them, too. 
These reinforced guns are called Columbiads. 

before the Nahant, which had just arrived on the scene, could even 
fire a single shot. In a quarter of an hour it was all over. 

Yesterday the writer of this article visited the English Channel 
fleet lying in Liverpool harbour. There were the Warrior, the Black 
Prince, the Royal Oak, the Defence, the Reststance—all of them 
battleships with broadside guns (smoothbore 68-pounders, 8” 
calibre and 110 1b Armstrong, 7” calibre) armoured with 18-24” 
timber and 4'/5-5” iron; undeniably the most beautiful and 
powerful armoured fleet now afloat, which, its draught permitting, 
could steam unmolested in between any European coastal forts, as 
these are at present armed, and into the harbour behind them. But 
how would the best of these ships fare against one of these 
American turret ships with its 440 1b gun? To judge by the trials 
made by the English themselves, a much smaller calibre is 
sufficient to pierce their sides; what havoc would a 440 Ib shell 
not wreak in their innards? One single hit on the waterline would 
be bound to sink the ship, since a leak like that cannot be plugged. 
At the sight of these splendid ships, each one of which must have 
cost close on £1 million sterling, including the experiments, one 
cannot help thinking that all of them were already condemned 
and completely outdated. 

Henceforth, it would seem to be an absolute necessity to equip 
battleships with the heaviest calibres that a ship can carry. These 
guns, however, cannot be broadside guns; the largest ship can only 
carry a few of them, and these have to be positioned in the middle 
of the ship. But this is only possible with turret ships, and for this 
reason turret ships will, from now on, constitute the decisive 
strength of any navy. 

True, the turret ships built hitherto have only been seaworthy in 
a certain qualified sense. This was because they were constructed 
in America for a specific purpose: for operations in shallow coastal 
waters. If they are built bigger and given a greater draught they 
will certainly prove at least as seaworthy as the broadside 
battleships, which still leave much to be desired on this score. But, 
even if we restrict ourselves to the experience we have at present, 
the following points are quite definite: 

1) Turret ships with heavy guns (10-15” calibre) are incompara- 
bly the strongest ships both for defence proper and for offensive 
operations on neighbouring coasts. 

2) Armoured battleships with 2'/)-5” iron plating and broadside 
guns of 8” calibre can be of great advantage for operations over a 
longer distance, against coasts, if one has coaling stations, and, 
above all, if one does not have to fight against turret ships. 

3) For true mobile tactics on the open sea wooden ships 
continue to be the only ones suitable. They alone are able to hold 
enough provisions, coal and ammunition to carry their own base 
of operations around with them for several months; they alone are _ 
able to carry out the necessary repairs after a battle themselves. In 
India and China, for instance, armour-plated ships of any kind 
would be helpless, even in the hands of the English. 

What are the conclusions as far as Germany is concerned? 

1) Learn to cast guns of American calibre and build turret ships. 
Two such ships in the Elbe or Weser will keep the entire North 
Sea coast clear. Four of them in the Baltic will bring the sea under 
our control and, if necessary, force Copenhagen to capitulate; 
then no one will take the present Danish Navy seriously any 
longer." Even if improvements are introduced making really 
seaworthy turret ships possible, the old ones will still remain the 
best harbour defence there is. They are cheap in any case. 

2) Broadside armoured ships of 6-7,000 tons like the English 
and French ones each cost as much as six turret ships, while two 
turret ships are sufficient to beat one of them. They are not worth 
the money. On the other hand, very fast screw steamers of 
moderate dimensions armoured with 2'/s-3" of the very best (e.g. 
Styrian) iron plating and with a few guns, but heavy ones, can be 
of considerable service against the existing navies. They are able to 
evade the large, unwieldy armoured frigates and are well able to 
cope with a wooden ship of the line. 

3) For long-distance operations wooden ships—both sailing 
vessels and screw steamers—are indispensable. We already have 
the Chinese station; it is bound to become more important 
every year. As long as we have no coaling station there, sailing 
vessels are the only ones that can be used; for the time being, they 
are sufficient too. Stations in the West Indies, on the east and west 
coasts of North and South America and in the Levant have long 
been needed; everywhere German trade must be protected and 
respect won for the name of Germany. Twenty-five per cent 
steamers to seventy-five per cent sailing vessels would be enough 
there. At home, however, many large wooden ships are of no use; 
in fact, there is now no point whatever in having ships larger than 
60-gun frigates, as the present-day ships of the line are outdated 
while those of the future have yet to be invented. 

II 

According to established practice, when laying siege to fortified 
ramparts the breach batteries were placed on the crest of the 
glacis, about fifty paces from the wall that was to be bombarded. 
When Montalembert’s casemated works with uncovered stone walls 
were proposed,’ and especially when such uncovered masonry 
was used in many places in Germany, there was much discussion 
whether or not such stone walls could be breached even at a 
distance; as far as actual experiments are concerned, however, the 
only one known to us is that of Wellington in 1823, when a 
detached wall covered by a contregarde was breached at 500 and 
600 paces by indirect hits. The Crimean War only proved that 
stone-built coastal forts were safe against ships; Bomarsund *” only 
proved that the Russian government had been dreadfully swindled 
by the building contractors. The Italian War°*” proved nothing, 
since it never came to siege operations. Until then one could 
assume that, with the artillery means available at the time, the 
uncovered stone walls of casemates could, in certain circumstances, 
make possible such superior firepower against siege batteries that 
it was worth its expense.* The trials at Juliers have proved that 
rifled guns with percussion shells, even of a light calibre, are able 
to breach brick fortifications at 1,200 paces, even by an indirect 
hit. And in America things are now happening that have quite 
different lessons to teach us. 

During the attack on Port Pulaski (outside Savannah) General 
Gilmore (indisputably the foremost living American artilleryman) 
had only heavy Columbiads, smoothbore guns up to 15” calibre for 
solid shells and powerful charges.** He set up his batteries 1,200 
paces away and turned the casemated fortification made of strong 
masonry into a heap of rubble in just a few days. Nevertheless, 
this experiment convinced him that at greater distances his guns 
would not be able to knock down.  stone-wall fortifications. 
Unfortunately, we have no data as to the charges, since all 
American reports are framed in an extremely superficial way; but 
it is obvious that '/; shot heavy charges are quite out of the question 
with such guns. 

Gillmore therefore demanded rifled guns of heavy calibre for 
the assault on Charleston, and got them. They were so-called 
Parrott guns, breech-loading guns with 4-7 grooves according to 
the calibre. The rifling is flat and has less twist than the 
Armstrong guns. The guns are of cast iron with a wrought-iron 

ring welded on above the breech which reaches as far as the 
trunnions, and are the same shape as the ordinary guns. 
Hundredweight for hundredweight they are said to cost exactly 
one quarter of what the heavy English Armstrongs cost. The shells 
were cylindro-ogival and had a coating of soft metal to be pressed 
into the rifling. 

With these guns Gillmore attacked Fort Wagner” (see the plan 
of Charleston recently printed in the Allgemeine Mulitar-Zeitung’). 
But this fortification, built out of light sand from the dunes, stood 
up to it. The bombproof covered shelters kept the garrison safe 
and several assaults were repulsed. It was necessary to mount a 
proper attack, and for this the heavy guns were too good. 
Gillmore therefore had them drawn up in three new batteries 
which he had set up against Fort Sumter, the latter lying in the 
middle of the harbour entrance. These batteries, one of which was 
in the swamp, were 3,300 to 4,200 yards (4,000 to 5,000 paces) 
away from Fort Sumter. 

Fort Sumter was built on an artificial island of special, very hard 
brick. The walls were 6-7’ thick, at the base up to 12’, the 
casemate arches and buttresses 8-9’ thick. It had two floors of 
casemates and one floor of guns on the roof, which fired from the 
barbette. Its shape was that of a truncated lunette; it was chiefly 
the gorge and one of the flanks that were exposed to Gillmore’s 
batteries. The fort contained 140 gun emplacements. 

The bombardment lasted for 8 days, from 16 to 23 August; 
from time to time the navy joined in, though without much 
success. But the rifled 200-pounders did their job. The gorge and 
flank walls fell first, and then the fronts taken 4 revers.” At the end 
of the bombardment the fort was, as Gillmore put it, a shapeless 
mass of ruins.‘ All in all 7,551 shots were fired, of which 5,626 
were hits (at these enormous distances!); 3,495 of these hit the 
outer wall area, 2,130 the inner. After the walls had been 
subjected to fire for a while many shells went right through both 
of them. 

Gillmore also had a rifled 300-pounder but it burst on the 
seventh shot. The first six shells, however, are said to have gone 
through both walls and caused collapses of brickwork up to 20 feet 
high in places. 

No. 20, May 16, 1863.— Ed. 

Understandably, the fort returned the fire on a small scale only. 
The batteries could not have provided any visible targets at a 
distance of half a German mile, even if there had been guns with 
such a range. As it was situated under the close fire of many 
Confederate batteries, no attempt was made to occupy it im- 
mediately, but now that Fort Wagner and Cunnings. Point have 
fallen, this will probably already have happened.°*” 

From the same batteries Gillmore launched 15 incendiary bombs 
on to the town of Charleston—over one German mile away—and 
only discontinued the bombardment because, after such a long 
journey, his percussion shells, not landing on their noses, failed to 
explode. 

What should we in Germany make of all this shooting? What 
should we think of our uncovered stone-wall fortifications? What 
about the detached forts, 800-1,200 paces before the main 
rampart, which are supposed to protect the place against 
bombardment? What of the redoubts of the Cologne forts, the 
flanking gates of Coblenz, and what about Ehrenbreitstein? Our 
enemies, who are naval powers, will soon have enough rifled 
artillery of the very heaviest calibre, and railways to carry it are 
everywhere. On the other hand, as far as we know, the biggest 
rifled calibre yet introduced is that of the 24-pounder, roughly | 
4'/,"——a veritable dwarf gun compared with what our enemies will 
pitch against us; and, if we had the same artillery in our 
casemates, it would not be possible to hit batteries 5,000 paces 
anyway. Our Rhine fortresses, however inadequately fortified the 
river line might be, have hitherto been our main strength against 
the first French attack; but what are they worth after experiences 
such as those described above? 

This is no time for reflection. We must act, and straight away. 
Any delay may cost us a campaign. Videant consules, ne quid 
respublica detrimenti captat.'