The decline of the Roman infantry found a continuation in that 
of the Byzantine foot soldiers. A kind of forced levy was still 
maintained, but with no other result than to form the very dregs 
of the army. Barbarian auxiliaries and mercenaries composed its 
better portions, but even these were of no great value. The 
hierarchic and administrative organization of the troops was 
perfected to an almost ideal state of bureaucracy, but with the 
same result that we now see in Russia: a perfect organization of 
embezzlement and fraud at the expense of the state, with armies 
costing enormous sums and existing in part only on paper. The 
contact with the irregular horse of the East reduced both the 
importance and quality of the infantry more and more. Mounted 
archers became the favorite arm; the greater part if not all of the 
infantry were also equipped with the bow beside the lance and 
sword. Thus, fighting at a distance became the fashion, hand-to- 
hand encounters being regarded as out of date. The infantry was 
considered such rubbish that it was intentionally kept away from 
the field of battle, and used for garrison duty principally; most of 
the battles of Belisarius were fought by the cavalry exclusively, and 
when the infantry partook in them, it was sure to run away. His 
tactics were entirely based upon the principle of avoiding a combat 
at close quarters, and of tiring out the enemy. If he succeeded in 
this against the Goths, who had no distance arms at all, by 
choosing broken ground in which their phalanx could not act, he 
was beaten by the Franks, whose infantry had something of the 
old Roman mode of fighting about them, and by the Persians, 
whose cavalry was certainly superior to his. 

The German invaders of the Roman empire originally consisted 
for the greater part of infantry, and fought in a kind of Doric 
phalanx, the chiefs and wealthier men in the front ranks, the 
others behind them. Their arms were the sword and lance. The 
Franks, however, carried short, double-edged battle axes, which 
they threw, like the Roman pilum, into the hostile mass the 
moment before they charged sword in hand. They and the Saxons 
retained for some time a good and respected infantry; but 
gradually the Teutonic conquerors everywhere took to cavalry 
service, and left the duty of the foot soldiers to the conquered 
Roman provincials; thus the infantry service became despised as 
an attribute of slaves and serfs, and the character of the foot 
soldier necessarily sunk in proportion. By the end of the 10th 
century cavalry was the only arm which really decided battles all 

Infantry 349 

over Europe; infantry, though far more numerous in every army 
than cavalry, was nothing better than an ill-armed rabble with 
hardly any attempt at organization. A foot soldier was not even 
considered a soldier; the word miles became synonymous with 
horseman. The only chance for maintaining a respectable infantry 
lay with the towns, especially in Italy and Flanders. They had a 
militia of their own which was necessarily formed of infantry; and 
as its service for the protection of the towns, in the midst of the 
never-ending feuds among the surrounding nobles, was a perma- 
nent one, it was soon found convenient to have a force of paid 
mercenaries instead of a militia composed of the citizens, this 
latter force being reserved for extraordinary occasions. Still, we do 
not find that the contingents of the towns showed any marked 
superiority over the rabble of footmen collected by the nobles, and 
in battle always left to protect the baggage. This holds good, at 
least, for the classic period of chivalry. In the cavalry of these 
times, every knight appeared armed cap-a-pied,* covered all over 
with armor, and mounting a similarly armed horse. He was 
accompanied by an esquire rather more lightly armed, and by 
sundry other mounted men without any armor and armed with 
bows. In order of battle, these forces were ranged upon a 
principle similar to that of the ancient Doric phalanx—the heavily 
armed knights in the first, the esquires in the second rank, the 
mounted archers behind them. These last, from the nature of 
their arm, were soon employed in dismounted fighting, which 
became more and more the rule with them, so that their horses 
were mainly used for locomotion, not for a charge. The English 
archers, armed with the long-bow, while those of southern Europe 
carried the cross-bow, especially excelled in this mode of fighting 
on foot, and it was very likely this circumstance which soon led to 
an extension, in this service, of dismounted fighting. No doubt, in 
their long campaigns in France, the horses of the heavily armed 
knights got soon knocked up and unfit to serve for more than 
means of transport. In this plight it was natural that the worst 
mounted gendarmes should dismount and form a phalanx of 
lances, to be filled up by the better portion of the footmen 
(especially the Welsh); while those whose horses were still fit for a 
charge, now formed the actual fighting cavalry. Such an arrange- 
ment appeared very well adapted for defensive battles, and upon 
it were based all the battles of the Black Prince,” and, as is well 

a From head to foot.— Ed. 
b Edward, Prince of Wales.—FEd. 

known, with perfect success. The new mode of fighting was soon 
adopted by the French and other nations, and may be considered 
as almost the normal system of the 14th and 15th centuries. Thus, 
after 1,700 years, we are brought back almost to the tactics of 
Alexander; with this difference only, that with Alexander cavalry 
was a newly introduced arm which had to strengthen the declining 
capabilities of the heavy infantry, while here the heavy infantry, 
formed by dismounted horsemen, was a living proof that cavalry 
was on the decline, and that a new day had dawned for infantry. 

IV. THE REVIVAL OF INFANTRY 

From the Flemish towns, then, the first manufacturing district 
of the world, and from the Swiss mountains, arose the first troops 
which, after centuries of decline, again deserved the name of 
infantry. The French chivalry succumbed as much to the weavers 
and fullers, the goldsmiths and tanners of the Belgian cities, as the 
Burgundian and Austrian nobility to the peasants and cowherds of 
Switzerland. Good defensive positions and a light armament did 
the most, supported as they were in the case of the Flemish by 
numerous fire-arms, and in that of the Swiss by a country almost 
impracticable to the heavily armed knights of the time. The Swiss 
carried principally short halberts, which might be used as well for 
thrusting as for striking, and were not too long for hand-to-hand 
fight; subsequently they also had pikes, and cross-bows and 
fire-arms; but in one of their most celebrated battles, at Laupen 
(1339),**° they had no arms for distant fighting but stones. From 
defensive encounters in their inaccessible mountains, they soon 
came to offensive battles in the plain, and with these to more 
regular tactics. They fought in a deep phalanx; defensive armor 
was light, and in general confined to the front ranks and the flank 
files, the centre being filled up by men without armor; the Swiss 
phalanx, however, was always formed in 3 distinct bodies, an 
advanced guard, a main body, and a rear guard, so that greater 
mobility and the chance of varied tactical arrangements were 
secured. They soon became expert in taking advantage of the 
accidents of ground, which, coupled with the improvement in 
fire-arms, protected them against the onslaught of cavalry, while 
against infantry armed with long lances they devised various 
means to work an entrance somewhere through the forest of 
lances, after which their short heavy halberts gave them an 
immense advantage, even against men cased in armor. They very 
soon learned, especially when assisted by artillery and small 

Infantry 351 

fire-arms, to hold out in squares or cross-shaped bodies against the 
charges of cavalry; and as soon as an infantry was again capable of 
doing that, the days of chivalry were numbered. 

About the middle of the 15th century the struggle of the cities 
against the feudal nobility had been everywhere taken up by the 
princes of the larger monarchies now consolidating, and conse- 
quently the latter had begun to form armies of mercenaries both 
for putting down the nobles and for carrying out independent 
objects of foreign policy. Beside the Swiss, the Germans, and soon 
after them most other European nations, began to furnish large 
contingents of mercenaries, raised by voluntary enlistment, and 
selling their services to the highest bidder without any regard to 
nationality. These bands formed themselves tactically upon the 
same principle as the Swiss; they were armed chiefly with pikes, 
and fought in large square battalions, as many men deep as there 
were in the front rank. They had to fight, however, under 
different circumstances from the Swiss who defended their 
mountains; they had to attack as well as to hold out in defensive 
positions; they had to encounter the enemy in the plains of Italy 
and France as well as in the hills; and they very soon found 
themselves face to face with the now rapidly improving small- 
arms. These circumstances caused some deviations from the old 
Swiss tactics, which were different according to the different 
nationalities; but the chief characteristics, the formation in 3 deep 
columns, figuring in name, if not always in reality, as advanced 
guard, main body, and rear guard or reserve, remained common 
to all. The Swiss retained their superiority until the battle of 
Pavia,**’ after which the German Landsknechte, who had already for 
some time been nearly if not fully equal to them, were considered 
the first infantry of Europe. The French, whose infantry had as 
yet never been good for any thing, tried very hard during this 
period to form a serviceable national body of foot soldiers; but 
they succeeded with the natives of two provinces only, the Picards 
and the Gascons. The Italian infantry of this period never counted 
for any thing. The Spaniards, however, among whom Gonsalvo de 
Cérdova during the wars with the Moors of Granada** first 
introduced the Swiss tactics and armament, very soon rose to 
considerable reputation, and after the middle of the 16th century 
began to pass for the best infantry of Europe. While the Italians, 
and after them the French and Germans, extended the length of 
the pike from 10 to 18 feet, they retained shorter and more handy 
lances, and their agility made them very formidable with sword 
and dagger in close encounter. This reputation they upheld in 

western Europe—France, Italy, and the Netherlands at least—to 
the close of the 17th century. 

The contempt of the Swiss for defensive armor, based upon 
traditions of a different time, was not shared by the pikemen of 
the 16th century. As soon as a European infantry was formed in 
which the different armies were becoming more and more equal 
to each other in military qualities, the system of lining the phalanx 
with a few men covered with breastplates and helmets proved to 
be insufficient. If the Swiss had found such a phalanx impenetra- 
ble, this was no longer the case when it was met by another 
phalanx quite its equal. Here a certain amount of defensive armor 
became of some importance; so long as it did not too much 
impede the mobility of the troops, it was a decided advantage. The 
Spaniards, moreover, had never participated in this contempt for 
breastplates, and they began to be respected. Accordingly, 
breastplates, helmets, cuissarts, brassarts, and gauntlets began 
again to form a part of the regular equipment of every pikeman. 
To it was added a sword, shorter with the Germans, longer with 
the Swiss, and now and then a dagger. 

V. THE INFANTRY OF THE 16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES 

The long-bow had for some time disappeared from the 
continent of Europe, excepting Turkey; the cross-bow made its 
last appearance among the French Gascons in the first quarter of 
the 16th century. It was everywhere replaced by the matchlock 
musket, which, in different degrees of perfection, or rather 
imperfection, now became the second arm of the infantry. The 
matchlocks of the 17th century, unwieldy and defectively con- 
structed machines, were of very heavy caliber, to secure, beside 
range, at least some precision, and the force to penetrate the 
breastplate of a pikeman. The form generally adopted about 1530 
was the heavy musket fired off from a fork, as a man could not 
have taken aim without such a support. The musketeers carried a 
sword, but no defensive armor, and were used either for 
skirmishing or in a kind of open order, to hold defensive positions 
or to prepare the charge of the pikemen for the attack of such 
positions. They soon became very numerous in proportion to the 
pikemen; in the battles of Francis I in Italy they were far inferior 
to the pikemen in numbers, but were at least in equal numbers 
with them 30 years later. This increase in the number of 
musketeers compelled the invention of some tactical method of 
regularly encasing them in the order of battle. This was done in 

Infantry 353 

the system of tactics called the Hungarian ordinance, invented by 
the imperial troops in their wars with the Turks in Hungary. The 
musketeers, being unable to defend themselves at close quarters, 
were always placed so as to be able to retire behind the pikemen. 
Thus they were sometimes placed on either wing, sometimes on 
the 4 corners of the wings; very often the whole square or column 
of pikemen was surrounded by a rank of musketeers, who found 
protection under the pikes of their rear men. Finally, the plan of 
having the musketeers on the flanks of the pikemen got the upper 
hand in the new tactical system introduced by the Dutch in their 
war of independence.” This system is distinguished especially by 
the subdivision of the 3 great phalanges in which every army was 
formed according to both the Swiss and Hungarian tactics. Each of 
them was formed upon 3 lines, the middle one of which was again 
subdivided into a right and a left wing, separated from each other 
by a distance equal at least to the extent of front of the first line. 
The whole army being organized in half regiments, which we will 
call battalions, each battalion had its pikemen in the centre and its 
musketeers on the flanks. The advanced guard of an army, 
consisting of 3 regiments, would thus be formed as follows: two 
half regiments in contiguous line in the first line; behind each of 
their wings another half regiment; further to the rear, and 
covering the first line, the remaining two half regiments also in 
contiguous line. The main body and rear guard might be placed 
either on the flank or behind the advanced guard, but would be 
formed on the same plan. Here we have a return in a certain 
degree to the old Roman formation in 3 lines and distinct small 
bodies. 

The imperialists, and with them the Spaniards, had found the 
necessity of dividing their large armies into more than the 3 
masses already mentioned; but their battalions or tactical units 
were much larger than the Dutch, fought in column or square 
instead of in line, and had not had a regular formation for order 
of battle until during the Dutch war of independence the 
Spaniards began to form them in what is known as a Spanish 
brigade. Four of these large battalions, each consisting often of 
several regiments, formed in square, surrounded with a rank or 
two of musketeers, and having wings of musketeers at the corners, 
were disposed at proper intervals on the 4 corners of a square, 
one corner being turned toward the enemy. If the army was too 
large to be comprised in one brigade, two could be formed; and 
thus arose 3 lines, having 2 battalions in the first, 4 (sometimes 
only 3) in the second, and 2 in the third. As in the Dutch system, 

we find here the attempt to return to the old Roman system of 3 
lines. 

Another great change took place during the 16th century; the 
heavy cavalry of the knights was broken up and replaced by a 
mercenary cavalry, armed similarly to our modern cuirassiers, with 
cuirass, helmet, sword, and pistols. This cavalry, greatly superior 
in mobility to their predecessors, became thereby more formidable 
to infantry also; still the pikemen of the time were never afraid of 
it. By this change cavalry became a uniform arm, and entered in a 
far larger proportion into the composition of armies, especially 
during the period we now have to consider, viz., the 30 years’ 
war.’ At this time the system of mercenary service was universal 
in Europe; a class of men had been formed who lived upon war 
and by war; and though tactics might have gained thereby, the 
character of the men, the material composing armies as well as 
their morale, had certainly suffered. Central Europe was overrun 
by condottiert of all kinds, who took religious and political quarrels 
for their pretext to plunder and devastate the whole country. The 
character of the individual soldier had entered upon that 
degradation which went on increasing until the French revolution 
finally swept away this system of mercenary service. The imperial- 
ists formed their battles upon the Spanish brigade system, having 
4 or more brigades in line, thus forming 3 lines. The Swedes 
under Gustavus Adolphus formed in Swedish brigades, each 
consisting of 3 battalions, one in front and two a little to the rear, 
each deployed in line, and having the pikes in the centre and the 
musketeers on the wings. They were so disposed (both arms being 
represented in equal numbers) that by forming a contiguous line 
either could cover the other. Supposing the order given to form a 
contiguous line of musketeers, the two wings of that arm of the 
centre or front battalion would cover their own pikes by stepping 
before them, while those of the two other battalions would, each 
on its flank, advance into alignment with the first. If an attack of 
cavalry was apprehended, all the musketeers retired behind the 
pikemen, while the two wings of these latter advanced into 
alignment with the centre, and thus formed a contiguous line of 
pikes. The order of battle was formed of two lines of such 
brigades, composing the centre of the army, while the numerous 
cavalry was stationed on the two wings, and intermixed with small 
bodies of musketeers. The characteristic of this Swedish system is 
that the pikemen, who in the 16th century had been the great 
offensive arm, had now lost all capacity of attack. They had 
become a mere means of defence, and their office was to screen 

Infantry 355 

the musketeers from a charge of cavalry; it was this latter arm 
again which had to do all the attacking work. Thus, infantry had 
lost, cavalry had regained ground. But then Gustavus Adolphus 
put an end to the firing which had become a favorite mode of 
fighting for cavalry, and ordered his horse always to charge at full 
speed and sword in hand; and from that time to the resumption 
of fighting in broken ground every cavalry which adhered to these 
tactics was able to boast of great successes over infantry. There can 
be no greater condemnation of the mercenary infantry of the 17th 
and 18th centuries than that; and yet it was, for all purposes of 
battle, the most disciplined infantry of all times. 

The general result of the 30 years’ war upon European tactics 
was that both the Swedish and the Spanish brigades disappeared, 
and armies were now disposed in two lines, the cavalry forming 
the wings and the infantry the centre. The artillery was placed 
before the front or in the intervals of the other arms. Sometimes a 
reserve of cavalry, or of cavalry and infantry, was retained. The 
infantry was deployed in line, 6 deep; the muskets were so much 
lightened that the fork could be dispensed with, and cartridges 
and cartridge boxes had been everywhere adopted. The mixing up 
of musketeers and pikemen in the same infantry battalions now 
gave rise to the most complicated tactical movements, all founded 
upon the necessity of forming what was called defensive battalions, 
or what we should call squares against cavalry. Even in a simple 
Square, it was no trifle to get the 6 ranks of pikemen from the 
centre so drawn asunder that they completely surrounded on all 
sides the musketeers, who, of course, were defenceless against 
cavalry; but what must it have been to form in a similar way the 
battalion into a cross, an octagon, or other fanciful shapes! Thus it 
happened that the drilling system of this period was the most 
complicated ever seen, and nobody but a soldier for life ever had 
any chance of attaining even the commonest proficiency in it. At 
the same time, it is obvious that, before the enemy, all these 
attempts at forming a body capable of resisting cavalry were 
perfectly useless; any decent cavalry would have been in the midst 
of such a battalion before one fourth of the movements could 
have been gone through. 

During the latter half of the 17th century, the number of 
pikemen was very much reduced in proportion to that of 
musketeers; for from the moment that they had lost all power of 
attack, the musketeers were the really active part of the infantry. 
Moreover, it was found that the Turkish cavalry, the most 
formidable of the time, very often broke into the squares of 

pikemen, while they were quite as often repulsed by the well 
aimed fire of a line of musketeers. In consequence, the 
imperialists did away with all pikes in their Hungarian army, and 
replaced them sometimes by chevaux de frise, which were put 
together on the field, the musketeers carrying the blades as part of 
their regular equipment. In other countries, too, cases occurred of 
armies being sent into the field without a single pikeman, the 
musketeers trusting to their fire and the assistance of their own 
cavalry when threatened with a charge of horse. Still, two 
inventions were required to do away entirely with the pike: the 
bayonet, invented in France about 1640, and improved in 1699 so 
far as to be the handy weapon now in use; and the flint lock, 
invented about 1650.* The former, though certainly an imperfect 
substitute for the pike, enabled the musketeer to give himself, to a 
certain degree, that protection which he had hitherto been 
supposed to find in the pikemen; the second, by simplifying the 
process of loading, enabled him to do much more than make up 
by rapid firing for the imperfections of the bayonet. : 

VI. THE INFANTRY OF THE 18TH CENTURY 

With the superseding of the pike, all defensive armor disap- 
peared from infantry equipment, and this arm was now composed 
of one class of soldiers only, armed with the flint-lock musket and 
bayonet. This change was accomplished in the first years of the 
Spanish war of succession,’ coinciding with the first years of the 
18th century. At the same time, we now find everywhere standing 
armies of considerable magnitude, recruited as much as possible 
by voluntary. enlistment coupled with kidnapping, but in case of 
need also by forced conscription. These armies were now regularly 
organized in battalions of from 500 to 700 men, as tactical units, 
subdivided for special purposes into companies; several battalions 
forming a regiment. Thus the organization of infantry now began 
to take a more stable and settled form. The handling of the flint 
lock requiring far less space than that of the old matchlock, the 
old open order was done away with, and the files were closed well 
up to each other, in order to have as many firing men as possible 
in the same space. For the same reason, the intervals between the 
various battalions in line of battle were reduced to a minimum, so 
that the whole front formed one stiff and uninterrupted line, the 
infantry, in two lines, in the centre, the cavalry on the wings. 

a The New American. Cyclopaedia has 1670 here.— Ed. 

357 

Firing, formerly done by ranks, every rank after having fired 
retiring to the rear to reload, was now done by platoons or 
companies, the 3 front ranks of each platoon firing simultaneously 
as the word of command was given. Thus an uninterrupted fire 
could be maintained by every battalion against the enemy in front 
of it. Every battalion had its distinct place in this long line, and the 
order giving to each its place was called the order of battle. The 
great difficulty now was to organize the marching order of the 
army so that it could always with facility pass from the marching 
to the fighting order, every portion of the line getting at once and 
quickly into its proper place. Encampments within reach of the 
enemy were arranged with a view to the same object. Thus the art 
of marching and encamping armies made great progress during 
this epoch; still the stiffness and unwieldiness of the order of 
battle formed a heavy clog upon all the movements of an army. At 
the same time, its formality, and the impossibility of handling such 
a line in any but the most level plains, still more restricted the 
choice of ground for battle fields; but as long as both parties were 
bound by the same fetters, this was no disadvantage for either. 
From Malplaquet*” to the outbreak of the French revolution, a 
road, a village, or a farm yard was tabooed to infantry; even a 
ditch or a hedge was considered almost a drawback by those who 
had to defend them. 

The Prussian infantry is the classic infantry of the 18th century. 
It was principally formed by Prince Leopold of Dessau. During the 
war of the Spanish succession, the line of infantry had been 
reduced from 6 deep to 4 deep. Leopold did away with the 4th 
rank, and formed the Prussians 3 deep. He also introduced the 
iron ramrod, which enabled his troops to load and fire 5 times in 
a minute, while other troops scarcely fired 3 times. At the same 
time they were drilled to fire while advancing, but as they had to 
stop for firing, and as the alignment of the whole long line had to 
be maintained, the step was but slow—what is called the goose 
step. Firing began at 200 yards from the enemy; the line advanced 
at the goose step, stepping shorter and redoubling fire the nearer 
it got to the enemy, until the latter either gave way, or was so far 
shaken that a cavalry charge from the wings, and an advance with 
the bayonet of the infantry, drove him from his position. The 
army was always ranged on two lines, but, there being scarcely any 
intervals in the first line, it became very difficult for the second to 
come to the aid of the first when wanted. Such was the army and 
such were the tactics which Frederick II of Prussia found at his 
disposal on his accession. There appeared to be very little chance 

for a man of genius to improve upon this system, unless he broke 
through it, and that Frederick, in his position and with the 
material he had for soldiers, could not do. Still he contrived to 
organize his mode of attack and his army so that he could, with 
the resources of a kingdom less than Sardinia now is, and with 
scanty pecuniary support from England, carry on a war against 
almost all Europe. The mystery may be easily explained. Hitherto 
the battles of the 18th century had been parallel battles, both 
armies being deployed on lines parallel to each other, struggling in 
a plain, fair, stand-up fight, without any stratagems or devices of 
art; the only advantage accruing to the stronger party being that 
his wings overlapped those of his opponent. Frederick applied to 
the line order of battle the system of oblique attack invented by 
Epaminondas. He chose one wing of the enemy for the first 
attack, and brought against this one of his wings, overlapping that 
of the enemy, and part of his centre, at the same time keeping 
back the rest of his army. Thus not only had he the advantage of 
outflanking the enemy, but also of crushing by superior forces the 
troops exposed to his attack. The other troops of the enemy could 
not come to the assistance of those attacked; for not only were 
they tied to their places in the line, but as the attack on the one 
wing proved successful, the remainder of the army entered into 
line and engaged the hostile centre in front, while the original 
attacking wing fell upon its flank after disposing of the wing. This 
was indeed the only imaginable method by which it was possible, 
while maintaining the system of lines, to bring a superior force 
upon any one part of the enemy’s line of battle. Every thing, then, 
depended upon the formation of the attacking wing; and as far as 
the rigidity of the order of battle admitted of it, Frederick always 
strengthened it. He very often placed in front of the first line of 
infantry of the attacking wing an advanced line formed of his 
grenadiers or élite troops, so as to insure success as much as 
possible at the first onset. 

The second means which Frederick took to improve his army 
was the reorganization of his cavalry. The teachings of Gustavus 
Adolphus had been forgotten; cavalry, instead of relying on the 
sword and the impetuosity of the charge, with rare exceptions had 
returned to fighting with the pistol and the carbine. The wars in 
the beginning of the 18th century had thus not been rich in 
successful charges of horsemen; the Prussian cavalry was especially 
neglected. But Frederick returned to the old plan of charging 
sword in hand and at full gallop, and formed a cavalry unequalled 
in history; and to this cavalry he owed a very great part of his 

Infantry 359 

successes. When his army became the model of Europe, Frederick, 
in order to blind the military men of other nations, began to 
complicate to an astonishing degree the system of tactical 
evolutions, all of them unfit for actual war, and intended only to 
hide the simplicity of the means which had procured him victory. 
He succeeded so well in this that nobody was more blinded than 
his own subordinates, who actually believed that these complex 
methods of forming line were the real essence of his tactics; and 
thus Frederick, beside laying the foundation for that pedantry and 
martinetism which have since distinguished the Prussians, actually 
prepared them for the unparalleled disgrace of Jena and 
Auerstadt.*”” 

Beside the infantry of the line, which we have so far described, 
and which always fought in closed ranks, there was a certain class 
of light infantry, but this did not appear in great battles. Its task 
was the war of partisans; for this the Austrian Croats were 
admirably adapted, while for every other purpose they were 
useless. Upon the model of these half savages from the military 
frontier against Turkey,’ the other European states formed their 
light infantry. But skirmishing in great battles, such as was 
practised by the light infantry of antiquity and of the middle ages, 
even up to the 17th century, had completely disappeared. The 
Prussians alone, and after them the Austrians, formed a battalion 
or two of riflemen, composed of gamekeepers and forest guards, 
all dead shots, who in battle were distributed over the whole front 
and fired at officers; but they were so few that they scarcely 
counted. The resuscitation of skirmishing is the product of the 
Amcrican war of independence.” While the soldiers of European 
armies, held together by compulsion and severe treatment, could 
not be trusted to fight in extended order, in America they had to 
contend with a population which, untrained to the regular drill of 
line soldiers, were good shots and well acquainted with the rifle. 
The nature of the ground favored them; instead of attempting 
manoeuvres of which at first they were incapable, they uncon- 
sciously fell into skirmishing. Thus, the engagement of Lexington 
and Concord marks an epoch in the history of infantry.